

Louvain School Of Management

**The 2022 'S RUSSIA-
UKRAINE WAR AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS: A
BALANCE IMPACT IN THE EU**

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*I would finally like to dedicate this work to my big brother **Franck Marc Tamguè Fotso** who passed away on the **28th June 2024**. May your soul rest in peace Brother!*

*In the Lovely memory of my Father **Joseph Fotso Djuikom***

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INTRODUCTION

In 2014, another conflict opposed Ukraine and Russia led to the annexation of Crimea. The reasons behind this unorthodox operation from Russia can be found back in the history of these two countries, which were until the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 90s a compacted block led by Russia with a paternalist behavior towards its Soviet Republics.

The reminiscence of the 2014 war generated another bloody conflict that started in March 2022 with another Russian invasion. Two years later, the conflict is still going on perhaps with less light shed on it, but the consequences are just too much to such an extent that it will take more than one paper to analyze them from any angle. What we are planning to do in this research thesis is to analyze the impact of the refugee crisis on the European Union derived from the 2022 Ukraine war.

To conduct this work properly and for a better understanding of the context, we need to analyze the historical context of the Ukrainian migration with a focus on their relationship with Russia, then we will focus on the refugee crisis and its impact in some EU countries. In this part, we will analyze the population displaced, where they have gone or they are going the most, the local impact of their presence in the respective countries, and make a comparison with previous waves of migration to highlight their impacts. In this part, we chose three EU countries with different specificities: Germany, Italy, and Poland. By analyzing the impact of the refugee crisis in these countries, we would like to answer whether or not the new wave of Ukrainian refugees could be an answer to the issue of the aging workforce in Germany and Italy, and the missing workforce in Poland given the fact that most Polish workers are moving to the West to find well-paid jobs and better living standards. In the final part, we will analyze properly the EU's response to this crisis and explain whether the EU's actions were enough to cope with the refugee crisis in the targeted countries. This will be achieved through the cost analysis of the chosen EU's actions and the outcome of this analysis will shed light on the issues the EU will still have to deal with and the potential solutions to adopt.

This leads us to the following research questions: Why did Ukrainians immigrate through the times and where did they go the most? Does the new wave of Ukrainian refugees in Germany, Italy, and Poland represent a solution to any of their problems? Is the EU's support towards the targeted Members States enough to cope with the refugees crisis? What should we learn and what can be improved for the future?

Given the criticality of this subject, we will use relevant sources to support our analysis. Since this subject has already been studied by some scholars, we will rely on some of their findings and try a comparative analysis. Other relevant sources from governments and international organizations will help us to get some accurate data on the conflict and some figures to help the readers get more insights on the subject.

Unfortunately, there will be some limitations to our research: we will face some problems in finding the most recent data or have conflicting data given a lot of sources but a choice has to be made. We will also have translation problems since some sources did not provide English translation so we relied on AI tools to translate into English for a better understanding but it is not excluded that translations may not be accurate. AI tools such as DeepL, Grammarly, and Reverso also helped us to check the spelling and grammar of this research with their limitations which I hope I managed to correct.

I- Ukraine migration across the time and Russian perspective

Ukraine at the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc became the second largest European country in size but it was still struggling to become a competitive economy with strong institutions after decades of Soviet state-planned economy¹. The series of economic crises that followed the first years of independence forced the Ukrainians to move to another country. From 1991 to 2020, the country's population dropped from 52 million to 42 million due to a mix of high emigration rate, high death, and low birth rate²

Some data from 2002 taking the country of birth as the defining criterion estimated that 3,559,975 Ukrainians were living in Russia, which represented 66,7% of the Ukrainian diaspora estimated to be 5,335,840 in total³. Other sources estimated that another seven million people would leave the country before the start of the war in the eastern part of Ukraine in 2014 making the country appear among the top ten countries with more emigration as stated by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs in its reports of 2022⁴.

The first months of the 2022 Russian invasion on February 24 generated a huge amount of displacement inside and outside the country. Nearly twelve million have been displaced amongst which 2.6 million have fled to neighboring countries and about seven million who were internally displaced⁵.

Therefore, we can identify four phases of Ukrainian emigration across time. The first one happened between the late 19th – early 20th century and it involved a rural population from Western Ukraine, then Galicia, a territory that was part of Austria-Hungary. Nearly half a million people moved to countries such as the US, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina. People from Eastern Ukraine which was part of the Russian Empire moved eastward to Siberia and the Far East⁶. Another historical atrocity has favored the migration of other Ukrainians abroad, the Jewish Ukrainians. The Pogroms were the manifestation of antisemitic behaviors towards Jewish people. Their properties and their businesses were constantly attacked and thousands of them were killed. The October 1905 Pogroms for example took place simultaneously in 660 cities, towns, and villages from 18-29 October 1905⁷. In Ukraine territory where most of the Jewish population lived, 3100 Jews were killed, 2000 were seriously injured and more than 15,000 were wounded⁸.

The second phase instead took place at the early stage of the Soviet Regime between the 1920s and 1930s. Due to the agricultural policies imposed by Stalin, many Ukrainians, mainly peasants have

¹ Olena Fedyuk, Marta Kindler (2016): Ukrainian Migration to the European Union Lessons from Migration Studies, IMISCOE Research Series, p.25, [Ukrainian Migration Research Before and Since 1991 | SpringerLink](#)

² State Statistics Service of Ukraine (2021),

http://ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2007/ds/nas_rik/nas_u/nas_rik_u.html, (accessed 04-22-2024)

³ MPC. (2013). Ukraine. Migration Profile. Migration Policy Centre. www.migrationpolicycentre.eu

⁴ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2020). International Migration 2020. Highlights https://www.un.org/en/file/105459/download?token=oh_ySKJg (accessed 04-22-2024)

⁵ IOM (2022). Ukraine Internal Displacement Report. General Population Survey. Round 5, 23 May 2022. <https://displacement.iom.int/sites/default/files/public/reports/> (accessed: 04-23-2024).

⁶ Pawliczko, A. (1994). Ukrainian immigration: A Study in Ethnic Survival

<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.2050-411X.1994.tb00104.x> (accessed:04 -23-2024)

⁷ V. Khieterer (2015): The October 1905 pogroms and the Russian authorities, Routledge, P.1, [the-october-1905-pogroms-and-the-russian-authorities.pdf \(cambridge.org\)](#)

⁸ Klier, John D., and Shlomo Lambroza, eds. 1992. Pogroms: Anti- Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History. New York: Cambridge University Press

been dispossessed of their lands and displaced by force in other regions of the USSR⁹. The third phase was linked to the Second World War and the National Socialist Regime of Hitler which relied a lot on foreign labor to improve its industrial capacities. This generated mass deportation across Europe to the German Reich and people from the actual Ukraine were also forced to join the German Reich. The Nazi occupation of Soviet Ukraine was followed by the implementation of racial policies that led to the mass killings of Jews. Around 1,5 million Ukrainian Jews perished and over 800,000 were displaced to the East¹⁰. Ukrainians were also among the 2.8 million civilian forced laborers from the Soviet Union and some of them at the end of the War refused to return to the USSR for different reasons¹¹. Some sources suggest that after WW2, around 300,000 former fighters of the national liberation movement and members of their families were deported from Western Ukraine to remote areas in the northern and eastern regions of the USSR¹². This relocation was intensified under Khrushchev in the 1960s with his resettlement policy that aimed at developing virgin lands and mineral resources in the east and the north¹³.

Part 1 of Figure 1 here below shows the main destinations of Ukrainian émigrés after the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s. We can easily observe that they moved to the former USSR with Russia heading the list with 3.302,000 Ukrainians inside its territory. It is followed by Poland and Kazakhstan with a bit less than five hundred thousand Ukrainian émigrés. The first Western countries on this list are Israel, the US, and Canada.

The second part of Figure 1 instead shows more movements of Ukrainians in the West, with Russia still leading the list in 2020 with more Ukrainians living in the country. The US is ranked second right after Russia while in the 1990s, it was at the bottom of the list. Germany appears in the list as the first EU country with more Ukrainians, followed by Poland which was ranked second in 1990, and then Italy appearing for the first time in the top ten. This ranking underlines the main EU countries of destination for Ukrainians, and we are going to analyze the refugee crisis in these three countries.

⁹ PATRICK J. KIGER (2019): How Joseph Stalin Starved Millions in the Ukrainian Famine, History, <https://www.history.com/news/ukrainian-famine-stalin>

¹⁰ Zasenka, Oleksa Eliseyovich, Hajda, Lubomyr A., Makuch, Andriy, Stebelsky, Ihor, Yerofeyev, Ivan Alekseyevich and Kryzhanivsky, Stepan Andriyovych. "Ukraine". *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11 Jul. 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine>. Accessed 11 July 2024.


