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Solidarity in Migration

Coherence and a normative argumentation for contemporary transnational forms of solidarity

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Introduction

Contemporary challenges of migration have gained increased attention in political actions as well as in civil society. Political discourse has flooded with calls in favour or against migration, while civil society has been coping with the defying situation in different ways. Migration has increasingly become a divisive subject not only in policymaking, but even in daily institutional, collective and individual action. The fluctuation of migratory movements around the globe point towards the need to further address the underlying issues that shape the discussion on migration. The discussion and real-world actions surrounding migration reveal a need for further clarification of some of the concepts that compose the debate. A particularly troubling concept is solidarity. The application of solidarity to the context of migration provides a challenge for theoretical clarification and normative argumentation.

In the European Mediterranean, civil society organisations have been continuously providing support for immigrants traversing land or sea to reach European territory. Even though they advocate for increased institutional action and support, they also take into their own hands efforts that include search and rescue missions, coordination and distribution of necessary supplies, and medical and legal counselling, among other actions. These efforts are often, but not necessarily, coordinated by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Whether in cooperation or in stand-alone efforts, they continue to name their operations as actions of solidarity with migrants. They name and construct their strategies in accordance to a certain notion of solidarity that, at least to them, is applicable to this context.

Solidarity in migration is, however, not necessarily welcome by authorities. In the last few years, European and local authorities have upped their efforts to reduce or avoid state-coordinated or state-approved actions of support towards immigrants. As a result, some civil society members that continue to attempt to pursue their goals of solidarity with immigrants have seen an increase in persecution. These take form either directly with arrests, judicial prosecution, fines or threats; or indirectly with a lack of support or other measures to trump their efforts. Civil society actors that aim towards providing such support to immigrants have denounced these actions and named it the *criminalisation of solidarity* (Fekete, 2018).

Criminalising solidarity opens two basic points for further analysis and argumentation. Initially, the question if it is actually solidarity what is at stake here. This requires a theoretical clarification to determine if we are in fact dealing with solidarity. Within this first point, we will also explore a conceptual reconstruction to understand the weight that relations of solidarity might carry, in contrast to one-directional efforts of aid. Then, it would also call for a normative argumentation that determines the permissibility of such criminalisation of solidarity. In this thesis, these two points are addressed with particular attention to the conceptual groundworks of solidarity and its applicability to migration.

It seems clear that the concept of solidarity has been increasingly applied in the context of migration. However, different uses of the concept and a strong attachment to traditional meanings make its understanding nebulous and its application diverse. Its use in several contexts that deal with the question of migration make it particularly important to achieve more clarity at different levels. Whether it is coherent and makes sense to talk about solidarity in the discussion of migration remains an open question, one that needs to be addressed. At the same time, the ongoing debate on migration calls for a better comprehension of the concepts which shape it, both in academic and non-academic areas.

Solidarity is a particularly challenging concept to understand because there is no unified definition, but rather different attempts to define it. Only in the academic research on migration and refugeehood, solidarity finds a wide range of senses. Some may be more common than others, but the variety of understandings of solidarity is a reality in the literature (Bauder & Juffs, 2019). It becomes particularly challenging to find an applicable account to matters of migration that corresponds to current real-world conditions.

In sociology and political philosophy, the bonds of solidarity have been more thoroughly analysed within the discussions of closed, established societies. However, the call for solidarity in contexts of migration has been increasing, for which it is clear that a certain coherence is presupposed, particularly if such calls attempt to be taken seriously. Solidarity with those who are not already integrated into existing relations of solidarity, particularly in the stronger bonds of rights and duties of local social protection systems, remains unclear.

The introduction of this concept to the discussion on migration already demands analysing its applicability into the context. Solidarity in migration could be understood

in different forms. A key parameter that impacts its shaping is the question of limiting those who are introduced into the circle of solidarity. For instance, solidarity could be focused on already belonging native peoples, among specific sectors or cultural groups, at a generalised level within a closed state, or even in an international or transnational sense. This thesis will further inquire on a transnational application of solidarity. A main objective here is to explore the possibility and conceptual coherence of solidarity directed at including newcomers into these types of bonds. Our attention will be directed to analyse solidarity *with* immigrants. This form is particularly challenging and will require a deconstruction and reconstruction of the concept. Since it contests the more standard, closed, views of solidarity, making its applicability counterintuitive at the beginning, it will require a deep analysis and a strong argumentation.

Additionally, the extension of solidarity from the local sphere to include immigrants also introduces normative questions. If solidarity is in fact coherently applied in migration, we must question the normative impact that it might have. In other words, if solidarity with immigrants makes sense, we must explore the obligations that arise from it. Recognising solidarity in migration would open a new set of normative questions that would require further argumentation in regard to the limits and extent of responsibilities. A coherent account of solidarity in migration, however, may not only introduce such questions but even provide initial hints to advance a normative argumentation that favours its defence.

The main foundation of the concept of solidarity in social studies and its further impact on political philosophy commonly points towards Émile Durkheim's account. According to Durkheim (1964), solidarity is the social cohesion based upon the dependence individuals have on each other in more advanced societies. For the author, there are different types of solidarity and they correlate with different types of societies, each with differing social facts. In more general terms, particularly considering modern industrialised societies, we can highlight what he calls an *organic solidarity*, which surges as the network of interactions in modern societies. This account of solidarity has been highly influential, helping shape the initial understanding of the concept and its application in different domains of life in society. Based on inter-dependence within the society, organic solidarity binds its members together. However, it includes only "very general and indeterminate ways of thought and sentiment, which leaves room open for a growing variety of individual

differences” (1964, p. 172). Nevertheless, this coherent account of solidarity is more easily applied to contexts where it has already been established who are the members of society. Put in closer terms to the debate on migration, the context on which organic solidarity is more commonly found are those in which membership to the political community has already been distributed. Therefore, this account is somewhat insufficient to understand the challenges that an influx of new people might pose. It does not offer the adequate conceptual tools to comprehend if and how solidarity is expanded to newcomers. With large migratory movements at hand in contemporary history, this becomes a rather strong shortcoming of the traditional account of solidarity that calls for closer inspection. How, then, could we apply the concept of solidarity to immigration?

Current applications of the term solidarity in different contexts regarding migration already point out the need for clarity. The term solidarity is not limited to academic research. It is actually a term shaping legislation, policies and conventions throughout national, regional and international organisations. Nonetheless, within the context of migration, not all conceptions of solidarity share the same meaning.

One of the main challenges that surface is that the concept of solidarity is already being applied at an international scale. Horizontal organisations such as the European Union and even the United Nations continue to mention solidarity regarding migration (Šalamon, 2017). Solidarity in this case does not share the same nature as the intra-societal solidarity that Durkheim states. This international form of solidarity is supposed to know no boundaries regarding interdependence and social facts, but its application becomes clearer once we widen the spectrum from the intra-societal perspective to an inter-state one. This means that we are no longer considering solidarity among inter-dependent individuals, but rather between states.

Nevertheless, there seems to be a disjunction in the application of the concept of solidarity, even within the context of migration. We can already ask a fundamental question to better understand the root of this lack of clarity: Solidarity with who? We have already mentioned the EU and UN, who apply the concept of solidarity with states, particularly calling for *shared responsibility*. For horizontal organisations, solidarity conveys the shared responsibility among states to avoid migration-caused crisis within them.

On a different perspective, civil society organisations such as NGOs focusing on migration issues use the concept quite differently, pairing solidarity with “humanity

and respect for human rights” (ENPAM, 2011). We can see that this second group conceives solidarity in relation to migrants themselves, rather than with states that welcome them.

As shown so far, the concept of solidarity in migration does not have a unique application. In fact, establishing differentiated recipients for solidarity seem to entail a very different conception of the term. Taking this into account, we need to ask ourselves two questions to better assess the concept: One, what is the core of the concept of solidarity, that would allow its application in such different cases as international and at civil society levels? Secondly, we would need to inquire about the possibility of its application at a transnational level. Transnational solidarity may open the opportunity to effectively explaining calls for solidarity beyond borders. Such form would require a strong conceptual construction, particularly so it is properly distinguished with more unilateral or simplified relations with migrants such as aid or assistance.

