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How coherent are the EU's peace-building efforts in Libyan crisis after the fall of Gaddafi?

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Table of contents

1. Introduction.....	4
2. Libya in post Gaddafi's Era.....	6
2.1 Current situation in Libya.....	6
2.2 Geopolitical situation of Libya.....	8
2.3 Historical reasoning for tribal division in Libya.....	9
2.4 Political failure to secure Libya after death of Gaddafi.....	11
2.5 Governance crisis in Libya.....	14
3. Peace-building efforts applied by the European Union in Libyan crisis.....	24
3.1 Peace-building efforts of the EU in the Libyan security sector.....	28
3.1.1 The state of security and defence sector in Libya.....	28
3.1.2 European Union Global Strategy.....	29
3.1.3 Why is the EU interested in Libya?.....	31
3.1.4 The Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU in Libya.....	32
3.1.5 EU Sahel Strategy	35
3.1.6 Security Sector Reform (SSR).....	38
3.2 Peace-building efforts of the EU promoting democratic governance in Libya.....	41
3.2.1 EU and democratic liberal peace theory.....	41
3.2.2 European Neighbourhood Policy.....	42
3.2.3 Security Sector Governance.....	44
3.2.4 Democratization strategy of the EU.....	46
3.2.5 Economic liberalization strategy of the EU.....	51
3.3 Peace-building efforts of the EU promoting development in Libya.....	53
3.3.1 Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP).....	57
3.3.2 European Neighbourhood Instrument.....	59
3.3.3 EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa	60
4. Conclusion.....	62
5. Bibliography.....	64

1. Introduction

At the heart of Libyan misery is the country's de facto partition into areas dominated by different tribal groups, disputing for national wealth and unable to come into peaceful agreement. The political process is in limbo with three governments, ideologically divided among moderate and extreme Islamists, liberals, secessionists or monarchists, creating a lawless space in Libya. Military groups, once united in their revolutionary struggle against Muammar Gaddafi, are split along ethnic, regional and local lines, wielding the real power in Libya holding politicians in the impasse. Ordinary Libyans are suffering from electricity and water shortages, impending collapse of health sector and depreciating Libyan currency. The crisis in Libya may have unprecedented consequences and external actions are seen as indispensable for the security and stability of the region and also the European Union (EU). The far-reaching consequences of the aggravating situation in Libya are pushing the international community and predominantly the EU towards action, which has been plagued by migrants, subsequent rise of extreme-right political movements and has suffered from Brexit, pushing it to take responsible actions to resolve the instable situation in its neighbourhood. The Lisbon Treaty declares that the European Union aims to "preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security".¹ This research is significant for political science because it brings together the description of the dire situation in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi and the analysis of main peace-building tools and strategies the EU can offer for creating peace in Libya. The Agenda for Peace, by then Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali, set out a vision of post-conflict peace-building, as a combination of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, defining it as "action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict".² The main objective of this thesis is to assess how coherent are the EU's peace-building efforts in the Libyan crisis after the fall of Gaddafi, examining the connection between the EU's peace-building tools and strategies with its performed activities on the ground in Libya. Even though, post-conflict peace-building in Libya is predicted to be performed in cooperation with different external actors, as a reason of the EU's geographical proximity to Libya, the EU is anticipated to be one of the most active actors on the

¹ Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, EUR-Lex, 2007, OJ C306/23, Chapter 1, Article 10 A.

² 'An Agenda for Peace', UN Documents Gathering a Body of Global Agreements, A/47/277, 1992, <http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm>, (accessed 15 May 2017).

ground in Libya due to fear of unfolding consequences of insecurity in its neighbourhood. Due to persistence of instability in Libya since 2011 up to present times, led me to start this research with a hypothesis that the EU's peace-building efforts in the Libyan crisis after the fall of Gaddafi are not coherent, because the EU is mainly concerned for its own security and economic interests rather than for peaceful, democratic and sustainable development in Libya. In order to validate this hypothesis, the methodology of this research paper consists of mixture of qualitative and quantitative data. Conducting interviews with practitioners and engaged academics that have deep insight into the situation in Libya, allowed me to have the comprehension of the reality on the ground in Libya. The first part of this analysis explores the current situation in Libya and the maturing governance crisis in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi. The second part analyses the peace-building instruments and strategies the European Union is offering to resolve the crisis in Libya, using peace-building theories as the main theoretical framework.

2. Libya in post Gaddafi's Era

The first chapter will demonstrate the seriousness of the Libyan present situation by describing its political, economic and social context. The worsening state of Libya since 2011 has been evident through the deteriorating environment in the country, which makes the peace-building response to be seemed as imminent. In order to assess constructively the potential peace-building activities on the ground, it is necessary to particularize the main sectors in Libya which are in strong need for reforms. Libya is inseparable from the geopolitical situation of Middle East and North Africa region and therefore this descriptive part will be also devoted to create linkages between the region and Libya, which is fundamental in thinking about peace-building strategy in Libya.

2.1 Current situation in Libya

The current political situation in Libya is anarchy and scramble for power and wealth. The struggles for power and political influence are between the officially and internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), previously UN-backed House of Representatives (HoR) in the east of Libya, and National Salvation government, or former General National Congress (GNC) in the west part of Libya. Neither of them recognizes the legitimacy of the other.³ As a result of continued anarchy without political agreement between HoR and GNC and the deteriorating situation in Libya, the UN formed the third government, Government of National Accord (GNA) on 17 December 2015 led by Fayez al-Sarraj as a resolution between warring factions, with the main aim to create a unity government. GNA is seen as “the last hopes of keeping the country united.”⁴ However since the beginning of its rule in Tripoli, it was unable to gain support of two rival governments and it was incapable to solve some of the main challenges facing Libya.⁵ The prevalent absence of legitimate representative

³ 'A Powerful Show Of Support For The House Of Representatives', *Stratfor*, 2017, <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/powerful-show-support-house-representatives>, (accessed 14 April 2017).

⁴ Guma EL-GAMATY, 'Libya: The Story Of The Conflict Explained', *Aljazeera*, 2016, [website], <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/libya-story-conflict-explained-160426105007488.html>, (accessed 14 April 2017).

⁵ Aidan LEWIS, 'Deputy Leader Of Libya's U.N.-Backed Government Resigns', *Reuters*, 2017, [website], <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-politics-idUSKBN14M13A>, (accessed 1 April 2017).

authority in Libya and the lack of agreement between all governments, where one side demands from the other to break the connections of GNC politicians to Salafist militias and the other demands to break the connections to Libyan Army General Khalifa Haftar have direct effect on the deterioration of the situation on the ground.⁶ Both demands are unrealizable because both military groups represent the main power which both governments need, in order to back up its political authority and to retain respect in front of its people that support them. The power of Haftar is manifested by the increasing support he gets from international backers, mostly Egypt, but also The United Arab Emirates and Russia. The lack of political consensus enables other military groups to divide Libya among political and tribal lines. This situation is aggravated by terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and Ansar al-Sharia that create safe havens in uncontrolled territory. The absence of social contract between governments and Libyan population in the whole country have created a political vacuum that serves to benefit to illicit trade and smuggling networks through Libya. The mounting insecurity in Libya has been a major impediment to political, economic and social progress in the country, which needs to be tackled by the future government in a sustainable manner.

The European Union has been engaging more actively with Libyan authorities since 2013 through a civilian mission and through various initiatives. According to the peace-building theories, the most fundamental elements, the EU is highlighting in its peace-building approach, have been security, democracy and development. It has been acknowledged by both academics and practitioners that neither democracy nor development can be reached without security and vice-versa. According to the Global Peace Index (GPI) 2016, Libya's place in the ranking of the global state of peace is at 154th place, therefore among the 10 lowest in the GPI.⁷ Moreover, there has been a significant deterioration in the state of peace in Libya since 2014, exemplified by its fall from 133th place in GPI to 149th place in 2015.⁸⁹ In spite of the EU's engagement, the gruesome situation in Libya leads to the questioning of the peace building instruments and strategies that are applied and their effects on the ground.

⁶ 'Civil War In Libya' *Council on Foreign Relations*, 2017, <http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/civil-war-in-libya>, (accessed 14 April 2017).

⁷ 'Global Peace Index 2016' *Institute for Economics & Peace*, 2016, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/02/GPI-2016-Report_2.pdf, (accessed 11 May 2017) p.11

⁸ Ibid. p. 6

⁹ 'Global Peace Index 2015' *Institute for Economics & Peace*, 2015, http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Global-Peace-Index-Report-2015_0.pdf, (accessed 10 May 2017), p. 2

2.2 Geopolitical situation of Libya

Libya cannot be taken out of the broader context representing the situation in Africa, seen as the continent of conflicts and fault lines based on identity.¹⁰ Libya is a part of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and neighbours the Sahel region, with which it shares common characteristics and is directly influenced by the events taking place in any country of those regions. Almost all states in the MENA and Sahel regions are Muslim, retaining pre-Islamic elements. All states share a dire colonial past, which left marks on their future development.¹¹ Many of them share the absence of adequate infrastructure and resources, the underdevelopment of their economies due to non-diversification, and a youth crisis due to lack of employment. The system of tribes, kinship, loyalties and big division between rural and urban life is often a sign across those regions which had impacted the manner of politics in many countries. Another common trend in the regions is the low security resulting from the lack of state capacity, division of power between elites and the rise of terrorism.¹² The mix of political instability, social division and lack of economic prosperity located especially in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa, serves as a breeding ground for radicalism. Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Sharia, Islamic State (IS), Boko Haram and al-Shabaab pose a threat to the whole region.¹³ The uncontrolled areas in those countries have open up new opportunities for drug traffickers.¹⁴ Both regions are impacted by globalization and foreign interference. The MENA region has experienced the worst levels of peace deterioration in the world and it rates as “the least peaceful region in the world”.¹⁵ This is due to the increase of its involvement in regional conflicts¹⁶, decrease in internal security¹⁷, the highest level of military expenditure per capita¹⁸ and a sharp

¹⁰ Hans HOEBEKE et al., “The EU as a security actor in Africa “, *The Clingendael Monitor 2016*, https://www.clingendael.nl/pub/2015/clingendael_monitor_2016_en/2_the_eu_as_a_security_actor_in_africa/ (accessed 2 May 2017).

¹¹ 'North Africa: A Cultural Crossroads Faces The Future' *Stratfor*, 2014, <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/north-africa-cultural-crossroads-faces-future>, (accessed 11 April 2017).

¹² Saul B. COHEN, *Geopolitics: The Geography Of International Relations*, 3rd edn, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2014, chapter 7.

¹³ Hans HOEBEKE et al., op.cit..

¹⁴ Mehdi TAJE, 'Vulnerabilities And Factors Of Insecurity In The Sahel', *OECD, Sahl and West Africa Club Secretariat (SWAC/OECD)*, 2010), <https://www.oecd.org/swac/publications/45830109.pdf>, (accessed 3 April 2017).

¹⁵ 'Global Peace Index 2016' *Institute for Economics & Peace*, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/02/GPI-2016-Report_2.pdf, (accessed 11 May 2017), p.8.

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 23

¹⁷ Ibid. p.26

rise in the level of violent crime¹⁹. Overall those regions have very little experiences with democracy due to highly centralized decision-making structures installed during the colonial period. Tunisia is today the only democratic state in North Africa, which is struggling for preserving this form of governance due to slowness of reforms which inspired many people to go out to the streets and protest again. Furthermore, it is not just features of the MENA and Sahel regions that have big influence on Libya, it is the whole African continent that has impact on the stability of Libya. An increase in development in African states tends to have a positive correlation with an increase of emigration from those countries.²⁰ Libya represents a major gateway to Europe. Europe, which is located just across the Mediterranean, needs to be prepared to act accordingly. The common geography of the North Africa and Sahel regions, common history, religion, traditions and common security threats make analysis about Libya impossible to separate from the region as a whole because of the strong inter-regional influence that interlinks all threats and insecurities of the region together.

2.3 Historical reasoning for tribal division in Libya

The social cleavages play important role in the Libyan conflict and to overcome the current societal antagonism should be a part in the future peace-building process. In order to assess the tribal division in Libya accurately, this paper has to explore Libyan history before Gaddafi's regime. After the Allied victory in WWII, Italy lost power over its colonies and Libya came under the control of Great Britain and France, which decided to divide the country into three regions, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan as a consequence of their national interests.²¹ After Libya gained independence in 1951, it started off as a federal monarchy consisting of those three regions.²² Each region had its own regional government and legislative body whilst the central

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 46

¹⁹ Ibid. p.8

²⁰ Marie-Laurence FLAHAUX and Hain De HAAS, 'African Migration: Trends, Patterns, Drivers', *Comparative Migration Studies*, Springer Open, 2016, <https://comparativemigrationstudies.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40878-015-0015-6>, (accessed 11 April 2017).

²¹ Nadine SCHNELZER, *Libya In The Arab Spring: The Constitutional Discourse Since The Fall Of Gaddafi*, 1st edn, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden VS, 2016, p. 31.

²² Mahmoud Cherif BASSIOUNI, *Libya From Repression To Revolution: A Record Of Armed Conflict And International Law Violations*, 1st edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, p.40.

government and parliament were tackling other issues. In 1963, Muammar Gaddafi came to power, abolished the federal system, unified the country by centralizing political institutions and became an absolute dictator of Libya for almost 42 years.

Gaddafi, during his 42 years' rule of Libya, did not invest in institutions or nation-building projects, but rather concentrated on consolidating his power by a reliance on kinship networks.²³ This fractured Libyan society along the lines of tribal, geographical and social classes. Gaddafi was able to manipulate loyalty of these tribal rivalries in order to pre-empt the rise of any central power and to maintain his grip on power.²⁴ Dispensing patronage to kin and clan was not however done on equal basis. Gaddafi was marginalizing tribes from eastern Libya, whilst over-supporting tribes in central Libya where his hometown Sirte is located and in western Libya where the government was based. Gaddafi exploited the historical division between western Tripolitania, eastern Cyrenaica and southern Fezzan to "divide and conquer", suppressing regional interests in order to legitimize his authority.²⁵ Lacher argues against misleading interpretation of rising conflict only between tribes and emphasizes a rival confrontation also between cities and towns.²⁶ Crisis group supports this view by putting emphasis on Qaddafi's divide and rule strategy which set communities against each other, prioritizing the growing wealth in one town over the other depending on the connections with ruling elites and unequal share of resources.²⁷ This was indeed an effective short-term strategy to keep the country together. However as a long-term strategy with continuous urbanization and increase of education, it proved to be unsustainable, because people became annoyed with the prevalence of kinship and with the extent of corruption in the country, slowly recognizing Gaddafi's regime as their common enemy. Taking into consideration that Libya had the highest Human Development

²³ Housam DARWISHEH, 'Trajectories And Outcomes Of The 'Arab Spring': Comparing Tunisia, Egypt, Libya And Syria', *Institute of Developing Economies*, No. 456, 2014, <http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/456.pdf>, (accessed 11 April 2017).

²⁴ Wolfram LACHER, 'Families, Tribes And Cities In The Libyan Revolution' *Middle East Policy Council*, 2017, <http://www.mepc.org/journal/families-tribes-and-cities-libyan-revolution>, (accessed 11 April 2017).

²⁵ Richard BAXLEY, 'Shifting Loyalties; Libya's Dynamic Tribalism', *Harvard International Review*, vol.33, no.2, Harvard International Relations Council, 2011, <http://www.freepatentsonline.com/article/Harvard-International-Review/261641025.html>, (accessed March 2017).

²⁶ Wolfram LACHER, op.cit..

²⁷ 'Divided We Stand: Libya's Enduring Conflicts' *International Crisis Group*, no.130, 2012, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/divided-we-stand-libya-s-enduring-conflicts>, (accessed 10 March 2017).

Index in Africa before the NATO invasion²⁸, Bexley summarized that “in the ideal world, governments would build nationwide loyalty through providing security, stability and services for their people rather than manipulating a corrupt political system to remain in power.”²⁹ National bureaucracy has been found in a disastrous, disorganized stage due to local administrative divisions that have been changed several times in order to prevent one of them from getting too much power.³⁰ Despite this, Gaddafi’s leadership is often defended and he is seen as the authority that retained respect in the eyes of powerful dimensions within Libya and was able to preserve the country together.³¹ The fragmented nature of the post-Gaddafi political scene is in line with historical tribal division in colonial Libya, which was aggravated during Gaddafi’s rule and by his policy-making, filled with corruption and clientelism, which antagonized different groups in Libya and led to their revolt and consequently to a struggle for power in the current state of civil war. The strong sense of tribalism existing in Libya indicates why a strong authority such as Gaddafi was needed to unite the country together and it remains to be a challenge for the future political leaders to find a system, which will be able to represent all Libyan tribes in unified way in accountable and transparent manner.