¹¹ Rovenchak, O., Volodko V. (2018). Comparative Analysis of the Identity and Practices of Post-war Representatives and the Contemporary Wave of Ukrainian Immigrants in the United States. [Externer Link:https://journals.umcs.pl/i/article/download/6541/5801](https://journals.umcs.pl/i/article/download/6541/5801) (accessed 04-23-2024)

¹² Olena Fedyuk, Marta Kindler (2016): Ukrainian Migration to the European Union Lessons from Migration Studies, IMISCOE Research Series, p.27 [Ukrainian Migration Research Before and Since 1991 | SpringerLink](#)

¹³ Ibidem.

Figure 1. Top ten countries with the highest number of Ukrainian migrants (Part 2)

2020




Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2020). International Migrant Stock 2020: Destination and origin. https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/unesa_pd_2020_ims_stock_by_sex_destination_and_origin.xlsx (accessed: 26-4-2022).

Lizenz: Creative Commons by-nc-nd/3.0/de
 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2022, www.bpb.de



Figure 2. First residence permits issued to Ukrainians in the EU

2010-2020



Source: Eurostat, First permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship [MIGR_RESFIRST], last updated 09/11/2021, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/product?code=migr_resfirst (accessed: 11-5-2022).

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 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2022, www.bpb.de



The *Statistics Bundesamt*, the Federal Office of Statistics of Germany also states that nearly 128,000 Ukrainians were living in Germany before 2014 whereas only 30,000 were in the country in 1995 during the first years of the Soviet collapse, so there is a net increase of the population across the years. Table 3 below instead shows the dynamic of the Ukrainian diaspora from 2008 to 2015. It appears that the number of Ukrainian diasporas in Germany is decreasing slightly until 2013. They live more in Renana (NRW) region (28,000), Bavaria (24,000) and Bade-Wurttemberg (14,000) [6]. For historical reasons, Ukrainians live more in the South of Germany because of the mass deportation that happened during World War two. A more detailed repartition of Ukrainians across Germany is included in Table 4, but this table does not consider the period from 2016 until now.

With the beginning of the Russian invasion on the 24th of February 2022, around 390,000 Ukrainians will join Germany during the first two months of the conflict¹⁵. This number will increase progressively to reach 1.1 million in February 2023 according to the *Statistisches Bundesamt*¹⁶. The ongoing conflict generated a net increase of Ukrainians in Germany of over 962,000¹⁷





Table 1, Source: UNHCR

¹⁵P. Oltermann (2022): Ukraine refugees flock to Germany after being put off by UK red tape, The Guardian. [Ukraine refugees flock to Germany after being put off by UK red tape | Germany | The Guardian](#) (consulted on 05-05-2024)

¹⁶ Press release No. N010 of 16 February 2023, Statistisches Bundesamt. [1.1 million arrivals of people from Ukraine in 2022 - German Federal Statistical Office \(destatis.de\)](#) (consulted on 05-05-2024)

¹⁷ Ibidem.


Grafik 1: Ukrainische Diaspora in Deutschland: Dynamik 2008–2015



Quelle: Zusammenstellung der Redaktion der Ukraine-Analysen nach Angaben des Statistischen Bundesamtes/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/AuslaendBevoelkerung=publicationFile>

Table 3

Grafik 3: Ukrainische Diaspora in Deutschland zum Jahresende 2015 nach Bundesländern



Insgesamt: 133.774 Personen

Quelle: Zusammenstellung der Redaktion der Ukraine-Analysen nach Angaben des Statistischen Bundesamtes, <<https://www.de-statistik.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/AuslaendBevoelkerung2010200157005.xl>>=publicationFile>

Table 4

II-1-2- Gender and qualification of Ukrainians in Germany

In 2015, the age of Ukrainians residing in Germany reflected the following figures (see the graph of Table 5): 33% were between 35-55 years old for a total of 44,398 people while 29% (38,206) were between 20-35 years old. 27% were more than 55 years old, 35,742 Ukrainians. Only 11% (15,428) were less than 20 years old. We can conclude that the population of those over 35 is more important, which is an indicator of the fact they left their country in their adulthood, most probably to seek a better standard of living.

In 2022 instead during the invasion, the statistics showed that more females from 18 to 59 years old have arrived in Germany while we see fewer males in the same interval of age. This is probably because men were almost forced to join the Army. In an article written in the German Newspaper Deutsche Welle on 25 April 2024¹⁸, the Ukrainian Government has ceased to renew passports for people abroad of age to join the Army. This follows a statement released by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba in which she urged the Ukrainian embassies to restrain the consular services for Ukrainians living abroad, especially for those who can join the front in the country.

In percentage (see Table 7), the females coming from Ukraine to Germany from January 2022 to the first semester of 2023 represent 61% (6 out of 10 immigrants) while males represent 39% (4 out of 10). Female adults represent 69% while male adults were only 31%. This domination of female immigrants can be explained by the fact that women left the country during the war as single parents with their children while men were generally invited to join the Army¹⁹.

Regarding their qualification, an important part of the Ukrainian immigrants that landed in Germany have an academic qualification. According to a census made by the *Statistisches Bundesamt*, among the people from 25-59 years old, 45% of them have an academic qualification and only 27% have a non-academic qualification. The share of women with an academic qualification was higher (48%) than the one of men (37%) ⁽²⁰²³⁾. The employment rate instead was 19% from the beginning of 2022 and this percentage reflects the gap between the Ukrainian qualifications and the real needs of the German labor market. Nearly half of the Ukrainian immigrants²⁰ are doing non-qualified jobs concerning their qualifications because of some barriers such as language on the one hand and the other hand poor relevancy of their qualifications with the German market. Women are more exposed to unemployment and less-qualified jobs than men and they earn less than men. Their unemployment can also be explained by the fact that most of them are single parents, and they find it hard to get a place in a *Kindergarten*, which reduces drastically their availability to the labor market²¹.

For the Ukrainian immigrants in Germany, the completion of German language courses generally increases their chance to have more paid jobs whereas those who do not speak German are more subject to less-qualified jobs, generally blue-collar jobs in the industry, agriculture, HORECA, and caregiver. These jobs are generally low-paid jobs where we sometimes find cases of exploitation of people with poor language knowledge and therefore with poor knowledge of their rights.

¹⁸E. Theise (2024): Keine Pässe mehr für Ukrainer im Ausland - und nun? Deutsche Welle. [Keine Pässe mehr für Ukrainer im Ausland - und nun? – DW – 25.04.2024](#) (consulted on 05-04-2024)

¹⁹ Pressemitteilung Nr. 476 vom 13. Dezember 2023, Statistisches Bundesamt, [40 % der seit 2022 aus der Ukraine Eingewanderten sind Alleinerziehende und deren Kinder - Statistisches Bundesamt \(destatis.de\)](#) (consulted on 05-04-2024)

²⁰ Ibidem.

²¹ Ibidem.

II-1-3- Ukrainian immigration's economic and social impact in Germany

Immigration has generally economic and social impacts in host countries. Regarding Ukrainian immigration, we will focus on the impacts in Germany following the 2014 and 2022 Russia-Ukraine War. The particularity of these two periods is that they have generated a big flow of refugees in a short period making it harder for Germany to deal with the turmoil.

The Ukrainian refugee inflow of 2022 was more than double that of the Syrian refugees in 2015 and this is weighing a lot on the country's finances. Around 5.5 billion euros has been spent on Welfare payments for Ukrainian refugees, which is much more than what other refugees and asylum seekers are receiving²². A single person receives 563 euro per month while couples receive 506 euro per person monthly and children receive between 357 to 471 euro depending on their age²³. The State also covers their health insurance and accommodation costs and finances their home furnishings and school supplies.

Regarding the low employment rate of Ukrainians, it can be justified by the complex administrative procedures, this is at least what the Sociologist Dietrich Thranhardt found in November 2023 in a study conducted for the SPD-affiliated Friedrich Ebert Foundation. He argued that countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic, but also Denmark, the Netherlands, and Ireland that have simple administrative procedures have higher employment rates²⁴. Only a single registration is required to provide the person an entire legal status whereas in Germany the procedure is a bit more complex, preventing many refugees from entering the labor market even being under financial assistance. Complex administrative procedures are not an issue only in Germany, but also in Ukraine where the migrants come from. On 16 November 2021, the Ukrainian parliament adopted Draft Law No. 3475 "On administrative procedure" which aimed at facilitating the interaction between the State, individuals, and businesses to protect individual rights and interests²⁵. The facilitation of the administrative procedures as recommended by Thranhardt can therefore represent one of the solutions to the low employment rate of Ukrainian immigrants. In addition to the complex administrative procedures, the low employment rate of Ukrainians in Germany can be justified by the irrelevancy of their qualification with the needs of the German labor market as well as by the predominance of women with minors in the community. Those are struggling to find a job that matches their parenthood.