When discussing relations of solidarity, it must be clear the ways in which its actions differ from aid. An important distinction is that “in activities grounded in solidarity, the other is not considered to be needy, but independent and responsible (Schwertl, 2017, p. 73). The framing of actions and relations of solidarity is not attached to the immediate physical need but rather establishes a new form of relation, a new dynamic between different parts that engage in solidarity. This differs from aid, which relates more closely to economic development and the fight against poverty (p. 74), but that is also more centred on a unilateral and voluntary support. What is at stake here is not the forms in which aid is fashioned and realized, but rather the possibility and coherence of establishing relations of solidarity beyond the scope of closed societies.

Following the example of application of solidarity by civil society and migration focused NGOs, we can begin to seriously inquire about solidarity with non-members. Within the debate on migration, certain special obligations towards rights of immigrants are more commonly acknowledged and analysed¹. But this more often

¹ A more typical exemplification of the discussion on rights and duties towards migrants is performed between two prominent figures of the Open Borders and Closed Borders debate, Joseph Carens and

relates to a rights-based approach, not paying much attention to possible relations of solidarity with non-members, nor the normative implications it would entail. If anything, it relates to local more expressions of solidarity explained by more traditional accounts, and their weight in limiting new relations of solidarity that may include immigrants.

To advance in this discussion and introduce the concept into the transnational setting in which migration takes place, we must ask, what is solidarity? How does it relate to those who are not directly inter-dependent in a political community? Can the answer be related to globalisation and the inter-dependence among different societies? Or could it point towards a different perception of a unified globalised society?

Several examples can be quoted to make sense of the application of the concept of solidarity. However, more than anything, it reveals to us the unclarity of its application towards non-members or newcomers. For instance, the European Observatory of Working Life states that “the principle of solidarity of the European Union is a fundamental principle based on sharing both the advantages, i.e. prosperity, and the burdens equally and justly among members” (EurWork, 2011). In such example, the concept of solidarity points towards inner members of society or, in this particular case, member states of the European Union. But what does it mean when the term solidarity is applied to non-members?

To think about non-members is to take immigration into account. Particularly, we can envisage solidarity in migration as a distributive matter in which available and future benefits, as well as duties and responsibilities, are shared not only with existing members, but also with newcomers who are granted, if not membership, at least a certain inclusion to the unity and inter-dependence to which the concept of solidarity appeals.

The concept is still fluctuant, but we can at least extract some clues on how to proceed its deconstruction. The concept of solidarity, even in migration, appeals to a certain form of unity or sense of sharing, but it still leaves us with the intriguing question about who does solidarity apply to. To respond, there are several key issues that require

David Miller. A more complete recompilation of the state of the debate is done by Miller, who summarises the most common arguments and counterarguments of different postures. “Cf. D. Miller. *Strangers in our Midst: the political philosophy of immigration*, (2016)”.

further clarification. To better understand not only the concept of solidarity, but to make a better sense of what it means when solidarity is brought up in the context of migration, we would need to take into account the variety of its conceptualization and applications. As an introduction to the variety at hand, we can contrast two perspectives on solidarity.

For instance, Michael Hoelzl (2004) sums up that “the engagement characterized by solidarity is the acknowledgment of the otherness of the other in such a way that a constructive cooperation is possible (considering that) self-determination and the development of the autonomous individual are only possible through social relations” (p. 48). This work is ultimately part of a long, ongoing process of building and sustaining connections across spatial and ethnic differences. However, this engagement by solidarity seems to continue to point towards a closed account of solidarity, where the immediate influx of new agents through immigration is still not taken into account.

Other authors have been trying to construct an account to solidarity that sets aside the focus on closedness and exclusion. They both denounce this characteristic of more Durkheimian accounts and try to point towards a different direction. Some contemporary authors, particularly in feminist theory, have been working to introduce a critique, giving a twist to solidarity and introducing it to new categories. For example, Georgina Colby (2018) insists on the need for a ‘new’ form of solidarity which does not rely on exclusionary principles. The author criticises the exclusionary value of conventional forms of solidarity and its centredness on an *us* and *them* dialectic. To respond to this characteristic judged as deficiency, she introduces a different conception of solidarity, that of reflective solidarity.

Reflective solidarity 'builds from ties created by dissent', offering a form of solidarity that resists becoming 'yet another exclusionary ideal' through respecting 'the historical conditions of value pluralism, the ever-present potential for exclusion, the demands of accountability, and the importance of critique' (p. 2).

The author attempts at conceptualising solidarity differently, without necessarily focusing on exclusion. This attempt already points us towards current efforts to better understand or reconstruct this concept so that it better comprises the challenges that arise from migration. To surmount the challenges of exclusion of solidarity, and to understand if there is such a thing as a solidarity towards strangers, we will engage in a deeper analysis. Colby’s critique provides us at least an initial motivation to better

understand solidarity and consider the possibility to envisage coherent non-exclusionary accounts.

In the end, we can identify a certain need to avoid the exclusionary paths that has characterised solidarity in a ‘Durkheimian’ tradition. Our endeavour to look for clarification and expanding beyond conventional accounts of solidarity comes from a presupposed inadequacy to explain non-exclusionary expressions of solidarity. Our point of departure here is not the normative shortages that conventional solidarity might create, but its challenges to understand current phenomena. Nevertheless, once we deconstruct and reconstruct solidarity, we will argue for its normative weight with a more novel argumentation in the debate on migration.

The concept of solidarity continues open to interpretation. It has some very well rooted definitions such as the one introduced by Durkheim over a century ago, but its current application is not necessarily loyal to his account. New interpretations continue to share some characteristics, in particular its fundamental importance to the possibility of social unity and tendency for cooperation. Nevertheless, there is a key fragment of the definition which remains variant and certainly requires the proper argumentation. The application of solidarity to migration demands that we seriously consider the question of ‘solidarity with whom?’. Without doing so, it seems that the lack of clarity of the concept, as it is differently applied by diverse agents in the matter, will continue to cloud arguments in all sides of the discussion surrounding migration.

The unclarity surrounding the concept of solidarity introduces a relevant question to address. Does it make sense to talk about solidarity in migration? To answer this question, we will need to revise and reconstruct some more traditional accounts of solidarity and review the literature on the concept. Particularly, we will try to present the discussion on the more closed or exclusionary forms of solidarity that come from a Durkheimian tradition, or the possibility to think about more open forms.

Given the challenge that we find in applying the concept of solidarity to migration, we will divide our efforts in three major points. In the first chapter, we will conduct a more thorough analysis of the concept of solidarity. Initially, we will try to prove that solidarity is a variable concept. Fortunately, in the last twenty years the interest on solidarity has been increasing. Pointing towards the obscurity of solidarity and its variations, authors as Steinar Stjernø have conducted a thorough analysis of the historical evolution of the concept. Basing ourselves in his recount and considering

different conditions on which solidarity has been applied or theorized, we will attempt to demonstrate the variability of solidarity.

Following Stjernø's recount (2005), we will see how solidarity has been evolving throughout the history of Europe depending on the context. However, such evolution is not univocal, even finding different forms of development, at the same time. There have been, and still are, contrasting conceptions of solidarity depending on ideological and organisational differences. For instance, in a same period of time, solidarity has seen varying evolutions among two distinct groups which have given solidarity an important place, Catholic ethics and Classic Marxism. We find a valuable lesson from a more detailed analysis of the history of Europe, the variability of solidarity as a concept.

However, it is not only important to prove that solidarity is a varying concept with different applications. To reconstruct a coherent account that will allow us to understand why some people are (non-equivocally) talking about solidarity in migration, we will need to find what lies at its core. This means that we will need to enter into a deconstructive phase for the concept. We will then work to identify the common ground on which different interpretations of solidarity stand, and to which a relevant account in solidarity must also abide. In this section, we will focus on what we will call *relational* and *non-relational* forms of solidarity. This categorization will provide a new perspective on a division of solidarity which will determine its coherence or incoherence in its application towards immigrants. Mainly, relational solidarity will refer to the more closed perspectives that focus on solidarity as a given condition within an established society. This means that the emphasis would remain on conditions where mobility was still not strongly challenging the concept of solidarity, particularly those close to the Durkheimian account. Opposite to these accounts that are now being contested by authors such as Colby, we will find the form of non-relational solidarity which have been receiving more attention in the last few decades. Although missing the strong and rich tradition of relational solidarity, non-relational solidarity gives us reason to conceive it as a possible response to the insufficiencies that solidarity faces when confronted to the questions of migration. In particular, it will open the possibility to understand how solidarity with an external member is possible. Based on the non-necessity of a pre-existing relation, new bonds of solidarity become possible. Therefore, we will advance on such non-relational form of solidarity to advance on this quest of coherence between solidarity and migration.

