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Economics School of Namur - ESN**

**A theoretical analysis of the cultural
transmission mechanism of cultural
minorities originating from immigration
in an anti-communitarian France**

Author : Arthur De Wulf

Thesis Director : Guilhem Cassan

Thesis Reader : Guilhem Cassan

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Abstract

The objective of this thesis is to present a clear overview of the French immigration situation and the resulting discrimination, with a particular interest in the mechanism of transmission of cultural traits among cultural minorities originating from immigration, who will often be people originating from the Maghreb, as their immigration trajectory is deeply linked with France's historical colonial behaviour. Our analysis will be focused on a specific cultural feature: Child naming decisions. We will see that this particular cultural trait is strongly affected by discrimination and as a result, the transmission of the first name as a cultural practice is decreasing but continues to be of importance since parents' preferences are strong. We will find that cultural assimilation in terms of child naming decisions differ among cultural minorities and that this phenomenon is the results of difference in their respective coherent and stable preferences. We will try to explain why the differences of preferences could originate from the degree of importance accorded to religion.

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This master thesis, as humble as it can be, represents for me the end of a very long journey of school education that has taught me to think by myself, to get me out of my comfort zone, a lot of general knowledge and the true sense of the word effort. It also marks the start of the school of life, and the beginning of true independence. I believe that on some level, everybody I encountered made me who I am today, but I believe that some of them had a key role in this process and therefore definitely deserve recognition.

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1. Introduction

Wholeness is not achieved by cutting off a portion of one's being, but by integration of the contraries.

Carl Gustav Jung

Due to its history, the French population is becoming increasingly diversified with the phenomenon of constant immigration, which has added to the different strata of the old waves of immigration. Consequently, the question of cultural assimilation has come to be central in today's debates concerning integration. For some years now, France has seen the rise of the political extreme-right leaders, who holds racist and xenophobic statements. One of the central focuses of their politics is their campaign against immigration and their criticism of poor integration. They blame people originating from immigration to poorly integrate by valuing their cultural practices over the French common values (Blanc-Chaléard, 2001).

This is where this research work comes in, and its aim is to question the so-called poor quality of integration of ethnic minorities, by analyzing quantity of references on the subject, in order to present an overview of the history of immigration and the culture shock that originates from it. Then, we will focus on the French integration model and its paradoxes, followed by the difficulties minorities go through in terms of discrimination. After, we will be focusing on the transmission of cultural traits by minorities and we will learn that, unfortunately, there happen to be discrimination of people with immigrant backgrounds that results from their cultural traits. We will look at the transmission of the first name, since it is the “pure” expression of cultural identity, and we will see how a name can easily be a cause of discrimination. Then, we ask ourselves how child naming decisions evolve considering that it can be a cause of discrimination. We will see that the transmission of the first name as a cultural practice is decreasing but continues to exist because parents' preferences are strong. Finally, we propose a reflection on why the preferences of a minority in terms of first names differ from those of another. Also, it is necessary to point out that most of the time, “minorities” will be people originating from the Maghreb, as their immigration trajectory is deeply linked with France's historical colonial behaviour.

A close attention will be directed to the “*Trajectoire et Origines*” (TeO) survey throughout this work. We will often use the results of the TeO team of this survey to support our reflections. Also, thanks to the access to the survey database, we will be able to present our results on certain aspects that are of interest. The TeO survey is a co-production of INED¹ and INSEE² that was conducted between September 2008 and February 2009 by INSEE interviewers. It describes and analyses living conditions and social trajectories of individuals according to their social origins and their link to migration. It examines the importance and impact of experiences of discrimination on individuals' paths. The survey was carried out on approximately 21,000 people born between 1948 and 1990, living in an ordinary household in metropolitan France in 2008.³ The TeO questionnaire explores the migratory history of individuals or their parents, describes their educational and professional backgrounds, their residential history and housing conditions, their family life, the ways in which languages are transmitted and religion. In a transversal manner, it examines the access of individuals to goods and services (work, housing, services, care, etc.) as well as the discrimination that may hinder. The term “majority population” will often be used in this work, it refers to the numerically largest group of people living in metropolitan France. They are neither descendants of immigrant(s) nor are they natives of a DOM⁴ (Beauchemin, Hamel, & Simon, 2010).

¹ *Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques*

² *Institut national de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques*

³ For individuals who are the son or daughter of an immigrant or of a person born in an overseas department, the representative field of the survey is limited to people born after 1958.

⁴ Those are overseas territories. There happen to be 12 of them: Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, Reunion, Mayotte, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Saint Barthélemy, Saint Martin, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, the French Southern and Antarctic Lands and the islands of Wallis and Futuna, i.e., nearly 2.6 million inhabitants, including 1.2 million young people. (Ministère des Outre-Mer, 2021)

2. Analysis of the French integration phenomenon

2.1 History of immigration in France

2.1.1 A bond that last

Immigration in France has been deeply impacted by the weight of its colonial history. Indochina, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Equatorial Africa were all deeply impacted by the action of the French people on their land, profiting from their resources with impunity, going as far as sending men to fight their own battles. In 1914-1918, it is more than 180 000 riflemen that are sent into battle, on the front lines. 29 000 of them died, 36 000 became war-wounded men. Then, out of 60 000 French soldiers killed during the German invasion of 1940, one third belonged to the colonial troop; Senegalese riflemen that were mandated to cover the retreat suffered heavy losses (Dignat, 2020). In 1943, Corsica was freed by Moroccan soldiers and later, in 1944, about 130 000 soldiers from North- and Sub-Saharan Africa landed in Provence and fought their way for months to Germany. Many of them died. After winning the war, those fighters were sent back where they were taken from, no war pension were awarded to them (Ministère des Armées, 2019). The end of the war initiated the period of decolonisation of the French colonies, which took place peacefully for Morocco and Tunisia (1955), Black Africa (1957-1960) and by warfare for Indochina (1946-1954) and Algeria (1962) (Duché, 1998).

Now, colonisation and wars are the kinds of bonds that are deeply forged by history and that could not easily be deconstructed, although many would prefer to forget what men has been able to do to other men. This historic link between France and North- and Equatorial Africa is the original cause of today's flow of immigration, the reason why these immigrants chose France and not another host nation. (Ministère des Armées, 2019) In a way, we could see immigration as the rightful comeback of the offspring of the French Colonial Empire.

2.1.2 On the matter of immigration

It is only after the Second World War that the issue of foreign labour became a state competence, with the introduction of the ordinance of the 2 November 1945 (Légifrance, 2016), in order to introduce a sufficient amount of labour force in France, to enhance reconstruction and economic development. From this moment, legal and illegal labour immigration is tolerated and sending people back is rather rare. Those workers are all the more accepted as they are “temporary”, so they thought. Then, the 1960s mark the affirmation of the

refugee status, guaranteed by the 1951 Geneva Convention (UNHCR, 2019). In the mid-1970s, the oil crisis led to an economic crisis that incentivized the French government to block labour immigration, which led to a drastic reduction of foreign labour. Despite this strong position on immigration, France is obliged to implement legislation that respects international conventions for the protection of human rights and therefore, it is compelled to legalize family immigration through family reunification and the right of residence for French family members. In 1995, the Schengen area abolished the national borders for Member States, People were from this point authorized to move freely across this area and in return, the Schengen agreement introduced a common policy for managing visas for entry into the EU. Since then, Several European directives were adopted on the right to asylum (1990 and 2003), family reunification (2003), and the expulsion and return of illegal immigrants (2008) (Martinez, 2011).

Today, 6.8 million immigrants live in France, i.e., 10.2% of the total population. Among them, 2.5 million (36%) have acquired the French nationality. In terms of origin distribution, we find that 47.5% of immigrants living in France were born in Africa and 32.2% were born in Europe. The most common countries of birth for immigrants are Algeria (12.7%), Morocco (12%), Portugal (8.6%), Tunisia (4.5%), Italy (4.1%), Turkey (3.6%) and Spain (3.5%). Half of the immigrants come from one of these seven countries (49%). Moreover, the essential of the migratory flow towards France originates from family reunification. For years now, between 80 000 and 100 000 people obtain each year a residency permit. It is also important to point out that the share of women in immigration flows has been increasing, whether through family reunification or not. In 2020, 52% of immigrants were women, compared with 44% in 1975 and 45% in 1946 (INSEE, 2021).

2.2 The culture choc

In the XIX^e century and during a large part of the XX^e century, people that immigrated were cut-off of any social links they had with their homeland, their family. Therefore, when people had no choice but to adapt to the new culture, when there was possible contact with their homeland, they could blend in much easier. But we are far from the time when sending a message demanded a lot of time and patience, when receiving a letter was something great because it meant that you had news of a closed one living far away.

Nowadays, we find ourselves in an instantaneous interaction society, where multiple means of communication enable immigrants to stay close while being far, they continue to speak their mother tongue every day and since satellite television is available about everywhere, they can keep up with their native culture. Sure, the ability to stay in contact with your loved ones is amazing, and we can only wish them to find comfort in it since leaving is often not their first choice for an ideal life; it often means being alone for perhaps a long time and abandoning everything familiar for an uncertain period of time (Banerjee & Duflo, 2019).

Given that Integration is an acculturation process into the host society, it is for some people more difficult than for others. Let's face it, it is easier for a Catholic Spaniard than for a Muslim Algerian to assimilate the French culture since the gap between both cultures is smaller for the Spaniard than it is for the Muslim. This phenomenon takes its essence in what is called the "culture shock" which happens because of the anxiety caused by the loss of all our familiar references and symbols in social interaction. (Oberg, 2006). Immigrants are profoundly impacted by that; it weakens them in their path to integration and sometimes excludes them when the culture gap is too large; when one suffers from a missed or partly missed education, for example. Changing culture, acquiring another one, forging a new cultural identity in order to better integrate and identify with the new community is a particularly slow process. It is especially the case for immigrant offspring born in France, they often experience a feeling of loneliness, a loss of their culture of origin and a part of their history, since the transmissions of those values is not something easily done. Defining its cultural heritage seems quite complicated (Santelli, 2009).

Furthermore, it needs to be pointed out that before the communications revolution, a real physical separation happened and obliged every immigrant to really try to integrate its host nation, by learning its language and the culture. Today, this process has become more optional than mandatory (Leschi, 2020).