2.4 Political failure to secure Libya after death of Gaddafi

Gaddafi was killed on 20 October 2011 outside of Sirte by Misrata thuwar revolutionaries. The immediate result of NATO’s Operation Unified Protector was seen as a success, evidenced by Obama’s remarks at the UN: “Libya is a lesson in what the international community can achieve when we stand together as one”.³² The NATO operation was principally appraised for boots off the ground, low number of casualties, quick victory, clear exit strategy and no subsequent foreign occupation, which could spark hatred by Arab states. Russia, China and South Africa

²⁸ 'Libya: Country Profile Of Human Development Indicators', Global Research, UNDP, 2011, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/libya-country-profile-of-human-development-indicators/24152>, (accessed 11 April 2017).

²⁹ Richard BAXLEY, op.cit..

³⁰ Larbi SADIKI, *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring*, 1st edn, TAYLOR & FRANCIS, 2014, p.108.

³¹ George FRIEDMAN, “Libya, the West and the Narrative Democracy”, *Stratfor*, 2011, <https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/libya-west-and-narrative-democracy>, (accessed March 2017).

³² Office of the Federal Register National Archives And Records Administration, *Public Papers Of The Presidents Of The United States, Barack Obama*, 1st. edn, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 2015, p.1086, (accessed 1 April 2017).

disagreed with the excitement from victory and argued that NATO exceeded its mandate approved in Resolution 1973 by enforcing regime change, which increased distrust between world powers about the final intentions in Libya.³³ The western excitement was also shared on the side of the Libyan revolutionaries who were able to topple Gaddafi and to end the era of dictatorship after 42 years. The US president Barack Obama at the United Nations declared “Today, the Libyan people are writing a new chapter in the life of their nation. After four decades of darkness, they can walk the streets, free from a tyrant,” predicting positive future for Libyans.³⁴ The follow-up of the international community was under discussion, the US was suggesting a form of new partnership with Libya, in which Libya will be encouraged to undertake democratic reforms or the UK was suggesting a tailored form of the Marshall Plan for Libya. There was however hostile reaction from inside of Libya due to the fear that any western intervention could undermine the political legitimacy of any rebel group in the eyes of Libyans and would increase animosity of other Arab countries which regard Western engagement as a part of post-colonialist activities and thus could obstruct an eventual relationship with them.³⁵ Being in the midst of a financial crisis as Europe was and having recent memories of failed post-conflict deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, western countries had little appetite in investing in another uncertain environment. Furthermore, no world power felt committed enough to Libya in order to massively invest to its transformation, to send their own experts and threaten their security. No political consensus was achieved at the United Nations Security Council and no politician was willing to risk his/her own political career for Libyans.³⁶ On the other side, there were programmes run by the western community to help Libya get back on its knees after the revolution, such as training Libyan soldiers in the country or a disarmament programme, however all of them proved to be unsuccessful, because Libya did not have the capacity and the

³³ Christopher CHIVVIS and Jeffrey MARTINI, 'Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons And Implications For The Future', RAND Corporation, 2014, p. 5., http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR577/RAND_RR577.pdf, (accessed 11 April 2017).

³⁴ Office of the Federal Register National Archives And Records Administration, op.cit., p.1086.

³⁵ Dag HENRINKSEN and Ann Karin LARSEN, *Political Rationale And International Consequences Of The War In Libya*, 1st edn, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2016.

³⁶ Amitai ETZIONI, 'The Lessons Of Libya', *The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (USACAC)*, 2012, p.45. http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20120229_art011.pdf, (accessed 12 April 2017).

structure to absorb those efforts.³⁷ To deal with Libyans accustomed to dictatorship according to western democratic standards, proved to be challenging and without any real success. Therefore after the initial success of the 2011 NATO intervention, the international community left Libya vulnerable to factionalism and infiltration by terrorist groups and trafficking networks.

The National Transitional Council (NTC) was established in 2 March 2011 in Libya and was primarily tasked to represent rebels on the international stage, but after the fall of Tripoli, it became the de facto transitional government of Libya and its main task became to lead Libya through a transitional phase until a new Libyan government would be formed. They declared to abide by democracy, the rule of law and constitutional legitimacy.³⁸ Despite the fact that it obtained international support from the international community and from various Libyan cities, it was not able to back its authority by force. It did not have any means to enforce the transitional programme other than by agreements, which proved to be too weak to function properly. In addition to military weakness, the NTC lacked representative power. It was set up by expatriates or recent regime officials.³⁹ The main respected heroes of the revolution by Libyans were military leaders rather than political leaders. The NTC had a mandate to supervise elections, to draft a constitution and to form a transitional government but it was not able to impose political will on the ground. Another defect was that it was internally divided and indecisive which caused them to advance very slowly in the eyes of the population and to be ineffective. The NTC tried to deal with different militias that have been active in the country by co-opting them with the objective to transfer them into the state's official armed forces.⁴⁰ This however required time and finances necessary for them to comply with the rules, which NTC did not have. Failure in establishing respectable and effective authority, failure to disarm heavily armed population and failure to start reintegration process led Libyan society into regression and instigated an even bigger division between different militias, which consequently led into an even worse crisis in Libya.

³⁷ Mattia TOALDO, 'Libya: Security, Economic Development And Political Reform', *Security in Transition*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2016, p.5, http://www.securityintransition.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/WP04_Libya_FinalEditedVersion.pdf, (accessed 12 April 2017).

³⁸ Larbi SADIKI, op.cit., p. 111.

³⁹ Christopher CHIVVIS and Jeffrey MARTINI, op.cit., p. 37.

⁴⁰ Christopher CHIVVIS and Jeffrey MARTINI, op.cit., p.16.

2.5 Governance crisis in Libya

The meaning of governance may have different interpretations. The World Bank sees governance as the way “... power is exercised through a country’s economic, political, and social institutions.”⁴¹ The UNDP regards governance as “The exercise of political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences.”⁴² Albeit most definitions talk about power relationships, institutions and authorities, governance is also about values and principles through which a community is managed. The definition provided by UNESCO talks about governance as “structures and processes that are designed to ensure accountability, transparency, responsiveness, rule of law, stability, equity and inclusiveness, empowerment, and broad-based participation. Governance also represents the norms, values and rules of the game through which public affairs are managed in a manner that is transparent, participatory, inclusive and responsive.”⁴³ It sees governance as more than just organs of the government managing public affairs and regards governance as interactions among citizens and stakeholders. Therefore, talking about the governance crisis in Libyan context means not only the failure of public institutions and services but the deeper failure in the interaction between different groups that had previously existed as one society, failure to follow norms and values, failure to have any accountable and responsive process through which public affairs can be managed.

After the fall of the authoritative machinery in Libya which has managed all public services for 62 years, any democratic follow-up was very hard to achieve. It did not last long and Libya fell into chaos due to the political power struggle and fight for economic resources and land ownership. Without any strong authority on the top, all agreements became invalid and disputes over property, land and power got out of control. These disputes could be overcome by a proper police force at the borders, fair distribution of land, transitional justice and proper coordination

⁴¹ 'Governance - What Is Governance?', *World Bank*, 2013, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/EXTMNAREGTOPGOVERNANCE/0,,contentMDK:20513159~menuPK:1163245~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:497024,00.html>, (accessed 12 April 2017).

⁴² “Governance and Development”, UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, *United Nations*, 2012, p.3, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Think%20Pieces/7_governance.pdf, (accessed 2 April 2017).

⁴³ 'Concept Of Governance', *UNESCO*, 2017, <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/strengthening-education-systems/quality-framework/technical-notes/concept-of-governance/>, (accessed 13 April 2017).

with central authorities.⁴⁴ However there was no widely-accepted central authority to ensure this order. Human Rights Watch registered new crimes committed against Libyan civilians by rebel forces against Gaddafi's loyalists.⁴⁵ Tribal clashes and armed struggle between militias grew and Libya got into a state of lawlessness. People hoped that replacement of the weak NTC with a new elected government would reverse anarchy and put their country back to order. The 2012 parliamentary elections, which were the first democratic elections since 1964 for General National Congress (GNC), recorded a turnout of 62% of the population and culminated in the full transfer of powers from unelected NTC to the newly elected GNC. This high electoral turnout was interpreted as a sign of the population's interest in democracy and desire to participate in their national elections to elect their representatives.⁴⁶ This election was won by the National Forces Alliance (NFA), described as liberal and secular party, led by Mahmoud Jibril, who served as the NTC's Prime Minister. The Justice and Construction Party (JCP), made up of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, turned out to be weak and was able to gain only 17 seats in comparison to NFA, which received 39 seats in the General National Congress.⁴⁷ This broad-based congress made up of NFA, JCP and many independents was not long-lived because of failure to reach political compromise on major issues due to internal disagreements over extremely wide variety of political agendas, high degree of parochialism and deterioration of security situation for which GNC turned a blind eye allowing armed groups including Islamist forces to expand both in Tripoli and in the east of Libya.⁴⁸ Its last defeating move was extending its electoral mandate without elections in 2014, which resulted in widespread protests. This was the first attempt of establishing democracy in Libya and it failed to achieve security in its country. This shows the difficulty of establishing democracy in such a torn-apart country that needs to be rebuilt from scratch.

As a result of GNC's decision to continue without elections in its mandate, one of the protesters, Khalifa Haftar launched Operation Dignity on 16 May 2014 composed of eastern tribes, federalists and other militias. The GNC called upon Libyan Shield Forces (LSF) made up of

⁴⁴ 'Divided We Stand: Libya's Enduring Conflicts' *International Crisis Group*, op.cit..

⁴⁵ 'World Report 2012: Libya', *Human Rights Watch*, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-chapters/libya>, (accessed 14 April 2017).

⁴⁶ Borzou DARAGAH, 'High Turnout for Libyan Elections', *Financial Times*, 2012, <https://www.ft.com/content/b92fcd1e-c82f-11e1-b900-00144feabdc0>, (accessed 16 May 2017).

⁴⁷ 'Libya 2012', *World Elections*, 2012, <https://welections.wordpress.com/2012/07/20/libya-2012/>, (accessed 14 April 2017).

⁴⁸ Christopher CHIVVIS and Jeffrey MARTINI, op.cit., p.41.

Islamists, to defend the legislature. In May 2014, Tripoli and Benghazi were again under siege of attacks this time due to armed conflict between the Operation Dignity and Libya Dawn military coalition.⁴⁹ Khalifa Haftar announced a goal to remove Islamist militias out of the eastern part of Libya, starting his campaign in Benghazi. As a reaction to this, Misrata-Islamic bloc announced Libya Dawn offensive to get forces loyal to pro-Dignity block out of Tripoli.⁵⁰ In June 2014 the GNC held another parliamentary election, which ended with terribly low turnout, a mere 16% in comparison to 62% in the 2012 elections, due to the absence of voting in some Libyan cities as a cause of low security and disinterest of Libyan citizens to support those political parties in power. The elections resulted in the victory for the nationalist-federalist bloc and defeat for Islamist-Misrata forces, which refused to accept the reality and sparked hostilities between those loyal to old parliament and those to new one.⁵¹ The outbreak of Operation Libya Dawn by Tripoli's Islamists and Misrata militias, who seized Tripoli International Airport, further deteriorated the security situation in Libya. The GNC rejected the election results, refusing to hand-over power to the new elected House of Representatives, declaring Tripoli as their political capital, Nouri Abusahmain as president and Omar al-Hasi as prime minister. The new elected House of Representatives (HoR) was forced to relocate to Tobruk and align with Haftar who was appointed as army chief. This led to a ceasefire between the Operation Dignity and Operation Libya Dawn and to the creation of two opposing governments. The GNC was controlled by Misrata and Libya Dawn forces whilst the HoR by liberals and Operation Dignity forces. Since then the fighting continues and the lack of agreement between two governments has complicated the stabilization of the country. The new parliament in Tobruk, the House of Representatives (HoR), was ruled as unlawful by the Libyan Supreme Court, whose decision has been subsequently questioned due to its headquarters in Tripoli and the Islamic influence exerted over the Court. The international community decided to recognize the House of Representatives in Tobruk as the official and legitimate government of Libya, undermining the decision of the Libyan Supreme Court.⁵² Whilst the previous government failed to establish security in the

⁴⁹ Daveed GARTENSTEIN-ROSS and Nathaniel BARR, 'Dignity And Dawn: Libya's Escalating Civil War', International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, 2015, p.16, <https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-Barr-Dignity-and-Dawn-Libyas-Escalating-Civil-War-February2015.pdf>, (accessed 11 March 2017).

⁵⁰ Ibid. p.1.

⁵¹ Ibid. p.7.

⁵² 'Governance Of Libya', *Fanack Chronicle of the Middle East & North Africa*, [website], 2017, <https://chronicle.fanack.com/libya/governance/>, (accessed 14 April 2017).

country by being unable to achieve a monopoly on force as a state authority, the next government produced a political vacuum caused by continuous fighting between the two governments, which has been exploited by jihadist groups and illegal trafficking groups and resulted in a further rise of insecurity in Libya.⁵³

The UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) gave birth to the Government of National Accord, which was established in 2015 as an interim government for Libya and the Presidential Council located in Tripoli. The Libyan Presidential Council functions as the head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces. This government has 17 ministers led by Sarraj's government, a former member of the internationally recognized Tobruk parliament, and has been recognized as the sole legitimate government of Libya. Whilst the Libyan Presidential Council is an UN-backed and officially recognized government in Libya, the House of Representatives represents the legislative body also officially recognized by the international community.⁵⁴ The instability of this government is exemplified by the HoR's voting to reject GNA in August 2016, which signified the deficiency of support the GNA has.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the international community chose sides on whom to support in Libya, this government can be easily undermined by Islamist forces or by the second power centre in Libya, the National Salvation Government led by Prime Minister Khalifa Ghwell. This government follows Islamist policies and bases its legitimacy on the authority of the General National Congress (GNC), headed by Nouri Abusahmain. The acts of sabotage and coup d'état such as those exercised on 14 October 2016 by Ghwell's government against al-Serraj's government are expected to repeat in the future unless those relations are settled.⁵⁶ The present pattern of Libyan governance shows that it is "a government of local division" rather than of unity.⁵⁷ The overconcentration on unifying the government of Libya and assembling its military forces, had a negative effect of failing to address everyday issues of the Libyan population including water shortage, power cuts and currency crisis.⁵⁸ Prioritization of establishing a united government by the Libyan Political

⁵³ Daveed GARTENSTEIN-ROSS and Nathaniel BARR, op.cit., p.25.

⁵⁴ Nicola MISSAGLIA, 'Chaos In Libya: A Background' *Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale*, 2017, <http://www.ispionline.it/it/articles/article/sicurezza-mediterraneo-medio-oriente/chaos-libya-background-16290>, (accessed 14 April 201).

⁵⁵ Michael ASIEDU, "The Libya Political Agreement: Time for Reconsideration", *E-International Relations*, 2017, <http://www.e-ir.info/2017/02/24/the-libya-political-agreement-time-for-reconsideration/>, (accessed 14 April 201).

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Larbi SADIKI, op. cit., p.108.

⁵⁸ Michael ASIEDU, op.cit..

Agreement in the shortest possible time had considerable negative consequences on the shortfalls of the agreement, as evidenced by ignoring the security sector in the agreement, on which the stability of Libya hugely depends.⁵⁹ The absence of inclusive representation persists and unless the new GNA government has enough support from Libyans and has sufficient means to back-up its power by force, Libya will suffer from instability and lack of governance. The situation representing GNA joining hands with HoR and GNC's acceptance of defeat would be the ideal, but is far from reality. The lack of trust and low security situation on the ground is preventing the political progress in Libya.

The security apparatus in Libya has been seriously fragmented already under Gaddafi's regime, who instead of national army entrusted military capabilities to paramilitary brigades that were commanded by his relatives. After ousting of Gaddafi, the NTC also chose to rely on local revolutionary brigades rather than on state forces. The real power inside of Libya is not held by the government that is officially recognized by the international community, but rather by military groups that have means to back up its power by military force. The Zintan Military Council is seen as one of the most powerful and well-organized groups in Libya. Their major success has been the capture of Tripoli in 2011, which gave certain degree of legitimacy to this group and led the NTC to appoint one of their leaders, Osama al-Juwaili, as minister of defense. Their main competitor is Islamist group Misrata Brigade, which is aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood and its Justice and Cooperation Party. Souk al Jouma and Sadun al-Suwayli Brigades are other Islamist groups which gained legitimacy by controlling Mitiga airport, stored munitions and led the final attack on Sirte during which Gaddafi was killed. The east of Libya is controlled by the Islamist groups February 17 Brigade, Libyan Shield 1, Ansar al-Sharia which is associated with the Benghazi attacks gaining some acceptance among the Benghazi's public, Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade located in Derna and Ansar al-Sharia operating in Derna.⁶⁰ The reason for the concentration of majority of rebel groups in the east, can be traced back in the history. Undermining economic and social progress in the eastern part of Libya, where most of the oil reserves are concentrating (the Sirte Basin) have culminated in the frustration of the Libyan population living in the east to form opposition movements against Gaddafi's regime.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Christopher CHIVVIS and Jeffrey MARTINI, op.cit., p.30-34.