Another important aspect of solidarity that we will take into account are the conditions of solidarity. Clarifying what the conditions are, it will be possible to devise a reconstructive argumentation about solidarity in a non-relational form. Considering the weight of each condition and the capacity to build a bond of solidarity with different levels of strength among them, we will move towards a more precise comprehension of the concept. In the end, we will point towards the possibility of conceiving non-relational solidarity dispensing (to a certain extent) with some conditions that seem to narrow solidarity to pre-established relations. Focusing on the conditions of joint interests or values, disposition to empathy and mutual trust, we will achieve this. At the same time, we will insist on the weakness of the condition of identification with a group. We will see how such identification may not be strictly necessary for solidarity to arise, particularly in a form that requires pre-established relations.

With a better understanding of solidarity, we will see how it has a certain link to morality, particularly based on the condition of joint interests and mutual trust. Although this will not become central in this analysis, we will show that these two conditions lead towards a normative value of solidarity, even in its non-relational form. At the end of the first chapter, we will have analysed and begin the reconstruction of solidarity in non-relational forms. Specifically, we will have pointed out the link between the conditions of solidarity and the possibility to expand towards non-exclusionary forms. The first chapter will ultimately serve to construct an initial basis that arms solidarity with the necessary conceptual tools to be amplified from local relations towards other more open expressions found beyond borders.

In the second chapter, we will expand our analysis of the core of solidarity towards attempts to explain transnational solidarity. We will first frame the conceptualization of transnational solidarity in the attempts to expand solidarity beyond local applications. In this section, we will introduce two main families of argumentative strategies, universal and non-universal. The first, depending largely on more cosmopolitan concepts, will prove to be particularly weak since it comes short in explaining the motivation of an actual engagement of solidarity. Therefore, we will focus on the latter to explain how transnational solidarity can be constructed. Mainly, we will establish that non-universal strategies to construct transnational solidarity are less abstract and that they provide a focus on discursive relations. Considering a discursive construction of solidarity in which no pre-existing relation, not even

previous physical interaction is necessary, this second strategy will enable us to think about solidarity in a transnational sense.

Advancing this non-universalist strategy will lead us to the two main aspects on which transnational solidarity will rely upon on our account: interconnectivity and vulnerability. These intertwined notions will enable us to think about the formation of possible relations in a transnational setting. Besides, they will point towards a cross-border vulnerability that opens up the discussion of moral obligations at the foundation of bonds of solidarity, but also throughout their development.

The second chapter will finally conclude by applying the construction of our account to real-world cases of so-called solidarity with immigrants. The objective here is to test our account to see if it coherently explains expressions of transnational solidarity. First, we will deal with the case of solidarity among feminist movements in the transnational setting. Second, and finally introducing our concept to migration, we will see the case of solidarity movements towards immigrants in the European Mediterranean. Thanks to such application of our account of the concept, we will reach our first conclusion. This account of transnational solidarity is coherent with expressions of solidarity in the context of migration. It will provide a coherent explanation of what is currently being called solidarity with immigrants. Solidarity would then be coherently expanded to a more open form, also introducing possible and actual bonds of solidarity between locals and immigrants (or attempting immigrants). Thus, our account will not only be equipped to deal with the challenges of immigration, but it is coherent with actual expressions of solidarity in real-world conditions.

Finally, in the third chapter, we will introduce a normative argumentation which supports the defence of this account of transnational solidarity in the debate of migration. Initially, we will link the weight that these relations of solidarity carry with freedom of association and its importance in the conception of justice in liberal societies. We will borrow some initial concepts from John Rawls to understand the role that freedom of association plays in the conception and in the efforts to achieve a just society. Here, we will begin focusing on the two components of freedom of association: inclusion and exclusion. Nonetheless, we will centre our argumentation on inclusion. We will argue that freedom of association has a central role in the development of moral agency in the individual. Considering the importance freedom of association has for the development of the moral agent, we will then insist on the

strong link between the relations of solidarity as a particular form of inclusion. Therefore, solidarity as not only exclusionary but also inclusionary will be linked to justice in liberal societies and will call for a serious normative consideration.

Consequently, we will integrate the previous initial conclusion to the debate of migration. With a brief introduction to the current state of discussion, we will emphasise that there is a focus on exclusion on the debate. Whether in favour or against, the centrality of exclusion as self-determination of the political community is central to the debate on migration. However, we will try to present a different perspective in which inclusion at the individual level needs also to be taken in to account. Its relevance is particularly exposed by the weight that developing relations of solidarity carry and its centrality to the conception and quest for justice in liberalism. Finally, we will apply this account of justice and our normative argumentation to the case of solidarity in the European Mediterranean. We will see that there are overlapping and conflicting interests in this case, but that the interests of those who wish to include newcomers or strangers into certain relations of solidarity are particularly ignored in the debate of migration. The applicability of solidarity to transnational relations and particularly to the case of locals and potential or actual immigrants, drives our argumentation towards a renewed and strengthened relevance of the interest to include. Hence, we will conclude by stating that the interest to include by local moral agents is not also relevant, but that it requires closer attention. The weight of relations of solidarity, and their importance in the process of justice in liberalism (considering our selection of Rawlsian concepts) leads to the previous conclusion.

In this final conclusion, we will not provide an answer to the actual weighing process of conflicting interests of exclusion and inclusion. Instead, we will point towards the relevance of the interest to include, backed by our account of solidarity, in the weighing of interests in both the academic and political debate. This would call for the introduction of the member's interest to include into the debate. Based on the significance of relations of solidarity that are created at a transnational level, these interests should be more seriously considered in the debate and in decision-making in the context of migration.

Throughout the extent of this work, there is an exploration on the concept of solidarity, fuelled by the variability of the concept. The case of solidarity in migration reveals not only that the concept remains unclear, but that it even presents the possibility to better

understand and address some of the challenges from migratory movements. To achieve a better clarity and to point towards a novel application of solidarity in the normative discussion on migration, the following argumentative line will be followed. Some details of the argumentation and the structure of this thesis have already been outlined above. Overall, we will follow three methodological steps to better understand solidarity in migration and advance a normative argumentation.

First, we will perform a more thorough analysis of solidarity focused on its variability, its core. We will also categorize some of its variations into two major groups to further advance our analysis (relational and non-relational solidarities). This initial phase will consist on deconstruction to better understand what solidarity is, and how its conceptual bases are constructed.

Second, we will begin a reconstructive phase in which non-relational solidarities are not only coherent but applicable to the challenges of migration. Here we will extend solidarity to reach transnational forms. Based on conclusions of the possibility of non-relational solidarities, we will be able to introduce transnational solidarity. This second phase will be a reconstructive effort to transform into transnational solidarity. Argumentation here will comprise both the basic, core understanding of solidarity and its transnational form. Different strategies to construct transnational solidarity are considered and, in relation to existing efforts for conceiving a transnational solidarity, we will conclude on a coherent account of transnational solidarity.

The last step here will be advancing a normative argumentation based on the account of transnational solidarity, which we will then apply in the debate of migration. Once solidarity in migration is clarified, it will bring the question of how it can reshape the discussion. Here we will provide further normative arguments in relation to the liberal tradition. To summarise: after analysing and reconstructing solidarity to achieve an account of transnational solidarity, we will reach the normative aspect, where we will argue for the weight that solidarity has for the discussion of migration.

The present thesis is an exploration of the concept of solidarity and an attempt to reconstruct some of its aspects so that it finds a new-found coherence within the present context of transnational interconnectivity. It provides an analysis of the variations and possibilities that the concept of solidarity carries. At the same time, it expands on the core of the concept to reconstruct an account that carries the necessary tools to respond to transnationalism and, particularly, to migration. Finally, it provides a normative argumentation in favour of a minimal protection of interests that comes

from transnational solidarity, adding a new perspective for the debate in ethics of migration. Although the actual application of our normative conclusions would be a more extensive and future work, we hope to at least provide a new and useful tool in the ongoing debate.