2.3 On Integration

2.3.1 Cultural assimilation and pluralism

Cultural assimilation is a process that demands from immigrants to embrace the same habits, behavior and tradition as the host population. It can also be referred as a sort of acculturation, which is a situation that occurs when an individual or a group abandons their

original culture in order to adopt the values, cultural practices and languages of another group with the aim of conforming as much as possible. This process can take place voluntarily or under pressure of the focused group. The characteristics and behaviour of immigrants are often interpreted in terms of 'failures' to conform to the norms of the host society (Sayad, 1999). The ethnocentric dimension of this theory of integration is thus clearly visible.

However, it is of vital importance not to confuse cultural assimilation with mere assimilation, as the first refer to the acculturation of the host society and the last as the “sharing a common historical memory”. That is how Ernest W. Burgess, a representative of the early Chicago school of sociology, defines assimilation, it can be understood as a process in which formerly distinct and separate groups come to share a common culture and merge together socially. As a society undergoes assimilation, differences between groups decrease over time (Safi, 2006). On the other hand, we have pluralism, which is a social situation that gives the freedom to different groups or individual to maintain their identities. In a pluralistic society, groups remain separate, and their cultural and social differences persist over time (Healey & Stepnick, 2020). A good example of cultural pluralism would be Canada where the Government has officially established multiculturalism as a national principle, embracing your cultural heritage is a sign of integration (The Economist , 2011).

2.3.2 Assimilation or integration? The French Integration Model

In France, the word assimilation tends to fade away as the intention was to break with that term, to opt solely for the word “integration”, which admits the persistence of cultural specificities of immigrant populations or those of immigrant origin. The reason for that is that assimilation was considered as a process of alignment of behaviours of people belonging to minority groups, which implies the existence of a power relationship, reminiscent of the colonisation experience. This change of word choice is the result of this long-lasting bond between France and its ancient colonies, of historic guilt. The integration “à la Française” is described as a process of uniform convergence of immigrants' characteristics towards the average of those of French society (Safi, 2006). It is relevant to note that the question of integration was not addressed directly after the war, at the start of the massive immigration waves. The question of migration then was only a question of finding work, not finding a new place to live, it had nothing to do with citizenship (see Graph 1 for a Ngram Viewer of the word “integration” in France).

2.3.3 The paradoxes of the French integration model

2.3.3.1 “Communautarisme” or republicanism?

Anyone who wishes to understand the French debate about immigrant integration must look at the notion of “Communautarisme”, which refers to any form of self-centredness by a religious or ethnic group that values its differences from the rest of society (Bertossi, 2020). In France, the relationship between the State, society and its communities (particularly religious communities) is very specific because of a strong attachment to secularism and to universalism, which sees each individual first and foremost as a citizen and not as a member of a group or community. However, despite the State and society being loyal to and concerned for its people, without regards to other allegiances, they do not ignore all personal or community affiliations. This is where the balance is often difficult to understand, and especially difficult to maintain. With the historical evolution of immigration, successive governments and public authorities have constantly and increasingly had to take account of these different religious affiliations (*Ibidem*).

The ideal of assimilation, which concerned certain religious minorities, specifically Muslims but in some sense also Jews and Catholics, has slowly but surely given way to the imperative of integration and since the 1980s, to the valorisation of their cultural differences. This is particularly true in the economic and business spheres, where there lies a real melting-pot of cultural differences among its stakeholders, bringing individuals of different origins and even of different nationalities around the same project is inevitable and it is economically vital to learn to work together, and this can only succeed through valorisation of the cultural differences (Meier, 2005). However, this should not be seen as an “accommodation”, like it is being interpreted in Canada, it is not a shift toward multiculturalism, we can see it as a question of recognising individuals on the basis of their membership of a group.

But this shift towards cultural acceptance is in its core incompatible with the republican tradition that insists on the common. The republican and secularism principle are both being challenged and weakened by the communautarism⁵ logic. Measures are often envisaged to “fight against communautarism”, but this does not solve the problem of the loss of common

⁵ Derived from the French “Communautarisme”.

reference points among those whose only horizon is their specific belonging. Religious, political and social issues are intimately linked. We find ourselves in a first paradox, where France tries to value cultural differences, while, because of its republican principle, she also wishes to abolish communitarism. The transmission of cultural values is seen as a withdrawal of a community that does not wish to agree with the values of the republic, that refuses the social contract, in Rousseauian terms. Because of this important contradiction, there is a mixed message emerging from the state, lots of people get confused and it contributes to social, economic and political tensions (Bertossi, 2020). The TeO survey documents very precisely that even if most of foreign-born French people feel French, in the sense that they consider having adopted the values of the French Republic, they experience the feeling that other French people with no African, Caribbean or Arab background do not see them as French. To the statement "I am seen as French", 58% of immigrants respond in the negative. More surprisingly, half of those who have become French share this feeling. Among the descendants of immigrants, although of French nationality, 37% do not feel truly recognised, the size of the gaps between the descendants of immigrants from Southern Europe and those from Sahelian Africa, from the Maghreb or Turkey testifies to the fragility of the recognition of national belonging (see Figure 1).

2.3.3.2 The constitution of “ghettos”

What the authorities would like is for people with immigrant backgrounds to merge into society, that they leave behind communitarism and welcome the French values of secularism and republicanism. All of this, while still being able to transmit their cultural heritage to their children. This is where our second paradox finds its essence. A large number of people of immigrant origin is concentrated in cities that could be described as ghettos, whose very mention of the name is synonymous with outbursts and violence: Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, Béziers or Montfermeil are just a drop of water in the ocean of French ghettoisation, and in some sense, pauperisation. The public authorities declare that they wish to increase the diversity in the schools and housing areas, while they allow people with an immigrant background to crowd into the same neighbourhoods (Marchal & Stébé, 2010). A solution would have been to organise the geographical dispersion of new immigrants, as Canada and Sweden did, but this matter had been put aside at the time. Today, more than half of the African and Maghrebi immigrants live in areas where social housing is more than 25%, which is surprising since those are also places where public services and civil servants struggle to

maintain and tend to totally disappear. Furthermore, we note the emergence of ethnic alimentary shops, that end up pushing away more French-like grocery shops. People wishing to buy “forbidden” food are left to have to shop further away, or simply leave for more convenience. Similarly, we see mosques popping up every now and then, that have to co-exist with African evangelical churches always overcrowded. Schools are no better, they are the “factory of failure”, where 400 000 young people leave the school system each year, with no diploma. 23% of people descendants of immigrants between 15 and 34 years old have no diploma and for them, the tentation to delinquency and unemployment is very strong (Leschi, 2020). “Even if it is not the majority, the failures of integration are particularly serious and painful. When some of the youth in the suburbs develop a counterculture that is hostile to France and is violent, the damage is impressive. When some people claim particular rights that clash with secularism and our conception of equality between men and women, the friction is strong. Distrust sets in. And this breeding ground feeds fears and extremism” (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration , 2011). Using the TeO database, the next OLS regression shows our results when we analyze how the presence of immigrants in the neighbourhood of the respondent is being influenced by the fact that the respondent is himself an immigrant:

$$reg\ l_immi = \alpha + \beta_1 i.cpidom + \beta_2 i.sexee + \beta_3 agenq$$

Where,

l_immi = Presence of immigrant residents in the neighbourhood, ranging from 1 = almost everybody is of immigrant origin, to 5 = almost nobody is of immigrant origin;

$cpidom$ = Respondent's place of birth, 0 = Born in France, 1 = Born in a DOM , 2 = Born abroad;

$sexee$ = Sex of the respondent, 1 = male and 2 = female

age = age of the respondent on the day of the survey

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	20,820
Model	1475.75903	4	368.939757	F(4, 20815)	=	229.67
Residual	33436.4794	20,815	1.60636461	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.0423
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0421
Total	34912.2384	20,819	1.67694118	Root MSE	=	1.2674

l_immi	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
cpidom					
1	-.5622083	.0506149	-11.11	0.000	-.6614174 - .4629992
2	-.5030515	.0196752	-25.57	0.000	-.5416163 - .4644866
2.sexee	-.0474637	.0175922	-2.70	0.007	-.0819457 - .0129816
agenq	.0197631	.0008274	23.89	0.000	.0181414 .0213849
_cons	3.128016	.030426	102.81	0.000	3.068378 3.187653

We see that being born in a DOM and abroad both decreases the level of `l_immi`, meaning that people of immigrant origin tend to live in place where other immigrant are also living, which is statistically significant. This supports what we have seen about the centralisation of people with an immigrant background.

2.3.4 Pluralism of identities

The TeO Survey is particularly useful to look at the interest in the national sentiment of people with an immigrant background, since most of the suspicion of non-authenticity of national sentiment is said to be directed at descendants of North and sub-Saharan Africans (Simon,2013). This phenomenon is also being exacerbated by the rise of multiple identities and belongings or more precisely, the rise of bi-nationality among immigrants and second generations. Indeed, French law does not oblige its citizen to a single nationality and the child of foreigners that gave birth in France may also access the French nationality, while keeping that of his/her parents (Service Public , 2021). Thanks to the survey (see Figure 2) we can see that very few participants that belong to the majority population possess bi-nationality, in contrary to the immigrant population where it goes up to 21%. The vast majority of them is found among immigrants from the Maghreb, Turkey and Portugal, with respectively 68, 55%, and 43% of those immigrants having both nationalities. Also, most people from other EU27 countries ask for the bi-nationality when they become French, unlike immigrants from South-

East Asia; fewer than 10 per cent of them are binational. As for their descendants, despite being almost all French, we see a strong attachment to their origin, which is particularly marked when both parents are immigrants; almost a third of them report dual nationality, versus 12% for descendants of mixed couples. Again, this trend is especially seen for Turkish and Maghrebi offspring (Beauchemin, Hamel, & Simon, 2010). Thus, the case of bi-nationality is not an isolated one; many people with an immigrant background resort to this procedure, probably because, on the one hand, they wish to adapt to their new environment (in the case of first-generation immigrants), to blend in, and on the other hand, they don't want to neglect their cultural heritage. Now, this is perfectly operational ammunition for racist and xenophobic ideologies and indeed, it has been considered on multiple occasion as a threat to the national cohesion and a deterioration of the national sentiment (L'OBS, 2014). But the TeO Survey gives us the ability to perfectly answer those critics. One question of the survey was about the sentiment of being French⁶, thanks to the data of the survey it was made possible to look at the results of the question “do you feel French?” depending on whether they are immigrants or not⁷.