II-1-4- Comparing 2022's wave of immigration with the previous Syrian wave in Germany

The 2022 Ukraine wave of immigration was the most important in Germany in terms of numbers. Other waves have taken place over time, and we would like to make a comparison with the most recent one, the Syrian one to outline the difference in treatment of these humanitarian issues.

²² Ibidem.

²³ Ibidem.

²⁴ Ibidem.

²⁵ Olga Shenk (2021): Administrative procedure law finally passed in Ukraine, CMS LOW-NOW, [Administrative procedure law finally passed in Ukraine \(cms-lawnow.com\)](https://www.cms-lawnow.com)

- Background of the Syrian refugee crisis in Germany

2011 was a year of political turmoil in different Arab countries of North Africa and Middle East Asia. In Syria, just to give a quick overview of the conflict, a part of the population began a protest against the Regime of President Assad, and it quickly escalated into a full-scale war between the Syrian Government and anti-government rebel groups and later by the Islamist State. In 2013, the Islamist State started to take control over parts of the national territory and perpetrated terrorist attacks making victims among the population and it became a source of controversies worldwide. The barbarian attacks from both the Islamist State and Assad's loyalists' troops on the population created a climate of fear forcing people to leave their lands and move abroad and it is in this context that Europe received a powerful wave of Syrian fleeing the conflict and seeking asylum.

Germany has been proactive in hosting Syrian refugees. The reason behind this proactive reaction of Germany toward Syrian refugees relied on the economic and demographic context of the country: a noticeable decrease in births in the country and the aging working population. According to the IMF, Germany's working-age population is projected to decline rapidly despite the aging workforce that has been covered in the last decade by migrants escaping regional conflicts²⁶. To sum it up, Germany needs people to power its industry and for this purpose, the former German Chancellor Angela Merkel has removed the legal EU barrier that required Syrian refugees to claim asylum only in their first country of arrival²⁷.

On the 31st of December 2023, Germany registered 972,460 Syrians living in Germany with only 129,810 born in Germany²⁸. These numbers include the Syrian refugees of 2013 and 2015. Only for 2015, according to the former German Interior Minister, between January and December, 243,721 Syrians entered the territory to seek asylum while in 2013, nearly 30,000 joined Germany for the same reasons²⁹. Despite the support of the German Chancellor, Syrian refugees will face different challenges and the first is integration.

With no knowledge of the German language and a different cultural background combined with some educational problems, they will struggle to find their place in society. For Germany for example, integration means assimilation, and many Syrians were more likely to maintain their strong traditions from home this created a tear in the society and generated criticisms from the far-right parties which were already fighting Merkel's policy of opened borders.

- Syrian refugees versus Ukrainian refugees in Germany

The comparison of these two categories of refugees can be held on two grounds: Integration and work.

Integration: the nearly close cultural background of Ukrainians with Germans made it easier for them to find their place in German society despite the poor knowledge of the German language they shared with the Syrian refugees. The Syrian refugees instead have a difficult integration process due first time to their strict religious beliefs and secondly to the gap between their culture and one of their host

²⁶ Harri Kemp, Kevin Fletcher and Galen Sher (2024): Germany's Real Challenges are Aging, Underinvestment, and Too Much Red Tape, International Monetary Fund, [Germany's Real Challenges are Aging, Underinvestment, and Too Much Red Tape \(imf.org\)](#) (consulted on 07-12-2024)

²⁷ "Germany suspends 'Dublin rules' for Syrians," Deutsche Welle, August 25, 2015,

<http://www.dw.com/en/germany-suspends-dublin-rules-for-syrians/a-18671698>, consulted on 06-07-2024

²⁸ [Foreign population by place of birth and selected citizenships - German Federal Statistical Office \(destatis.de\)](#), consulted on 06-07-2024

²⁹ Ibidem.

countries. They benefited from the support of various non-profit organizations to perform their societal integration, but it was still not enough to make their integration easier than the one of the Ukrainian refugees whose wave of immigration in 2022 was much more important. Ukrainians have benefited from some legal facilitations: they were exempted from asylum procedures, and employment bans and were immediately granted residence permits³⁰. This helped them engage easily in language courses and the labor market. Syrian refugees instead did not benefit from these legal facilities, they have to face the long process of asylum-seeking which has complicated partly their integration and delayed their access to the labor market.

Despite the above-mentioned differences between these two waves of immigration, there are common issues that have made their integration quite difficult: family separation with numerous children that have separated from one or both parents and the low level of life satisfaction in their host country³¹. Generally, the reality they faced on the ground was far behind their expectations.

Work: As seen earlier, Ukrainian refugees faced some problems in entering the labor market due mainly to their poor knowledge of the German language and the unwillingness of Germany to recognize easily their academic qualifications earned in their motherland. For Ukrainian healthcare workers for example there was not an automatic recognition of their diploma, and the procedure was discouraging. This can be explained by the fact that the country did not need a workforce in this sector but rather in industry and some other non-qualified sectors. The additional workforce of the healthcare sector has been already covered by the German measure of 2013 that aimed at attracting skilled healthcare workers from Bosnia. More than 10,000 nurses, doctors, and carers left Bosnia for Germany according to the German Federal Employment Agency making healthcare coverage fall at a worrying level in Bosnia³². Ukrainian refugees for the reasons mentioned upfront were working generally for non-qualified jobs and it is the same for Syrian refugees whose working situation was slightly worse compared to the Ukrainians. While Ukrainian refugees do not necessarily need training to perform low-skill jobs thanks also to the help of their existing community, Syrian refugees for cultural and educational reasons need vocational training to enter the labor market. Vocational training was a means of integration for refugees who could therefore avoid deportation for the three-year vocational training period³³. This policy of vocational training despite its fundamental importance considerably delayed their access to the labor market making Syrian refugees more assisted by the welfare system than the Ukrainian refugees.

This study of Ukrainian immigrants and refugees in Germany helps us to shed more light on their situation in the country and the different issues and controversies they are generating. Despite the commitment of the German government to give them more support, it appears that there are still some obstacles to their integration and participation in the labor market. These obstacles are mainly administrative and linguistic: without a simple administrative procedure, more Ukrainian refugee will not complete their registration in a short time and therefore will not enter the labor market quickly. This generates controversies among far-right parties about their refusal to work because of financial

³⁰ Herbert Brücker, Andreas Ette and other (2023): Ukrainian Refugees in Germany: Evidence From a Large Representative Survey, Federal Institute for Population Research, p.23, [Ukrainian Refugees in Germany: Evidence From a Large Representative Survey \(bund.de\)](#)


³¹ Ibidem.

³² K. Panic and D. Kozina (2016): Germany drains Bosnia of Doctors and Nurses, BalkanInsight, [Germany Drains Bosnia of Doctors and Nurses | Balkan Insight](#) (consulted on 06-07-2024)

³³ [Integration Act to support and challenge \(bundesregierung.de\)](#) (consulted on 07-12-2024)

assistance from the State. Now let's see how other countries such as Italy are facing the Ukrainian refugee crisis in their territory.

Grafik 2: Ukrainische Diaspora in Deutschland zum Jahresende 2015 nach Alter




Insgesamt: 133.774 Personen

Quelle: Zusammenstellung der Redaktion der Ukraine-Analysen nach Angaben des Statistischen Bundesamts, <de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/AuslaendBevoelkerung2016/blob=publicationFile>


Table 5

Arrivals from Ukraine

By age (years) and sex (female & male), %



Arrivals, total




© Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis), 2024

Table 6


Bevölkerung nach Lebensformen

Vorabergebnisse des Mikrozensus im 1. Halbjahr 2023, in %



© Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis), 2024

**Grafik 4: Ukrainische Diaspora in Deutschland zum Jahresende 2015 nach aufent-
lichem Status**



* nach altem oder neuem Ausländergesetz

Insgesamt: 133.774 Personen

Quelle: Zusammenstellung der Redaktion der Ukraine-Analysen nach Angaben des Statistischen Bundesamts, <<https://de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/AuslaendBevoelkerung201020015/blob=publicationFile>>

Table 7

II-2- Ukrainian immigrants and refugees in Italy

The immigration of Ukrainians in Italy started at the same time as in other countries such as the United States and Canada for the same reasons and the same context. During the Soviet Regime, they were fleeing the dictatorship of the regime and the forced collectivization of agriculture that generated a huge famine also known as Holodomor. During the Second World War, they were subject to mass deportation, and some of them after the War, instead of going back home, chose to stay abroad, disseminating to different countries among which Italy, mainly in the North.