Chapter I. Understanding Solidarity – Variability, Core and Non-Exclusionary forms

The concept of solidarity involves a particular challenge for its understanding. As other concepts, it continually flows in both meaning and application. Even though it has certain commonalities throughout history, with traces as early as Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire, it is possible to see its transformation and breakthroughs in flow with diverging contexts (Brunkhorst, 2005). Unable to detach solidarity from its context, we find that it is strongly connected to other concepts and values from its time and place. Such complexity amounts to a necessity to study and clarify what can be understood as solidarity. To do so, we need to have a clearer sense of the variability of the concept. Then, we will be able to look more closely into the core aspects of solidarity and try to provide an account to elucidate solidarity in migration. Finally, we will conclude this chapter by analysing necessary conditions for solidarity to arise. We will also explore some initial moral aspects that an account of solidarity that is not dependent on pre-existing relations might entail. Along this first chapter, we will analyse the concept of solidarity, its variations and the possibility and coherence to consider other accounts of solidarity that are not so closely related to exclusion.

The challenge of clarifying solidarity needs, first of all, a better comprehension of some of the traits that make it highly variable. Before we launch ourselves into a contemporary understanding of the concept, we will point towards demonstrating that solidarity changes in form and understanding. There are two ways in which we will achieve this. First, we will quickly review two accounts found in two different approaches: Catholic ethics of solidarity and Marxist political philosophy. By conducting a key analysis of these two, we will be able to remark that solidarity is not univocally understood, not even in the theoretical field. Second, we will review the application of the concept to political institutions and public life throughout recent history in Europe. By examining such differences, we will see how the concept has been differently shaped and had different outcomes depending on its context. With these two main elements to understand the variability of solidarity, we will conclude by pointing out the need for further analysis.

Once we understand solidarity as an ever-changing concept, we will analyse some of its more general traits, looking for a more global understanding. Reviewing definitions

by different authors, we will try to understand the core of solidarity. We will therefore see different approaches to solidarity and try to provide a general understanding of its core. Lastly, we will explore the conditions for solidarity, reaching a more open understanding of the concept that sets aside a focus on exclusion. Besides, this will introduce us into the moral character that new forms of solidarity entail.

1. Solidarity as a variable concept

The study of solidarity has not been exclusive of a specific field of research or tradition. Solidarity has been studied and applied throughout a wide range of fields that include sociology, biological and medical ethics, political philosophy, political science, and others. Besides, it has even had different applications by real political movements, states and civil society organisations. Solidarity does not come as a clear concept, nor is its history linear in the sense that its evolution can be traced in a single tradition.

An exhaustive study of the evolution of solidarity, however, will not be part of our analysis. What is at stake here is to prove the complications that solidarity as a variable concept entail. At the same time, it introduces the possibility to reconstruct a coherent account that is able to provide a better understanding of solidarity in migration. Considering this first limitation of the following analysis, we will make use of some examples to contrast different comprehensions and applications of the concept. Instead of proving the extent of diversity of the concept of solidarity, we will simply aim to prove its variability.

We will use two examples that differently construct a theory of solidarity, with distinctive links to other concepts or values. These are two large traditions that have paid special attention to the concept of solidarity: Catholic solidarity ethics and Marxist political philosophy. Both of these have had a major influence in the development of the concept of solidarity, both at a theoretical level but also in its application.

Even though both Catholic and Classic Marxist thought might conduct a study of solidarity, they differ in their understanding, which is specially influenced by underlying beliefs and conceptual bases. To make apparent the way in which solidarity is transformed, we will contrast both approaches, starting with Catholic theology. Later, we will also review how the application of the concept to the political sphere

might also differ. For this case, we will focus on the accounts and applications of solidarity by social democratic and Christian democratic parties.

Catholic scholars and ecclesiastical members have been some of the most prominent authors on solidarity. The concept has not only been thoroughly studied by theologians; it has come to have an important role in the Catholic world view. Solidarity even provides a main constituent in Catholic ethics. In Catholic tradition, there are three key elements of solidarity that also shape social relations of solidarity. First, there is a recognition of human interdependence that creates obligations, especially towards the marginalised. This interdependence is accompanied by an anthropological perspective of humans as particularly vulnerable. It emphasises the role of social relations and its necessary fundamental structures that are essential for human development.

Second, a firm commitment to the common good, which requires the adequate social structures to ensure its realization. The distinction between individual and societal good is partially blurred in this case. Interdependence is here closely related to interrelations which become central to achieve a higher state of morality.

Third, a willingness to work with others for a common good regardless of contingent differences such as class, sex, religion or nationality (Beyer, 2013). This final element introduces an important openness that we will be able to further contrast to the more closed perspective of Classic Marxism. The attention on “regardless of contingent differences” introduces a certain form of universality that will be, to a certain extent, applied to solidarity. These key elements of the Catholic ethics of solidarity also reveal particular readings from a theological perspective.

For Catholic tradition, the value of recognising human interdependence lies on the ability to also acknowledge a shared humanity, which is strengthened by experiencing the needs of the other as our own (2013, p. 733). Social ethics, not only in Catholicism, but also in Christianity in general and Judaism, “points to the *Brotherhood of Man*” (Stjernø, 2005, p. 61). Such brotherhood, with a common humanity, needs to find a way to fulfil the obligations that come with it. Therefore, an ethics of solidarity is not only of intentions or bland altruism. It involves the effective channels to satisfy its own demands. For the Catholic tradition, solidarity requires an institutionalisation to enable all peoples to actively engage in the construction of common good, at the same time enjoying its fruits. A Catholic understanding of solidarity, therefore, includes notions of effectiveness and participation which necessarily translate into the construction of

the proper channels within the political domain where common good becomes a possible realization.

The focus of the Catholic understanding of solidarity reveals a very particular trait which we will be able to contrast with our future analysis of the study by political philosophy. Catholic theology insists on recognising a common humanity and a mutual interdependence as a first pillar for solidarity. This is to say that all of those who share their humanity are vulnerable and depend on the work of others and themselves for a common good. But, as mentioned in the first key element, this creates obligations towards others.

The mention of an “obligation” is crucial for understanding the particularity of the Catholic account of solidarity. To state that an obligation towards others is created, we can argue that there is a focus on the others, who are now recognised as a commonality. It now introduces a commonality among humans that takes a higher importance than contingent differences. Not to say that differences are to be ignored, but in achieving good, common humanity is the main fact to consider.

Before a first recognition of mutual interdependence, there is ‘I’ and ‘They’². Thanks to such recognition, this opposition is transformed into a ‘We’, with a very specific trait within Catholic tradition, a non-exclusionary ‘We’³. But the efforts towards a common good for the ‘We’ are not promoted by the idea of improving one’s individual good. The understanding of an ethical obligation that is set into place is related to the common humanity which is shared among its members. The obligation to work towards the common good, and particularly the marginalised, is also not fuelled by an idea of compensation. It is then not a form of investment for the eventuality the individual might depend on the work of others. It is a different form in which, as stated before, involves feeling the need of the other as one’s own. From this, an obligation is created.

² Steinar Stjernø introduces a particularly valuable account on the tripartite I, We and They. Not only limited to the Catholic account, he explains this distinction and relates it to other concepts and political perceptions, even considering the relation to subordination and exclusion “Cf. S. Stjernø. *Solidarity in Europe: The history of an idea*, (2005), p. 17”.

Interdependence is not understood as a clash of individual goods in which the basis is self-interest. It is a work for the common good precisely because the commonality, the *Brotherhood*, creates an ethical obligation of cooperation and the creation of effective institutions that increase and expand its benefits and responsibilities. The commonality that lies as a foundation is, in a certain sense, a unity based on two different aspects.

On the one hand, common humanity and fragility; on the other, “the idea that we are joined together in common cause” (Peters, 2015, p. 229). This common cause is at first glance common good. However, this account of solidarity insists on the value of each individual’s capacity and obligation for both common good and self-development. Fulfilling this ethical obligation to others is also basic element of the common cause. In the Catholic account of solidarity, we can identify that the ‘We’ is constructed by the obligation towards others, and its effective realisation by individuals throughout common action becomes vital for self-realization. The actual development of the individual is mediated and requires the societal and institutional foundations for advancing in the search for good.