Lieu codé de naissance de l'enquêté	Opinion de l'enquêté par rapport à la proposition : je me sens français(e)						Total
	1	2	3	4	8	9	
0	9,391	2,120	394	288	21	88	12,302
1	541	128	28	23	0	5	725
2	3,292	2,325	1,238	1,606	35	238	8,734
Total	13,224	4,573	1,660	1,917	56	331	21,761

On the table above, we tabulate the variables “place of birth” and the “feeling of being French” and we see that 66,5%⁸ of the immigrant participants are, at least, agreeing when they are being asked whether they feel French. Now, unfortunately most of the sensible variables in the data set were not available, which is why we can't directly look at how different origins reacted to this question. But fortunately, we dispose of the origin of the names of the participants, making it possible to bypass this issue.

⁶ The participant had to choose between 1 and 6, being: 1. Totally agree, 2. Mostly agree, 3. Mostly disagree, 4. Totally disagree, 8. You don't know, 9. You don't wish to answer. We decided to create two main categories to compute our results: 1&2 = Feel French and 3&4= don't feel French, 8&9 are irrelevant.

⁷ 0. born in France, 1. Born in an overseas department (DOM), 2. Born abroad. Again, we decided to create two main categories to compute our results: 1&2 = born out of metropolitan France and 0 = born in metropolitan France.

⁸ $((1:1)+(1:2)+(2:2)+(2:1)) \times 100 / \text{Total1} + \text{Total2} = 6286 \times 100 / 9459 = 66,46\%$, The same calculation will be operated on the next table.

nationalite	Opinion de l'enquêt� par rapport � la proposition : je me sens fran�ais(e)						Total
	1	2	3	4	8	9	
other	9,776	3,364	1,216	1,432	41	247	16,076
Maghreb	2,113	709	271	290	9	47	3,439
Muslim	332	118	39	43	1	11	544
West Africa	271	85	32	33	0	4	425
Turkey	694	261	93	110	4	15	1,177
Total	13,186	4,537	1,651	1,908	55	324	21,661

We focus on three main nationalities and the nationality “Muslim”, which are Muslim-sounding names that could not be classified because they were found in many countries (names like Ahmed, Mohammed). We focus on French people of Turkish and African origin because this part of the population of foreign origin is the main focus of criticism and is presented as a problem in or for the French society. They are often accused of being the cause of unemployment, of not being loyal to France, of taking advantage of the French social system, of practicing religious propaganda. This implicitly or sometimes even explicitly induces doubt about their very quality as French people. (Brouard & Tiberj, 2005) We see that the feeling of being French for people with foreign-sounding names is quite important, it is for the Maghrebin, the “Muslims”, the West-Africans⁹ and the Turks respectively 82%, 82.7%, 83.8%, 81%. Now, there are limits to this process. First, we isolate the foreign-sounding names, which means that among the 16,076 “other” participants there probably is a certain amount of immigrant and descendants of immigrants being classified as non-foreign sounding names that should actually be taken into account as immigrants or immigrant offspring. Despite this possible “bias”, the results found are pretty much similar to what P. Simon found in his study of the republican politics of identity and integration in which he also used the TeO database (Simon, 2013). Then, the differentiation of immigrant and immigrant offspring could not be made, which is not a bias per se, but it would have been relevant to make the distinction.

To sum up, when someone chooses for bi-nationality he/she makes the decision to stay attached to his/her origin, which is in no mean incompatible with a true French identity. Furthermore, it is because they live in France that they develop a strong bond to the French identity, this sentiment of belonging does not lie in the nationality itself, it comes out the time

⁹ Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

spent in France, learning about its history, values and politics. This, of course, highly depends on one's education and social environment.

2.4 On discrimination

The debates on immigration and integration, as explain *supra* started in the early 80s, when we began to talk about communautarism. The issue of discrimination, on the other hand, took a bit more time to enter the national heated debates we are all probably very familiar with (See Graph 2 for the Ngram Viewer for the sentence “Lutte contre les discriminations”¹⁰). Several reasons can explain the fact that the fight against discrimination was not addressed before. The first finds its essence in the word universalism which, as said, is the loyalty to and concern for others without regard to national or other allegiances¹¹, which was inherited from the French Revolution, and can be understood as the struggle of the French authorities to realize that, despite the principle of universalism attached to the French citizenship, deep-seated discrimination does exist in the hexagon (Bertossi, 2020). It had become essential to combat racist and discriminatory ideology, to confront its direct and indirect modes of expression. To do this, it was necessary to set up public anti-discrimination mechanisms. In 1997, there happened an important change; the majority of the National Assembly shifted, and a left-wing government took the head of the country (1997-2002). It was then that the French authorities decided to set up instances to prevent the spread of discrimination and to work towards its abolition (de Rudder, Poiret, & Vourc'h, 2000). Another explanation would be about ethics and statistics, as for about twenty years controversies have arisen in the French academic, political and media spheres over whether it is appropriate to produce ethnic statistics. Because of that, people struggle to find a legal framework that could represent the population in its diversity, while not entering ethics conflicts (Simon, 2014). It is part of the French “colour-blind” approach, according to which ethnic or racial distinctions are the basis of racism (Lieberman, 2001).

At the dawn of the 21st century, the topic of discrimination made its way to become one of the biggest issues in France, as explained above, and people in charge of this matter slowly recognized that the integration was not being held back because immigrants neglected the

¹⁰ The fight against discrimination.

¹¹ Definition of the Oxford English Dictionary.

Republican Integration Contract (Service Public Français, 2021)¹², but rather by the discrimination committed against them. From that point, authorities highlighted the importance of anti-discrimination; people were incentivized to see the cultural practices of the immigrant population as a contribution to the national culture and no longer as a withdrawal of identity (Simon, 2014). However, the principle of universalism that promoted anti-discrimination rapidly found itself in a dead end since it was being contradicted by the principle of secularism. The limits were clearly highlighted during the debate around the wearing of the veil by users of public services since it was considered by many as an infraction of the French secularism. Since, the public debate has never stopped and it seems like, most of the time, the emphasis is laid on the banishment of behaviours of “communautarisme” rather than on the fight against discrimination (Bertossi, 2020). This is a problem because when we want to weaken the distinctions between social groups, the best way to do so is to reduce the stereotypes, the “ethno-racial” categorization of the member of the society. What we really want is to weaken the discriminatory barriers. Unequal treatment makes it particularly difficult, not cultural identity (Safi, 2011). Now, in this context it is utterly relevant to look at the work of Richard Alba¹³, who explains in his book “Blurring the Color Line” that the barriers to integration are not unbreakable, he describes thoroughly the mass-scale assimilation of Irish Catholics in America, among other nationalities, and believes that under certain conditions, “ethno-racial hierarchies, at least in democratic, economically dynamic societies, are less rigid than they’re sometimes thought to be”. The question, of course, is whether this could be applied in 21st century France. (Wilson, 2011) As optimistic as it is, the equalization of the situation of ethnic and racial minorities in the coming decades is somewhat doubtful when we look at the big numbers concerning discrimination.

Despite the lack of reliable statistics that would allow us to measure the degree of awareness of the French concerning the existence of discriminatory treatments, the TeO survey is a fine start for someone who wants to work on this issue. The experience of discrimination is being measured by the subjective experience of the participants; their answers reflect self-reported experiences. They were given a list of eleven reasons among which they had to choose which, from their perspective, had led to discrimination. The survey explores two major faces

¹² The Republican Integration Contract (CIR) is concluded between the French State and any non-European foreigner admitted residing in France who wishes to settle there permanently, with some exceptions. The signatory undertakes to follow training courses to promote integration into French society. Civic training is compulsory. Language training may be required depending on your level of French.

¹³ American sociologist, professor at CUNY Graduate Center.

of discrimination: the one against women and the one against the skin color and the origin¹⁴. While multiple research studies have proven it to be of utter importance for the well-being and welfare of society (Duflo, 2012), we will not be focusing on the matter of sex discrimination in this study. Table 1 depicts how people perceive the discrimination that takes place in France. Surprisingly, the majority population perceives discrimination due to origin and skin color more importantly than all the immigrants, by 11 percentage points for the men and 19 percentage points for the women. Then, the descendants of immigrants, on the other hand, have a perception of discrimination much more marked than the immigrant themselves and slightly more severe than the majority population. The descendant of mixed couples seems to feel discriminatory behaviours even more (Beauchemin, Hamel, & Simon, 2010). This phenomenon is less surprising and has already been analyzed in a 1994 American study where the author studied the formation of ethnic self-identities during adolescence of children of immigrants from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. Among some of the results, he found that two-thirds of the participants ethnically identified with their parents' immigrant origins because those who feel like they will be discriminated against, no matter their level of education, were more likely to choose for an identity that derives from their parents' identity. Furthermore, the descendants of ethnically mixed couples feel the injustice of discriminatory behaviours more vividly than in the case of non-mixed couples (Rumbaut, 1994). Furthermore, when we look at the reasons for discrimination by origin (see Table 2), we can see that different origins account for different reasons for discrimination. First, the skin color is the main reason for discrimination when you are an immigrant or descendant of immigrants from Sahelian and Sub-Saharan Africa. This trend is the same for natives of an overseas department and descendants of natives of an overseas department. Then, if you are from a Maghrebi, South-East Asian or Turkish origin, the main reason for subjective discrimination is the origin itself. Compared to the majority group, we see that gender and age are not that important in terms of reason for discrimination; while it accounts for respectively 24% and 16% for the majority group, it lies around 5% and 10% for both immigrants and descendants of immigrants (Beauchemin, Hamel, Lesné, & Simon, 2010).

¹⁴ The two questions are worded as follows: "Do you think that women in France suffer unequal treatment or discrimination compared to men? Do you think that in France some people are treated unequally or discriminated against because of their origin or skin colour? The response options for both questions are: "often", "sometimes", "never", "no answer" or "don't know".