The first important wave of Ukrainian immigration in Italy happened after the collapse of the Soviet Union when the policies of transformation of the economy from a state-planned economy to a market economy generated an intermediate crisis (increasing cost of living and mass unemployment) that forced Ukrainians to find better conditions of living abroad. It was then economic immigration made of non-qualified immigrants who were covering essentially blue-collar work: Men were working essentially in the industry and women were covering the growing demand of the caretaking sector.

With the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, the number of Ukrainians in Italy has increased exponentially. In 1999, Italy registered officially 3.067 Ukrainians in the country, in 2008 they grew up to 149,000, and in 2021, a year before the conflict, 223,449 Ukrainians were living legally in the country³⁴. In January 2022 a month before the War started, 230,373 Ukrainians were legally registered with more than half residing in the North (54,7%)³⁵. In April 2022; nearly two months after the beginning of the conflict, 91,131 Ukrainians³⁶ landed in Italy, and we will see their gender distribution and qualification in the following part. This distribution will also consider Ukrainians already present in the country.

II-2-1- Gender Distribution and Qualification of Ukrainians in Italy

The Ukrainian immigration in Italy is characterized by a huge gender Gap that has been confirmed by the recent arrival of refugees. Among the 91,131 people who arrived in Italy because of the war according to the Homeland Secretary (Ministero dell'Interno), 47,112 were women, while only 10,229 were men. The remaining 33,796 were minors³⁷. As in Germany, many single parents fled with their minors' children while men were generally enrolled in the Army or encouraged to do so.

In a report released by the Ministero dell'Interno in 2022 regarding the Ukrainian community in Italy³⁸, 79% of Ukrainians in Italy were women while only 21% were men. In January 2023 there were 249,613, representing 4,9% of the foreigners in the country. This study also raised the issue of unaccompanied children: Table 9 shows that in March 2024, there were 3,970 unaccompanied Ukrainian children in Italy. Even here we still find a domination of females since they represented

³⁴V. Lombardo (2022) : Ucraini in Italia, la migrazione dagli anni '90 a oggi, PIUCULTURE, [Ucraini in Italia, la migrazione dagli anni '90 a oggi \(piuculture.it\)](https://www.piuculture.it/ucraini-in-italia-la-migrazione-dagli-anni-90-a-oggi), (consulted on 05-07-2024)

³⁵ Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali (2022): La Comunità Ucraina in Italia, Rapporto annual sulla presenza dei migranti, [rapporto-annuale-sulla-presenza-dei-migranti-2022-ucraina \(lavoro.gov.it\)](https://www.lavoro.gov.it/rapporto-annuale-sulla-presenza-dei-migranti-2022-ucraina), (consulted on 05-07-2024)

³⁶ V. Lombardo (2022) : Ucraini in Italia, la migrazione dagli anni '90 a oggi, PIUCULTURE, [Ucraini in Italia, la migrazione dagli anni '90 a oggi \(piuculture.it\)](https://www.piuculture.it/ucraini-in-italia-la-migrazione-dagli-anni-90-a-oggi), (consulted on 05-07-2024)

³⁷ Ibidem.

³⁸ Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali (2022): La Comunità Ucraina in Italia, Rapporto annual sulla presenza dei migranti [rapporto-annuale-sulla-presenza-dei-migranti-2022-ucraina \(lavoro.gov.it\)](https://www.lavoro.gov.it/rapporto-annuale-sulla-presenza-dei-migranti-2022-ucraina) (consulted on 05-07-2024)

50,579% of those children while male was just 49,421%. Children aged between 7-14 are dominating both in female and male presence: They represented 26,65% of female unaccompanied children while they were a bit more male, 26,80% (See Table 9). Their geographic distribution shows a dominating presence in Northern regions: Lombardy and Emilia Romagna are leading the list with respectively 26,56% and 15,95% (see Table 9). This distribution also follows the pattern of their elders who are more present in the North (Lombardy, Piedmont, Veneto, and Liguria).

- **Qualifications and employment**

The very first wave of Ukrainians in Italy was constituted mainly of non-qualified workers working mainly in industry, agriculture, and caretaking services. In this wave, we had a high number of illegal immigrants with no residency permit, and it therefore generated a high rate of black labor and unemployment in the community. In July 2002, Law 189/2002 was adopted and it facilitated the regularization of illegal Ukrainian immigrants³⁹. Following this law, Ukrainians became officially the fourth foreign community in Italy, and today, they are ranked second just behind Morocco. This regularization also allowed Ukrainian women, who we said are dominating, to increase their presence in work such as housekeeping, domestic work caregivers, etc. Even today, we find Ukrainian women in large numbers in these jobs.

The new wave generated by the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war brought Ukrainians more academic and professional qualifications. With their qualification and the simplification of the administrative procedures, some Ukrainians can do the same work they used to do in their country. This is for example the case of nurses and doctors who have arrived in Italy following the War. The State, with the “misura urgente” (urgent measures) of the 21st of March 2022 has decided to not impose the recognition of academic qualifications for healthcare workers as a condition to work in the same sector in Italy. This measure has been recently extended to the end of 2024. Other facilitations have been adopted by the state to allow a large number of refugees to enter the labor market: the Ordinance 872/2022 of the Civil Protection (Protezione Civile) allowed Ukrainian refugees who have applied for a resident permit to be hired with the receipt of the application or to open a business.

With this simplification of the administrative procedures, Italy has drastically reduced the unemployment rate among Ukrainian refugees and Ukrainian residents in general. In a report published in 2023 covering data from 2022 and the first semester of 2023 regarding the Ukrainian Community in Italy⁴⁰, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policies stated that 64,01% of Ukrainians were employed, this represents in detail 63,6% for women and 65,8% for men. Compared to Germany, the gap in employment between women and men is not too wide. Moreover, Ukrainian women have the higher employment rate among the non-EU women residing in Italy (see page 19 of the report) with just 29,6% unemployed.

³⁹ V. Lombardo (2022) : Ucraini in Italia, la migrazione dagli anni '90 a oggi, PIUCULTURE, [Ucraini in Italia, la migrazione dagli anni '90 a oggi \(piuculture.it\)](https://www.piuculture.it/migrazione-dagli-anni-90-a-oggi) (consulted on 05-07-2024)

⁴⁰ Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali (2022): La Comunità Ucraina in Italia, Rapporto annual sulla presenza dei migrant, [RC-Ucraina-2022.pdf \(lavoro.gov.it\)](https://www.lavoro.gov.it/RC-Ucraina-2022.pdf) (consulted on 07-05-2024)

II-2-2- Economic and Social impact of Ukrainian immigrants and refugees in Italy

The mass inflow of Ukrainian refugees in Italy has generated huge financial costs for the Italian government. The Italian Civil Protection, the state organism in charge of the management of the Ukrainian emergency has registered between April 2022 and May 2024 151,831 requests of financial assistance from Ukrainian refugees (see table 10). The Ukrainian women given their dominating share in the refugee population have more financial assistance requests, 127.732, representing 84% of the requests. We also notice that people between 30 and 39 years old have made more requests for financial assistance and they are located mainly in the Lombardy, Campania, and Emilia Romagna regions and cities like Naples, Roma, and Milano.

Apart from the financial costs, the State did not have sufficient means to relocate all the refugees. To cope with this issue, they relied on private owners to have more space for the relocation. These extraordinary private shelters or CAS (*Centro di Accoglienza Straordinaria*) have managed to offer 17,012 more places to the State (See Table 11) and were located mainly in the South with 6,656 places offered. Even for this case of relocation, the South has proposed more places than the rest of the country while we know that Ukrainians are generally present in large numbers in the North. The shortage of accommodation for the relocation has increased the dissemination of Ukrainians in the whole country. At the beginning of their arrival, some of them were hosted by the existing Ukrainian community that we know is mainly in the North and were slowly disseminated because of the accommodation crisis their mass arrival generated.