Solidarity in Catholic tradition is not only a side concept nor a useful conceptual tool on which ethics depend. Instead it lies at the core of ethics themselves, providing two necessary notions. Interdependence and common humanity are a fact of human existence, and actual good can only be achieved by the necessary form of solidarity that must be developed. Solidarity is not only central, but it is understood as an essential component of ethical human life. It particularly brings our attention to the inclusion of a generalised humanity into bonds of solidarity and the real actions to achieve a better state of ethical progress.

Having analysed one of the main aspects of the Catholic understanding of solidarity, we can proceed to the account by Marxist political philosophy. Considering different traditions and contexts, it is impossible to find a consensus on the reading that political philosophy performs on solidarity. However, as our objective in this sub-section is to demonstrate the variability of the concept rather than to review all its different approaches, we will take one stream of thought as an example. We will broadly analyse the conception of solidarity in traditional Marxist theories to illustrate how solidarity differs from the Catholic account.

One of the most radically different understandings of solidarity, compared with the Catholic account, is Classic Marxist theory⁴. Classic Marxists conceived a working-class solidarity, which focused on standing together in the fight for liberation against economic oppression from the exploiting bourgeoisie. There are two important preconceptions that we can identify in Marxist theory. Initially, there is a condition of subjugation and exploitation which a group of people suffer. Understood in Marx's terms, it is the proletariat, a social class that shares this common condition. Second, members of the social class, thanks to their shared condition, would also be able to create a sense of unity. Thanks to these conditions, there would be an "ever-expanding union of workers" (Marx & Engels, 2009, p. 53). The unity that conditions make possible is, therefore, an active one. Individuals in the working class recognise the commonality of their conditions, later advancing towards the fight for their own interests as a unified class.

The basic premises of Marxism in general and on which its conception of solidarity is constructed is that human history is rooted on the actual existence of living human individuals. What is considered here is the actual material life of men whose social relations are determined and determine the modes of production. Marx and Engels (1845) centre their perspective on the individual's real material conditions and the needs that come from them. It is these real conditions that bring about social relationships. The satisfaction of needs, both individual and social, takes a central place, for achieving these establish the modes of production and the social relationships. Satisfying needs involves a determined mode of production which, at the same time defines the mode of cooperation in society.

The modes of production determine the actual social relations among real-living humans. These can and come into contradiction with the state of society and a consciousness, a theorizing capacity. Such contradiction presents the actual movement

⁴ For the purpose of proving the variant character of the concept of solidarity, we mention only Classic Marxist theory. It introduces a clear contrast with Catholic theology, which helps us reach our argumentative objective here. Nevertheless, Marxist theories have constantly evolved and have been revisited by several authors. Diverging from Classic Marxist solidarity, and as we will see in the next subsection, modern social democratic solidarity introduces a more inclusionary model that does not depend on liberation.

of history: the change in the modes of production and its determination of and determinability by social relationships. Central to this is the fact that contradiction is only possible if social relations are already contradicting existing relations of production. Such contradiction introduces the capacity of revolution, which plays a major role since “not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history, of religion, philosophy and all types of theory” (Marx & Engels, 2004, p. 59). Revolution then becomes central for the movement in history and the overall centrality of development of modes of production.

Revolution is an indispensable expression of working-class solidarity in Marxist thought. Unity calls for the liberating act of revolution from the economic boundaries that oppress them in support with the bourgeoisie legal system (Marx, 1965). The recognition of the other on which this lies, however, is both “ever-expanding” and at the same time restricted, exclusionary. The unity continually expands among workers, but it does not include those who do not share their conditions. In contrast with the Catholic conception of solidarity, we see that Classic Marxist theories introduce a certain form of exclusion. Working-class solidarity is restricted to those in the proletariat. Even if the unity of solidarity transcends boundaries, a particular sort of restriction, of exclusiveness is put in place. In the end, Classical Marxism’s restricted notion of solidarity becomes a form of struggle towards the “*freedom from slavery*” (Schwarzenbach, 2015, p. 6). Solidarity is here limited, restricted within the necessary historical developments that the revolution will bring. However, this conception of solidarity within dialectic materialism is not prescriptive. Instead, it presents the descriptive observation of the necessary next movement of history that will take place from the common situation a society’s and then world’s proletariat.

The notion of solidarity in this case is nevertheless restricted. Even though Marxist thought is not limiting the conditions of access to solidarity in a normative manner, it presents a conception on which solidarity, or revolutionary solidarity, will only make sense among those who share the conditions of being exploited. There is a subtle but necessary distinction to make, solidarity here is conceived as part of the necessary evolution of history in the real world instead of a desirable state for the advancement of good.

The complementing aspects of liberation and exclusiveness to the working-class reveal a significant difference between Classic Marxism and Catholic theology. Not only is the exclusionary aspect an important difference to take into account, but the focus on

liberation reveals a new perspective which is not present in Catholicism. Even leaving the point of exclusion aside, the narrative on which solidarity stands differs greatly if we compare both approaches.

The Catholic focus on solidarity as an ethical obligation does not necessarily entail any sort of class struggle or liberation, much less necessary historical dialectics. It does consider a perspective of common good and unity based on a shared interdependent humanity, but these are not necessarily triggered by subjugation. Besides, the consideration of the other as an expression of solidarity remains a significant basis.

In Catholic thought, Solidarity comes as a response to the form of interdependence relation and a way in which it is possible to respond to the obligations that arise from common humanity. On the other hand, Marxism introduces the need for liberation as a main source and objective of solidarity. It introduces a different account in which solidarity is not linked to an ethical objective but to the necessary contradiction on which the development of movements of history depend on. Hence, solidarity becomes teleologically significant in the revolutionary process of contradiction.

On the one hand, solidarity becomes elemental for the realization of the good and, therefore, for the self-realization of the individual, which is part of a common humanity or universal brotherhood. This is the Catholic perspective. On the other hand, solidarity in Classic Marxism comes as a necessary fact that will rise through the dialectic history for the liberation from exploitation among the proletariat.

Thus far, we have emphasised the underlying conceptual variability of solidarity. Contrasting Catholic ethics of solidarity and Marxist working-class solidarity, it is clear that conceptual foundations may differ and even have certain contradictory traits, as is the case of exclusion. We have used both examples as a generic path to demonstrate such variability, but its variations are not limited to these two. The conceptual bases of both understandings of solidarity reveal how the concept may arise from different concerns and perspectives.

Nevertheless, solidarity is not restricted to a purely theoretical plane, it involves effective demands and influences real-life conditions. To better exemplify the varying applications of solidarity, we will move from the conceptual bases to a different review centred on two forms of application of the concept within actual political institutions, with different consequences in shaping and reshaping public action.

Solidarity is far from an inert concept; it has a significant influence on political institutions and public life. The application of the concept to legislation, political

discourse and other expressions in public life reveal this. But the mention of the concept in the public sphere does not necessarily reveal the implications it has, nor does it provide a conceptual clarity.

For the moment, we will attempt to better understand the different applications of solidarity in actual political activity, by taking into account its rise on political discourse. We will initially contrast the impact that solidarity has in two political traditions that often mention or include the concept in their programmes and discourses: Christian democracy and social democracy. These two introduce different understandings of solidarity which result in distinctive impacts on public institutions. Thanks to these two examples, we will demonstrate how solidarity is not only variant in its conceptual basis, as seen above, but also in its application.

To understand the variant impact of solidarity in politics, we can concentrate on the objective which it seeks according to each narrative. According to Steinar Stjernø (2011), both social democracy and Christian democracy have subtly different understandings on the objective of solidarity. Although subtle, the difference reveals how the objectives that come as product of solidarity are crucial elements to analyse the impact of the concept on public institutions and policymaking.

Social democracy focuses on the objective of solidarity as signalling a “political will to use government power to redistribute and give priority to collective values” (2011, p. 169). The accent on collective values determines an important form in which solidarity is configured with other strong concepts within social democracy. As revealed by several social democratic parties throughout central, Northern Europe and Scandinavia, since the 1970’s, solidarity was transformed, and it was increasingly influential in their programs (p. 160). Not only solidarity became more important to a certain extent for some social democratic movements, it shifted from working class exclusiveness to a more inclusionary account. A new reading of solidarity that differed from traditional socialism and Classic Marxist theory was now in place. Solidarity became more present and parties often paired it with other concepts such as justice,

freedom and dignity (2005, p. 273)⁵. Even though the development of this new and open account of solidarity was not synchronised among Europe⁶, the more generalised result of having a modern concept of solidarity would come to have an influence on the state of social democracy and its influence on public institutions.