The French model of integration is being deeply damaged by discrimination. While it promises equality for people of all horizons, the immigrant and their descendants face another harsh reality. Policies of anti-discrimination, which consisted mainly in the concept of “positive discrimination”, have unfortunately not been efficient. Moreover, this concept is based on an ethno-racial analysis of society, it thus goes against the republican principle of equality before the law. Then, ethnic statistics could have been used to control equality but the stubborn refusal to compile them make it particularly difficult to work on this issue. Because of this “colour-blindness” approach, the ethno-racial divisions grow and, to some extent, creates a hierarchy between the different ethnic groups, which gives way to reviving a national identity and regulates access of privileges and powerful positions (Simon, 2013).

The question of integration of the immigrant population and the discrimination that results from this culture shock has mainly been addressed through its education, family and economic dimension. While some assume that there is a resistance from the population originating from immigration, as we have seen, to integrate properly by getting along with the values of the République, the contrary is true (Coulangeon, 2007). Multiple studies have shown that there is a clear tendency towards assimilation in their political, religious and moral attitudes (Brouard & Tiberj, 2005). Unfortunately, even if access to employment and housing is improving (the study was only conducted in Paris though), this population is still being targeted by discriminatory behaviours in those sectors (Bidoux & Virot, 2011).

3. The impact of the transmission of cultural traits

We have seen that the origins and the Skin color were particularly felt as the reason for discriminatory behaviours by the participants of the TeO Survey, mostly for, respectively, those of Maghrebi origin and those of Sahelian and Sub-Saharan African origin. It is now time to look at another aspect that causes discrimination, which is intrinsically linked to everything we have seen until now since it has been considered as an obstruction to integration and a reason for communitarism: the transmission of cultural practices from parents to their offspring. “One of the most important obstacles to integration is actually how people, through subjective representations, perceive otherness of lifestyles, cultural habits, norms and values in a wide variety of registers, ranging from culinary or clothing habits to educational styles, festive or family rites and neighbourhood behaviour” (Coulangeon, 2007).

3.1. The transmission of first names, the “pure” expression of cultural identity

Cultural practices are shared perceptions of how people routinely behave in a culture (Frese, 2015). It is particularly interesting to look at the transmission of first names when we talk about cultural practices since the choice of a name is considered as being a “pure expression of cultural identity” (Lieberson, 2000). A name is thus a cultural marker and in 2000, S. Lieberson studied the first name people gave to their children and showed that patterns in name choices emerged, which can happen exogenously or endogenously¹⁵. Based on the premise that first names shape cultural identity, many studies interpret the degree of closeness of these names to those of the majority population as a measure of cultural assimilation (Goldstein & Stecklov, 2016). In a 2004 American paper that took the first steps towards an attempt to understand what role Black culture might play in explaining continued poverty and racial isolation, R. G. Fryer and S. D. Levitt found that in the late 1960s and early 1970s most black parents shifted towards more distinctively Black names, which happened in parallel with the rise of Black Power movements across the country. This is a perfect example of an exogenous reaction, a change in cultural habits triggered by an outside force, and it is also very clear example of a cultural nonconformity, a refusal for cultural assimilation by a minority

¹⁵ “Each time the world changes through internal dynamics—whether people are imitating each other or, indeed, trying to be different—we have an instance of *endogeny*. In sociology, as in most other social sciences, endogeny tends to play second fiddle to *exogeny*, in which outside forces—political regime, pestilence, corporations—are thought to move history.” (Molotch, 2020)

group. Since this study focuses on French immigration, it is highly relevant (mandatory even) to look at the evolution of immigrant names to know whether it follows the same trend as the 1970 Black American population or whether there is a tendency of cultural assimilation (Fryer & Levitt, 2004)

In a 2009 paper, M. Arai & al.¹⁶ presented evidence demonstrating that immigrants gave first names to their children different from those given by the French majority population, especially when they originated from Maghreb/Middle East. When it comes to natives with an immigrant background, these differences are less pronounced. The native-born with immigrant background have similar naming practices for their children as the French majority population, meaning that being born in France, and raised up as well, is a strong assimilation force (the overall naming pattern was robust for controls of demographic and educational variables as well as a measure of religious practice). We see that by being exposed to the French culture through residence and educational systems it enhances the process of cultural assimilation (Arai, Besancenot, Huynh, & Skalli, 2009).

The TeO survey, again, gives us the ability to further analyze how first names are transmitted in immigrant families, depending on their origins. Apparently, the same trend is being followed by the first generation of immigrants: 94% of immigrants from North Africa have first names classified as Arab-Muslim; 82% of immigrants from Sahelian Africa have “African” or Arab-Muslim first names; 92% of immigrants from Turkey have a Turkish first name; and “only” 58% of immigrants from Southeast Asia have an Asian-sounding first name. This is not surprising, most of the times immigrants leave their places of origin with a strong cultural baggage belonging to this country (Coulmont & Simon, 2019). For what concerns the names of immigrant’s children and grandchildren, it can only be studied for Southern Europeans (Spain, Italy, Portugal) and North Africans because the size of the sample for the other origins of immigrants is too small. 65% of Southern Europeans who arrived before 1980 had Latin names (i.e., José, Manuel, Ana), which were not given to the majority population at the time. For the second generation, only 16% of them received a Latin name. As mentioned *supra*, we focus our attention on the North African origin because they are the main focus of criticism and discrimination in the French society. Thus, we see that for the next generation,

¹⁶ They used the French survey “Histoire de vie” to find those results, which was conducted by the French National Statistics, INSEE in 2003, and has recorded the first name of the children of the respondents.

about two third of the children of immigrants from those origins are given an Arab-Muslim name, which is a much poorer results compared with Southern Europeans immigration ¹⁷. It looks like cultural assimilation, in terms of name choice, is a factor of cultural preservation for those communities, and this seems to be exacerbated when descendants of immigrants are in a relationship with first-generation immigrants and when parents give a high degree of importance to religion, as depicted on Graph 3 (*Ibidem*). Despite this pattern, B. Coulmont and P. Simon demonstrate something particularly important. Despite the fact that the tendency to call one's children by more French names does not seem to be very present in families of North African origin, a detail must be taken into account; in order to study the development of the transmission tendencies of the first names, it was necessary to categorize the first names of probable belonging, each first name present in the database was thus given a "grade" of probability of belonging to a country. However, when we look at the name and no longer in the categories, something stands out. We can see that a cultural innovation is taking place in the choice of first names with the introduction of new names such as Nadia, Myriam, Yanis, Rayane or Lina, which are considered to be of North African origin. These names will therefore not be part of the majority population and in a sense, be wrongly categorized.

3.2. Yet another reason for discrimination

“The year is 2020 AD. All of France tends to be culturally homogeneous... All of it? No! A community of irreducible Maghrebis still resists the assimilation of French culture.” But is it really so?

As we have seen, the cultural assimilation of immigrants in terms of name choice is on the rise for most of them. It is true though that the tendency to call one's children by a more French name does not seem to be that present in families of North African origin. But as we have seen, this finding can be mitigated by the fact that many names were wrongly categorized as North African names. Now, let's take a short break from first names in order to quickly analyze other cultural practices which, in comparison, do demonstrate a trend towards cultural assimilation. First, the access to employment is made easier when one possesses the French nationality and this phenomenon has actually incentivized men from sub-Saharan Africa and

¹⁷ Around 65% of southern Europeans who arrived in France before 1980 have Latin first names (Maria, José, Antonio). These names were not given much in France at the time. The fast abandonment of these first names began with the first generation born in France: only 16% of descendants have a first name of Latin origin (Coulmont & Simon , 2019).

Maghreb or women from Turkey and the Maghreb to acquire the nationality (Fougère & Safi, 2005). Then, the number of mixed marriages for the second generation of North African man and woman is relatively high (it is on, average, respectively 48% and 39%) and is constantly increasing, as we can see on table 3 (TeO). Also, the level of French language is much higher than that of Turks and Asians for example, as it can be seen on Table 4, also compiled using the TeO survey (Beauchemin, Hamel, & Simon, 2010). Lastly, their civic and associative commitment has also increased (Baillet, 2001), in parallel with their political participation (Piketty, 2021). Despite all of that, the socio-economic factors won't follow: "record unemployment rates, job and housing insecurity, children's difficulties in school. The lack of resources in these communities, the weak organization of their relational networks, but also, and perhaps above all, the strong discrimination that affects them mean that, even if solidarity exists, it can hardly be translated into financial and professional support" (Safi, 2007) .

It is surprising to see that the Maghrebis go through a process of relatively high cultural assimilation, on the one hand, and a low social integration and high risk of discrimination on the other hand, making them experience imbalance in their migratory process (*Ibidem*). Despite all their efforts, we see that it does not always pay and that discriminatory behaviours persist. Would choosing for a French-sounding name ease this phenomenon? To do so, it would imply that child naming practices, as an expression of cultural identity, is indeed subject to discriminatory practices. Let's investigate.