⁶¹ Ibid. p.38

In the eyes of the Libyan population, militia groups are seen as both security providers and sources of insecurity. According to an interview of different people in Libya, most of them claimed that whilst they felt safe within their community, it was not secure for them to go outside of their neighbourhood.⁶² On one hand those military groups are dividing Libya into different zone of influence, while on the other hand they are seen as the source of security by people living in the controlled area. This indicates a widespread mistrust among Libyans towards national security, absence of control of armaments spread among Libyan population and the dominance of local security arrangements entrusted by locals for their protection.

The economic situation in Libya became devastated due to civil war and political struggle which does not allow the economy to get back on its knees. Libya is one of the most hydrocarbon-dependent countries in the world and is having the least diversified exports in the world.⁶³ The civil war in Libya is mainly concentrated around the control of hydrocarbon resources and access to state funds. Most of the non-hydrocarbon economic activity, including infrastructure and production facilities, and banking activity were destroyed by the civil war.⁶⁴ The international predictions for economic prosperity of Libya are dire and alarming. The International Crisis Group predicts possible bankruptcy by the end of 2017.⁶⁵ The oil incomes represent 97% of Libya's total exports, which indicates the dependency on the oil sector for the recovery of the Libyan economy.⁶⁶ After Haftar took power over oil facilities located in the Gulf of Sirte in September 2016, the oil production has increased from around 250,000 barrels per day (b/d) to

⁶² Fiona MANGAN and Christina MURTAUGH, 'Security And Justice In Postrevolutionary Libya', *United States Institute of Peace*, 2014, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW100-Security-and-Justice-in-Post-Revolution-Libya.pdf>, (accessed 11 March 2017), p.31.

⁶³ Ralph CHAMI and others, 'Libya Beyond The Revolution: Challenges And Opportunities', Middle East and Central Asia Department, *IMF*, 2017, p.9, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2012/1201mcd.pdf>, (accessed 14 April 2017).

⁶⁴ Ralph CHAMI and others, *op. cit.*, p.2.

⁶⁵ 'Libya: Amid Political Limbo, Time To Rescue The Economy', International Crisis Group, 2017, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/libya-amid-political-limbo-time-rescue-economy>, (accessed 14 April 2017).

⁶⁶ Federica Saini FASANOTTI, 'Making Libya's Economy Work Again', *Brookings Institution*, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/10/07/making-libyas-economy-work-again/>, (accessed 14 April 2017).

700,000.⁶⁷ The GNA has been however struggling to get its hand on these revenues due to refusal of pro-Haftar forces to recognize GNA, which he demonstrated by withholding their access from profits gained in the oil production. Even though this increase is substantial and could according to National Oil Corporations reach 1 million b/d by the end of March 2017, it is not going to be enough to cover all government expenditures, which are estimated to be around \$40 billion in 2017.⁶⁸ The inefficiency of the private sector in Libya is displayed by 85% of Libya's labour force that is employed in the public sector, thus absolutely dependent on government salaries.⁶⁹ If the Libyan government does not get access to its state funds, it might get in the short term into a situation when it will not be able to pay salaries to its security forces and will further stimulate the illegal economy. The long term challenge for Libya remains to diversify its economy in order to create more employment, particularly for the youth and to promote sustainable growth which can be achieved only if a secure environment and a stable government exist in Libya.⁷⁰ Given the dependence of the majority of Libyans on public salaries, the destructed public infrastructure and limited income from hydrocarbon economic activity shows that any government in power in Libya will require the help of external actors to get funds and expertise in order to re-establish the Libyan economy.

Due to a porous southern border and absence of local income, southern tribes continue to benefit from illicit trade without any law enforcement mechanism able to stop them. The UN described Libya as the epicentre of the illegal trade in arms.⁷¹ The control over Libya's 1.680-mile southern border was an enormous problem already under Gaddafi's regime. Today, the lack of governance in the country deteriorates even more the disarray at the border and allows traffickers to profit from the political vacuum persisting in the country without order.⁷² Trafficking in weapons, drugs and migrants are flourishing through the passage way between North Africa and

⁶⁷ 'Libya: Amid Political Limbo, Time To Rescue The Economy', International Crisis Group, 2017, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/libya-amid-political-limbo-time-rescue-economy>, (accessed 14 April 2017).

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Federica Saini FASANOTTI, op. cit..

⁷⁰ Ralph CHAMI and others, op. cit., p.15-16.

⁷¹ Hans HOEBEKE et al., op. cit..

⁷² Christopher CHIVVIS and Jeffrey MARTINI, op. cit., p.9.

the Sahel. Fuel smuggling has also been flourishing between Libya and Chad.⁷³ The price for one litre of gasoline in Libya costs 10 cents in comparison to a dollar in Chad. People are however aware of the importance coming from smuggling, evidenced by one Tebu questioning in 2016: “Yes, smuggling is wrong. But why crack down on it now, especially when alternate means of income have not been developed?”⁷⁴ Whilst the EU suggested financing construction of migrant detention centres in the south, some mayors rejected this proposal. They regard migrants smuggling as a consequence of a non-functioning economy, which the construction of migrant centres does not solve. Militias and terrorist groups are those groups that pay for smuggled goods, therefore unless the country is in peace, those illicit trades will be flourishing.

The work of Civil Society Organisations (CSO) and NGOs in Libya has been suppressed under Gaddafi’s regime. They are not usually identified by any official recognition, it is barely a group of people that created a space to interact together, sharing common goals. Engagement of citizens in social and political affairs is an important exercise of democracy. UNDP, UNICEF and Acted collected evidence about the existence of 1,022 civil society organisations in Libya, which proves Libyan vibrant society and their willingness to get engaged.⁷⁵ Whilst these Civil Society Organisations are mostly invisible to foreign actors, they are the ones that are being trusted by Libyan citizens and are potential actors to be included in the new governance of Libya.

The lack of governance has created a power vacuum and allowed transnational jihadist groups to operate in Libya. The main extremist Islamic groups are al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitun, Ansar Dine, Ansar al-Sharia and the Islamic State. The Libyan territory is largely used as a logistical hub for illicit trade that sponsors on-going conflict in Libya and for training of future terrorists.⁷⁶ The Islamic State has established a strong presence in Libya, especially since 2015, by attracting fighters from sub-Saharan countries, seizing complete control over Sirte

⁷³ Frederic WEHREY, op. cit..

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Jean-Louis Romanet PERROUX, ‘Libya’s Untold Story: Civil Society Amid Chaos’, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, no.93, 2015, <https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB93.pdf>, (accessed 28 May 2017).

⁷⁶ Candice MOORE, ‘Four Years After The Fall Of Gaddafi The Role Of The International Community In Stabilising A Fractured Libya’, *African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes*, 2015, <http://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/four-years-fall-gaddafi/>, (accessed 14 April 2017).

and strategically spreading its presence in main Libyan cities at each geographical direction.⁷⁷ The CIA director John Brennan pronounced that in Libya are stationed between 5.000 to 8.000 Islamic State fighters.⁷⁸ Ansar al-Sharia has developed strongholds in Benghazi, Derna and Sirte, where they operate separately from the Islamic State and are named on the U.S. terrorist watch list.⁷⁹ The relationship between jihadists and local groups has been evaluated as one of convenience and shared interest. The unsecured state allowed terrorists to create safe havens in Libya, in which they will thrive unless they are stopped. The role of jihadists on the disarray in Libya may be however easily exaggerated⁸⁰ such as for political purposes to gain support of European political leaders for counter-terrorist activities in Libya. No borders can be sealed; therefore it needs to be taken into consideration, if terrorism flourishes in Libya, then it will eventually spread into Europe and will endanger not only the European stability, but also its democracy.

Libya is currently at a state of tribal governance without real representative national government. Libyan national authorities in charge of public goods have failed and even though some form of governance has been established in Libya during the time of crisis, there is not an accountable government that would be recognized by the whole population and would be representative of all Libyan citizens. The Libyan crisis must be recognized by the international community as not only a Libyan problem, but a problem of the whole world, because if Libya is left to continue to deteriorate in a power vacuum, it will endanger neighbouring countries in North Africa, foreign investments in the MENA and Sahel regions and will promote migration and criminal networks from those countries to the richer Western world. Even though Europe is recognized as the most peaceful geographical region in the world according to the GPI, its security has deteriorated due to an increased number of terrorist attacks especially in France and Belgium and an increased level of criminality in the society.⁸¹ Furthermore, the massive increase in the number of refugees

⁷⁷ "Guide To Key Libyan Militias", *BBC News*, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19744533>, (accessed 14 April 2017).

⁷⁸ 'Civil War In Libya' *Council on Foreign Relations*, 2017, <http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/civil-war-in-libya>, (accessed 14 April 2017).

⁷⁹ Fiona MANGAN and Christina MURTAUGH, *op.cit.*, p.18.

⁸⁰ Jason PACK, *The 2011 Libyan Uprisings And The Struggle For The Post-Qadhafi Future*, 1st. edn, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 191–228.

⁸¹ 'Global Peace Index 2016', *op.cit.*, p.12-13.

that reached Europe by sea in 2015, has been estimated by UNHCR to be over a million.⁸² The EU's unpreparedness for this huge influx of migrants has had dire consequences manifested by Brexit and rising support of extremist political parties to power.⁸³ This indicates the absolute necessity to solve the Libyan question in a comprehensive way, which would contribute to stability in North Africa and in Europe.

This description of the evolution of situation in Libya, since ousting of Gaddafi up to present times, provides essential insight into the prevailing instability on the ground, caused primarily by political vacuum created from the absence of real representative government, lack of security due to local militias and widespread ownership of weapons in the society, and hydrocarbon-dependent devastated economy. This all allowed traffickers to profit from illegal trade and transnational jihadist groups to create safe havens in Libya exploiting the lawlessness on the ground. All these investigated sectors need equal peace-building attention if Libya wants to prosper into peace.

⁸² Ibid., p.30.

⁸³ Christina PAZZANESSE, 'In Europe, nationalism rising', Harvard Gazette, 2017, <http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2017/02/in-europe-nationalisms-rising/>, (accessed 27 May 2017).

3. Peace-building efforts applied by the European Union in Libyan crisis

The second chapter illustrates the theory of peace-building and the EU's capabilities devoted to post-conflict peace-building. In consonance with the three main peace-building principles: security, democracy and development, this section will analyse the application of the EU's policies and activities in those areas during Libyan crisis.

Peace-building has been seen by both academics and practitioners as idealist and pragmatic, performative and instrumental, and an elastic concept.⁸⁴ The first official definition of peace-building came from the United Nations Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's 1992 Report, *Agenda for Peace*, where he introduced the concept of peace-building to the international community as the "action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."⁸⁵ It represents the crossroads of three dimensions: security, democracy, and development. Firstly, the security needs to be established to prevent violence, and then conditions need to be installed preparing a country for democratic transition and lastly economic recovery needs to take place with a reshaping of the financial system and enhancement of basic public services for ensuring a stable and lasting peace.⁸⁶ This order is essential, because without security on the ground, a political and economic progress cannot take place. On the contrary, without political and economic stability, a country might regress into instability and conflict. Academics, such as Duke and Courtier highlight "generous parameters of what falls under the peace-building rubric" and suggest regarding peace-building as "synergy rather than strategy".⁸⁷ This synergy of instruments has been promoted by top practitioners like Kofi Annan, who stated in 2005 that "No development without security, no security without

⁸⁴ John HEATHERSHAW, "Unpacking the liberal peace: the dividing and merging of peacebuilding discourses", *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 36(3), 2008, p.2-21, (accessed 3 April 2017). https://www.academia.edu/1028370/Unpacking_the_liberal_peace_the_dividing_and_merging_of_peacebuilding_discourses, (accessed 3 April 2017).

⁸⁵ Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI, "Report of the UN Secretary-General: "Agenda for Peace", *Council on Foreign Relations*, 1992, <http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-un-secretary-general-agenda-peace/p23439>, (accessed 3 April, 2017).

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Simon DUKE and Aurélie COURTIER, 'EU Peacebuilding: Concepts, Players and Instruments', Working Paper No. 33, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, *Centre for the Law of EU External Relations*, 2009, pp. 38, 3, (accessed 3 April 2017).

development”. In the same vein, the European Security Strategy (ESS) made a clear link between development, security and democratic governance by stating that “security is a precondition of development” and that “the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states”.⁸⁸ This proves the significance of inter-linkage of these principles and of using different instruments and strategies in order to achieve success in all three areas, in order to be effective in peace-building efforts. The ultimate goal of peace-building theories is the achievement of peace. Taking into consideration, various forms of peace, Galtung identifies negative peace as the “absence of violence” and positive peace as the “integration of human society”.⁸⁹ Gaddafi achieved in Libya a negative peace, by being able to keep his country stable and to avert any big military confrontation that could have an impact on his power or integrity of the country. This kind of rule however proved to be very short-sighted and therefore negative peace turns out to be unsustainable in the long term. Negative Peace is however a precondition to positive peace. The Global Peace Index (GPI) suggests eight pillars of peace, necessary for achieving peaceful societies: “A well-functioning government; a sound business environment; an equitable distribution of resources; an acceptance of the rights of others; good relations with neighbours; free flow of information; a high level of human capital; and low levels of corruption.”⁹⁰ Libya must firstly achieve negative peace, which will allow the international community to fully engage in peace-building efforts directed to achieving positive peace, which will be aimed to secure all eight pillars of peace.

The EU has been continuously developing its peace-building instruments and strategies since 1999 when the Treaty of Amsterdam established Common Security and Defence Policy.⁹¹ The biggest step forward was made by adopting the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, which stated that the EU is committed to “preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security.”⁹² It has established the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the new position of High

⁸⁸ “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, *European Security Strategy*, 2003, (accessed 3 April 2017).

⁸⁹ Johan GALTUNG, *Theories Of Peace: Synthetic Approach To Peace Thinking*, 1st. edn. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1967, p. 12.

⁹⁰ ‘Global Peace Index 2016’, op.cit., p.72.

⁹¹ Michael MERLINGEN, *EU Security Policy: What It Is, How It Works, and Why It Matters*, 1st. edn. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012.

⁹² ‘Capacity building in support of security and development-Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 2015, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015JC0017&from=en>, (accessed 4 April 2017).

Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) representing the EEAS and ensuring consistency of the EU's external actions.⁹³ The main conflict management strategy that the EU has been using in Libya is the combination of conflict prevention, aimed for the long-term engagement in structural changes of peace-building and conflict settlement which aims to resolve disputes between conflicting parties. The EU has been particularly praised for its use of civilian and normative forms of power as a way of promoting stability and its values abroad which has made the EU look unique and exemplary with its experiences in this area. The measures of the Civilian Crisis Management contain four priority sectors: police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection.⁹⁴ The still evolving civil-military instruments of the Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP) have helped the EU to be seen as an extraordinary crisis manager in the world using a comprehensive approach to solve crisis.⁹⁵ The use of soft power in its crisis management has put liberalism at the heart of its peace-building approach, regarding positive peace as its key overall objective.

This comprehensive approach is a guiding principle for the EU's external action for crisis resolution, particularly related to conflict prevention. Given the Union's wide array of policies, tools, and instruments which could be put into coherent responsive strategies addressing insecurity in the world, it employs a vision of maximalist perspective to peace-building, which aims to achieve more than just cessation of violence. The maximalist perspective to peace-building represents a long-term strategy which aims to transform social relations into a positive peace, whilst it encompasses humanitarian activities directed towards a society and institution-building, state-building and nation-building activities directed towards a state.⁹⁶ According to liberal IR theory, states adapt their behavior according to their surroundings, whilst the EU has adopted its policies to effectively face the Libyan crisis, it hopes that Libya will also adapt its

⁹³ Fernanda FARIA, 'What EU Comprehensive Approach? Challenges for the EU action plan and beyond', *European Centre for Development Policy Management*, 2014, p.8, <http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/BN71-What-EU-Comprehensive-Approach-October-2014.pdf>, (accessed 4 April 2017).

⁹⁴ Heiner HÄNGGI and Fred TANNER, 'Promoting security sector governance in the EU's neighbourhood', *Institute for Security Studies*, no.80, 2005, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp080.pdf>, (accessed 1 May 2017), p.36.

⁹⁵ Richard G. WHITMAN and S. WOLFF, *The European Union As A Global Conflict Manager*, 1st edn. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012.