Concerning the financial costs of Ukrainian refugees, Italy from the beginning has been working to give more complete support to Ukrainian refugees. In April 2022, the Civil Protection Department delivered an online platform where all registered Ukrainian refugees were able to ask for financial support for a period of up to three months. The State has decided to allocate 300 euro per adult and an additional 150 euro per child less than 18 years old⁴¹. This emergency support has been extended to the end of this year (2024). We observed that some refugees have decided to go back and for those who have chosen to remain in Italy, also thanks to the support of their relatives and community in the country, they have been legalized and were able to enter the labor market. The simplification of administrative procedures in Italy has helped a lot of Ukrainian refugees earn their living and weigh less on the State.

We have seen earlier that Italy has simplified the working procedure for healthcare professionals who were able to work without the recognition of their diploma. In other sectors, the country has simplified the hiring of Ukrainian refugees, and this has helped a lot to cover the increasing demand for caregivers, a sector where Ukrainian women work the most.

- **Can Ukraine immigrants and refugee partly solve the issue of the aging population in Italy?**

⁴¹Protezione Civile (2022): online piattaforma per richiesta contributo a Ucraini, Dipartimento della Protezione Civile, [piattaforma contributo Ucraini | Dipartimento della Protezione Civile](#) (consulted on 05-13-2024)

Italy in 2020 was the country with the second highest percentage of older people in the world behind Japan with 23 percent of the population aged above 65 years old. In terms of number of adults in Europe, Italy is behind Germany⁴².

Age is an important issue for the economy of the country because it determines the active population, those on which we can rely to continue to produce. The more a country has an aging population, the less workforce it must maintain its production and the more it will spend on welfare to assist them. In Italy, the population is aging and is not followed by a convincing number of births to replace the workforce numerically. Immigration appears to be one of the solutions to attract a foreign workforce to the country. With the recent Ukrainian refugee crisis, Italy has found a means to compensate for the missing workforce in the healthcare and caregiver sector.

By simplifying the recognition of diplomas of skilled healthcare workers such as nurses and doctors from Ukraine, they have facilitated their access to the labor market to cover the uncovered positions in the different hospitals subject to brain drain. The increasing request for caregivers for the elderly is also proof of the aging population of Italy. Ukrainian immigrants, mainly women, have traditionally worked in the caregiver sector and they can easily contribute to increasing the workforce in this sector. Men will contribute to covering the needs of the industry and the agricultural sector where we find them the most.

The recent Ukrainian refugee inflow in Italy is one of the potential solutions to the issue of the aging population in Italy. Other solutions can be for example the increase the salary to attract more workers and avoid brain drain, mass investment in the industry to create more economy of scale, or the automatization of the production process as it is done in Japan.

In the end, we can say that Ukrainian refugees in Italy have generated costs for their hospitality and these costs have been paid back with their entrance into the labor market, covering demands in agriculture, industry, and healthcare. Socially we can say that they have been well integrated thanks to the existing community and the Italian citizens through their mobilization for Ukraine. We have seen volunteers offering food and accommodations and also giving school support to Ukrainian children.

⁴² [Countries With the Oldest Populations in the World | PRB](#), consulted on 06-07-2024




Table 10

Source: [Emergenza Ucraina. Dashboard contributi di sostentamento | Dipartimento della Protezione Civile](#)




Table 11

Source : [Emergenza Ucraina. Dashboard esiti manifestazioni di interesse accoglienza diffusa | Dipartimento della Protezione Civile](#)

Genere
Tout

Regione
Tout

Cittadinanza
UCRAINA

Periodo selezionato
31 mars 2024

Distribuzione di Minori stranieri (MSNA) per genere e fasce d'età al: 31 mars 2024				
Fasce Età	Minori		Valore %	
	Femmina	Maschio	Femmina	Maschio
0-6	151	162	48,24%	51,76%
7-14	1 058	1 064	49,86%	50,14%
15	247	217	53,23%	46,77%
16	264	238	52,59%	47,41%
17	288	281	50,62%	49,38%
Total général	2 008	1 962	50,58%	49,42%

INDIETRO

Table 8: Ukrainian unaccompanied children Per Age

Source : [Classeur : Presenza dei Minori stranieri non accompagnati in Italia \(lavoro.gov.it\)](#)

II-3- Ukrainian immigrants and refugees in Poland

Poland and Ukraine share the same borders, and this has eased their tights over time. While Poland decided earlier to move westward until its adhesion to the European Union in January 2004 thanks to the will of the EU to enlarge eastward, Ukraine is still struggling to seize its historical links with Russia that have generated the ongoing war. Let us then analyze the historical links between Poland and Ukraine and the issue of Ukrainian refugees in Poland.

II-3-1- Historical background of Ukrainian immigration in Poland

Poland and Ukraine have historical links that make it easier for both people to move from one territory to another. In 1306, when the Polish Queen and the Grand Duke of Lithuania Jogaila decided to marry, they created a dual state Poland-Lithuania occupied in the South by Ukrainian Rusyns. After the death of the last Jagiellon in 1572, the large Poland-Lithuanian state was reconfigured, and Ukraine fell under the rule of the Kingdom of Poland⁴³. For centuries, Poland has influenced Ukrainian culture until the nineteenth century at the end of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, when Ukraine started to fight for its self-determination in culture and lands. They fought for example for lands in regions such as Volhynia and Galicia.

This is a quick historical reminder to show to what extent these two countries are linked. We find, apart from Ukrainian minorities in Poland, existing Ukrainian immigrants who for different historical events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the following crisis, the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan Revolution and the violence they have generated, have forced Ukrainians to cross the border and find safety to the neighboring Poland.

The most recent numbers show that in 2021, there were 1,5 million Ukrainian citizens residing in Poland. This number largely increased with the Russian invasion of February 2022: around 9 million refugees arrived in Poland and nearly 1,55 million of them have applied for temporary protection⁴⁴

II-3-2- Gender and qualification of Ukrainian in Poland

Poland is one of the countries in the world that have quickly switched from an emigration country to a country of immigration. This can be explained partly by its adhesion to the EU in 2004 and its close borders with eastern European countries whose people are trying to enjoy the better conditions an adhesion to the EU can bring to the country. According to EUROSTAT, Poland is the EU country that has issued the highest number of residency permits for foreigners. This period is not anodyne because it follows the first Russia-Ukraine war of 2014, a period from which a high inflow of Ukrainians landing in Poland started to be observed.

Ukrainians are the first community of foreigners in Poland and are already well integrated into the country for historical reasons. Regarding the gender repartition of Ukrainians in Poland, in 2023, like in the other countries we have studied, the share of Ukrainian women in Poland was higher than the

⁴³N. Davies (2022): The forgotten history of Poland and Ukraine, The Spectator, [The forgotten history of Poland and Ukraine | The Spectator](#), consulted on 06-10-2024

⁴⁴ [Ukrainians in Poland: New Normal \(kyivpost.com\)](#), consulted on 06-10-2024

one of men. According to a survey made by Statista⁴⁵, the share of Ukrainian men in Poland has been decreasing since 2021. It has dropped from 57 percent in 2021 to 31 percent in 2023 and can be explained by the ban of the Ukrainian government on the emigration of Ukrainian men since the beginning of the war in 2022. Other numbers from the Polish Department of Statistics state that the demographic structure of Ukrainians in Poland is led by a majority of women representing 68 percent among which 78 percent are refugees⁴⁶ and they are mostly aged between 27-44 years old. The presence of young children reduces drastically the capacity of women to enter the labor market because of the poor availability of kindergarten and the costs it generates for female refugees.

Most of the pre-war immigrants and refugees were well-educated. 42 percent for the pre-war migrants and 48 percent for the refugees and their knowledge of the Polish language is improving and this allows them to integrate easily into the labor market. For the refugees, it is a bit harder to generate income through labor compared to the pre-war migrants who, in addition to their work revenues, receive Polish social benefits. Most of the refugees only receive reimbursement for accommodation up to 70 PLN per day⁴⁷. Their rate of employment has slightly decreased from 65 percent in November 2022 to 63 percent at the end of 2023⁴⁸ and they have more fixed-term contracts compared to pre-war migrants who have mainly permanent jobs and are less inactive. Their wage is much higher and depends mainly on the sector in which they are working. Both pre-war migrants and refugees working in IT, construction, and transport with academic qualifications earn the most while those working in household services, agriculture, and tourism have the lowest wages. These sectors generally do not require any qualification and it is where we find the most refugees, and this explains the wage gap between pre-war Ukrainian migrants well integrated and refugees⁴⁹.

II-3-3- Economic and social impact of Ukrainian pre-war migrants and refugees in Poland

The economic and social impact of Ukrainians in Poland is a bit biased. First, we have seen that Poland went from a status of emigration country to a status of country of immigration mainly for its eastern European neighbors.