Firstly, we used the TeO database in order to analyze the impact of having a name categorized as originating from the Maghreb on the discrimination experienced.

$$reg\ d_discri = \alpha + \beta_1 i.cpidom + \beta_2 Maghreb + \beta_3 agenq + \beta_4 sexe$$

Where,

cpidom = Respondent's place of birth, 0 = Born in France, 1 = Born abroad;

d_discri = Unequal treatment or discrimination in the last 5 years, 0 = No (Never), 1 = Yes (often or sometimes);

sexe = Sex of the respondent, 1 = male and 2 = female

age = age of the respondent on the day of the survey

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	21,761
Model	120.484107	4	30.1210267	F(4, 21756)	=	58.47
Residual	11207.5816	21,756	.515148998	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.0106
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0105
Total	11328.0657	21,760	.520591255	Root MSE	=	.71774

d_discri	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
cpidom						
born abroad	.1025256	.0106762	9.60	0.000	.0815995	.1234517
maghreb	.0077052	.0133143	0.58	0.563	-.0183917	.0338022
agenq	-.0063894	.0004589	-13.92	0.000	-.007289	-.0054899
2.sexee	-.042406	.0097463	-4.35	0.000	-.0615094	-.0233026
_cons	.4726201	.0170146	27.78	0.000	.4392702	.50597

We see that being born abroad sensibly increases the discrimination experienced and is statistically significant, while having a “maghreb” name has very little impact on the discrimination and its effect is very insignificant. Now, that is a surprising result and goes against our intuition. But many things could explain such a result, like a bad identification of Maghrebi names for example. The next field experiments will demonstrate that name do indeed account for discrimination

A very well-conducted American field experiment showed compelling results. The researchers wanted to analyze the labor market discrimination against African American sounding names taking place in the cities of Boston and Chicago. Their approach was to send resumes in response to ads in newspapers and measure the number of call-backs each resume receives for interviews, they responded to over 1300 employment ads in the sales, administrative support, clerical and customer service job categories. To do so, they assigned White and African America names (e.g.: Emily Walsh, Greg Baker or Lakisha Washington, Jamal Jones) to the same number of resumes and sent four of them in response to each ad: two higher quality and two lower quality ones. After sending about 5000 resumes, they found large racial differences in call-back rates: applicants with White names needed to send about 10 resumes to get one call-back whereas applicants with African American names needed to send around 15 (see table 5). This 50 percent gap in call-back rates was statistically very significant (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004). Secondly, a more recent Belgian study followed the pioneering field experiment by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) for the United States. They decided to conduct a comparative study in Ghent and Antwerp, in which they alternated

between a Flemish-sounding name and a Turkish-sounding name for 376 job applications. It is relevant to look at those results because Turks are the largest ethnic minority in Ghent and the second largest in Antwerp and it can thus be compared with the French immigration situation where people with North African origins are the largest ethnic minority. They submitted applications for low-qualification and high-qualification jobs, dividing them into jobs with and without a labour shortage. The results can be seen on this next results table.

Emplois	Nombre d'offres	Pas de réponse positive pour aucun des deux candidats	Réponse positive pour les deux candidats	Réponse positive pour le candidat flamand uniquement	Réponse positive pour le candidat turc uniquement	Taux net de discrimination	Ratio de réponse positive
Tous les emplois	376	297	43	29	7	0,28***	1,44**
Peu qualifiés sans pénurie de main-d'œuvre	76	58	5	13	0	0,72***	3,60***
Peu qualifiés avec pénurie de main-d'œuvre	119	102	8	6	3	0,18	1,27
Très qualifiés sans pénurie de main-d'œuvre	119	95	14	9	1	0,33***	1,53
Très qualifiés avec pénurie de main-d'œuvre	62	42	16	1	3	-0,10	0,89

Note :

** : le taux (ratio) est statistiquement différent de zéro (un) avec une marge d'erreur de 5 %.

*** : le taux (ratio) est statistiquement différent de zéro (un) avec une marge d'erreur de 1 %.

They calculated the net discrimination rate by deducting the number of situations in which the Flemish candidate was preferred by the number of situations in which the Turkish candidate was preferred, and then dividing this difference by the number of situations in which at least one of the two received a positive response. The total net discrimination rate is 0.28. The hypothesis of equal treatment was rejected at a statistical significance level of 1%. This test provides robust empirical evidence that there is discrimination against young graduates with Turkish-sounding names in the Flemish labour market. By splitting the net discrimination rate among the type of job and the presence or not of labour shortage they also found that the degree of unequal treatment decreases as the level of professional competence increases and as the labour shortage increases (Baert, Cockx, Gheyle, & Vandamme, 2013). Lastly, we look at a 2016 French study conducted by Dares Analyses that examining the discriminatory risks linked to the alleged 'North African origin' of applicants in the recruitment process. The methodology applied is very comparable with both studies we have analyzed. The overall results were also in line with those, they show that recruiters were more often interested in French-sounding names than applicants with North African-sounding names: the rate of positive responses was 47% and 36% respectively of the applications sent, i.e., an average difference of 11 points. The only thing that differed was the way they formed their sample, they opted to focus “only on 40

companies of at least 1000 employees. Moreover, the results they found on “only” 12 of them showed a much greater tendency toward discrimination with results that oscillate between a difference of 15 points and a difference of 35 points. This means that on average, those 12 companies show statistically significant differences to the disadvantage of 'Maghrebi' candidates of 25 percentage points (Ruault, Valat, & Foroni, 2016).

Now, these testing surveys have clearly shown the negative impression that North African, African names can have in recruitment processes. Those results can be found when investigating the link between the overexposure of African immigrants to unemployment in France and their underrepresentation in jobs in contact with customers (Combes, Decreuse, Laouénan, & Trannoy, 2016). And from this observation, we can only speculate on the discrimination caused by the first name in access to housing or even to certain services such as insurance or banking. It is now clear that a foreign-sounding name leads to discrimination. Although one could argue that, in the French case, this phenomenon may be very specific to a minority of large French companies, let's not forget that this survey was conducted on a very small sample of companies (40). Moreover, it has been clearly stated that in the Belgian and American cases first names of minority origin was a cause for discrimination, there is no evidence whatsoever that could indicate that the French's behaviour would differ. Since minority-sounding names leads to discrimination, opting for French-sounding names would ease that phenomenon, logically. This is also the reason why in January 2013, Monica de Coninck (the Belgian Federal Employment Minister at the time) requested the Central Labour Council to formulate an opinion on the introduction of a system of anonymous applications to reduce discrimination in hiring minorities (Baert, Cockx, Gheyle, & Vandamme, 2013). Thus, the reason for choosing for a French-sounding name for your children may also reflect a concern to spare the child from future difficulties in life, which raises our next question: what is the magnitude of this possible phenomenon?

3.3. How does cultural transmission react when being impacted by discrimination?

As thoroughly showed, the attribution of a 'majority' first name would ensure partial invisibility of the descendants of immigrants, protecting them from certain discrimination. Starting from that certainty, it is intriguing to know to what degree are the discriminatory practices incentivizing parents to opt for a culturally conformed name. We will be looking at a 2020 French paper that studies how economic incentives influence cultural transmission, using

a crucial expression of cultural identity: Child naming decisions (Algan, Malgouyres, Mayer, & Thoenig, 2020). In this, the authors analyse how social and economic forces constrain the inter-generational transmission of culture among immigrants and their descendants, with particular emphasis on the tension between the taste for the perpetuation of inherited cultural traits and the perceived economic discrimination attached to them. Their study is in line with what we have seen so far, they focus their attention on people with an Arabic background because, as they explain, the largest share of immigrant or immigrant offspring are from North African Countries. Plus, most of Arabic names relate to religion, since they are found throughout the Quran, and are thus a potential source of conflict with the French culture because it interferes on multiple levels of the social sphere: political and religious tensions, heavy historic legacy (ex-colonies) and different consumption habits.

To do so, they designed a random-utility discrete-choice model of parental naming decisions where the choice is binary; $U_{it}(1) = \text{Arabic name}$, $U_{it}(0) = \text{non-Arabic name}$, and thus where $\text{Baby} \in \{0, 1\}$ denotes alternatives, $V_{it}(\text{Baby})$ is the observed part of utility and $\epsilon_{it}(\text{Baby})$ is the unobserved parental-specific random shock across alternatives (residual).

$$\boxed{U_{it}(\text{Baby}) \equiv V_{it}(\text{Baby}) + \epsilon_{it}} \quad (1)$$

Then, they identify the differences in utility compared to the alternatives; $\text{Baby} = 1$ if and only if $\Delta U_{it} \equiv U_{it}(1) - U_{it}(0) \geq 0$. The difference in observed part of utility is as follows; $\Delta V_{it} \equiv V_{it}(1) - V_{it}(0)$ and the difference in unobserved utility; $\epsilon_{it} \equiv \epsilon_{it}(1) - \epsilon_{it}(0)$. From that:

$$\boxed{\begin{aligned} \Delta U_{it} &= \Delta V_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \\ &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \underbrace{\text{Parents}}_{\text{Vertical}} + \alpha_2 E \left[\frac{1}{N_{k(i)t}} \sum_{j \in k(i), j \neq i} \text{Baby}_{jt} \right] + \alpha_3 E[C_{it}] + \epsilon_{it} \\ &\quad \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\text{Horizontal}} \quad \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\text{Economic Cost}} \end{aligned}} \quad (2)$$

Their model incorporates three channels of transmission through the ΔV_{it} : vertical, horizontal and economical.¹⁸ The **Vertical** component captures the parental desire to transmit their own cultural type (as measured by coefficient α_1), it allows both for cultural transmission (the names

¹⁸ The model incorporates the two traditional vertical and horizontal channels analysed in the literature on cultural transmission (Bisin & Verdier, 2001)

of parents and babies belong to the same cultural type) and cultural adoption (parents with Arabic names that do not transmit their cultural type to their baby or parents with non-Arabic names adopting an Arabic name for their baby). Parents_{*i*} is measured by two binary variables; The first one, *One parent/grandparent with Muslim country nationality*, codes for babies born from parents or grandparents' nationals from a list of countries where Arabic names are prevalent (i.e., Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Middle East and Turkey); the second one, *One parent with Arabic name*, codes for the type of parental first names, Arabic/non-Arabic (using the same list as for babies). The **Horizontal** channel is the share of parents in the residential block chosen, namely block *k*, expected to make the same choice as *i*, with parameter α_2 expected to be positive. In their data, the block *k* is small enough that household *i* is not negligible. Basically, it is the social influence from their social environment. Among the $N_{k(i)t}$ babies born in residential block $k_{(i)}$ in year *t*, the variable $Baby_{jt}$ codes for choices of names among babies born from other parents *j* living in the block. It is measured by *the share of Arabic-named children aged 4-10 in the block*. The third component, **Economic Cost**, relates to the economic penalty that parents *i* expect to be attached to their baby if they choose an Arabic name. Thus, their utility depends on the expected economic cost that would burden their children, with an intensity of α_3 . It reflects both the degree to which parents value their children's economic welfare and the fact that parents are more or less likely to gather information based on their neighbours, which is labeled as the *Local Information on Penalty* (LIP). It is thus a perceived expected penalty, based on information from the labour market that households retrieve from social interactions and communication with their neighbours. More precisely, it is the average unemployment differential between Arabic and non-Arabic name holders across the occupations of neighbours.