⁹⁶ Rens C. WILLEMS, *Security And Hybridity After Armed Conflict: The Dynamics Of Security Provision In Post-Civil War States*, 1st edn., Routledge, 2015.

policies according to the liberal EU.⁹⁷ In the same vein, the concept of security has been understood by the EU as encompassing economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, respect for human rights and the rule of law.⁹⁸ At the center of this changed vision about security is the 1994 Human Development Report issued by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).⁹⁹ The comprehensive approach advocates non-military root causes of instability, cooperative problem-solving frameworks and integrative approaches to related policy areas.¹⁰⁰ John Paul Lederach is one of the biggest academic proponents of maximalist approach and of peace-building from below. According to him, peace building "is more than postaccord reconstruction", and he criticizes the deficiency of peace-building at the micro level and believes that peace-building is a "dynamic social construct", when relations, behaviour attitudes and structures are changed from negative to positive.¹⁰¹ He emphasizes reconciliation and rehabilitation paradigms of post-conflict societies by peace-building approaches.¹⁰² The EU, inspired by the academics advocating a maximalist peace-building approach, believes that peace-building requires holistic approach, including prevention of conflicts, resolution of hostilities, consolidation of peace, reconstruction of a state and dealings with the root causes of a conflict. The maximalist peace-building approach doesn't pay attention only to the conflict and the state, but to the population as whole. It believes in the need of economic development, improvements of socio-economic conditions with the goal of ensuring better life for everyone. Whilst in its policies and mandates, the EU generously advocates those elements, in reality the practice often differs in what the EU really offers as a crisis management actor.

⁹⁷ Andrew MOVAVCSIK, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', *The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology*, 51, 4, 1997, p.537, <https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences.pdf>, (accessed 1 May 2017).

⁹⁸ Nicoletta PIROZZI, 'The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management', *DCAF*, 2013, p.5. <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/The-EU-s-Comprehensive-Approach-to-Crisis-Management>, (accessed 1 May 2017).

⁹⁹ Human Development Report 1994, UNDP, Oxford University Press, 1994, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf, (accessed 1 May 2017).

¹⁰⁰ Nicoletta PIROZZI, op. cit., p.5.

¹⁰¹ 'The conceptual origins of peacebuilding', Peacebuilding Initiative, *International Association for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research*, 2007-2008, <http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index34ac.html?pageId=1764>, (accessed 4 May 2017).

¹⁰² Susanna CAMPBELL, David CHANDLER and Meera SABARATNAM, *A liberal peace? The problems and practices of peacebuilding*, London, Zed Books, 2011, Electronic book, chapter 1.

3.1 Peace-building efforts of the EU in the Libyan security sector

3.1.1 The state of security and defence sector in Libya

The Libyan security and defence sector is currently in a challenging state of crisis. The Libyan security sector collapsed in 2014 and it is in a strong need for far-reaching security sector reforms to develop functioning and modern security institutions, professional forces which were extremely weakened under Gaddafi's regime by arbitrary movements of their ranking without looking at the merit, and new modern weapons and equipment as most of them have been damaged during the war.¹⁰³ No post for minister of defence was formed under Gaddafi's regime, which poses challenge for the new minister to gain legitimacy in the eyes of public.¹⁰⁴ The lack of state monopoly on the use of force in Libya has been regarded by the EU as the main source of conflict.¹⁰⁵ The UN helped post-Gaddafi's Libya to write a white paper on security sector reform to identify challenges that are facing Libya and recommendations for future improvements. The implementation of these recommendations proved to be another challenge and as one international officer put it: "without either viable state security forces or an international stabilization force to maintain security, the implementation of security sector reform initiatives proved ineffective."¹⁰⁶ Libya needs an international experienced force that will be able to bring the implementation of security reforms into practice. The Libyan government held the "International Ministerial Conference on Support to Libya in the Areas of Security, Justice and Rule of Law" in 2013, where they identified 6 main areas in the security sector to be resolved: 1) national security coordination and architecture; 2) disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); 3) arms and ammunition control; 4) border security and management; 5)

¹⁰³ Christopher CHIVVIS and Jeffrey MARTINI, op.cit., p.10.

¹⁰⁴ Lenka FILÍPKOVÁ and Jan KUŽVART, 'Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Libya', *Prague Security Studies Institute*, 2013, p.3, http://www.pssi.cz/download/docs/174_background-paper-security-sector-reform-in-libya.pdf, (accessed 11 April 2017).

¹⁰⁵ 'Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 2014-2015, Strategy Paper/ Multi-Annual Indicative Programme Libya (2014-2015)', EEAS and European Commission DG DEVCO, p.3, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/financing-the-enp/lybia_strategy_paper_multi-annual_indicative_programme_2014-2015_en.pdf, (accessed 10 April 2017).

¹⁰⁶ Christopher CHIVVIS and Jeffrey MARTINI, op.cit., p.12.

defence reform and development; and 6) police reform and development.¹⁰⁷ These developments combine to show that Libya is in strong need for reconstruction of its security forces and recognizes its own inability to deal with Libyan issues by itself and the need for help by an experienced external power. Whilst NATO is not welcome in the MENA region as a peacemaker and regional powers are perceived to be non-neutral, the EU is seen as the best alternative for executing peace-building efforts in Libya. The combination of the EU's expertise, its willingness to engage with Libya and the eagerness of the GNA to cooperate with the international community is perceived as the necessary starting point for deeper engagement.

3.1.2 European Union Global Strategy

Preventing resumption to violence is one of the main aims of peace-building and the security transition in the post-conflict state is regarded as an indispensable base for positive peace.¹⁰⁸ The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) on Foreign and Security Policy has addressed the resolution of root causes of conflict and poverty as the only way to ensure long-term stability. The EUGS has defined the major threats for the EU: Terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflict, state failure, and organised crime, which are all connected to the worsening Libyan insecurity which provides criminals transitional path for trafficking between Africa and Europe.¹⁰⁹ It has also moved further the comprehensive approach by joining it with the integrated approach to conflicts and crisis. The EUGS, seen as the predecessor of the White Book of the EU, has defined three main priorities for the external actions of the EU: the 'security of our Union'; 'State and societal resilience to our East and South'; and 'an integrated approach to conflicts and crises'.¹¹⁰ The Integrated Approach (IA) of the EU has been defined as multi-dimensional by involving policies and instruments directed to conflict prevention, management and resolution, as multi-phased due

¹⁰⁷ 'Ministerial Conference on International support to Libya (Rome, 6 March 2014) – Conclusions', Farnesina, 2014, http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/20140306_minconflibconcl.html, (accessed 11 April 2017).

¹⁰⁸ Charles-Philippe DAVID, 'Does Peacebuilding Build Peace? Liberal (Mis)steps in the Peace Process', *Security Dialogue*, 30, 25, 1999, SAGE, p.25, https://politique.uqam.ca/upload/files/PDF/PDF-102-Does_puicebuilding_build_peace.pdf, (accessed 20 April 2017).

¹⁰⁹ 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy For the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy', *EEAS*, 2016, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, (accessed 20 April 2017).

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

to the EU's ability to be involved at any stage of a conflict, as multi-level encompassing national, regional and global levels and finally as the multilateral level comprising EU partners, aiming for the long term stability of its neighbouring region and thus also for the EU. In regards to post-conflict stabilization, the EU has accentuated long-term commitment, local buy-in, inclusive and locally owned political processes, and the security-development nexus. The emphasis on the convergence between the external-internal security nexus implies primarily on the external security policies and stronger role for the CSDP in the external environment.¹¹¹ The emphasis on the European Union's own security in its first priority for any EU external action, gives an impression of discrepancy within its liberal approach to peace-building. This middle ground between "over-ambitious liberal peace-building and the under-ambitious objective of stability" has been addressed by the EUGS by introducing 'resilience' as the new leitmotif.¹¹² The EU's definition of resilience is "the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks".¹¹³ It prioritizes resilience over human rights agenda, democratisation, and human security resonating with embracing pragmatism as the overall objective in its external actions.¹¹⁴ The US did not wish to lead any intervention in Libya, which left the leadership open for the EU to show that it is able to stabilize its own neighbourhood. If the EU wants to be seen as a responsible global power according to the EUGS, it should be ready to prove its words with resources, capacities and commitments in its foreign policy activities. The EUGS provides a vision and a strategy for the EU's external intervention, predominantly putting forward resilience as a hybrid compromise of handling crisis and reflecting the 'intervention fatigue' from the low effectiveness in spreading the European norms through foreign intervention.

¹¹¹ Thierry TARDY, 'The EU: from comprehensive vision to integrated action', *European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)*, 2017, p.3, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_5_Integrated_Approach.pdf, (accessed 20 April 2017).

¹¹² Wolfgang WAGNER and Rosanne ANHOLD, 'Resilience as the EU Global Strategy's new leitmotif: pragmatic, problematic or promising?', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 37 (3), 2016, p. 415, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13523260.2016.1228034>, (accessed 28 May 2017).

¹¹³ 'The EU approach to resilience: Learning from Food Security Crisis', Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council', 2012, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52012DC0586>, (accessed 28 May 2017).

¹¹⁴ Wolfgang WAGNER and Rosanne ANHOLD, op.cit., p.414.

3.1.3 Why is the EU interested in Libya?

The EU has seen the Libyan crisis mainly through the lenses of rising insecurity and fear of a spill-over effect, which have served as the guiding reasons for the EU's intervention in Libya. In order to stop those threats thriving under Libyan instability, the EU has been determined to apply its security instruments as part of its peace-building approach in war-torn Libya. The European Security Strategy (ESS) has recognized the interconnection between the internal and external security nexus, being aware of the implication of the insecurity at its external borders on its own territory. The pressure of migration flows from Libya has been an exemplary case of a security threat, whose direct impact was the rise of radicalism within the EU and Brexit. The fear of future anarchy in Libya, which will increase even more insecurity and uncertainty inside the EU's territory, may have further significant implications for the EU.¹¹⁵ Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler, using critical perspective of post-liberal form of peace-building, explain the EU peace-building activities through vested interests. Corresponding with Libya which is only 288 nautical miles away from the EU, they believe that the main theatres of EU peace-building are those where EU member states have vested interests or where conflict in the European neighbourhood are pushing the EU into action due to a fear of spill-over on the EU's territory. This explains why in spite of security risks located also in southern parts of Africa, the EU concentrates its policies of engagement mainly on North Africa. The EU's overall objective is to promote stability elsewhere whilst ensuring security for itself. In addition to migratory challenges the EU is facing, the EU has economic interest in preserving Libyan stability. Since 2006 Libya has been the 3rd biggest supplier of crude oil into the EU and the 6th biggest supplier of natural gas to the EU.¹¹⁶ Multiple EU companies are under threat, including the European energy companies, such as Italian Eni, German Winterhall, France's Total, BP of UK, Repsol of Spain or OMV of Austria. Energy companies were among the favourite Daesh's targets using it for illegal oil transfer.¹¹⁷ This shows that the EU's peace-building efforts are also seen as reconciliation between interests and norms. The EU's conflict management is used as a way to advance its own interests, and the promotion of EU's strategic culture as a mechanism of gaining higher political weight in

¹¹⁵ Nicole KOENIG, *EU Security Policy and Crisis Management: A Quest for Coherence*, Routledge, 2016, p. 25

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Matt KILLINGSWORTH (ed.), Mathew Sussex (ed.) and Jan Pakulski (ed.), *Violence and the state*, Manchester University Press, 2015.

international politics.¹¹⁸ This contributes to the image of neo-colonialism practiced by the EU, supporting the statement of Krtsonaki and Wolff, who in their study came to the conclusion that the EU is mostly active in areas where it perceives itself to have the greatest interests at stake threatened by the evolving crisis.¹¹⁹ CivCom representatives underline the political conditionality for budget, forces and capabilities of each EU member states, where each has its idiosyncratic preferences that need to be taken into account for every EU's engagement.¹²⁰ This illustrates that the EU's strong interest in security of Libya, may actually ensure cohesive peace-building strategy in the future, predominantly concentrated in the first phase at security sector, maintained with necessary budget and constructive strategies towards Libyan state and its people.

3.1.4 The Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU in Libya

The main strategy of the EU to respond to security threats around its territory has been through executing civilian missions and military operations of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EU's comprehensive approach has been put into practice by establishing civilian CSDP mission, EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya in May 2013. Its primary mandate was to support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of Libya's borders.¹²¹ Its phased strategy is coordinated with its short term goals and long term goals. Whilst the short term target is to enhance the security at land, sea and air borders in Libya, the long term target is to develop a broader Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy.¹²² Due to deterioration of the security situation in Libya in 2014, EUBAM has moved its

¹¹⁸ James HUGHES, 'EU conflict management policy: comparing the security-development model in the 'sui generis' cases of Northern Ireland and Kosovo', *LSE Research Online*, 2009, p.5, [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/26061/1/EU_conflict_management_policy_\(LSERO_version\).doc.pdf](http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/26061/1/EU_conflict_management_policy_(LSERO_version).doc.pdf), (accessed 20 April 2017).

¹¹⁹ Argyro KARTSONAKI and Stefan WOLFF, 'The EU's Responses To Conflicts In Its Wider Neighbourhood: Human Or European Security?', *Global Society* 29.2, 199-226, 2015, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, p.225, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600826.2015.1021242>, (accessed 20 April 2017).

¹²⁰ Katya Scicluna BARTOLI, Representative of Civilian and Crisis Management Committee at Permanent Representation of Malta to the EU, Interview, May 2017, at Permanent Representation of the Malta to the EU, Brussels.

Erik de FEIJTER, Representative of Political Security Committee and Civilian and Crisis Management Committee at Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU, Interview, May 2017, at Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU, Brussels.

¹²¹ 'CSDP EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya', EEAS, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions_operations/eubam-libya/eubam_factsheet_en.pdf, (accessed, 20 April 2017).

¹²² Ibid.

headquarters from Tripoli to Tunisia and has downsized its team.¹²³ Due to continuation of an insecure and anarchic environment in Libya, in February 2016 EUBAM's mandate was amended to represent a possible civilian capacity building and assistance crisis management mission, which will support the transition of Libya to a democratic, stable and prosperous state.¹²⁴ EUBAM is aiming to assist Libya in the field of security sector reform, with a focus on police, criminal justice, border security and migration.¹²⁵ Institutionalizing governance in the security and defence field and building trust between citizens and government institutions are often seen as elements which epitomize sovereignty and statehood. EUBAM aims to increase responsiveness and accountability of the security and defence sector to civil society and to build domestic order on liberal values. As a result of EUBAM's current inefficiency in practice, it only conducts mapping exercises at the moment, it is in question if its aims will ever be transformed into practice. Despite the rising threats from Libya, Libya has been suffering from the question of prioritisation in the eyes of the EU, which has impacted its commitment, use of capabilities and resources. Whilst Libyans themselves are asking for stability and reinforcement of the EU's actions, if EUBAM wants to be coherent with its mandate, it should increase overarching coordinated efforts, reinforce its team on the ground and provide capacities and tools to bring desired results.¹²⁶ The slowness of the EU is defended as being in parallel with Libyan advancement in their management and organisation.¹²⁷ Even though there is a strong need to do more, the complex situation in Libya is hindering the EU's actions. The increase in EUBAM staff is predicted when it moves to a more executive format of its mission, but it has been compromised with a lack of reliable interlocutors in Libya and insufficient Libyan capacity to absorb the reforms EUBAM would like to introduce.¹²⁸ The EUBAM's aim for coherent peace-building strategy has been so far compromised with obstruction at the political level on both

¹²³ 'CSDP EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya)', EEAS, 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eubam-libya/pdf/factsheet_eubam_libya_en.pdf, (accessed, 20 April 2017).

¹²⁴ 'About EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM)', EEAS, 2016, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/3859/About%20EU%20Border%20Assistance%20Mission%20in%20Libya%20\(EUBAM\)](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/3859/About%20EU%20Border%20Assistance%20Mission%20in%20Libya%20(EUBAM)), (accessed 28 May 2017).

¹²⁵ 'Factsheets on the relations between Libya and the European Union', EEAS, 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/19163/EU-Libya%20relations,%20factsheet, (accessed, 20 April 2017).

¹²⁶ Serge STROOBANTS, Major (GS), Bel. Army, Brussels Representative of Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Governance Institute, Interview, May 2017, Royal Military Academy, Brussels.

¹²⁷ Erik de FEIJTER interview, 2017.