A more open social democratic solidarity requires the creation of a sense of community that arise from collective values, with a sense of ethics and even altruism. Leaving traditional and more radical Marxist thought aside, the application of modern solidarity for social democracy encompasses the improvement of common good at a larger scale. To attain this general objective, it focuses on improving conditions for those it sees as peripheric in both economic and political life, particularly stressing on women and minorities (2011, p. 169). The sense of community that the modern understanding of solidarity requires, leads to paying special attention to those who might not be effectively included in the democratic process.

The special attention to women and minorities has as a result strong impacts on institutions and policymaking. An example is the inclusion of minorities or gender quotas for positions in public institutions. Even though the outcomes are not guaranteed, gender quotas have expanded throughout countries.

In Europe, there are now 17 countries with gender quotas for the legislative power, 12 more than in 2005 (*Balanced Participation of Women and Men in Decision-Making*, 2017). It would be hard to argue that this is due to a supremacy of social democratic solidarity, but it can certainly be taken into account as one of the influencing factors.

⁵ The frequency of the solidarity might vary depending on the party and the country. However, some of them, even with marked political and geographical differences shared this common trait under the renewed perspectives that social democracy had for solidarity. We find as an example the French Communist Party and the “Cf. S. Stjernø. *Solidarity in Europe: The history of an idea*, (2005), p. 273”, a more common approach along social democratic parties in Scandinavia, and even in the highly influential German Social Democratic Party (p. 159).

⁶ We will have to set aside the question on the historical particularities that came to be for the development and inclusion of a modern concept of solidarity in social democratic parties around Europe. The extensive account by Stjernø (2005) is available for this matter, but here we will only focus on showing the varying degree that solidarity has in itself and in its influence on public institutions and policymaking.

In fact, some political parties, notably, social democratic, have their own self-imposed quotas that are often effective (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, & Johansson, 2013). From the roots of social democratic modern solidarity, the drive to pay special attention to gender equality in legislative representation is strengthened. Therefore, we observe in this example how the idea of social democratic solidarity currently influences contemporary politics and public institutions. Solidarity has a real effect that is closely linked to its conceptualisation. The construction of the concept of solidarity and its adaptation to the context, linking it with other values within social democracy, create a particular applicability and effect of solidarity.

On the other hand, Christian democracy introduces a different perspective of solidarity. First of all, we must note that its roots differ from the roots of Social Democracy. The process that Christian democracy followed for the renewal of solidarity did not carry the challenges of an exclusionary class-based concept. A prominent source for Christian democracy's understanding of solidarity comes from Catholic theology and Catholic ethics. Consequently, Christian democracy solidarity accentuates interclass integration with a reduced focus on the collective when compared to social democracy.

The objective of this type of solidarity, rather than creating or reinforcing a sense of collectiveness, is social integration (Stjernø, 2005, p. 169). Taking from the tradition of Catholic ethics of solidarity, Christian democracy prioritises the interdependence and common humanity of all people. As a result, social integration means recognising the value of human dignity and having the opportunity to work to protect it. The forms to attain social integration might vary, but it already points towards prioritising the expansion of social inclusion, with the justification of common humanity.

Instead of stressing the importance of collective values with a focus on women and minorities, Christian democracy solidarity stresses the importance of duties toward the poor. Christian democratic solidarity not only differs in its objectives, but also in the methods to attain them. Hence, its influence on public institutions will also be different. As it is not our goal to do an extensive review of objectives and impacts that any of these two political traditions have, we will limit ourselves to a specific (although significant) influence that they exercise.

We have already considered the gender quota case as an example for social democracy. Now, for Christian democracy, we will see its more general impact on redistribution. However, we must first take a closer look to the relation of solidarity with other values

in this case. We will see how not only solidarity in itself differs throughout different conceptualisations, its relation to other concepts and values is also differently shaped. For instance, as we will further explain, solidarity finds a particular relation with subsidiarity in Christian democracy. After we expand on this relation, we will see how Christian democratic solidarity influences public institutions in a different sense than in the case of social democracy. Such influence is structured by the relation between the concepts of solidarity and subsidiarity.

The conception of solidarity for Christian democracy is closely related to different values than for social democracy. Interconnected with them, and supported by the account of human dignity, solidarity reaches a different application in the public sphere. After reviewing the programmes and other documents of political parties, Stjernø concludes that Christian democratic solidarity is often mentioned next to subsidiarity, the person and responsibility. We will first define the last two. The concept of person states that an individual depends on relationships in a community for his or her self-realization. Responsibility presents the need of individuals to be responsible for their own life. However, at the same time, it requires them being aware of the needs of others, creating an obligation to those in need (p. 269). The obligation, as we have seen before in Catholic ethics of solidarity, remains an important aspect in the configuration of solidarity and its paired concepts. Christian democratic solidarity is already differently constructed taking into account its relation to these two last concepts. However, we will now review the particular way in which subsidiarity modifies solidarity.

Subsidiarity can be understood, in more general terms, as a process of establishing different kinds of power throughout different social levels (Schweigert, 2002, p. 36). It is *limiting* as it allocates power to a determined local agent or groups. But it is also a “*linking principle*” that denotes the complexity and interconnection between different social levels (p. 40). Subsidiarity is then closely related to both effectiveness of the distribution of power and the accountability that is created throughout social levels. Christian democracy internalises this double principle and as a result has a strong concept which enters into a particular relation with solidarity.

The configuration of solidarity relative to subsidiarity introduces a particular tension among the two concepts. Subsidiarity limits the range of solidarity in both discourse and application. Therefore, solidarity is partially reduced to give way to the other configuring concept of subsidiarity. We have insisted that solidarity is not an isolated

and independent concept. Its link to other concepts, as seen in this case, greatly influences it and modifies not only its understanding but also its application. In this particular case, the solidarity-subsidiarity relation, also influenced by personal responsibility, leads to reducing government interference in public life. Christian democratic solidarity may in fact shine for promoting that shaping of public institutions should be done in such a way that a lesser influence in public life is to be established, to then focus on other levels or agents for common action. It states that certain responsibilities are better to be left to other social actors as family, local communities or voluntary charity (Stjernø, 2005, p. 298). Hence, Christian democratic solidarity has a distinct influence on public institutions which avoids the expansion of their power and range of action.

There is already an interesting finding in the application of solidarity in this case. Solidarity in the political activity is not to be necessarily introduced as action at the state level. This would mean that solidarity is not exclusive to the state's activity. Solidarity in relation to subsidiarity shows a form of stratification of solidarity. Although we will not further analyse the extent of action of solidarity at different levels, it is clear that the very distinction of different levels of applicability of solidarity is possible in Christian democracy.

When compared to social democracy, Christian democracy more often introduces programs that limit state intervention at different levels. Christian democracy stands for the inclusion of Christian values into politics and its institutions (van Kersbergen & Kalyvas, 2010). Solidarity and subsidiarity are both an example of such inclusion and their impact is notable in both political party programmes and a specific influence on the ideal application of both concepts. This translates into limiting institutionalised redistribution among social classes, at the same time promoting individual or more local contributions. In other words, "solidarity and subsidiarity belong together... (where) government should support personal initiative and responsible self-help" (Stjernø, 2011, p. 167). The key factor that we must note is that Christian democracy's focus on subsidiarity, strongly related to solidarity, creates particular political necessities. Such understanding of solidarity influences political institutions because it requires a certain limit to its application, thus leaving it partially external to institutionalised politics.

If we compare both understandings of solidarity, of social democracy and Christian democracy, we can see differing forms of application of the concept in public

institutions. The examples we reviewed are not closely related, so there is no direct exclusion between the two. But it is clear that each of the conceptions of solidarity have different sources and that they impact institutions differently.

On the one hand, social democratic solidarity paves the way for paying special attention to women and minorities. The first is addressed through gender quotas in both legislative bodies and in parties. This example also reveals a particular trait that is found in social democratic solidarity but not in Christian democracy. It presents a different limit to the involvement of institutions on the life of its citizens, a more permissible one than Christian democracy. We do not argue here that solidarity is the main cause for social democrats to support gender quotas, but it is a factor that influences both discourse and political action. Their conception of solidarity calls for fulfilling principles of justice that relate to their own narrative. As a result, and converging with other values on the table, social democratic solidarity has a higher threshold for the limits of institutional action.