Their empirical analysis is based on the French Labor Force Survey (LFS henceforth) from 2003 to 2007. Which represents the French population, stratified at levels of around 3500 residential blocks per year, with each block defined as an average of 20 adjacent households. The survey records the first names of all household members, including children below 15 years old. To avoid the importance of the self-segregation factor (since most households choose their location), they restricted their estimation to a subsample of households living in the public housing sector, which was made possible because LFS distinguishes between the public and the private housing sectors. Then, they control for parental occupation and education fixed effects to avoid any bias of self-selection into occupations with low discrimination. In order to

avoid any bias in the estimate of the economic cost effect α_3^{19} , they include a set of controls at the local level, to make sure to have a sufficient degree of ethnic fractorization.

Starting from the last formula (2), the authors manipulate the equivalences to derive a function giving the probability of choosing an Arabic name according to the different channels, where σ is a scaling parameter.

$$P(\text{Baby}_{it} = 1) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp\left(-\frac{\Delta V_{it}}{\sigma}\right)} \quad (3)$$

From there, they present their baseline results of the logit estimation of equation (3):

Dep. Var:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Arabic name for baby								
one parent/grandp. w/ Muslim country nat.	0.11 ^a (0.02)	0.09 ^a (0.01)	0.09 ^a (0.01)	0.09 ^a (0.01)	0.09 ^a (0.01)				
one parent with Arabic name	0.28 ^a (0.02)	0.23 ^a (0.01)	0.23 ^a (0.01)	0.23 ^a (0.01)	0.23 ^a (0.01)	0.36 ^a (0.04)	0.36 ^a (0.04)	0.36 ^a (0.04)	0.34 ^a (0.04)
share of Arabic name in block (aged 4-10)	0.11 ^a (0.03)	0.09 ^a (0.02)	0.08 ^a (0.02)	0.09 ^a (0.02)	0.07 ^a (0.02)	0.03 (0.05)	0.06 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)
occupational information on penalty	-0.05 (0.16)								
local unemployment penalty	-0.02 (0.02)								
local information on penalty		-0.86 ^a (0.33)	-1.00 ^a (0.34)	-1.06 ^a (0.34)	-1.10 ^a (0.36)	-2.95 ^a (1.07)	-2.94 ^a (1.09)	-3.19 ^a (1.09)	-3.18 ^a (1.08)
local Islamophobia			0.16 (0.14)	0.15 (0.14)	0.14 (0.15)		0.03 (0.45)	0.08 (0.49)	-0.10 (0.50)
local ELF index			0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)		-0.15 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.20 (0.14)
share of Arabic name in sector (aged 4-10)				-0.02 (0.04)				-0.10 (0.11)	
share of Arabic name in dept (aged 4-10)				-0.18 (0.13)				0.12 (0.36)	
share of Arabic name in block (aged 11-25)					0.01 (0.04)				0.08 (0.10)
share of Arabic name in block (aged 26-49)					0.04 (0.04)				0.15 (0.11)
share of Arabic name in block (aged 50+)					-0.05 (0.04)				-0.15 ^c (0.08)
one parent/grandp. w/ Muslim country nat. only						Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2806	3829	3829	3811	3777	992	992	987	973
Pseudo R ²	0.384	0.399	0.400	0.403	0.402	0.160	0.161	0.164	0.170
Mean probability	0.24	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.51
SD LIP		0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
SD Horizontal	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28

Note: logit estimates (average marginal effects). Standard errors, clustered at the residential block level, are in parentheses with ^a, ^b and ^c respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%. All regressions include dummies for parental education level, parental occupation group, *département* of residence, and years.

(1)

¹⁹ Housing blocks with more unskilled workers could exhibit more social discrimination against the part of the population identified with immigration from Maghreb. This could discourage parents from giving an Arabic name, for non-economic reasons.

Columns (1) to (5) estimate regressions on babies with parents from all origins, it considers the Muslim origins as a separate determinant. We see that the coefficients on our two vertical transmission variables are positive and strongly significant in all regressions of columns. In column (1), having a parent/grandparent of Muslim origin or having a parent with an Arabic name yields effects of respectively 11 and 28 percentage points. The vertical transmission is therefore a key determinant. The horizontal transmission channel also exhibits a strong positive effect, significant at the one percent threshold, with an average marginal effect at 0.11 (*share of Arabic name in block: aged 4-10*). In column (2), the penalty LIP variable is taken into account, and we see that the vertical and horizontal channels keep similar magnitudes and significance levels. The coefficient associated with the LIP is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. It means that the estimated economic disincentive of giving an Arabic name is larger in households who live in blocks where individuals have jobs often exposed to an employment penalty. After computing the quantification of this effect, they found that increasing LIP by one standard deviation reduces the probability of giving an Arabic name by 1.59 percentage points. In column (3), they react on the fact that housing blocks with more unskilled workers could be more prone to social discrimination against Muslim-origin individuals and on the fact that Arabic identity could be weaker in blocks with higher ethnic heterogeneity, discouraging parents from giving an Arabic name for non-economic reasons. Therefore, they add two control variables: local Islamophobia and ethno-linguistic fractionalization²⁰. We see that those alternative stories do not receive strong empirical support, while the impact of the economic channel remains essentially unchanged.

Columns (6) to (9) restrict the sample to children born with parents or grandparents who are nationals from our list of Muslim. This second part of the table allows for those of Muslim origins to influence all determinants, and particularly how sensitive parents are with respect to the economic penalty. It is particularly interesting to look at the vertical channel now reduced to one variable, it has become stronger than in the general sample, while the horizontal channel becomes weaker and insignificant. Surprisingly, the effect of LIP is about three times

²⁰ They first use answers to a question in a large-scale survey about attitudes toward Muslims in France, designed to be representative at the occupation level (Sauger, 2012). The most relevant question for our inquiry reads as: "Can you tell me if ISLAM means to you something very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative, or very negative?". Following the structure of our LIP variable, they weight the occupation-specific answers by the share of each occupation in the block. As a second control, they also include a standard ELF (ethno-linguistic fractionalization) index measuring the heterogeneity of households from different countries of origin within each block.

larger for migrants from Muslim/Arabic origins than for the full sample of parents. They found that an increase of one standard deviation in the perceived economic cost reduces the probability of giving an Arabic name for a child by around 5.5 percentage points (from column 6). This is a large effect, representing more than a 10% fall in the baseline probability of this sample.

Now, they turn to quantifying the effects of vertical, horizontal, and economic channels in the naming decision. In the results table (1) coefficients are average marginal effect over choices, making it easy to interpret the change in the baseline probability of an independent change in each channel. But they opt for an alternative quantifying method: they look at the model's predicted numbers of babies born with an Arabic name when we shut down each of the three channels in turn. To do so, they run the benchmark regression to have the estimation of the coefficient of interest and have as a result the benchmark probability of transmitting an Arabic first name. Then, they shut down each channel in turn to have the counterfactual number of babies born with an Arabic name in each experiment. The results for the quantification of each channel are reported on the following table (they focus on the point estimates in column (6) of table (1)).

Scenario:	# babies with arabic name		Mean Δ Welfare wrt benchmark	
	count	weighted count	change	weighted change
true figure	501	320851	.	.
benchmark	501	316292	.	.
no vertical (parental name)	221	139636	-.555	-.567
no horizontal	491	310516	-.026	-.024
no penalty	783	490945	1.098	1.109
no ghetto	500	316275	.002	.005
no foreign names	0	0	-.822	-.838

Note: This table uses logit estimates (col 6 of Table 5) based on the sample of 992 babies (0-3 years old) with Arabic origins and living in public housing (representing 618374 nationally). Each line presents a scenario, removing in turn one of the channels of influence in the regression.

(2)

The first line reports the true number of babies with an Arabic name, 501 in this sample and after applying survey weights²¹, they represent 320,851 babies nationally. The second line is the number of babies born with Arabic names as predicted by the benchmark regression. Then, they remove the vertical channel and see that the predicted number of Arabic naming decisions

²¹ Beforehand, they re-weighted observations of the public housing sample. The procedure is designed so that the re-weighted public housing sample displays similar distributions for a selected number of covariates compared to the targeted sample (either the overall set of households, or the ones living in private housing). They do this so that statistics displayed above are reassuring as to the extrapolation of the results to the entire population.

falls to 221 in that case, that is, 44% of true births. The removal of the horizontal channel removes only 2% of Arabic naming decisions from the benchmark. Lastly, the economic channel has a very strong effect: removing the economic penalty completely increases the number of babies receiving an Arabic name by 56%. In conclusion, we saw that the vertical channel shapes profoundly cultural transmission behavior, but its effect is being partially counterbalanced by the information parents receive about the economic cost of their naming decisions. If we were to remove all economic penalties on Arabic names, the annual number of babies born with an Arabic name in France would be more than 50 percent larger. The horizontal channel, on the other hand, is found to be much less important.

Now, those results bring us back to section 3.1, in which we saw that cultural assimilation, in terms of name choice, is a factor of cultural preservation for some communities, especially for Muslim/Arabic communities. Thanks to the approach of Algan et al., we can confirm this by looking at the magnitude of the vertical channel. Now, it has been clearly understood that, despite the will of preserving Arabic names, the probability of giving that kind of names to a child was inexorably impacted by the perceive penalty of doing so. Concretely, the penalty has been understood as the possible risk of unemployment linked with such a name, which we can definitely state as a discriminatory practice based on the name. This refers directly to the field experiments conducted among different companies of different countries we have analyzed in section 3.2. But something still bothers; nothing explains why cultural assimilation, namely giving a French name to the children, happens a lot faster for immigrants from southeastern Europe than for immigrants with North African origins. One might argue that, as we have seen in section 2.4.3.2, the fact that the immigrant population, and therefore also their children, tend to live in places of high immigrant density, making it harder for them to integrate, but this is contrasting the results of the impact of the horizontal channel on probable name decisions we observed. Hence, the answer must lie elsewhere.

3.4. The underworld of preferences

"You are not a child of the Republic; your name is an insult to France". This sentence is something we could easily find on the internet, expressed by an individual that aims to generate controversy (more commonly known as a "troll"). But unfortunately, no, this sentence was stated on a French television set in September 2018 against Hapsatou Sy, a columnist for

the program "Les Terriens du Dimanche", by Eric Zemmour, a notorious political journalist, columnist and polemicist of extreme right-wing tendencies (Rousseaux, 2018).