Polish people in general are trying to take advantage of the European single market by moving abroad to find jobs where the salary is much more attractive. This leaves the country with an uncovered workforce that is covered by immigrants in Poland. The immigrants in Poland cover the most positions where it is not compulsory to have some qualifications. We think of sectors such as agriculture, transport, tourism, and industry. On the other side, Polish people who leave the country are generally qualified workers so here comes the problem: The inflows of qualified immigrant workers sometimes are not enough to cover the qualified positions left by Polish people who have moved abroad to find the most-paid jobs in the EU.

With the mass inflow of refugees from Ukraine joining the pre-war migrants, Poland is facing a great challenge in terms of costs: It spends on the accommodation of the refugees and their daily care while

⁴⁵ [Poland: Share of Ukrainians before and after the Russian invasion, by gender 2023 | Statista](#), consulted on 06-12-2024

⁴⁶ [Raport Imigranci 2023 EN.pdf \(nbp.pl\)](#), consulted on 06-12-2024

⁴⁷ Maciej Duszczyk, Agata Górny, Paweł Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej Kubisiak (2023): War refugees from Ukraine in Poland – one year after the Russian aggression. Socioeconomic consequences and challenges, Elsevier, [main.pdf \(sciencedirectassets.com\)](#)

⁴⁸ Ibidem, p.3

⁴⁹ Ibidem, p.4

still struggling to get a strong social policy. Poland is recognized by the EU to lack integration policies which make it difficult for newcomers to access quickly the labor market and stop weighing too much on the social system of the country. Immigration in its actual form is a problem in Poland because of insufficient policies and infrastructures to take the best out of immigrants. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) has confirmed this trend: Poland, just like most Eastern European countries does not grant equal rights to immigrants but just basic rights, with policy generally unfavorable to newcomers⁵⁰. The EU suggests then to Poland to improve its social policy and its legislation to increase the protection of foreigners by creating anti-discrimination laws and implementing the collaboration between civil society and Public authorities in charge of immigrants.

We can easily say as a way the conclusion of this part that refugees and immigrants in their actual state are more damageable than profitable for Poland not because of immigrants, but because of the lack of policies that would have made the integration of immigrants in Poland.

PARTIAL CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have studied the impact of the refugee crisis in three targeted countries: Germany, Italy, and Poland. The choice of these countries followed the need to highlight that impact in countries with different specificities: Germany opened widely its borders to cover the missing workforce generated by the aging population but was not willing to recognize the previous qualifications of the refugees, partly because of their irrelevancy with the need of the labor market. This has made their integration slightly difficult. We have made a comparison with another wave of immigration in the country (Syrian) to show the difference in context and treatment. In Italy, the country was more likely to open its borders and recognize the qualification of refugees mainly those of the healthcare sector to cover the missing workforce caused by the aging population and the brain drain. Ukrainian refugees in Italy appeared globally as a partial solution to the country's problems and their administrative treatment was quite exemplary. In Poland, there was a historical immigration of Ukrainians that increased with the 2022 Russia-Ukraine War. Unlike the two previous countries, Poland was not well-structured and lacked policies that would have made easier the integration of immigrants. So globally the treatment of immigrants in Poland needs great improvements and this has been pointed out by the EU: Poland needs reforms. Immigrants and refugees were more a problem than a solution for the country.

Finally, there is truth in this analysis shared by all these three countries: the dominating number of women among the refugees and the pre-war migrants and the subsistence of immigration issues through the different waves of immigration. In the next chapter, we are going to analyze the EU's response to the Ukrainian refugee's crisis, the solutions it has displayed to solve it and we will question the efficiency of these solutions.

⁵⁰ [Governance of migrant integration in Poland | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](#), consulted on 06-12-2024

III- The EU's Global Response To The Refugee Crisis And Its Efficiency In The Targeted Countries

Even if more than 2,5 million Ukrainians have returned home from the beginning of the conflict in February 2022, the Ukrainian refugee crisis continues to represent a big issue for the EU which is trying its best to solve it. The context was still hard for the EU when the conflict blew up: the Union was still managing the effects of COVID-19 that hit Europe and the world in general, but several policies have been materialized as a way of global response by the EU. We can mention for example the Temporary Protection Directive and the Cohesion's Action for Refugees in Europe and we will see how it helped to deal with this issue. The refugee crisis has also jeopardized the external border of the EU and we will analyze the action of the EU aiming at protecting its borders. We will finally analyze the special case of foreign residents in Ukraine from the beginning of the conflict and how some countries have dealt with their cases.

III-1- The EU Temporary Protection Directive

The EU first adopted the Temporary Protection Directive in 2001 in the context of large-scale conflicts in the Western Balkans, mainly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. This Directive was a tool to protect people who fled the conflict to find safety in the EU. The application of the Directive continued and has been extended to other conflicts and humanitarian issues from all over the world.

When the conflict blew up in Ukraine in February 2022 following the Russian invasion, the EU Parliament activated this mechanism in March 2022 to release the pressure on the national asylum system of EU countries given the mass inflow of refugees in a short period and provide them with a collective protection as reported by the EU Parliament. This mechanism is thus in essence an exceptional tool used in a period of humanitarian hardship.

For Ukrainian refugees, this Directive meant a lot. According to the EU, around 4.2 million refugees from Ukraine have registered for temporary protection with some countries leading the classification of top destination of Ukrainians for Temporary Protection. These are Germany with 1.194.000 applicants, Poland with 958.655, and the Czech Republic with 357.360 applicants⁵¹. In the context of the Ukrainian crisis, not only Ukrainian nationals were able to benefit from the temporary protection since it has been extended to non-nationals residing in Ukraine with refugee status and their family members and non-Ukrainian nationals with a permanent resident permit who were unable to go back to their countries safely⁵². The applicants for temporary protection still have to apply for residency permits in their host countries or apply for asylum because the Directive is an ad-hoc tool limited to a certain period. People from Ukraine and assimilated can benefit from temporary protection up to March 2026⁵³.

This protection grants the applicants the rights to access housing, labor market, and medical assistance and leaves the path to host countries to include more rights. Germany for example has made more than required by the EU to protect vulnerable groups such as minors by clarifying the existing custody

⁵¹ [How the EU helps refugees from Ukraine - Consilium \(europa.eu\)](https://europa.eu/press-room/en/infographic/how-the-eu-helps-refugees-from-ukraine), consulted on 06-29-2024

⁵² Ibidem.

⁵³ Ibidem.

relationship from Ukraine and recognizing them under German law to take into account the best interest of the child⁵⁴.

The Cohesion's Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE) is another response of the EU to the Ukrainian refugee crisis and we are going to see how it works.

III-2- The Cohesion's Action For Refugees In Europe (Care)

The Cohesion's Action for Refugees in Europe is a tool adopted by the EU to support EU countries to deal with the emergency support that covers the basic needs of Ukrainians fleeing the conflict in their country. CARE proposal has been adopted by the European Commission and it introduced the necessary flexibility to the 2014-2020 Cohesion Policy Rules to allow a swift relocation of available funding to emergency support⁵⁵. In a few words, CARE helps the Member States to enhance their capacity to meet the needs of the refugees. It helps the Member States, for example, to increase their infrastructure and staff. CARE is in some way a kind of financial tool made available to the Member States and it helps them to implement their responses based on their reality. CARE given the context brought some changes to the financial and budgetary practices of the Member States: It first reduced budgetary pressures on Member States and allowed them to use resources from the European Fund for Regional Development (EFRD) and European Social Fund (ESF) to support any action toward the Ukrainian refugees⁵⁶. The praxis in the EU is to use a fund for what it has been released for and the fact that Member States are allowed to use other funds to support their response to the refugee crisis is an innovation. Similarly, funds dedicated to REACT-EU (Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe) were used by the Member States to support their actions towards Ukrainian refugees under the supervision of the EU. The EU is said to have released Around 420 million Euros to allow the implementation of this Cohesion Policy and this number is expected to increase⁵⁷.

III-3-2- Refugee crisis and external borders issues

The management of the external borders is one of the key points of the EU policy. In 2016, following the mass influx of illegal third-country nationals in the EU, the EU decided to tackle this issue by launching the European Border and Coast Guard Agency usually known as Frontex. This institution was created after the mass call in 2015 of EU leaders to strengthen control at external borders. With conflicts blowing up in Ukraine following the Russian invasion, the necessity to increase the protection of the EU borders became vital. Neighboring countries were invited to work together with the EU to improve border control and facilitate the crossing of Ukrainian refugees while limiting any attempt for non-Ukrainians to take advantage of the conflict and the opened borders to join the EU.

