Matching with Couples with Farsighted Agents

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Supervisors: Vannetelbosch, Vincent
Faculty: Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales, politiques et de communication
Degree label: Master [120] en sciences économiques, orientation générale
Abstract: I study the model of matching model with couples where all the agents are farsighted. This means that they can predict the blocking coalitions that will be created if they deviate from a matching and they join one only if the final matching make them better off. I study the composition of the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable set and show that the result obtained by Mauleon, Vannetelbosch and Vergote (2011) is expandable to the matching market with couples: a singleton is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a stable matching.