What happened there is that Mr. Zemmour chooses to express his preferences for a society where every minority would assimilate the values of the Republic, where a name like Abdelkader could only be heard among a group of tourists visiting Paris. Preferences do not deceive; they are the results of what life has given us, and what we have decided to keep from that. While it can easily create a very strong sentiment of confusion when we hear about one's preferences, it is worth trying to understand why they achieve such a view. Obviously, it can also happen that one's preferences could not possibly be understood, which would terminate in a dispute. Now, we will not try to understand Mr. Zemmour's preferences since it would without a doubt end in a strong disagreement. Plus, it is not the aim of this work. Instead, we focus on the preferences of the North African community to transmit names culturally charged with their origins. In 1977, Becker and Stigler argued that preferences were something intrinsic to every person and that it was not influenced by social pressure, nor was it a random phenomenon; it is a well thought and *coherent judgement* on what we value as individuals (Becker & Stigler, 1977). Now, the first instinct could be to state that their preferences are incoherent since the economic penalty to bear that kind of name is quite significant, but this is without taking into account the huge importance of the vertical channel: North-African people value the transmission of their typical names enormously. The explanation for that is not easily comprehensible for someone not part of this community but we have to accept the fact that it is not because we value certain preferences that everybody must see things the same way we do. On the other hand, Becker & Stigler also make the assumption that people's choices are *stable* and thus won't be affected by anything orbiting around them (i.e., social norms) that could influence the way they feel about their preferences. At first, this could be understood as a contradiction with the reaction linked with the economic channel. In reality, what looks like conformity and the alienation of one's preferences, is actually the outcome of rational decision-making by many individuals with no intention of conforming. It is a fad, they see the economic penalty attached to a name and react accordingly, but their preferences stay coherent and stable since the utility parents obtain from transmitting a Muslim/Arabic name is harshly reduced when the penalty variable is introduced in the model. If it was not the case, then we could consider their preferences as unstable. Following this reasoning, the reason why immigrant from southeastern Europe assimilated more easily into French culture must lie in their preferences. Unfortunately, it is very challenging to try to understand why the preferences of

both groups are so different, or in other words, explaining why the vertical channel plays such a huge role for Arabic families and (apparently) not for Southeastern families, we can only assume: what if the answer laid in what we have been avoiding until now?

3.5. An insight on the importance of religion

Since the massive post-war waves of immigration, the French religious sector is undergoing a profound transformation, marked by the continuation of the secularization movement and by the emergence of Islam as a minority religion. As we saw in section 3.1, it seems that cultural assimilation, in terms of name choice, is a factor of cultural preservation for the communities where parents give a high degree of importance to religion.

Arabic names are a sign of religion since most of them come from the Quran and it is a natural practice to transmit names associated with the Quran for religious people (Algan, Malgouyres, Mayer , & Thoenig, 2020). In France, non-Arabic names are often inspired by Christian Saints names (collet, 2019). The names from Southeastern European countries follow the same trend as the majority population since they are also inspired by Christian names, the difference is that those names are Latin names inspired by the Latin tradition of Christian names. By looking at the results of the importance of religion according to the origin on table 6 (Beauchemin, Hamel, & Simon, 2010), we see that on average approximately 77% of first-generation immigrant from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia give “enough or a lot” of importance to their religion. In contradiction, for Portugal, Spain and Italy it is on average approximately 40%. Now, the table does not specify which religion, but it is safe to assume that most of the respondents believe respectively in Islam and Christianity.

Then, for second generation, scores are respectively of approximately 75% and 30%. We see a decrease of 10 percentage points for the Southeastern European countries while Maghreb countries stay consistent. This reflects the results we found on child naming decisions, even if it is not proportional, Latin names tend to disappear while Arabic names persist, even if decreasing due to, as we have seen, economic penalties. Now, one might argue that immigrant from Southeastern European countries choose easier for French names since those are linked to their religion also, but our reasoning tends to see things differently. We see that Portugal, Spain and Italy follow the same trend as the majority population in terms of importance given to religion (24%). Now, even though the majority population and the people

of Latin origin choose for a French name, and thus names often linked with Christianity, there is a strong respective difference between the importance given to religion, meaning that the desire to choose a French-sounding first name stems more from the mechanics of conforming to social norms than from the importance attached to the religious faith. The French idea on religion is an anti-nihilist view, in the Nietzschean sense of the term, meaning that there is a clear dynamic of religious disillusion, whereas Muslim communities in France tend to build themselves religiously against the trend of the majority population.

This explanation is but a mere reasoning on the question of preference identification. Identifying the preferences of others is something particularly delicate; inferring explanations about the preferences of a community to which one does not belong is not an easy task. Whether religion plays a key role in preferences or not is a relevant question that might be worth studying more closely.

4. Conclusion

Today, it would be wrong to state that all people originating from immigration tend to mimic the cultural practices of the majority population, but it would also be wrong to argue that their differences are the results of an incomplete integration. The truth lies somewhere in between.

This work has been focusing mainly on immigrants from North-Africa because as we have seen, France's colonial past deeply impacted the course of their existence. The result is that they are today the largest community of immigrants of multiple generations. But they are also the more prone to integration retention since the culture shock is for them particularly powerful. In the eyes of the French Republic, this resulted in an incomplete cultural assimilation. Now, its responsibility plays an important role in the so-called lack of cultural assimilation as they were the one to geographically centralize immigration. Also, the mixed message emerging from the State saying that they are openly and firmly against communitarism but at the same time trying to value cultural differences is something that is interpreted as inconsistent and does not help in the integration process. Moreover, the French model of integration is being deeply damaged by discrimination as we have seen with the perceived discrimination based on skin color and origin, which is particularly strong for immigrants with Sub-Saharan and Maghrebi origin. Also, the anti-discrimination process has been slow to introduce because of the authorities' refusal to account for the ethno-racial discrimination present in France and it remains imperfect because of the State's "colour-blind" approach to the problem; it is very reluctant to compile ethnic statistics. Subsequently, we focused our attention on another trigger for discrimination: the transmission of cultural practices from parents to their offspring, more precisely, the transmission of first names on the basis that it can be considered as the purest expression of cultural identity. We demonstrated that immigrants gave first names to their children different from those given by the French majority population, especially when they originated from Maghreb/Middle East. We saw that for the next generation of immigrants, about two third of the children of immigrants from the North African origin are given an Arab-Muslim name, which was a much poorer results compared with the Southern Europeans immigration. Despite that, we noticed that a cultural innovation is taking place in the choice of first names with the introduction of new names that are wrongly considered of North African origin. After demonstrating through different field experiments that first names, when coming from a cultural minority, were a cause for

discrimination, we investigated the incentives of cultural assimilation in terms of child naming decisions. We found that the parental desire to transmit their own cultural type shapes profoundly the cultural transmission behavior, but its effect was being partially counterbalanced by the economic cost of the child's name (the information on unemployment). We saw that by removing this penalty on Arabic names, the annual number of babies born with an Arabic name in France would be more than 50 percent larger. We also deduced that the effect of the neighbour's child naming decisions was found to be much less important. Then, we justified the child naming behavior of minorities by their preferences, and we argued that they were coherent and stable and that the decision to give French names to their children was the outcome of rational decision-making by many individuals with no intention of conforming but who wanted to avoid an economic penalty. Lastly, we accounted for the fact that understanding the preferences of others was very challenging. Even though, we tried to find an explanation in the importance given to religion for the fact that parental desire to transmit their own cultural type of name played an important role in Muslim Arabic families and not for Christian Southeastern families.

It is not true that immigrants are reluctant to integration. It is well true that for certain communities the process can be slower, but we have seen that even though people didn't feel perceived as French, they did feel French, despite the tendency to access the bi-nationality when originating from immigration, which is in no mean incompatible with a true French identity. The cultural diversity of French society is today a reality and does not systematically represent a failure of integration. It is an expression of people's preferences and even though they can be incentivized to change, we have to respect the fact that not everybody see and feel things the same way. In 21st century France, the pluralism of culture and identities is as real as it could be and since it is here, why not embrace it?

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
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
6. Appendix

Graph 1: Ngram Viewer of the invention of immigrant "integration" (1780-2019).



Source: "French 2019" by Ngram Viewer (smoothing of 1).

Figure 1: Proportion of DOM-born, immigrants and their descendants who say they are not seen as French, according to their origin.




Source • Enquête Trajectoires et Origines, INED-INSEE, 2008.

Champ • France métropolitaine. Individus âgés de 18 à 50 ans.

Lecture • 39% des natifs d'un DOM résidant en France métropolitaine sont en désaccord (plutôt pas ou pas du tout d'accord) avec la phrase « on me voit comme un Français ».

Graph 2: the fight against discrimination (1940-2019)



Source: "French 2019" by Ngram Viewer (smoothing of 1).

Table 1: Representation of gender and origin discrimination by link to migration and sex


	Discriminations liées à l'origine ou à la couleur de la peau		Discrimination à l'encontre des femmes		Effectifs non pondérés	
	Hommes	Femmes	Hommes	Femmes	Hommes	Femmes
Ensemble des immigrés	42	43	16	19	2921	3447
Descendants de deux parents immigrés	55	59	24	31	2172	2453
Descendants d'un seul parent immigré	58	62	30	33	1693	1790
Population majoritaire	53	60	27	29	2088	2293
Ensemble de la population métropolitaine	53	58	26	28	8874	9983

Source • Enquête Trajectoires et Origines, INED-INSEE, 2008.
 Champ • Population âgée de 18 à 50 ans.
 Lecture • 42% des hommes immigrés optent pour la modalité « souvent » dans leur réponse à la question sur leur perception des discriminations liées à l'origine ou la couleur de la peau en France.