¹²⁸ Katya Scicluna BARTOLI interview, 2017.

sides, unable to move forward. EUBAM is an exemplary case, where the EU aims to bring convergence of both norms and security interests in its external activities, by regarding protection as a synonym to value projection, aiming to deter direct threats and then to promote liberal order on the basis of the confluence of domestic political constraints and a transnational ideational liberal agenda.¹²⁹

In addition to the civilian response of the EU, the union has decided to also apply a military component to the EU's response by establishing a military operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia in June 2015, as an answer to global migration and refugee crises. Its core mandate is to disrupt the business model used for human smuggling and trafficking networks across the Mediterranean. On 7 October 2015, the operation has moved on to Phase II in international waters, entailing boarding, search, seizure and diversion of ships used for human smuggling or trafficking. Furthermore, its mandate was reinforced by 2 additional tasks, which include training of the Libyan coastguard and navy and contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.¹³⁰ EUNAVFOR MED Sophia was created as the consequence of the EU's own inadequacy to secure the EU's southern borders before migration flow. From the academic perspective, the incoherence of fighting migration in the Mediterranean Sea is doomed to fail, because it is not solving the underlying causes why migrants are taking this dangerous, long route across Africa.¹³¹ There is a strong incoherence between the aims and achievements of EUNAVFOR MED Sophia. Whilst the EU did not get an invitation from the Libyan government to operate in Libyan waters, there is a big frustration on the EU's side, which found itself inadvertently facilitating the work of smugglers, allowing them to use cheap rubber boats and relying on the EUNAVOR MED Sophia to pick-up migrants half-way through their Mediterranean journey. On the other hand, if the EU would have an invitation to Libyan waters, it would become responsible for the lives of migrants brought back to Libya, which would cause an additional challenge.¹³² The EU is planning to put its integrative approach into practice in Libya by combining forces of EUBAM, which will be assisting to secure the southern Libyan

¹²⁹ Benjamin POHL, 'Explaining ESDP: A Liberal Approach', Universiteit Leiden, p.12, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.568.253&rep=rep1&type=pdf>, (accessed 3 April 2017).

¹³⁰ 'European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean Operation Sophia', EEAS, 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en_0.pdf, (accessed 22 April 2017).

¹³¹ Serge STROOBANTS interview, 2017.

¹³² Erik de FEIJTER interview, 2017.

border, with forces of EUNAVFOR MED Sophia, which will be assisting to secure northern Libyan border. Furthermore, they are jointly working on developing a counterterrorist database that will enable them to fight terrorist networks.¹³³ This indicates the plan for the application of a civilian-military nexus into practice. The effectiveness of the EU's response to Libya has been often undermined by a "multiplicity of voices", lack of inter-institutional coordination and resource scarcity.¹³⁴ This was exemplified by Britain's refusal to support the search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean which, limited the EU's budget and has impacted the EU's operation.¹³⁵ This is due to divergent interests between the Northern member states and Southern member states of the EU, which needs to come into compromise in their intergovernmental bargaining. Whilst before 2011 Libya was hugely used as a destination country for migrants looking for working opportunities, today Libya is used as a transit country due to instability created after the Arab Spring uprising.¹³⁶ Incoherent with its primary aims of destroying smugglers network and its final practise on the ground, the EU is also incoherent with its overall migration strategy, which on one side aims to deter migrants from coming into Europe, but on the other side acts as a humanitarian organisation without real incentive to improve economic prospect in the MENA region where migrants used to travel for work before.

3.1.5 EU Sahel Strategy

The security implications of the Libyan crisis on the southern porous border, where illegal trade and smuggling flourishes, cannot be stopped only by stabilizing Libya and the EU has recognised the need for more comprehensive and integrative Sahel strategy, which would address the common negative causes and consequences of the region. The Sahel has been recognized as one of the poorest regions in the world. After the fall of Gaddafi, his army's arsenal was spread uncontrollably across the region. The increased insecurity in the whole MENA and Sahel region needs to be also addressed in a substantive manner. The GPI has recognised that stronger relations with neighbouring countries induced by security cooperation in

¹³³ Katya Scicluna BARTOLI interview, 2017.

¹³⁴ Nicole KOENIG, *EU Security Policy and Crisis Management: A Quest for Coherence*, Routledge, 2016, p.74-76.

¹³⁵ 'Britain opposes operations to save migrants in Mediterranean', EURACTIV, 2014, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/britain-opposes-operations-to-save-migrants-in-mediterranean/>, (accessed 28 May 2017).

¹³⁶ Carmen CARASCO, Cristina MUGURUZA, Rocío SÁNCHEZ, 'Case Study: Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)', *FRAME Fostering Human Rights Among European Policies*, 2016, p.147, <http://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Deliverable-10.3.pdf>, (accessed 28 May 2017).

the region help to improve score of peace in some countries such as Chad, which have further positive effects on other countries.¹³⁷ In contribution to this fact, one way the EU addresses this issue is by developing a comprehensive regional Strategy for security and development in the Sahel, called the “golden child of the EEAS”.¹³⁸ The reason for taking a regional approach is the linkage between the Maghreb and Sahel regions. Any political development in one region will have an impact on the situation in the other and vice versa.¹³⁹ Furthermore, a significant number of citizens of the Sahel region migrate to the Maghreb region or further to Europe, increasing risks of illicit trade and proliferation of arms and drugs in the region. Its comprehensive security and development approach has been put into practice by establishing CSDP civilian missions the EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali. Their main aims are to advice, train and mentor their armies in strengthening their security capabilities to ensure better control over illegal migration, trafficking and spread of terrorists.¹⁴⁰ This way the EU can better control the illegal transfer of migrants, weapons or drugs across the countries which could eventually impact its own security by getting into the EU’s territory. Richmond, Björkdahl and Kappler criticizes the inconsistency of the EU’s action that the further the EU goes from its vested interests, its positive effects are compromised with lower finances, lack of policy coherence and political disagreements.¹⁴¹ The aims contained in the Sahel Regional Action Plan, which aims to combat terrorism, trafficking, radicalization and violent extremism are often not matched with realities of missing capabilities, resources and tools necessary to be effective.¹⁴² Moreover, ensuring border control is not dealing with causes of why people chose to adhere to illegal trade in the first place.¹⁴³ Most often inefficient national economy is forcing people to join those groups to earn their living. The complexity of this mission is that whilst EUCAP Sahel Niger was supposed to

¹³⁷ 'Global Peace Index 2016' op. cit., p. 15.

¹³⁸ Nicole KOENIG, *EU Security Policy and Crisis Management: A Quest for Coherence*, Routledge, 2016, p.123.

¹³⁹ ‘Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel’, EEAS, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf, (accessed 11 May 2017).

¹⁴⁰ ‘CSDP The EUCAP Sahel Niger civilian mission’, EEAS, 2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-sahel-niger/pdf/factsheet_eucap_sahel_niger_en.pdf, (accessed 9 May 2017).

¹⁴¹ Oliver RICHMOND, Annika BJÖRKDAHL and Stefanie KAPPLER, ‘The emerging EU peacebuilding framework: confirming or transcending liberal peacebuilding?’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, v.24, no.3, 2011,

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09557571.2011.586331>, (accessed 9 May 2017).

¹⁴² Minke MEIJNDERS and Dick ZANDEE, “The EU as a security actor in Africa “, *The Clingendael Monitor* 2016, https://www.clingendael.nl/pub/2015/clingendael_monitor_2016_en/2_the_eu_as_a_security_actor_in_africa/ (accessed 2 May 2017).

¹⁴³ Serge STROOBANTS interview, 2017.

be a regional mission, today it is focused on Niger's and Mali's security sector. It is believed to be still in the implementation phase, believing that once those trained armies will train the armies of other Sahel countries. The incoherence of this plan is that even though Sahel countries are willing to cooperate together, they are not always facing the same problems, which creates also impediments in passing the EU's training from e.g. Niger to Chad.¹⁴⁴ The incoherence in the EU's overall objective in Sahel and its limited capabilities and resources, leads academics to a conclusion that both missions resemble an EU "visibility project" rather than any real contribution to stability of Sahel region.¹⁴⁵ Despite agreeing in the Council of the EU about the need for such a project, none of the EU member states was willing to contribute ground troops except France, which forced very easy approval for almost unilateral France's action in Mali but shows the lack of solidarity within the EU for external cooperation. In addition to a French historical link with its former colonies located in the Sahel, France has also particular economic interests in that region. Given French high dependence on nuclear energy, its activities have been mainly focused in Niger and Mali, which are two of the biggest producers of uranium in the world.¹⁴⁶ France's interests are to secure those rich deposits from terrorist hands and simultaneously to safeguard uranium concessions for the French energy giant Areva, which is already extracting uranium at both places.¹⁴⁷ Whilst the EUCAP Mali was neither able to prevent religious extremism in the North, nor deterioration of security environment in the country, any upgrade of this mission was rejected under the argument of Malian authorities' inability to absorb any bigger project such as the Security Sector Reform.¹⁴⁸ Unless the insecurity is regionally and effectively addressed, Libya will be continuously used as a hub for illegal traffickers from the Sahel region. EUBAM should be connected to those missions in the future and thus contribute to regionalization and fight against organised crime.¹⁴⁹ Although recognizing the necessity of regionalization of the Sahel region, the EU finds itself in incoherence between non-responding to material and ideational demands of the society in the Sahel region, but at the

¹⁴⁴ Katya Scicluna BARTOLI interview, 2017.

¹⁴⁵ Nicole KOENIG, *EU Security Policy and Crisis Management: A Quest for Coherence*, Routledge, 2016, p.122.

¹⁴⁶ Mohamed El BATTIUI, interview, 2017.

¹⁴⁷ Pape Samba KANE, "Mali: The forgotten war", *Al Jazeera*, 2014, (accessed 18 May 2017).

¹⁴⁸ Nicole KOENIG, *EU Security Policy and Crisis Management: A Quest for Coherence*, Routledge, 2016, p.122.

¹⁴⁹ Katya Scicluna BARTOLI interview, 2017.

same time paying attention to the EU national interests' preferences, which decreases the overall impact of the mission and harms EU's credibility as an effective crisis manager.¹⁵⁰

3.1.6 Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Placing constitutional limits on arbitrary power is one of the key principles of the liberal framework.¹⁵¹ Contributing in improving governance and in transforming a security system of a country, which merges security and development together, is seen by the EU at the heart of conflict prevention. This convergence signifies that on one hand, it is impossible to achieve development without stability and on the other hand, security is not sustainable without development.¹⁵² SSR is aimed to support government authorities in increasing resilience of the state and to re-establish confidence in the state by ensuring its effectiveness, and democratic and civilian oversight. The EU regards its joined support in governance and reform of security sector as the key to its conflict prevention activities.¹⁵³ The paramount importance of the security sector is public security, to ensure safety for the state and its citizens. It is composed of the armed forces, the police, gendarmerie and paramilitary forces, the intelligence and secret services, border guards, judicial and penal institutions.¹⁵⁴ Execution of the SSR project in Libya without political agreement is currently out of reach.¹⁵⁵ Libya is a country with totally fragmented institutions, ministries and agencies.¹⁵⁶ Before moving into technical levels, a political question needs to be resolved. Primarily, Libyans themselves must decide what kind of security structure they want, how they want to share power and contain violence.¹⁵⁷ Unless the vision about Libyan security comes from Libyans themselves, including people of lower class, Libyan citizens will

¹⁵⁰ Benjamin POHL, op. cit., p.7.

¹⁵¹ Shahrbanou TADJBAKSH, *Rethinking the Liberal Peace: External Models and Local Alternatives*, Routledge; 1st. edn, 2011, p.4.

¹⁵² Mark R. DUFFIELD, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The merging of Development and Security*, Zed Books Ltd 2001.

¹⁵³ Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Strasbourg, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/joint-communication-ssr-20160705-p1-854572_en.pdf, (accessed, 21 April 2017).

¹⁵⁴ Heiner HÄNGGI and Fred TANNER, op. cit., p.36.

¹⁵⁴ Richard G. WHITMAN and Stefan WOLFF, op.cit., p.13.

¹⁵⁵ 'Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 2014-2015, Strategy Paper/ Multi-Annual Indicative Programme Libya (2014-2015)', op. cit., p.20.

¹⁵⁶ Katya Scicluna BARTOLI interview, 2017.

¹⁵⁷ Erik de FEIJTER interview, 2017.

refuse to put down arms and to trust the public security structures.¹⁵⁸ Even though it is too premature to talk about the implementation of SSR in Libya now, they are included in the new EUBAM mandate and it is a matter of time the EU starts to implement them. Whilst the EU is putting emphasis on soft power, it is incoherent with its overall aim in Libya, which requires a combination of civilian and military power on the ground in order to counter Daesh and other radical groups and to reinforce its activities.¹⁵⁹ Paris defined this doctrine of liberal internationalism as “transplanting western models of social, political and economic organization into war shattered states”.¹⁶⁰ Duffield warns about the implication of this merging that “liberal peace contains within it the emerging structures of liberal war”.¹⁶¹ The post-liberal peace building approach however looks at SSR with irony, instead of helping to develop the post-conflict life of societies, the EU focuses on building institutions and enforcing security.¹⁶² The EU ISS however argues that because the security governance is mostly executed at the state and sub-state level, its control is exercised by governments unless it is a failed state which lost any power over its territory.¹⁶³ Therefore SSR must be executed at the government level which has full support of its citizens. The post-liberal peace-building theory doesn’t believe that the EU or any international actor is the right solution to the Libyan crisis. They argue that if post-conflict transition should be done in a successful way, it needs to be left on local actors and executed from below, not according to western or universalist-believed ways.¹⁶⁴ Richmond believes that only virtual peace is possible to create by western peace-building activities, which represent a peace viewed by the outside international community but not by civilians on the ground.¹⁶⁵ Academics have observed the EU’s parochial security interests at the expense of physical

¹⁵⁸ Mohamed El BATTIUI, interview, 2017.

¹⁵⁹ Serge STROOBANTS interview, 2017.

¹⁶⁰ Roland PARIS, ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Institutionalism’ *International Security*, 22, no. 2, 1997, (accessed 12 April 2017), p.56.

¹⁶¹ Mark R. DUFFIELD, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The merging of Development and Security*, 2001.

¹⁶² Oliver RICHMOND, ‘A post-liberal peace: Eireanism and the Everyday’, *Review of International Studies*, vol.35, no.3, Cambridge University Press, 2009, (accessed 12 April 2017), p. 16.

¹⁶³ Heiner HÄNGGI and Fred TANNER, op. cit., p.12-13.

¹⁶⁴ Peter FINKENBUSCH, ‘Post-liberal Peacebuilding and the crisis of International Authority’, *Peacebuilding Journal*, vol.4, Issue 3, Taylor & Francis, 2016, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21647259.2016.1193937?journalCode=rpcb20>, (accessed 12 April 2017).

¹⁶⁵ John HEATHERSHAW, op.cit..

security among civilians.¹⁶⁶ Ryan notes no points of contact between the EU and civil society on the ground, which is paradoxical to the EU's constant emphasis on local ownership in its policies.¹⁶⁷ The EU should be aiming to bring a security revival to Libya by matching security and development aims through the comprehensive approach, however, the lacking contact with locals who indicates sources of instability have been identified as a challenge that needs to be indispensably improved in the future missions.¹⁶⁸ The incoherence between words promising big expectations and actual deeds have created a gaping chasm and had an impact on the EU's compromised legitimacy on the ground.

¹⁶⁶ Andy AITCHISON and Jarrett BLAUSTEIN, 'Policing for Democracy or Democratically Responsive Policing? Examining the Limits of Externally Driven Police Reform', *European Journal of Criminology*, vol.10 (4), 2013, (accessed 3 April 2017), pp. 496-511.

¹⁶⁷ Barry J. RYAN, 'The EU's Emergent Security-first Agenda: Securing Albania and Montenegro', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 40(3), 2009, (accessed 3 April 2017), pp. 311-331.

¹⁶⁸ Erik de FEIJTER interview, 2017., Mohamed El BATTIUI, interview, 2017., Serge STROOBANTS interview, 2017.

3.2 Peace-building efforts of the EU promoting democratic governance in Libya

3.2.1 EU and democratic liberal peace theory

The long-term aim of the EU towards Libya is to support Libyan transition to a democratic, stable and prosperous country.¹⁶⁹ The importance of democracy promotion for the prevention of conflict has been evident already in the European Security Strategy, 2003, which claimed that “the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states,”¹⁷⁰ developing a “link between conflict prevention and democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance”.¹⁷¹ The EUGS identifies a resilient society, which characterises the composition of a resilient state featuring democracy, trust in institutions and development.¹⁷² This thesis will adhere to the definition of democracy declared by Abraham Lincoln in the Gettysburg Address: “government of the people, by the people, [and] for the people”.¹⁷³ Peace-building in the post-conflict states has been guided by the notion of liberalization, meaning democratization, promotion of civil liberties and economic liberalization.¹⁷⁴ The EU in its documents adopts the idea of liberal peace as the basic truism on how to secure global peace.¹⁷⁵ It perceives liberal values such as the political liberalization, economic liberalization, rule of law as the key means in building peace and stability within a state. The origin of liberal peace can be traced back to 18th century, when Kant praised democratic institutions, respect for civil liberties and rule of law.¹⁷⁶ After the Cold War, democratic liberalism proposed by Michael W. Doyle, which is based on the idea that democracies are peaceful, they abide to laws and are reluctant to

¹⁶⁹ ‘Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 2014-2015, Strategy Paper/ Multi-Annual Indicative Programme Libya (2014-2015)’, op. cit., p.2.