⁵⁴ Heiermann, P. & Atanisev, K. (2024). The Application of the Temporary Protection Directive to Refugees from Ukraine in Germany (EMN Germany Paper 1/2024). Nuremberg. Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. <https://doi.org/10.48570/bamf.fz.emndp.01/2024.en.2024.rlschutzukr.1.0>

⁵⁵ [Ukraine: Cohesion funding to support people fleeing \(europa.eu\)](https://europa.eu/ukraine/care), consulted on 06-29-2024

⁵⁶ Ibidem.

⁵⁷ Ibidem.

In March 2022, the EU Commission in its communication delivered operational guidelines for external borders management to facilitate border crossings at the EU-Ukraine borders⁵⁸. These guidelines followed in part the measures of the border controls available under the Schengen rules⁵⁹. It addressed 5 issues to facilitate movement of Ukrainians and third-country nationals fleeing the war:

- **Reducing congestion at border crossing points:** Here the Union suggests to the Member States to relax the rules of the Schengen Borders Code which suggests a strict border check for exceptional and unforeseen circumstances such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine⁶⁰
- **Derogation from the fulfillment of entry conditions for third-country nationals:** The Union encouraged Member State to allow TCN coming from Ukraine who do not fulfill certain conditions to cross the borders for humanitarian reasons.
- **Facilitation of rescue services:** Here Member States are invited to allow the entry and exit to their territory of members of rescue services, police, and fire brigades acting in emergency⁶¹
- **Setting up of emergency support lanes:** Member States are encouraged to facilitate the circulation of humanitarian convoys and providers of emergency assistance by designating a special lane at border crossing points.
- **Crossing of external borders outside official border crossing points in unforeseen emergencies:** Member states are encouraged to set up temporary border crossing points for the duration of the situation to fluidify the traffic at the official border crossing points.

With this guideline from the Commission, we have seen how the EU has managed to save its borders while dealing with the humanitarian crisis despite the high risks of illegal immigration the softening of border control could generate. We have mentioned in this part third-country nationals or foreign residents in Ukraine. They represented an issue during this conflict and we would like to know how they were treated in some EU countries.

III-3-3- Cost's Efficiency Analysis Of The EU Global Response In Germany, Italy, And Poland

As said earlier, the TPD and CARE aimed at easing globally the integration of Ukrainian refugees in the host countries. This happened through the allocation of residency permits for the duration of the protection, access to housing, education, and the labor market. The TPD was partly financed through the funds of CARE and React-EU which also helped to strengthen border control and protect the external borders of the EU wherever it was necessary. To analyze the efficiency of this response, we will attempt to make a cost analysis with the available data to point out whether the financial contribution of the EU through these different programs was enough to deal with the refugee issues in the respective countries and the extent of the burden they must support.

⁵⁸ [Communication providing operational guidelines external border management EU-Ukraine borders_en_1.pdf \(europa.eu\)](#), consulted on 07/02/2024

⁵⁹ Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), (OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1)

⁶⁰ [Communication providing operational guidelines external border management EU-Ukraine borders_en_1.pdf \(europa.eu\)](#), consulted on 07/02/2024

⁶¹ Ibidem, p.7.

- Cost Efficiency Analysis Of The EU Response In Germany

Until February 2024, Germany has registered 1,139,689 applicants and beneficiaries of the temporary protection. This number is slightly superior to the one of March 2023, 1,072,248⁶². When the conflict blew up, the Commission mobilized a total of 17 billion euros mainly by reallocating funds from the CARE and CARE + initiatives and by permitting Member States to make use of the 2022-REACT-EU tranches⁶³. For the REACT-EU, the Commission has increased the pre-financing by 3.5 billion to help Member States. Germany has therefore received 75.465.415 €⁶⁴ and these funds were used initially to cope with the emergency. At the beginning of the emergency, Germany agreed as a State through its Chancellor Olaf Scholz to allocate 2.17 billion \$ to help the 16 states of the country to accommodate and integrate Ukrainian refugees⁶⁵. Without going further, we observe the gap between the EU financial support and the estimated funds of Germany to cope with the emergency. With a simple subtraction of the EU funds from the estimated German funds, we realize that Germany from the beginning needed more than two billion dollars that it has probably found in its public finances. With the conflict still going on, it is estimated that until February 2024, Germany has spent 23.68 billion Euros for Ukrainian refugees⁶⁶. From this point of view, we can conclude that in terms of cost efficiency, the EU's contribution to the crisis still lags behind the spending of Germany for the same issue and then there is still something more to do towards the host countries.

- Cost Efficiency Analysis Of The EU Response In Italy

Italy at the beginning of the conflict received from the EU 452.139.527 € to deal with the refugee crisis⁶⁷ while the Italian government allocated 610 million euros⁶⁸. The estimated need from the beginning of the conflict to deal with refugees until February 2024 was around 2.46 billion Dollars according to Statista⁶⁹. This means that the country itself must bear the remaining costs of resettlement of the refugees. From this point of view, the contribution of the EU was much more insufficient from the beginning.

In addition to these costs, Italy also contributed 10 million Euros through its Migration Fund to fund projects in Moldova that will help the country improve its ability to assist refugees from Ukraine. These projects were realized with the contribution of the UNHCR⁷⁰.

⁶² Temporary Protection Germany, 2023 Update, page 5, [AIDA-DE Temporary-Protection 2023.pdf \(asylumineurope.org\)](#)

⁶³ Lucas Rasche (2022) : Implementing Temporary Protection in the EU From crisis response to long-term strategy, p.5, Hertie School, Jacques Delor Centre. [20220623_Rasche_Temporary_protection.pdf \(delorscentre.eu\)](#)

⁶⁴ [Inforegio - Ukraine: first cohesion funding payments made to Member States under CARE \(europa.eu\)](#), consulted on 07-13-2024

⁶⁵ Mathis Richtmann (2022) : Ukraine war: How Germany pays for refugees, Deutsche Welle, [Ukraine war: How Germany pays for refugees – DW – 04/14/2022](#)

⁶⁶ [Ukrainian refugee cost by country 2024 | Statista](#), consulted on 07-13-2024

⁶⁷ [Inforegio - Ukraine: first cohesion funding payments made to Member States under CARE \(europa.eu\)](#), consulted on 07-16-2024

⁶⁸ Margherita Montanari (2022): Italy allocates €610 million to support Ukrainian refugees. Euractiv, [Italy allocates €610 million to support Ukrainian refugees. – Euractiv](#)

⁶⁹ [Ukrainian refugee cost by country 2024 | Statista](#)

⁷⁰ [Italy in support of Ukraine – Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale](#), consulted on 07-18-2024

Moreover, the country was among the 13 EU contributors to the “EU for Ukraine”, an initiative launched by the European Investment Bank to support the recovery and reconstruction of the Country. In April 2023, Italy through its Finance Minister Giancarlo Giorgetti announced the intention of the country to mobilize 100 million Euros to support Ukraine⁷¹. It not only bears the costs of the management of the refugee inflow but also contributes to supporting the resistance of the Ukrainian army against Russia and the progressive reconstruction of the country. According to the Foreign Ministry, the country contributed nearly 390 million Euros to the assistance measures in favor of Ukraine through the EU’s European Peace Facility⁷².

All these costs combined represent a burden for the country while the support received from the EU covers them barely.

