Collusion through Blockchain: a new Theoretical Approach to Cartels’ Formation

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Supervisors: Johannes Johnen
Faculty: Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales, politiques et de communication
Degree label: Master [120] en sciences économiques, orientation économétrie, à finalité approfondie
Abstract: Blockchain and smart contracts are ground-breaking tools for coordinating economic activity among individuals. There are numerous novelties they introduce, including the immutability of the data stored, the increase of trust among agents without the need of a third party, and the automation of financial transactions. This thesis will explain why these novelties pose significant challenges to antitrust authorities because they increase the likelihood of enterprises deciding to collude both explicitly and tacitly. In addition, I will present models that are simple extensions of classical cartel theory to illustrate how the discount factor decreases in an environment where firms collude using blockchain.