¹⁷⁰ ‘EU Security Strategy’, House of Lords, European Union Committee, 31st Report of Session 2003-04, p.21.

¹⁷¹ ‘Council Common Position 2005/304/CFSP/ concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa and repealing Common Position 2004/85/CFSP’, *Official Journal of the European Union*, European Council, 2005, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32005E0304&from=EN>, (accessed 10 April 2017).

¹⁷² Wolfgang WAGNER and Rosanne ANHOLD, ‘Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s new leitmotif: pragmatic, problematic or promising?’, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 37 (3), p. 415, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13523260.2016.1228034>, (accessed 28 May 2017).

¹⁷³ William E. GIENAPP (ed.), *This Fiery Trial: The Speeches and Writings of Abraham Lincoln*, Oxford University Press, 1st edn, 2009.

¹⁷⁴ Roland PARIS, ‘At War’s End, Building Peace After Civil Conflict’, Cambridge University Press, 2004, <http://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/34124/sample/9780521834124ws.pdf>, (accessed 15 April 2017).

¹⁷⁵ Susanna CAMPBELL, David CHANDLER and Meera SABARATNAM, op. cit., Loc 447.

¹⁷⁶ Vesna DANILOVIC, and Clare JOE, ‘The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited)’, *American Journal of Political Science*, 51.2, 397-414, 2007, (accessed 15 April 2017).

provoke conflicts between each other, became to be seen as the fundamental instrument of peace-building and a path towards peace. Achieving respected political pluralism is not an easy task and especially not on the ground in Africa, with numerous diversified tribes living together behind artificially created borderlines. The opposition to democratic peace theory is the analysis of Mansfield and Snyder who argue that states that have experienced a democratic transition of regime change are more prone to war than those states that have not undergone any regime change.¹⁷⁷ Kühne also contradicts the notion of democratic peace, presuming that it is peace that brings democracy and not the other way around.¹⁷⁸ Tziarras challenged this democratic notion as a necessary step in post-conflict state and called it rather a form of neo-imperialism.¹⁷⁹ The build-up of democracy was seen as institutionalizing western interests rather than a part of post-conflict development. Knowing however that “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others,”¹⁸⁰ it is challenging to criticize Western democratisation efforts being aware that no better form of government has not been yet officially discovered and implemented in practice.

3.2.2 European Neighbourhood Policy

According to liberal peace consensus, assuming that “democratic and liberal modes of governance can be transplanted from the intervening states to sites of intervention”,¹⁸¹ one of the main instruments the EU is using for spreading democratic principles is the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which is supporting the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The main strategic objectives of the ENP are supporting democratic transition and human rights promotion, market economy transition, sustainable

¹⁷⁷ Edward D. MANSFIELD and Jack SNYDER, ‘Democratisation and the Danger of War’, *International Security*, vol 20, no.1, 1995, (accessed 15 April 2017), p.5-38.

¹⁷⁸ Winrich KUHNE, *Winning the Peace: Concept and Lessons Learned of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, International Workshop, Berlin, July 4-6, 1996’, 1st edn, Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik, 1996. P. 25.

¹⁷⁹ Zenonas TZIARRAS, ‘ Liberal Peace and Peace-Building: Another Critique’, *The Globalized World Post*, 2012, <https://thegwpost.com/tag/post-conflict-reconstruction/>, (accessed 15 May 2017).

¹⁸⁰ ‘The Worst Form of Government’, International Churchill Society, <https://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/quotes/the-worst-form-of-government>, (accessed 15 April 2017).

¹⁸¹ Marco OVERHOUSE and Mateja PETER, ‘The EU and Peacebuilding’, *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, 2012, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2012C41_ovs_ptr.pdf, (accessed 15 April 2017).

development and promoting policies of common interests.¹⁸² The 2015 review of the ENP has changed the face of this policy from being considered as only a long term instrument for conflict prevention and security building, to include also crisis management policies and emphasize security and stabilisation to build resilience of its neighbouring partners. Therefore even though the EU declared an emphasis on promoting deep democracy through the ENP after the Arab Spring broke out in the Middle East, its perception has changed by the review of the ENP, regarding promotion of democracy as the second step after establishing security and stability in the country. This change of order by prioritizing short-term needs in the first place and putting long-term aspirational values in the second place, has been praised by both academics and practitioners regarding peace-building in post-conflict transition countries as a phased approach.¹⁸³ Pace determined the EU's normative rhetoric as merely instrumental, whilst being preoccupied with own concerns for migration, stability and security of MENA region.¹⁸⁴ Libya does not have an Association Agreement with the EU, which keeps Libya outside most of the structures of the ENP. It can only benefit from observer status in the Barcelona process and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).¹⁸⁵ The fall of Gaddafi was not followed by any democratic transformation in Libya and the EU has been struggling to have any impact on Libyan post-conflict development. The specificity of the ENP is its self-differentiation policy, which means that it works with its partners based on bilateral relationships on a country-by-country basis. The ENP has been often criticized for its Eurocentric conception, applying conditionality on its partners on a selective and inconsistent basis, and its applicability only in a stable environment whilst it is the insecure countries in crisis that often need financial support.¹⁸⁶ The ENP has been denounced for failing to bring democratic transition to its Southern neighbours, yet the combination of internal widespread recognition for domestic change and external EU's support

¹⁸² 'The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)', The European Commission, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/european-neighbourhood-and-partnership-instrument-enpi_en, (accessed 1 May 2017).

¹⁸³ Mohamed El BATTIUI, interview, 2017. Erik de FEIJTER interview, 2017.

¹⁸⁴ Michelle PACE, 'Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean: The limits of EU normative power', *Democratization*, 16 (1), 2009, p.39-58, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510340802575809?src=recsys&journalCode=fdem20>, (accessed 28 May 2017).

¹⁸⁵ 'European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Libya', *European Commission*, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/libya_en, (accessed 1 May 2017).

¹⁸⁶ Stefan LEHNE, 'Time to Reset the European Neighbourhood Policy', *Carnegie Europe*, 2014, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/02/04/time-to-reset-european-neighborhood-policy-pub-54420>, (accessed 1 May 2017).

in reinforcing domestic reforms initiatives, proved to be prosperous in cases of Morocco and Tunisia and made the EU an instrumental actor in promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law.¹⁸⁷ The strong engagement of the EU towards Libya was exemplified by the remarks of Frederika Mogharini at the press conference after the Foreign Affairs Council: “our work with Libya, for Libyans and with Libyans mainly is going much beyond the issue of migration and the main focus is our political work. First of all, to guarantee inclusiveness, to support the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan Political Agreement; the delivery of services to the Libyans starting with health and social measures.”¹⁸⁸ By principally supporting only the internationally recognised GNA and non-respecting the decision of Libyan Supreme Court, the EU undermines the other two government institutions elected by Libyan people at national elections and accountability of national institutions, which is incoherent in its democratic promotion. Furthermore, the EU does not have any integrated strategy specifically for Libya and up to now only individual member states have taken actions, which keep the comprehensive approach of the EU far away from its implementation.¹⁸⁹ The ENP, which stands at the heart of the EU’s approach towards Libya, has portrayed incoherence between its democratic promotion and its security concerns, which has created inconsistency in the EU’s balance for advocating norms and strategic interests as the final goal of the ENP. Using democratization rhetoric merely to increase credibility on the ground, the EU undermines the objectives it tries to achieve at the first place.

3.2.3 Security Sector Governance

Even though the EU is not using such a name, the EU is addressing governance through cross-cutting strategies of its foreign policies, institutions and instruments, most notably through execution of the Security Sector Reforms. The crisis of governance has been recognised by the

¹⁸⁷ Vera Van HÜLLEN, ‘Europeanisation through Cooperation? EU Democracy Promotion in Morocco and Tunisia’, *West European Politics*, 35 (1), 2011, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402382.2012.631317?src=recsys>, (accessed 19 May 2017).

¹⁸⁸ ‘Remarks by the HRVP Federica Mogherini at the Press Conference following the Foreign Affairs Council’, *EEAS*, 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/20031/node/20031_ka, (accessed 1 May 2017).

¹⁸⁹ Toby VOGEL, ‘Libya: The Strategy that wasn’t’, *Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)*, 2017, <https://www.ceps.eu/publications/libya-strategy-wasn%E2%80%99t>, (accessed 2 May 2017).

World Bank as one of the main causes for the world's development problems.¹⁹⁰ The EU links security and development to democratic instruments, claiming that without democratic accountability, legitimacy and transparency the two other instruments cannot work out in an effective manner. The idea of democratizing security has been imported also by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report 2002, which argued for democratizing security in order to prevent conflict and build peace. By emphasizing the democratic peace theory, it underlines the importance of democratic civil control of the security sector.¹⁹¹ The Security Sector Reforms bridges security policy, promotion of democracy and peace, and development aid. Its main aim is to reduce security deficits and democratic deficits, in order to have sufficient democratic oversight of the security sector. It supports a holistic approach integrating firstly all security sector reforms under one umbrella and then promoting good governance through the encouragement of principles such as accountability, transparency and human rights.¹⁹² The EU is using the instrument of the SSR to push through the promotion of its values and norms. Not able to execute such a wide ranging reform in Libya alone, Security Sector Governance (SSG) could provide a possibility of cooperation with multiple organisations such as the OECD or UNDP. The link between stabilizing Libya and promotion of democratic governance has been made by supporting EUBAM to help through SSR to develop a functioning police and justice sector in Libya and to promote democratic governance, which is currently supported by the EU in Libya through its support of the constitutional drafting assembly (CDA) since their election in 2014. The EU encourages the contribution of women, of Civil Society Organisations (CSO) in this drafting and the role of media in improving their capacities to inform Libyan population about the constitution. Nevertheless the history proves that the EU often prioritizes security over democracy, and the EU values applied in its reforms for Arab states have been most often compromised with national or European interests, which led European leaders into paradoxical silence on questions related to democracy in Arab states.¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰ Stina LUNDSTRÖM and Matteo DRESSLER, 'Assessing EU Support to Governance Reform', *Berghof Foundation*, 2016, http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Other_Resources/Scoping_studies_WOSCAP/Scoping_Study_-_Governance.pdf, (accessed 2 May 2017), p.5.

¹⁹¹ 'Human Development Report 2002, Deepening Democracy in a fragmented world', *UNDP, Oxford University Press*, 2002, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/263/hdr_2002_en_complete.pdf, (accessed 2 May 2017).

¹⁹² Heiner HÄNGGI and Fred TANNER, *op. cit.*, p.17.

¹⁹³ Richard YOUNGS, 'Europe's flawed approach to Arab democracy', *Centre for European Reforms Essay*, 2006, http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/essay_youngs_arab_democracy-1423.pdf, (accessed 2 May 2017).

The quietness on promotion of European norms and values have often undesired consequences in the future and the short-sighted policy of prioritising stability of the incumbent regime over promotion of democracy has brought negative effects due to instability of authoritarian regimes as evidenced by the Arab spring.¹⁹⁴ In 2010 Gaddafi agreed with the European Commission on a €60 million deal over three years, for “economic development” or more specifically for curbing migration flows from North Africa to Europe through Libya. This confirms that stopping illegal migrants in Libya was more important for the EU than to push for democratic reforms and a human rights agenda in Libya.¹⁹⁵ The lack of support, in financial and security means, given to the new democratic government created after the 2012 elections, which was not able to create national Libyan army and to respond to basic needs of Libyans after the war, decreased trust in the eyes of Libyan citizens in democratic institutions, in democratic elections and in political parties which in combination with worsening situation on the ground led into dramatic drop in voter turnout in the next national elections in 2014. Whilst the overall objective of SSG is to bring security closer to citizens, looking not only at state institutions but also non-state actors influencing the security sector, lack of EU’s investments into Libyan security sector so far, has contributed to widespread mistrust the Libyan citizens feel towards their national security.

3.2.4 Democratization strategy of the EU

The main strategy towards democratization of post-conflict Libya is through spreading democratic principles such as the free elections, civil liberties, rule of law, independent judiciary, accountable institutions, open civic society and civilian control over military.¹⁹⁶ The Libyan political scene is dominated by multiple actors, which have never had the possibility to experience democracy. Libya has already had an opportunity to apply in practice some democratic measures. The first democratic elections in Libya took place in 2012 and 2014, which were however not able to establish neither desirable peace nor stability. In opposition to this democratization approach of the EU is Paris’s peace-building strategy called “institutionalization

¹⁹⁴ Erik de FEIJTER interview, 2017.

¹⁹⁵ Charlotte McDONALD-GIBSON, *Cast Away: True Stories of Survival from Europe's Refugee Crisis*, The New Press, 2016.

¹⁹⁶ Michael EMERSON (ed.) et al., ‘Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood’, *Centre for European Policy Studies*, Brussels, 2005, http://aei.pitt.edu/32588/1/27._Democratisation_in_the_European_Neighborhood.pdf, (accessed 2 May 2017).

before liberalization” (IBL), which concentrates on creating institution before spreading principles of liberalism.¹⁹⁷ Paris believes that by taking away the “pathologies of liberalization”, which refers to the societal competition fostered by democratization and economic liberalization, the peace is more sustainable in a post-conflict state.¹⁹⁸ The EU’s proposed cooperation in this domain in Libya is focused on strengthening public administration, key democratic institutions including municipal councils, police and judiciary reforms and democratic participation.¹⁹⁹ Zürker argues that liberal democracy cannot be imported from external sources and therefore cannot be created unless the local elites desire its creation.²⁰⁰ This therefore suggests that the creation of a liberal democracy is a country-specific process and must be formed indispensably by local forces. If forced by another way, peace-building comes to the crossroads of local resistance to western-type of development as a consequence of implementation of western values in the country, which does not support them. According to the EU mapping exercises that have been executed in the country, it has assessed that democracy is desirable in the country and even though people don’t call it this way, they describe it by wishing to have a government that is accountable, representative, transparent and responsive to the needs of the population.²⁰¹ The EU democratisation technique involves a top-down approach of strengthening institutions at the central level and amongst government elites.²⁰² This practice is evidenced by the creation of the GNA, which however struggles to be recognised by all Libyan society. Richmond, has criticized the practices of intervening actors as an attempt to assimilate local culture into the “top-down construction of the liberal peace. He named the importation of democracy as a “liberal imperialism”, when the west asserts their superior moral order, knowledge, justice and freedom whilst undermining and devaluing local culture, tradition, history and their own way of order.”²⁰³ Accountability, transparency, participation and inclusion are understood as universal principles of governance and The Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets out fundamental human

¹⁹⁷ Shahrbanou TADJBAKSH, op.cit., p. 2.

¹⁹⁸ Johanna Olsson STRANDBERG, ‘Kosovo: A success of Failure? A study of State-Building’, PhD Thesis, Lund University Department of Political Science, <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=1326136&fileId=1326137>, (accessed 2 May 2017).

¹⁹⁹ ‘Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 2014-2015, Strategy Paper/ Multi-Annual Indicative Programme Libya (2014-2015)’, op. cit., p.3.

²⁰⁰ Susanna CAMPBELL, David CHANDLER and Meera SABARATNAM, op. cit., Loc 160.

²⁰¹ Erik de FEIJTER interview, 2017.

²⁰² Marco OVERHOUSE and Mateja PETER, op. cit., p.2.

²⁰³ Ibid., 61

values universally recognised at the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, therefore liberal democracy should not be regarded as a Western style but as a universal aspiration of good governance.²⁰⁴ Whilst democracy is centred on the role of people, the EU's concentration on top-level of government is an incoherent peace-building strategy. Pursuing realist agenda in its intervention rather than normative agenda centred on promotion of democracy and human rights, put the EU into incoherence in its engagement and in contradiction with its willingness to be seen as a normative power.

The EU has been often challenged as a normative power for its own deficiencies during exportation of its core values abroad. The European states have been often inconsistent and divided over demands for democratic reforms in other countries. The complex EU's structure and plethora of actors coming from 28 member states, which often prolongs the time of negotiations, have been a limiting factor in executing liberal peace-building activities and an impediment to respond immediately to rising crises. The divisions between European leaders have direct impact on the use of conditionality dependent on reforms.²⁰⁵ In addition to time lag, the big complexity of the EU's system often motivates EU political leaders to work in silos and thus undermining the transparent approach of the EU and the effectiveness of its comprehensive approach.²⁰⁶ According to some political experts, the EU's actions over Libya are not going to be different than predictions mentioned above. Koenig criticized the horizontal and vertical incoherence of the EU's foreign policy, believing that: “the CFSP died over Libya – we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it”.²⁰⁷ If the EU wants to be seen as an effective external power in the world, it needs to learn to speak with one voice, which remains to be still a challenge up to now. Even though the academics often agree on a divergence of voices in the EU and a lack of necessary tools for the EU policies to be effective,²⁰⁸ EU practitioners

²⁰⁴ Mohamed El BATTIUI, interview, 2017.

