Contract design to support renewable investment : an equilibrium approach
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dellaFaille_17031300_2018.pdf
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- Considering the risky environment in which the electricity markets evolve, financing renewable energy projects is a serious challenge. The goal of this work is to analyse financial contracts that could improve the financing of renewables. Capital budgeting is modelled with the good-deal risk measure. The problem tackled is a partial equilibrium model with incomplete markets representing the electricity sector. A new iterative approach is proposed to solve the Nash equilibrium problem, by decomposing the problem in a sequence of QCP problems. Different types of contracts are analysed to find the market tools that are the best suited for financing renewable projects. The method is then applied to a larger scale including 88 yearly scenarios with an hourly resolution.