On the other hand, Christian democratic solidarity, in close relation to subsidiarity, reaches a different approach and influence on institutions. Instead of seeing as positive the larger involvement of institutions, it sees as desirable limiting their scope of action. Since solidarity is linked with subsidiarity and personhood, individual responsibility and limiting centralised action become more important. Not only the roots of the understanding of solidarity, but the consequences that it has on political agendas differ from social democracy. As an example, legislation for redistribution based on institutional power is not commonly supported.

Table 1. Linked concepts and different impacts on institutions between social democratic and Christian democratic solidarity.

	Close concepts	Impact on institutions
Social democratic solidarity	Justice, Freedom, Dignity.	Allocates more power to institutions and favourability towards institutional action for accomplishing objectives of solidarity.

		Allocates more power to other non-institutional agents.	We can
		Limiting the scope of action of public institutions for accomplishing obligations of solidarity.	
Christian democratic solidarity	Subsidiarity, Person, Responsibility.		

conclude that by comparing these two conceptions of solidarity, we can already mark the different application of solidarity to institutions, and even organised political life in their respective parties. We can see how social democratic solidarity would entail a more institutionalised approach. In contrast, Christian democracy focuses on localised or even individual action, thus limiting institutions. We applied these two cases as examples to show how different understandings of solidarity might have different impacts. Besides, the impact is not necessarily targeted with specific types of policies or concrete issues, it can even expand to the shaping of institutions. Solidarity is not the exclusive cause, but, as it may be an important concept linked with other triggering concepts, we note that it seems to have at least an indirect influence that varies depending on its understanding.

We have done a conceptual review of solidarity in two different traditions. Besides, we contrasted its application in politics, revealing that it has different forms of influencing institutions. We have more clearly stated the variability of the concept of solidarity. From its conceptual bases to its differing applications, solidarity suffers important changes. So far, we have focused on proving that solidarity is a variable concept. Depending on context, tradition and relation to other concepts, solidarity presents several forms of application. The idea of solidarity is complex and hard to define among its own conceptual diversity. We have limited this first section to only demonstrating its variability. A more comprehensive historical review of the concept escapes our objective here. However, thanks to the previous examples of interpretations and applications of solidarity, we can conclude that solidarity is in fact a variable concept which presents particular challenges for its comprehension.

2. Exploring the core of solidarity

The definition of solidarity is elusive, and it seems to be unproductive to provide a solid description which remains true throughout different perspectives and authors. However, we can review some conceptions of solidarity at a more theoretical level to pinpoint some of its core aspects. To better grasp this, we will mark a distinction

between two main categories of solidarity that we will name *relational* and *non-relational* accounts of solidarity. For the first, we will focus on the account of solidarity that Durkheim introduces to the discussion and that remains as one of the most influential ones throughout several fields of study, including political philosophy. For the latter, we will review different and more recent attempts to conceptualise solidarity that are trying to provide an account where the role of exclusion is reduced. The concept of solidarity has been used throughout several fields and contexts, but sociology has paid particular attention to it since modernity. Classical theories in particular will help us better understand the core of solidarity. This account started during the 19th century, motivated to explain the bonds among individuals during times of rapid urbanisation and modernization. New questions about the cohesion and functioning of society rose and intrigued sociologists. Driven by the fundamental question of what holds a society together, some sociologists looked more carefully at the role of solidarity. Notably, Émile Durkheim (1964) featured solidarity as a pillar of society, one without which it would be unable to persist. He would not perceive solidarity as a purely theoretical aspect to understand the bounds of society, but also as a real and effective aspect of social life. Nevertheless, even though solidarity became central for his explanation, he did not provide a general definition (Crow, 2010).

Durkheim's account of solidarity maintains that it is a persistent characteristic of social life (Oosterlynck, Loopmans, Schuermans, Vandenabeele, & Zemni, 2016). He insists on the main role that solidarity has on social cohesion. Yet, it has different characteristics depending on the kind of society in question. He introduces two categories of solidarity which change depending on its type of society. These are mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. Mechanical solidarity originates in pre-modern small societies that still have no marked distinction in their division of labour. These types of societies have a strong collective conscience based on the homogeneity that is possible in such simpler conditions (Durkheim, 1964).

As modernity arrives and more complex societies arise, Durkheim sees a different source and form of solidarity. Organic solidarity takes place in industrialised societies where division of labour is already conditioning the relation between individuals. With the increase of specialisation and population, inter-dependence becomes more apparent. Members of a society are not bound by a complete homogenization of values or conditions, but by a certain individual morality that is created through

interdependence. The relations among society depend on the self-enforced moral realization of necessary cooperation. Hence, it introduces a different understanding of social relations, since it includes “only very general and indeterminate ways of thought and sentiment, which leaves room open for a growing variety of individual differences” (1964, p. 172). Such openness, however, does not eradicate all need for a certain sharing of values and norms. A certain form of collective conscience with a common moral integration remained. “Durkheim postulated that in every community there exists a preestablished consensus on a set of intersubjectively recognized values, which orient the individual members” (Habermas, 1996, p. 67). Therefore, even though moving towards a more complex form of society, an underlying commonality of values still remained as necessary for solidarity and its binding force.

Organic solidarity is particularly interesting because it addresses the conditions of modern societies, and it has strongly influenced future authors concerned about the conceptualization and development of solidarity. Two traits of organic solidarity have been greatly influential in the study of the sources of solidarity: interdependence and shared norms and values. Both have had a major role and are even often found among the different categorizations of the sources of solidarity and several authors continue to base their research on solidarity on them (Oosterlynck et al., 2016).

With this introduction to solidarity we see certain features that lead us to its core. Then, what is the core of solidarity? We have insisted on the lack of consensus on this question, but we will take a more precise summary of the concept as a foundation for our study on the core of solidarity. From it, we will try to construct a comprehensive account. At the same time, we will introduce the distinction between relational and non-relational forms of conceptualisation of solidarity, to which we will pay special attention. This distinction does not relate to the possibility to create relations, but rather on the importance each form attributes to pre-existing relations for solidarity to arise.

We will show that the core of solidarity allows for the coherence of two large categorisations of conceptual bases. First, it allows for the most traditional sense of relational solidarity. This one closely relates to accounts based or linked to the Durkheimian sense of solidarity. It conceives solidarity as a product of already existing relations, as a product of the bonds that are already found within a society. Therefore, this conceptualisation is to a certain extent limited to already well-established societies and its already present members. In contrast, non-relational accounts introduce a more dialogical sense in which solidarity is not necessarily a given product but a

development. This second category of accounts does not necessarily depend on the pre-established relations of a well-established society. Instead, it takes into account the possibility of agents to establish relations of solidarity with one another. Solidarity would then be not necessarily a product, but also its own endeavour. In short, relational accounts would focus on existing and close relations as a precondition for solidarity to arise as a product, whereas non-relational accounts consider solidarity as open and dialogical among agents who do not necessarily share bonds of membership.

Jean Harvey (2007) identifies several threads on solidarity that will allow us to have a better comprehension of its core. According to the author, solidarity involves at least two individuals or groups, in which one is in solidarity with the other. It is triggered by immorality or injustice, and action may be involved but it is not limited to it. Besides, solidarity involves “a kind of alignment or unity or fellowship involved” (p. 22). So, if we condense these threads, we find that a more general understanding of solidarity is as a relational form shaped by the moral traits of existing conditions, that may trigger specific actions from one party in relation to the other with which the first stands in unity. To better understand this initial conceptualisation of the core of solidarity, we will analyse the threads we mentioned, hoping to shed some light and review each of them and provide a revised account.

First, solidarity has an interpersonal or intergroup form, requiring more than one individual. It is impossible to envisage a solidarity with oneself. This relation also comprehends a perception of mutual obligation between those involved. Modern accounts of solidarity suggest the idea of “mutual responsibility between an individual and society (...) meaning a commitment of the individual to support the community and the community to support the individual” (ter Meulen, 2015, p. 6). In a sense, we can even refer to solidarity as an individual-society relation. This society-wide view largely expands from other more limited forms of solidarity, such as solidarity for family or clan debt, or solidarity within legal firms (Brunkhorst, 2009). Solidarity in a moral, social, and political sense often refers to this expanded and complex intersubjective relation, rather than narrower and more private relations.