- Cost Efficiency Analysis Of The EU Response In Poland

At the beginning of the conflict, Poland received from the EU 562.098.072 € to deal with the refugee crisis as part of the REACT-EU additional pre-financing total (ERDF, ESF+, FEAD)⁷³. Another 144.6 million Euros (nearly PLN 700 million) has been received from the European Commission, 60% of the total funds of the emergency assistance mechanism (240 million Euros)⁷⁴. The Polish government citing the OECD’s Migration Outlook for 2022 announced that they have spent 2022 8.36 billion Dollars for the Ukrainian refugees⁷⁵. According to Statista, the estimated refugee costs in Poland from the beginning of the conflict until February 2024 were 22.17 billion Euros⁷⁶. These estimated numbers show the gap between the support received by Poland and what the country needs to deal with the refugee crisis. Among the three targeted countries of this research, Poland is less rich, but the country has received one of the biggest waves of Ukrainian refugees in a brief period. Poland is not well structured to face this issue alone without massive support from the EU and other stakeholders. This situation forced the Polish government in 2023 to cut some funds addressed to the Ukrainian refugees. At the beginning, the country has received 500k Ukrainian refugees and have provided them with housing facilities, rooms, and board. For the remaining 80k refugees still in the country, the Government has said that it cannot help them in the same way it used to do and has cut funds by half, making refugees pay part of their stay⁷⁷. One of the justifications of the Government was that optimum help for refugees should last no longer than a year so that they would be demotivated and return to the labor market⁷⁸. As seen earlier in the previous chapter, the EU has already pointed out the lack of efficiency of Polish policy toward Ukrainian refugees and this new policy confirms the doubts of the

⁷¹ [Italy provides €100 million to support the EIB EU for Ukraine Initiative](#), consulted on 07-18-2024

⁷² [Italy in support of Ukraine – Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale](#), consulted on 07-18-2024

⁷³ [Inforegio - Ukraine: first cohesion funding payments made to Member States under CARE \(europa.eu\)](#), consulted on 07-18-2024

⁷⁴ [Poland: Funding from the EC to support those arriving from Ukraine | European Website on Integration \(europa.eu\)](#), consulted on 07-18-2024

⁷⁵ OECD (2023), International Migration Outlook 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/b0f40584-en>

⁷⁶ [Ukrainian refugee cost by country 2024 | Statista](#), consulted on 07-18-2024

⁷⁷ Aleksandra Krzysztozek (2023) : Poland cuts funding for Ukrainian refugees by half, EURACTIV, [Poland cuts funding for Ukrainian refugees by half – Euractiv](#)

⁷⁸ Ibidem.

EU. Poland in return qualified EU's support as 'little help' and advocated for more support to address this issue.

Despite this controversy between Poland and the EU regarding the treatment of the refugees, we can say that given the structural problems of the country, the support from the EU and other stakeholders is still insufficient for Poland to deal properly with the Ukrainian refugee crisis.

III-3-4- The Special Case Of Foreign Residents In Ukraine

This part analyzes the situation of foreign residents in Ukraine during the conflict, mainly when people leave the country to find safety in neighboring countries, mainly EU countries. The previous part highlighted the fact that the EU has made no difference between Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians also known as third-country nationals. Third-country nationals legally residing in Ukraine were similarly allowed to cross the borders to find safety, but only those who could not go back to their countries safely were allowed to apply for temporary protection under the Temporary Protection Directive or for asylum. For many of them, especially foreign students coming from poorer countries, the war in Ukraine was a double burden: they must leave the country to save their lives but find themselves in an illegal situation in the EU because going back to their countries was not an option.

In France for example, foreign students in Ukraine who have chosen France as their safe place were invited by the Home Secretary to leave the country. In an article published by Le Monde in June 2022 few months after the beginning of the conflict⁷⁹, some foreign students, mainly African expressed their disappointment toward the "unfair" treatment they have received in their new host country. They expected the same treatment as Ukrainian refugees because they were both fleeing the war in Ukraine. Universities in France accepted the registration of foreign students from Ukraine, but they were unable to produce a valid residency permit. To be granted residency they must demonstrate that they were enrolled in a university, a big deal!

In the UK, some Universities have opened their classrooms also for foreign students of Ukraine with scholarship. The problem here is that most foreign students in Ukraine were studying medicine and the scholarship did not cover medical studies⁸⁰. Another barrier unfortunately for those people with already a complex situation.

The analysis of this special case of foreign residents or TCN in Ukraine followed the need to highlight another sad issue the Russian invasion of Ukraine has generated and the difficulty of the EU to solve it without feeling unfair or too soft depending on some point of view.

⁷⁹ Julia Pascual et Coumba Kane (2022) : Ukraine : des étudiants étrangers qui ont fui la guerre sommés de quitter la France, Le Monde [Ukraine : des étudiants étrangers qui ont fui la guerre sommés de quitter la France \(lemonde.fr\)](https://www.lemonde.fr), consulted on 07-02-2024

⁸⁰Le désarroi des étudiants étrangers qui ont fui la guerre en Ukraine, Le Figaro [Le désarroi des étudiants étrangers qui ont fui la guerre en Ukraine \(lefigaro.fr\)](https://www.lefigaro.fr), consulted on 07-02-2024

The outcome of this research

What should be learned from this study?

- Ukraine and Russia have had a conflictual relationship for decades and this situation is partly responsible for the immigration of Ukrainians to neighboring and farther countries
 - The 2022 Russian invasion represented the biggest waves of refugees in Germany and Poland and one of the most important waves in Italy.
 - Germany and Italy are facing the issue of an aging workforce and the inflow of Ukrainian refugees represents one of the solutions to this issue
 - Poland faces the emigration of its population to the West, nearly 20% are leaving the country to seek better standards of living in Western countries
 - Poland compared to Germany and Italy is not well structured to face the refugee inflow therefore represents more a problem than a solution to the missing workforce of the country
 - The level of integration of the refugees is changing from one country to another: In Germany, it is difficult because of the language barrier and the non-adequation of Ukrainian diplomas with the need of Germany's labor market. We also have the feeling that German policy tends to push refugees in particular sectors such as industry where more arms are needed. Added to this, we have a more complex administrative procedure that delays the entrance of refugees into the labor market.
 - Italy has a softer policy towards Ukrainian refugees that makes them enter the labor market easily. Moreover, the simplest administrative procedure allows refugees from the healthcare sector to practice in Italy
 - Poland is a historical country of immigration of Ukrainians where they solve partially the issue of missing workforce generated by Polish people moving to Western Countries. However, the country still faces structural problems that make it hard for it to face the challenge of refugee inflows
 - The EU's multiform support to the Member States is still not enough to deal with the refugee crisis. From the cost analysis we provided, Member States still have to bear the most important costs for the management of the crisis.
-
- From the three countries subject of this analysis, the Italian model appears to be the more efficient one to deal with a refugee crisis at the first stage: simplify the administrative procedure to make refugees available to the labor market, allow qualified refugees to work with their academic qualification from the motherland, especially in sectors where the workforce is missing. Allowing refugees to enter the labor market easily helps them to be independent and makes the country save the money it would have spent on them with a positive effect on the whole economy. Other Member States should copy at least partly this model and the EU should act in a way to facilitate the economic integration of refugees.

CONCLUSION

The study of the Russia-Ukraine war and the refugee crisis it has generated was an opportunity for us to highlight the local impact of the conflict in some countries and the response of the EU that has followed. We have analyzed in the first chapter the history of Ukrainian migration to point out where they have gone the most and the historical context.

In the second chapter we have studied the impact of Ukrainian refugees in their host countries, the gender repartition that has shown a predominance of women, the complexity of their accession to the labor market, and the reasons behind these barriers. The situation was a bit different from one country to another: Italy had a soft system that allowed the refugees to enter the job market quite early, and some from the healthcare sector were even able to work with their academic titles completed in Ukraine. In Germany, the situation was quite difficult because the qualification of jobs available for Ukrainian refugees was too low. They faced the barrier of the language and their academic title, for those in possession generally did not meet the needs of the German labor market, but still, the country needed human resources to replace its aging working population. We have attempted a comparison of the Ukrainian wave of immigration in Germany and the Syrian one of 2015 to outline their similarities and their differences. The Syrian wave has more difficulties in integrating society and labor due to cultural and educational reasons and probably because of less important financial treatment. In Poland, a country at the eastern border of the EU, the inflow of Ukrainian refugees from the beginning of the conflict generated issues that needed structural changes according to the EU. The social impact of the refugee inflow was negative, the refugees in Poland did not solve any of the problems of the country, unlike Germany and Italy where they respectively represented a solution for the aging working population and the deficit of workers in the healthcare sector.

The third chapter was an opportunity for us to analyze the EU response to the refugee crisis. We have highlighted the main policies adopted to materialize EU support in Europe and their efficiency in our targeted countries. This support represented a 'little help' and was not enough to cover all the necessary costs to address the refugees' issues. The burden remained on the respective countries, leading us to conclude that there is still a lot to do from the EU, even though the conflict is still ongoing. Excepted from the refugee crisis, Ukraine will need more support for reconstruction, and we acknowledge what the Union is doing for the reconstruction of Ukraine through the European Investment Bank where Italy for example is one of 13 contributors of the Fund for the reconstruction of Ukraine "EU for Ukraine". We made an excerpt by addressing the question of foreign residents in Ukraine and their treatment. We concluded that there was a difference in treatment that also must be addressed more deeply by the EU.

This study also followed the need to highlight the role of the EU in such circumstances and point out its functioning and its lacunes that can be corrected with time and the participation of all the Member States, not only those directly impacted by the crisis. It is an opportunity to remember the goal sought by the founding fathers of the EU in Rome: to create an ever-closer union. The Member States are invited to act as a single body and make the value of solidarity a reality and no longer an unreachable goal.

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