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A-priori knowledge in adaptive chosen-message side-channel attacks: methods, challenges, and benefits

(2024)

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Petre_65131700_2024.pdf
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Abstract
In the field of cybersecurity, side-channel attacks have emerged as a potent threat to cryptographic devices, capable of bypassing algorithmic protections by exploiting physical leakages such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions. This master thesis investigates the role of a-priori knowledge in enhancing the effectiveness of side-channel attacks, with a focus on power analysis techniques. This research systematically examines different methodologies for integrating a-priori knowledge into the attack process, assessing their strengths and weaknesses. The study explores the trade-offs involved in using a-priori knowledge in side-channel attacks. It examines how increased accuracy can lead to risks like over-reliance and reduced applicability in different scenarios, and whether the increase in computational cost is justified. By carefully examining these factors, the master thesis aims to offer a clear understanding of how to strategically use a-priori knowledge in side-channel attacks, contributing to the broader discussion on balancing its benefits with the challenges it presents.