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Reforming the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact: A Self-Enforcing Voting Approach

Fornasier, Luca
(2024)

Files

Fornasier_08412200_2024.pdf
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Details

Supervisors
Maniquet, François
Faculty
Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales, politiques et de communication
Degree label
Master [120] en sciences économiques, orientation générale, à finalité spécialisée
Abstract
The Stability and Growth Pact is a complex system of fiscal regulation with which the European Union has equipped itself to safeguard the European Monetary Union. However, compliance is delegated to the interaction between members, as there is no external authority to enforce the rules. Starting from Maggi and Morelli's (2006) positive analysis of self-enforcing voting International Organisations, this thesis analyses the institutional features of the Stability and Growth Pact and the dynamics among member States. The analysis concludes that it is very complex to establish a self-enforcing voting system that does not require unanimity of the voters. However, certain factors, including transfers among member States, can lower the costs associated with fiscal discipline commitments and encourage compliance.