²⁰⁵ Richard YOUNG, op. cit., p.2.

²⁰⁶ Eli STAMNES, ‘The European Union And Peacebuilding’, *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*, 2016, <https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2382111/3/EUPB.pdf>, (accessed 2 May 2017).

²⁰⁷ Nicole KOENIG, ‘The EU and the Libyan Crisis: A Quest for Coherence?’, *Istituto Affari Internazionali*, 2011, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/131118/iaiw1119.pdf>, page 3.

²⁰⁸ Serge STROOBANTS interview, 2017.

contradict this argument, believing that the EU disunity is still better than 28 different member states acting unitarily.²⁰⁹

Democratic style of government has been put into question if it is in coherence with Libyans' will and if peace-building activities are not at a crossroad of what they want to offer and what is actually welcomed by the host country. Whilst peace-building actors are mostly appeased with providing material forms of power, the local populations of a host country tend to think of power in terms of legitimacy and moral standing.²¹⁰ The exertion of economic pressure is contrary to liberal peace-building and is often met with indigenous resistance. An alternative view is offered by Cheng and Zaum who defended corruption as a necessary factor for executing peace-building activities. Philip assumes that whilst peace-building makes corruption possible also corruption makes peace-building possible.²¹¹ While these two concepts seem to be diametrically opposed to each other, in reality they work hand in hand. Peace-building is necessarily shaped and reshaped by corruption, informal economies, practice of neo-colonialism and often also by political oppression. Even though these processes seem to be at first glance immoral, they represent a source of income that is essential for any country undergoing peace-building. Chandler named it "non-liberal Other", by which he described interveners' actions in the peace-building process.²¹² The analogy of peace-building and colonialism has been however also put to criticism, not respecting the cultural and language linkage that have been developed during colonial past between two states which put the colonizer into the primary position to respond, such as France to Mali, or the UK and France to Libya. Furthermore, peace-building these days represent the predominant flow of resources, skills and knowledge coming from an international actor to the host state, which was the opposite direction during colonialism.²¹³ Libyan Mayors in their interaction with the European regional partners indicated that they don't wish to repeat "the assistance mode of donors to beneficiaries relations", which has often been the case in the

²⁰⁹ Katya Scicluna BARTOLI interview, 2017. Erik de FEIJTER interview, 2017.

²¹⁰ Roger Mac GINTY, *International peacebuilding and local resistance: hybrid forms of peace*, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2012, p.46.

²¹¹ Dominik ZAUM (ed.) and Christine CHENG (ed.), *Corruption and post-conflict peacebuilding: selling the peace? (Cass Series on Peacebuilding, 1st edn., London, Routledge, 2011, p. 40.*

²¹² Susanna CAMPBELL, David CHANDLER and Meera SABARATNAM, op. cit., chapter 1.

²¹³ Roland PARIS, 'Saving Liberal Peacebuilding', British International Studies Association, *Cambridge University Press*, 2010, http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~rparis/Saving_Liberal_Peacebuilding_FINAL.pdf, (accessed 3 April 2017).

corruptive system of development work.²¹⁴ This indicates that whilst tolerant in the Western world, corrupt and colonialist tendencies in peace-building activities in Libya might spark hatred of Libyans towards the EU, which regards peace-building in a different light.

The European strategy is not decisive in how to approach Libyan decentralisation / centralisation. On one hand, they believe that decentralisation could lead into further tensions and on the other hand it could be a driving source of peace and stability.²¹⁵ Even though in its strategy paper towards Libya, the EU aims to support elected municipal councils, it is mostly dealing with GNA, which lacks representation powers. According to analysis of Libyan history of tribal divisions, whose power grew over time, the Western support for a form of a centralised democratic system is neither coherent with Libya's fractured society nor feasible to represent equally this pluralistic Libyan society. Municipalities have remained the only legitimized bodies in Libya, however due to Gaddafi's preferential treatment and due to civil war, many are lacking finances for basic public services, such as electricity, water sanitation, and medical care. Tocqueville demonstrated the representative nature of local democracy, defending the electoral representation and their need for responsiveness of city mayors: "Town-meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people's reach, they teach men how to use and enjoy it."²¹⁶ International recognition of a stronger role in governance delegated to municipal governments in Libya would allow the EU to support them directly in needed services. It would also allow them to have direct control over mayors who often stand also behind illicit trade thriving in their region. Therefore Libya needs tailored made democracy which will be in a form of decentralised federalism or tribalocracy rather than centralised democratic system, in which each region will have its own government, parliament and economic resources would be equally redistributed.²¹⁷ The EU has extensive experiences with promoting political pluralism in Eastern Europe after the Second World War, which has successfully resulted in building

²¹⁴ 'CoR activities in the context of the Nicosia initiative', *ARLEM*, Committee of the Regions, 2016, <http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/arlem/Documents/Overview-events-Nicosia-initiative.pdf>, (accessed 30 May 2017).

²¹⁵ 'Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 2014-2015, Strategy Paper/ Multi-Annual Indicative Programme Libya (2014-2015)', op. cit., p. 4-5.

²¹⁶ 'What's gone wrong with democracy', *The Economist* Essay, 2017, <http://www.economist.com/news/essays/21596796-democracy-was-most-successful-political-idea-20th-century-why-has-it-run-trouble-and-what-can-be-do>, (accessed 15 April 2017).

²¹⁷ Serge STROOBANTS interview, 2017.

democratic states.²¹⁸ Furthermore, established democracy in Tunis and Maroc provides exemplary cases that democracy is possible in the Arab world. It can be assumed that the EU's democratic approach is incoherent with the liberal approach to democracy due to its support of the internationally recognised GNA whilst undermining the power of local municipalities, which is the last elected and truly representative unit in Libya. Furthermore, the EU's financial support for democratic transition has not been coherent with real Libyan needs, sufficient capacities and support on the ground and therefore proved to be lost among rivalry between Nationalists and Islamists without any democratic prospect for the Libyan future.

3.2.5 Economic liberalization strategy of the EU

The political liberalization which goes hand in hand with economic liberalization and economic interdependence urges states to act transparently and according to laws to preserve international cooperation necessary for a state to prosper. The troublesome economic situation is contributing to criminality and increased radicalization by contributing to a high level of frustration especially among Libyan youth. In the annual action program towards Libya, the EU has been contributing to Libyan economic development by financially supporting its economic integration, diversification and sustainable employment programme.²¹⁹ Also from the point of view of the IMF, the diversification of non-carbon sectors is significant to promote a higher labour intensive sector and to avoid vulnerability of Libya from oil price fluctuation.²²⁰ Market democracy, which combines democratic governance with market-oriented economy, has been one of the main principles of liberal peace-building, because it is seen as a remedy for civil conflict. Economic liberalization has been seen as necessary in Libya when the stability is established in order to create jobs and start the economy running but in a tailored made phased approach.²²¹ In reality, however, the policy is biased, favouring governmental coalition in power and powerful business, which in the end takes away the benefits for the lower part of the society. Economic

²¹⁸ Mohamed El BATTIUI, interview, 2017.

²¹⁹ 'Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 2014-2015, Strategy Paper/ Multi-Annual Indicative Programme Libya (2014-2015)', op. cit., p.22.

²²⁰ 'Annual Meeting of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economic Diversification in Oil-Exporting Arab Countries, *International Monetary Fund*, 2016, <https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2016/042916.pdf>, (accessed 14 April 2017).

²²¹ Erik de FEIJTER interview, 2017.

liberalization has been regarded under a critical light of peace-building academics, who see it as undermining the process of the liberal agenda of peace-building. Another problem is that “western donors(...)advocate a purist version of the neoliberal economic model that is not necessarily followed at home”²²² The EU hoped that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), offering trade, aid and political cooperation would encourage Arab states in political and economic reforms. Multiple academics critically assess this notion and believe that the haste for political and economic liberalization is often counterproductive for the main objective of liberal peace-building strategy. With no regard to regulatory capacity of the state, social structure, check and balances system, the effort made to install peace may go in vain by inspiring tensions and further conflicts within a society.²²³ In the same manner, Turner believes that “Liberalization exacerbates social tensions in post-conflict societies because it puts profits before people, privatization before jobs, free trade before security, private property rights before social welfare, and western security before development.”²²⁴ The EU is aware of its capacities, of economic opportunities in Libya and is recognising the need for coherent measures to improve business environment and to encourage the development of SMEs in the country in order to raise employment and to take away the incentive for crime and radicalism.²²⁵ Coherent in its current phase with its low-scale support, the coherence between the EU’s promises and activities on the ground will be seen in the upcoming years when Libya will stabilize and will aim or will be indirectly forced to adopt those economic transformations.

²²² Natalia MUTO, ‘Critically examine the concept of the ‘liberal peace’ as a peacebuilding framework’, 2012, https://www.academia.edu/3481226/_Critically_examine_the_concept_of_the_liberal_peace_as_a_peacebuilding_framework_ (accessed 14 April 2017).

²²³ Dorly CASTAÑEDA, *The European Approach To Peacebuilding*, 1st. edn, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

²²⁴ Roland PARIS, ‘At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict’, Cambridge University Press, 2004, (accessed 15 April 2017), p.103.

²²⁵ ‘Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 2014-2015, Strategy Paper/ Multi-Annual Indicative Programme Libya (2014-2015)’, op. cit., p.18.

3.3 Peace-building efforts of the EU promoting development in Libya

The post-conflict transition in Libya requires international development assistance to help Libya get back on its knees after many years of conflict. In 2010 Libya had the highest gross domestic product (GDP) at purchasing power parity (PPP) in Africa²²⁶ which indicates a high standard of living and high intellectual capacity of Libyans before the Gaddafi's regime downfall, which facilitates national development in the future.²²⁷ The European Union, being the world's largest aid donor and the principal promoter of soft-power diplomacy, is determined to provide support to Libya, which has been already evident in programmes such as those supporting Libyan institutions and their state-building activities: the Mediterranean Intervention Epidemiology Training Programme (MediPIET) aimed at improving public health, Erasmus Mundus programme, enhancing the quality of education in Libya, or Civil Initiatives Libya aimed at strengthening NGOs active in Libya.²²⁸ All these programmes are aimed to achieve sustainable development, which has been identified by the EUGS as at the heart of any resilient state.²²⁹ Even though there is not universally agreed definition, the UN defined sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs".²³⁰ It promotes long-term growth that aims to achieve economic and social development, and environmental protection. In the same vein, the World Bank advocates in development policy that civil wars are in correlation with economic failures.²³¹ The "security-development" nexus has been identified as at the roots of the liberal peace.²³² The EUGS represents evolution in EU's thinking about development. Whilst the European Security Strategy proclaimed that "security is a precondition of development", the EUGS understands development as a root cause of resilience, describing resilient society as a

²²⁶ Mary Lynn CRAMER, 'Before US-NATO Invasion, Libya had the Highest Human Development Index, the lowest Infant Mortality, the highest life expectancy in all of Africa', *Counter Currents*, 2011, <http://www.countercurrents.org/cramer040511.htm>, (accessed 19 May 2017).

²²⁷ Mohamed El BATTIUI, interview, 2017.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy For the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy', *EEAS*, 2016, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, (accessed 20 April 2017).

²³⁰ 'Sustainable Development, Background', *General Assembly of the United Nations*, President of the 65th Session, <http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/65/issues/sustdev.shtml>, (accessed 10 April 2017).

²³¹ 'World Development Report 2011, Conflict, Security and Development', *The World Bank*, 2011, https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf, (accessed 10 April 2017).

²³² Nicolas LEMAY-HEBERT, 'Research on Liberal Peacebuilding', *Academic Foresight*, 2014, http://www.academic-foresights.com/Liberal_Peacebuilding.pdf, (accessed 2 May 2017).

better off society with clear future and thus reverting the causal relationship. Nevertheless, without seeking to connect development policies with societal aims, the EUGS calls for better aligning of EU development policy with EU strategic priorities.²³³ Combining development assistance with national strategic preferences is incoherent with development goals and proves self-rationalisation of the EU member states' geopolitical interests in promoting development policy.

The EU has established a comprehensive series of programmes which aims to support the development of the civil society sector and the capacity building of civil society organisations.²³⁴ The European Committee of the Regions has supported Libyan cities since 2015, assisting to improve public services in Libya, most notably water and waste management, primary health care and public administration.²³⁵ Unfortunately, very few European cities and regions took this initiative to support Libyan development in the bottom-up way.²³⁶ Academics such as Kumar praise the international community for its positive effects in social rehabilitation, which have been according to her opinion more effective than political reconstruction.²³⁷ International development is seen as a product of liberal theory. It regards individuals as the main actors in the international system and aims to enhance their freedom and welfare.²³⁸ The socio-economic transition of post-conflict societies through economic recovery and rehabilitation is seen at the heart of peace-building theories.²³⁹ The liberal theory pursues a “bottom-up” view of politics, regarding individuals and societal groups as the fundamental actors in international politics, prior

²³³ Wolfgang WAGNER and Rosanne ANHOLD, ‘Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s new leitmotif: pragmatic, problematic or promising?’, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 37 (3), 2016, p. 415, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13523260.2016.1228034>, (accessed 28 May 2017).

²³⁴ ‘European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Libya’, *European Commission*, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/libya_en, (accessed 1 May 2017).

²³⁵ ‘CoR activities in the context of the Nicosia initiative’, *ARLEM*, Committee of the Regions, 2016, <http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/arlem/Documents/Overview-events-Nicosia-initiative.pdf>, (accessed 30 May 2017).

²³⁶ ‘Libya and the Committee of the Regions’, *European Committee of the Regions*, <http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/arlem/Pages/Libya-and-the-Committee-of-the-Regions.aspx>, (accessed 31 May 2017).

²³⁷ Krishna KUMAR (ed.), *Rebuilding societies after civil war, Critical roles for international assistance*, Lynne Rienner Pub, 1996, p. 9-11.

²³⁸ Andrew BLENCOWE, ‘A Liberal Structure for Realist Uses: International Development and the Question of Whose Interests Are Being Met?’, *E-International Relations*, 2009, <http://www.e-ir.info/2009/08/15/a-liberal-structure-for-realist-uses-international-development-and-the-question-of-whose-interests-are-being-met/>, (accessed 2 May 2017).

²³⁹ Charles-Philippe DAVID, *op. cit.*, p.35.

to governmental institutions.²⁴⁰ The EU has attempted to put this bottom-up process of development work into practice in Libya through Nicosia Initiative, which aims to steer cooperation between Libyan cities and European cities and regions.²⁴¹ This bottom-up approach has not been experienced in North African nations before, which points on a big deficit in EU's development works. Pouligny documented from her practitioner experience that peace-building activities are ineffective, because they are negligent towards "stories written at community level".²⁴² Her main argument is that peace cannot be advanced from above, but rather from the needs of post-conflict societies. In addition to this, Campbell criticizes the way organizations intervene in post-conflict societies. Whilst lacking a learning and adaptive capacity, they don't negotiate and bargain with local actors, which seriously hampers and undermines peace-building activities. Joelle Jenny, Director for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy at the European External Action Service (EEAS) argued for defence of the EU peace-building approach that "true state-building connects the institutions of governance with the people, and links people with people, in a social contract".²⁴³ The social contract is however difficult to develop if the EU concentrates its funds on the elites present in a country. Whilst the EU follows mostly a top-down approach by concentrating on governmental matters, some believe that other organisations, NGOs and regional actors should take the initiative to support Libyan society in its transition by engaging with locals.²⁴⁴ Development aid opens up doors for more wide-ranging cooperation between different organisation and NGOs, such as UNESCO, UNDP, UNICEF but also regional actors such as the African Union. Libya has not signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which would endorse harmonization and alignment of development aid. Whilst the multiplicity of actors in Libya increases legitimacy of the EU on the ground and allows separation of sectors that needs development aid, it often creates competition between those actors on the ground and often duplicity of their work. The bottom-up approach initiatives in the EU's development policy are coherent with peace-building aims, however the lack of

²⁴⁰ Andrew MORAVCSIK, op.cit., p.517.

²⁴¹ 'Libya and the Committee of the Regions', European Committee of the Regions, <http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/arlem/Pages/Libya-and-the-Committee-of-the-Regions.aspx>, (accessed 31 May 2017).

²⁴² Beatrice POULIGNY, *Peace Operations Seen From Below: UN Missions And Local People*, 1st ed. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2006. Print.

²⁴³ Joelle JENNY, 'The Growing Role of Conflict Prevention in Support of the EU's Efforts in Peacebuilding and Statebuilding', GREAT insights 4(1), December 2014/January 2015, (accessed 3 April 2017).

²⁴⁴ Katya Scicluna BARTOLI interview, 2017.

cooperative partnerships and slow pace of the European system are not responsive to Libyan urgent needs, which require those projects to be put in place immediately.