Table 2: Reasons for discrimination by detailed origin

	Âge	Sexe	Couleur de peau	Origines	Quartier	Accent	Religion	Look	Situation familiale	Effectifs non pondérés
Pays ou département de naissance des immigrés ou natifs d'un DOM										
DOM	11	5	78	34	6	14	6	8	3	168
Algérie	6	2	14	85	8	10	8	4	3	192
Maroc et Tunisie	6	5	24	87	3	8	12	3	1	273
Afrique sahélienne	2	3	81	52	3	16	3	1	2	240
Afrique guinéenne ou centrale	2	2	86	44	3	9	1	1	3	310
Asie du Sud-Est	3	6	25	73	5	20	0	0	3	95
Turquie	3	3	6	77	7	20	13	7	1	166
Portugal	4	8	2	51	3	14	5	9	18	37
Autres pays de l'UE27	4	18	3	72	12	20	1	9	6	97
Autres pays	3	5	38	64	5	22	2	3	1	236
Ensemble des immigrés	4	5	34	70	5	14	6	4	3	1668
Pays ou département de naissance des parents des descendants d'immigrés ou natifs d'un DOM										
DOM	14	9	81	28	12	3	1	10	2	243
Algérie	7	6	20	83	11	4	15	6	3	504
Maroc et Tunisie	9	7	31	80	18	3	23	8	3	423
Afrique sahélienne	10	7	87	43	16	10	6	11	1	210
Afrique guinéenne ou centrale	11	6	89	46	18	3	4	6	1	153
Asie du Sud-Est	22	14	38	64	12	6	1	8	5	159
Turquie	15	4	5	75	14	4	14	6	0	143
Portugal	13	18	14	44	6	7	3	10	6	105
Espagne et Italie	15	24	9	26	11	4	2	6	7	155
Autres pays de l'UE27	12	24	7	26	7	6	12	8	3	64
Autres pays	12	12	44	54	15	3	6	11	6	156
Ensemble des descendants d'immigrés	10	10	28	65	13	4	13	8	4	2502
Population majoritaire	16	24	8	18,5	6	4	3	11	9	356
Ensemble de la population métropolitaine	12	17	20	39	8	6	5	9	7	4487
<p>Source • Enquête Trajectoires et Origines, INED-INSEE, 2008. Champ • Individus âgés de 18 à 50 ans ayant déclaré avoir vécu une discrimination au cours des 5 dernières années. Lecture • Interrogés sur les motifs de discrimination, 78 % des natifs d'un DOM citent la couleur de la peau, 34 % les origines et 11 % l'âge. Notes • Plusieurs réponses étant possibles, les pourcentages sont supérieurs à 100. Le motif le plus cité par chacune des sous-populations est indiqué en rouge. Les résultats pour les immigrés en provenance d'Espagne ne sont pas présentés en raison des effectifs trop faibles. Les chiffres en italiques ont été calculés sur un effectif inférieur à 50 personnes et sont donc fragiles.</p>										

Figure 2: Proportion of bi-nationals by origin of immigrants who became French and descendants of immigrants



Graph 3: Proportion of Arab-Muslim first names among North African immigrants' grandchildren by parents' religiosity



B. Coulmont, P. Simon, *Population & Societies* no. 565, INED, April 2019.

Source: Trajectories and Origins (TeO) survey, INED-INSEE, 2008-2009.

* parent reported having no religion.

Table 3: Relationship to migration and origin of spouse of descendants of immigrants by country of birth of their parents

Pays de naissance des parents des descendants d'immigrés	Immigré originaire du même pays que celui des parents	Descendant d'un immigré originaire du même pays que celui des parents	Immigré d'un autre pays que celui des parents	Descendant d'un immigré d'un autre pays que celui des parents	Majoritaire*	Total	Effectifs non pondérés	% de descendants avec 1 seul parent immigré
HOMMES								
Algérie	22	16	5	13	44	100	288	35
Maroc et Tunisie	19	8	2	18	52	100	158	46
Afrique sahélienne	35	3	3	12	47	100	48	34
Afrique guinéenne ou centrale	7	4	7	16	66	100	37	46
Asie du Sud-Est	2	3	1	12	81	100	70	53
Turquie	38	12	4	6	41	100	79	23
Portugal	8	16	3	5	68	100	270	33
Espagne et Italie	2	6	5	7	80	100	554	63
Autres pays de l'UE 27	4	0	6	7	83	100	197	86
Autres pays	8	2	10	14	66	100	104	65
Ensemble des hommes descendants d'immigrés	10	9	5	9	68	100	1805	53
FEMMES								
Algérie	26	16	6	9	42	100	342	32
Maroc et Tunisie	38	11	7	8	36	100	309	32
Afrique sahélienne	45	5	6	19	26	100	64	35
Afrique guinéenne ou centrale	23	1	7	6	64	100	49	54
Asie du Sud-Est	8	9	10	16	57	100	112	56
Turquie	74	13	3	3	7	100	99	1
Portugal	13	14	6	5	62	100	297	28
Espagne et Italie	2	5	4	7	83	100	558	72
Autres pays de l'UE 27	0	1	9	10	80	100	210	92
Autres pays	7	2	6	15	71	100	131	73
Ensemble des femmes descendantes d'immigrés	16	9	6	8	61	100	2171	52
Ensemble des descendant-e-s d'immigrés	13	9	5	9	65	100	3976	53
Ensemble des descendant-e-s ayant un seul parent immigré	3	4	6	9	78	100	1893	
Ensemble des descendant-e-s ayant deux parents immigrés	23	14	5	9	49	100	2083	

Source • Enquête Trajectoires et Origines, INED-INSEE, 2008.
 Champ • Descendants d'immigrés âgés de 18 à 50 ans, vivant en couple marié, pacsé et concubin (cohabitant ou pas).
 Lecture • 22% des hommes âgés de 18 à 50 ans, ayant un ou deux parents immigrés d'Algérie, vivent en couple avec une femme immigrée née en Algérie.
 * Sont inclus ici les conjoints natifs d'un DOM ou descendants d'un natif d'un DOM qui ne représentent que 0,9% des conjoints des descendants d'immigrés.

Table 4: Proportion (in %) of immigrants with a good or very good level of French, on arrival in France and at the time of the survey

Pays de naissance	Hommes			Femmes		
	Bon ou très bon niveau déclaré...			Bon ou très bon niveau déclaré...		
	à l'arrivée en France	au moment de l'enquête	Effectifs non pondérés	à l'arrivée en France	au moment de l'enquête	Effectifs non pondérés
Algérie	52	84	330	44	72	395
Maroc et Tunisie	47	77	536	36	64	532
Afrique sahélienne	58	73	293	48	58	310
Afrique guinéenne ou centrale	82	95	254	73	90	368
Asie du Sud-Est	11	72	347	8	50	336
Turquie	4	38	403	3	37	355
Portugal	3	50	354	4	54	347
Espagne et Italie	5	78	168	12	75	180
Autres pays de l'UE 27	21	63	216	36	78	404
Autres pays	24	65	513	25	65	654
Ensemble des immigrés	31	69	3414	31	66	3881

Source • Enquête Trajectoires et Origines, INED-INSEE, 2008.
 Champ • Immigrés âgés de 18-60 ans résidant en France métropolitaine, arrivés après l'âge de 3 ans dont le français n'a pas été reçu ou n'est pas la seule langue reçue pendant l'enfance.
 Lecture • Les hommes immigrés originaires d'Algérie ont déclaré parler, comprendre, lire et écrire bien ou très bien le français au moment de leur arrivée en France pour 52% d'entre eux et au moment de l'enquête pour 84%.

Table 5: Mean call-back rates by racial soundness of names

	Call-Back Rate for White Names	Call-Back Rate for African American Names	Ratio	Difference (p-value)
Sample:				
All sent resumes	10.06% [2445]	6.70% [2445]	1.50	3.35% (.0000)
Chicago	8.61% [1359]	5.81% [1359]	1.48	2.80% (.0024)
Boston	11.88% [1086]	7.83% [1086]	1.52	4.05% (.0008)
Females	10.33% [1868]	6.87% [1893]	1.50	3.46% (.0001)
Females in administrative jobs	10.93% [1363]	6.81% [1364]	1.60	4.12% (.0001)
Females in sales jobs	8.71% [505]	6.99% [529]	1.25	1.72% (.1520)
Males	9.19% [577]	6.16% [552]	1.49	3.03% (.0283)

*Notes:

1. The table reports, for the entire sample and different subsamples of sent resumes, the call-back rates for applicants with a White sounding name (column 1) and an African American sounding name (column 2), as well as the ratio (column 3) and difference (column 4) of these call-back rates. In brackets in each cell is the number of resumes sent in that cell.
2. Column 4 also reports the p-value for a test of proportion testing the null hypothesis that the call-back rates are equal across racial groups.

Table 6: Importance of religion by gender and origin (%)

Tableau 3 - Importance de la religion selon le sexe et l'origine (en %)				
	Hommes	Femmes	Ensemble	Effectifs non pondérés
Pays de naissance des immigrés et des natifs d'un DOM				
DOM	50	63	58	410
Algérie	72	82	77	565
Maroc et Tunisie	72	82	77	817
Afrique sahélienne	77	89	84	507
Afrique guinéenne ou centrale	76	78	77	548
Asie du Sud-Est	50	59	55	343
Turquie	67	79	73	634
Portugal	38	51	45	431
Espagne et Italie	29	30	30	144
Autres pays de l'UE27	33	41	38	364
Autres pays	61	66	64	774
Ensemble des immigrés	62	70	66	5 127
Pays de naissance des parents des descendants d'immigrés et de natif d'un DOM				
DOM	43	49	46	414
Algérie	71	75	73	825
Maroc et Tunisie	71	81	77	864
Afrique sahélienne	90	85	88	392
Afrique guinéenne ou centrale	67	61	64	242
Asie du Sud-Est	49	45	47	251
Turquie	71	76	73	390
Portugal	30	44	37	617
Espagne et Italie	24	27	26	868
Autres pays de l'UE27	22	31	26	372
Autres pays	51	53	52	333
Ensemble des descendants d'immigrés	49	57	53	5 324
Population majoritaire	20	27	24	1 635
Ensemble de la population métropolitaine	31	38	34	12 910

Source • Enquête Trajectoires et Origines, INED-INSEE, 2008.
 Champ • Personnes de 18 à 50 ans ayant déclaré avoir une religion.
 Lecture • 72% des hommes immigrés d'Algérie ayant déclaré une religion accordent assez ou beaucoup d'importance à cette religion dans leur vie et 82% des femmes immigrées d'Algérie sont dans ce cas.