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have been identified as one of the main actors playing important role in the national development. They are numerous in Libya but not well developed, lacking funding and not aware of their role they can really play. By emphasizing local ownership in the EU's policies towards Libya, the EU is determined to support civil society organisations (CSOs) active in Libya, by reinforcing locals in their dialogue with governmental authorities.²⁴⁵ Even though the EU communicates with representatives of the CSOs, their impact on the subsequent EU's decision for thematic focus of development aid proved to be very limited.²⁴⁶ The EU has been criticised by the European Centre for Development Policy Management that the EU's aid focuses on a limited number of sectors, connected to the EU's strategic interests rather than to the interests of the society in need. The most popular sectors where the EU concentrates its development aid are agriculture and energy, which accounts for 40% of development funds. Critics of liberal peace-building, Richmond, Duffield and Pugh have argued against a standardized liberal peace social model, criticizing it for its insensitiveness to local context and disempowerment of local communities.²⁴⁷ Richmond pointed out the importance of "diverse infra-political areas", which are "social, historical, cultural, political and economic realities", which are often forgotten by liberal peace practitioners.²⁴⁸ Disregarding the view of seeing locals as the object of a "social engineering project associated with the liberal peace", Richmond suggests to pay more attention to local traditions, indigenous social practices and thus to distance oneself from all those liberal claims.²⁴⁹ The representatives of the CSOs in Libya, criticised the allocation of foreign development funds by foreign actors in Libya, which are

²⁴⁵ 'Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 2014-2015, Strategy Paper/ Multi-Annual Indicative Programme Libya (2014-2015)', op. cit., p. 21.

²⁴⁶ Alisa Herrero CANGAS, 'EU's top-down approach may run against high-impact aid strategy', *Devex*, 2015, <https://www.devex.com/news/eu-s-top-down-approach-may-run-against-high-impact-aid-strategy-87182>, (accessed 14 April 201).

²⁴⁷ Jan SELBY, 'The myth of liberal peace-building', *Conflict, Security & Development*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2013, <https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=jan-selby---the-myth-of-liberal-peace-building.pdf&site=320>, (accessed 4 May 201).

²⁴⁸ Pol BARGUÉS - PEDRENY, 'From The Liberal Peace To Pragmatic Peacebuilding to the Reality Of Post - Conflict Zones', *European Consortium for Political Research*, <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/7af8b485-6d09-4db8-8c42-8fa681439109.pdf>, (accessed 4 May 2017), p.1.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.75.

focused on empowerment of women and capacity-building. Whilst these sectors are identified as important, they are not contributing to current post-conflict urgent needs of Libyan people.²⁵⁰ Richmond decomposes the notion of the “local-local”, which should not represent only the local elites or donors but rather the ordinary local people, with which the peace-building actors should interact.²⁵¹ Local people in Libya are at the centre of the post-conflict state-reconstruction and unless they trust the external actors in their national development strategies and their public authorities, they will be willing to put down arms without force and to integrate into Libyan national army or support national development in any other way.²⁵² The EU diplomats agree with the post-liberal criticism that the EU is too far from citizens in its CSDP missions. However, it is believed that the EU cannot do everything and its prime responsibility is to interact with official institutions and democratically elected representatives of Libyan citizens. It is admitted to be a point where the EU should improve, which would however require more sustainable engagement in the developing country.²⁵³ Interaction with the local population and recognizing a government only as a representative institution of its people, is at the root of maximalist liberal peace-building theory and even though the EU devotes some small parts of its policies to local ownership and interactions with CSOs, it is insufficient and incoherent with the necessity required by the reality. Not-respecting locals’ choice for development sectors, but preferring development projects according to the EU’s interests, gives impression of EU’s credibility building, rather than wishing to have a positive impact on the ground in line with its pre-stated development goals.

3.3.1 Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)

The EU is promoting bilateral assistance to Libya through the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) which has already attributed to Libya €26,509,691 over the period of 2015 to 2019 for 10 projects.²⁵⁴ It is the main instrument established by the EU to respond to

²⁵⁰ Barah MIKAÏL, ‘Civil Society and foreign donors in Libya’, FRIDE A European Think Tank for Global Action’, 2013, http://fride.org/download/WP_Lybia.pdf, (accessed 31 May 2017).

²⁵¹ Ibid. p.53.

²⁵² Mohamed El BATTIUI, interview, 2017.

²⁵³ Katya Scicluna BARTOLI interview, 2017. Erik de FEIJTER interview, 2017.

²⁵⁴ ‘Insight on Conflict’, European Commission, *Peace Direct*, <https://www.insightonconflict.org/fr/icsp/>, (accessed 3 April 2017).

conflicts focused on crisis response, crisis preparedness, conflict prevention and peace-building. Noticeable delay in the implementation of development projects directed to crisis response, which started after four years of on-going conflict in Libya, put the development policy of the EU into question. The most recent projects have been directed to developing Libyan national capacities and supporting stabilisation in Libya. Development aid of the EU to Libya provides certain benefits and costs by prioritizing certain sectors for assistance over the others, which imposes a certain constraint on state behaviour. International regimes which are networks of rules, norms and procedures, are believed to alter behaviour of the Libyan state by increased interdependence between the EU and Libya. Wolff examines the difference between aims of the EU's intervention as a conflict manager and its impact on the ground. Its impacts are usually seen in a positive light, but they no longer aspire to objectives such as peace. The goals of EU's missions are either more limited and thus not enough ambitious or too vague as a result of intergovernmental bargaining. The existing intergovernmental tension between EU Member States over prioritization of the allocating funds between the East or the South neighbourhood often prolongs the negotiations.²⁵⁵ As a result of this, EU's mandates often differ from its actual results on the ground, which also provides a space for manoeuvre for promoting national interests of the EU member states.²⁵⁶ Furthermore, the problem of inter-institutional diplomacy is often prolonging the decision-making in practice and often fails to bring coordinated, coherent and consistent foreign policy as a response to a worsening crisis.²⁵⁷ On one hand, due to the lack of political stability, institutions and absorption capacity, Libya has been neither ready to engage with the EU effectively nor able to follow its development program. On the other hand, the EU's complex system of decision-making in the process of implementing development projects has caused a serious delay in bringing development aid, at a time when Libya most needed it, which brings the IcSP into incoherence with its original aims to respond to a crisis in an effective and quick manner.

²⁵⁵ Pierre VERLUISE, 'EU. Development Aid Policy', *Diploweb La Reveu Geopolitique*, 2015, <http://www.diploweb.com/EU-Developement-aid-policy.html>, (accessed 10 April 2017).

²⁵⁶ Richard G. WHITMAN and Stefan WOLFF, op.cit..

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

3.3.2 European Neighbourhood Instrument

Under the ENI, the EU supports Libya in its economic development, protection of vulnerable people, migration, internal security and justice.²⁵⁸ The regularly met impediment in the EU's development aid is the Libyan incapacity to absorb this aid, which is often challenging for a country in crisis. The EU approved to spend over €120 million investing in Libya into 37 projects across 6 sectors: civil society; governance; health; youth and education; migration and protection; and support to the political process, security and mediation.²⁵⁹ These projects however had to be stopped due to the mounting insecurity in the country and have been resumed with the arrival of the GNA to a certain extent. For the period of 2014-2015 the EU's assistance to Libya concentrated only on 3 priority sectors, supporting democratic governance, youth and health.²⁶⁰ Currently Libya has neither an overall National Development Strategy, nor a National Health Strategy, therefore health has been regarded as a priority area of the EU's intervention in Libya.²⁶¹ The EU is aware of the incoherence between the current aid, Libyan capacities to absorb it and the effect of this aid. Development aid is aimed to create synergies in both the security and development sectors engaging local and national authorities, the civil societies and private sector.²⁶² Richmond however regards liberal peace-building as flawed, due to conditionality and dependency made by development aid projects regulated by the superior external actor. Instead of liberal peace, it forms a "hybrid form of liberal peace", which undermines the idea of a social contract.²⁶³ In opposition to this, Richard believes in the lack of coherence in the EU development aid due to lack of exerting domination over regions influenced

²⁵⁸ 'Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 2014-2015, Strategy Paper/ Multi-Annual Indicative Programme Libya (2014-2015)', op. cit., p. 13-14.

²⁵⁹ 'Factsheets on the relations between Libya and the European Union', EEAS, 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/19163/EU-Libya%20relations,%20factsheet, (accessed, 20 April 2017).

²⁶⁰ 'European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Libya', *European Commission*, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/libya_en, (accessed 1 May 2017).

²⁶¹ 'Commission Implementing Decision of 30.11.2015 on Annual Action Programme 2015 and Annual Action Programme 2016 part 1 in favour of Libya to be financed from the general budget of the European Union', *European Commission*, 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/neighbourhood/pdf/key-documents/libya/20151130_aap-2015-2016-part1-libya-financing-commission-decision-en.pdf, (accessed 1 May 2017).

²⁶² 'Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 2014-2015, Strategy Paper/ Multi-Annual Indicative Programme Libya (2014-2015)', op. cit., p. 20.

²⁶³ Edward NEWMAN (ed.), Roland PARIS (ed.) and Oliver P. RICHMOND, 'New Perspectives on liberal Peacebuilding', *United Nations University Press*, 2009, http://i.unu.edu/media/unu.edu/publication/2317/liberalpeacebuilding_sample_chapter1.pdf, (accessed 10 April 2017), p.16-17.

by the development aid, which leads to a lack of visibility of EU projects.²⁶⁴ Furthermore, the often noticed issue of the EU civilian peace-building is that they try to adapt the local post-conflict society to the Western-made liberal approaches, whilst it should be the other way around, the peace-building process should be adapted to locals. The perfect solution would be to find the right compromise, which would trigger the “Western model itself [to be] modified by its engagement with its [...] “other”.”²⁶⁵ Often under the pretext of social agenda in Africa, the EU intervenes to promote growth by satisfying local elites. In addition to this, it pushes a country for implementing a neo-liberal model of economic development, which often exacerbates an already dire economic situation in a country which is not able to compete on the international market.²⁶⁶ Its incoherence between trade and development, economic liberalization and reduction of poverty, development aid and lack of capacities is contributing to the EU’s image, which Libyan leaders are afraid to support due to fear of societal disagreement which could be followed by a loss of political support.

3.3.3 EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has invested in the region of North Africa a total of €154.5 million for the period of 2016-2017 focused on responding to migratory challenges.²⁶⁷ Generally it has been created to respond to emerging situations to support the most fragile African states. The Trust Fund is managed by Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) and its aim is to provide quick, flexible, and collective EU responses to unprecedented levels of irregular migration, displacement and to contribute to better migration management. Investing most of the money from this fund to Libya, €90 million shows the urgency of the Libyan situation and the EU’s interest to invest in security in the country and in the continent. The incoherence of the development programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa is that the EU is one of the biggest founders of development programmes in that region

²⁶⁴ Pierre VERLUISE, op. cit..

²⁶⁵ Oliver RICHMOND, op. cit., p.9.

²⁶⁶ Luis MAH, ‘Reshaping EU Development Policy: Collective Choices & the new global order’, Center for African, Asian and Latin American Studies (CEsA), 2014, p.12, https://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~cesa/files/Doc_trabalho/WP130.pdf, (accessed 14 April 2017).

²⁶⁷ ‘International Cooperation and Development, Building Partnership for Change in developing countries, North Africa Window’, European Commission, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund/north-africa_en, (accessed 15 April 2017).

and in spite of this, the region has experienced the biggest increase in forced displacement after Syria in 2015.²⁶⁸ Migration is never a natural decision and most often migrants are forced to migrate under dire economic situations or conflicts in their country. Therefore stopping migrants by improving border management is incoherent with development agenda, which aims to invest in root causes of migration rather than in its consequences.²⁶⁹

Analysing the EU's peace-building instruments for development gives impression that the EU is in contradiction in its development agenda between funding areas benefiting the population as whole and securing its own interests on the ground, predominantly aiming for stability in Libya in order to counter the negative spill-over effects into Europe. Funding predominantly areas of its interests gives impression of neo-colonialism rather than willingness for sustainable development of Libya. Concentrating development aid mostly in the northern part of Libya is undermining Southern regions in development process, which leads to their distrust of external actors and is incoherent in the development aid which should focus on the whole country.

²⁶⁸ Annette JÜNEMANN, Nikolas SCHERER and Nicolas FROMM (Eds.), *Fortress Europe? Challenges and Failures of Migration and Asylum Policies*, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2017.

²⁶⁹ Serge STROOBANTS interview, 2017.

4. Conclusion

This study came into conclusion that whilst the EU presents itself as a normative power and the biggest donor of development aid in the world, the EU is over-prioritising own economic interests, security and stability in Libya over democratisation and development, and thus is facing incoherence in its peace-building efforts between its set objectives and real practices on the ground.

After careful examination of Libyan situation after the fall of Gaddafi, this thesis has presented three key findings. Firstly, the EU's preoccupation with its own security is compromising the EU's goal to achieve security objective for Libya. The emphasis on resilience in European Union Global Strategy displays a hybrid compromise of creating a middle ground between promoting liberal peace-building and promoting stability for its own security objective. The incoherence between its set mandates and insufficient devoted capabilities exemplifies the incoherence in the EU's missions and operations. The understood vision of geo-political interconnectedness of the MENA region in the EU policies is not matched with mobilised tools and capabilities by the EU for resolving common deficiencies and threats faced by the region.

The second finding of this research proves that the EU's democratization strategy, promoted as one of the key goals of its peace-building efforts, is predominantly used for institutionalizing its own economic interests in Libya and for gaining credibility on the ground in its external actions. The supported European form of centralised democratic governance is not suitable for Libyan pluralistic society. The EU's democratisation efforts, which should support the government of the Libyan people, by the Libyan people, for the Libyan people, is put into controversy due to its support of under-representative Government of National Accord and undermining other political parties elected by the Libyan people. The European Neighbourhood Policy, regarded as the main instrument used for spreading democratic principles, has been ineffective in Libya due to the EU's incoherence between its promotion of norms and securing its geo-strategic interests, preoccupied with own concerns for migration, terrorism and stability of its neighbourhood.

The third finding of this study is that the EU's development policy is primarily seeking to connect its development funds with its own strategic objectives in Libya, prioritizing sectors dealing with migration and public policy over the real needs of Libyan society. The EU's top-

down approach and low engagement with local population is incoherent with its future overall objective of achieving sustainable development in Libya. The incoherence between the liberal peace-building theory that it adheres to promote peace and its modus operandi, have been magnified by the complexity of the EU's multi-level system of governance and diverging interests between the EU member states. Development agenda in Libya has been met with lack of capacities from both the EU and Libyan side, which systematically limited the effective implementation of the development funds so far.

The analysis of these three principal areas of peace-building intervention by the EU, supports the original hypothesis of this research that the EU is not coherent in its peace-building efforts in Libya, and the EU's performed actions on the ground have been divergent from the vision of post-conflict peace-building set by Boutros Boutros-Ghali aimed at identifying and supporting structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace.²⁷⁰ The EU's predominant concerns in Libya are stability and security in order to avert the consequences of spill-over effect on the EU, and to secure future economic investment and interrupted free flow of oil. As a result of these findings, the EU's set goals in its external policies towards Libya are incoherent to resolve security-sector impasse, governance crisis and development predicaments in a sustainable manner.

Future research could look at the actual effectiveness of the EU's peace-building efforts on the ground. This analysis could be further extended by conducting interviews with EEAS officials, who could clarify the goals and actions of the EU towards Libya, and with Civil Society Organisations' representatives in Libya which could grasp better understanding of the use of the EU's development fund on the ground in Libya and its interaction with local population.

²⁷⁰ Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI, "Report of the UN Secretary-General: "Agenda for Peace", *Council on Foreign Relations*, 1992, <http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-un-secretary-general-agenda-peace/p23439>, (accessed 3 April, 2017).

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Résumé

Dans ce mémoire, j'ai analysé la crise en cours en Libye depuis la chute de Kadhafi en 2011, particulièrement en évaluant les efforts de consolidation de la paix de l'Union Européenne pour résoudre cette crise. La question centrale de cette recherche consiste en la cohérence des efforts de consolidation de la paix de l'UE dans la crise libyenne après la chute de Kadhafi.

Cette étude qualitative décrit la situation en Libye depuis 2011 et applique ensuite les efforts de consolidation de la paix de l'Union Européenne dans le secteur de la sécurité, la gouvernance démocratique et le développement dans la Libye post-Kadhafi, en utilisant les théories de consolidation de la paix comme principal cadre théorique de cette analyse.

Ma conclusion aboutit au constat que les efforts de consolidation de la paix de l'Union Européenne en Libye ne sont pas cohérents avec leurs objectifs initiaux. Le principal but de l'intervention de l'UE a été avant tout d'assurer des objectifs géostratégiques, consistant principalement en des intérêts sécuritaires et économiques.

Mots-clés: consolidation de la paix, Union Européenne, sécurité, démocratie, développement