Being in solidarity with the other creates certain obligations in two different ways. On the one hand, there might be a mutual responsibility which is found in the relation itself. In this case, we find those who are directly related through family or community membership. Whether this is at smaller or larger circles, a concrete relation is presupposed for this kind of relation and solidarity. Individuals in such circumstances

are mutually interdependent and obliged to assist one another when the need arises. As Durkheim's account of solidarity states, a main characteristic is that they are bound by a certain relation already set in place. These are the main characterisations of what we will name relational solidarity.

However, solidarity can even be understood in a different, non-relational sense. This means that it would not necessarily entail the pre-existence of relations between those who are engaged in solidarity. Instead of a mutuality relation which already exists, solidarity can also be found in another form of interactions that are not necessarily limited to pre-existing and direct relations within a physical community. An example of this is to take into account the expansion from assistant-assisted relations in which parties are not part of the same closed community towards the creation of a bond of solidarity.

This sense refers to the assistance to individuals, groups, or nations with whom no direct relation nor form of social cohesion exists that either directly or throughout a longer period of time evolves into more intricate forms of relation. Moving beyond a one-directional relation of aid, a certain relation of solidarity would be possible without a pre-existing relation nor a direct contact as occurs in closed societies. This would entail changing the structural relation that stands at the foundation of connections any interaction between different agents. More importantly, this translates into the recognition of the other, even if being supported, as an active agent (Schwertl, 2017, p. 73) with whom a bond of solidarity is created. Non-relational solidarity would then comprise other types of accounts of solidarity, which do not emphasise on existing relations, but rather portray the potential development and strengthening relations of solidarity among parties that do not necessarily belong to the same physical community.

If we take such consideration into account, it suggests that there are forms of solidarity that escape the relational account that Harvey synthesises following Durkheim's theory of solidarity. The introduction of openness, or the possibility to establish relations of solidarity beyond already established relations introduces a new possibility to conceive solidarity without the limiting focus of exclusion. However, this would not mean to establish an all-comprising solidarity that has no form of exclusion, it will simply point towards more open accounts that will allow new forms of inclusion to take place.

Solidarity is not exclusive to those who share a pre-established relation. In this sense, obligations and the motivation to act may even come from the need of assistance and

new or developing bonds of solidarity. These can take place between two agents that engage with each other in a form that expands beyond unidirectional aid. Initially, an assistant may answer to the distress of the other with whom no direct relation has been established and may even represent to himself (or themselves) a common ground with his (or their) own interests. The concerns of the assisted either relate to the assistant's own interests, values or goals, or become so during the solidarity process (Rippe, 1998, p. 358). A solidarity obligation is created without an existing interpersonal relation, nor the shared belonging to the same local or national community. Therefore, it seems to be that a pre-established relational thread does not stand at the core of solidarity.

The value of relations for the concept of solidarity is then not to be understood exclusively as a pre-existing relation kind. The relational notion of existing bonds as a basis for solidarity seem to fall short to explain solidarity with those with whom we do not share a relation. This does not require that solidarity should be deprived entirely from the relational thread. If anything, we can already point towards the value that relations have for solidarity. But it is important to take into account the different nuances of the importance of relations to solidarity. The thread on relations is particularly valuable, but only if we understand it in a more open sense. Solidarity as a relation comprehends not only a Durkheimian sense of existing and direct relations. It also involves new-forming relations where an initial relational structure, either in a direct interpersonal sense or in is absent. Besides, even though a relation might be created in this last sense, it might have a different bond strength than pre-existing relations.

Second, we will analyse the thread on immorality or injustice. As we have seen with Durkheim's account on organic solidarity, a normative dimension is not imposed but constructed. A popular interpretation of this aspect can be found in critical social theory. In some of their theories on social cohesion and solidarity, this school conceives morality as a reciprocal practice, resulting from the free association among autonomous individuals. Social moral actions and the expressions of solidarity are based on an "implied normativity of positive forms of association of free individuals" (Hoelzl, 2004, p. 47). If solidarity is rooted in such fundamental normativity, then its expressions and limits are also dependant on it. This explains not only the relational aspect of solidarity, but also how it is structured on the same normative values that make associations possible.

Following the interpretations by critical social theory, we find that the structural value of underlying normativity is vital for solidarity. Even more, solidarity in a relational sense also has a normative element. If normativity forms the relational aspects where solidarity rises, then solidarity is connected to these underlying values. According to Harvey (2007), solidarity is triggered by immorality or injustice. Now, we take into account critical social theory to state that it is not only triggered but shaped by the very same basic principles of justice and morality that allow associations to exist. However, we do not argue here that solidarity is caused by principles of justice, but rather that it is interconnected to them. We leave aside the question of causality between solidarity and justice to focus on the importance of the contingency of justice and morality that enable relations.

At the same time, it is important to note that it is not specified if a shared conception of justice is required to trigger actions of solidarity. This would mean that a relation of solidarity and the actions that come from it could be triggered by a unilateral conception of justice that is being infringed. As we test the possibility of widening solidarity to forms which do not depend on pre-existing relations, then a sense of injustice could be important but not necessarily shared among new and developing relations of solidarity.

Our previous analysis of this thread is particularly valuable for the relational account of solidarity. However, it also reveals certain important characteristics that influence non-relational solidarity. Non-relational solidarity also depends on the agent's own values. Even if the acting agent is not in a direct relation or association with the assisted, he relates with other fellow members of his own society. His own values are also shaped by the implied normativity of his relational community, but his actions against injustice are not limited to the scope of the community. Such normativity, then, also influences solidarity through the agent's conception of values and moral interests. More so, the supported agent also has such a structure, thus making it possible to have certain similarities and value links to be created between these two actors of solidarity. Even a shared conception of justice is not necessary, it seems to be that it is possible, and it can even be developed as the relation of solidarity strengthens.

The third thread for understanding solidarity is action. Injustice or immorality, grounded to underlying normativity, may trigger a certain action, an assistance with whom one has solidarity. Nevertheless, solidarity is not exclusively action, but rather has a component of creating a sense of common ground between the different agents

in solidarity. Whether from a particular project or a sense of justice in place, there is a certain form of recognition which motivates and constructs solidarity. The assistant recognises the concerns of the other as its own. For relational solidarity, this may be linked to interpersonal relations, but it is not limited to them. A common ground may be possible beyond direct relations, thus expanding its motivation to other forms. An important distinction from other concepts such as charity is that it includes such common ground (Rippe, 1998, p. 358), which we argue is possible in both relational and non-relational solidarities. Particularly considering the possibility to foster commonalities and to intertwine conceptions of justice, a common ground is not restricted to pre-existing relations.

Action may be effectively triggered by an injustice or immoral action, but it is not a unique characteristic of solidarity. So, it seems necessary to have a common ground which the assistant identifies or creates with the assisted. This common ground is more at the core of solidarity than action. This form of commonality, nevertheless, is not restricted to actual identification among the different agents. For instance, the perception of injustice in someone else, strong enough to wish to try and establish a relation of solidarity portrays a certain common ground. An example of this is the recognition of the other's humanity and the capacity of suffering or humiliation. An equal realization of these conditions and judging them as unjust may already generate the possibility for a new or the advancement of solidarity.

Sharing a common goal can also bring more artificial forms. It might entail a commitment from each part towards the realisation of a common goal, even though this may initially not be common knowledge. For example, agents located in the United States identify with the concerns and causes of a group struggling to end illegal mining and its dire impact on their community in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The latter may not be aware that the first have identified with their cause, but the agents in the US have opened a common ground between them. Eventually, throughout a process of building a relation of solidarity, efforts may become more apparent and they might even lead to establishing a direct relation, but the common ground appears to be the basis preceding concrete actions. By sharing certain common goals, it is possible to later establish that two groups, even without initial common knowledge, might act in solidarity (Sangiovanni, 2015, p. 347). In contrast with a relational account of solidarity, non-relational solidarity is based upon the common ground we just described and not interdependence and the relations it creates in modern societies.

Following the previous clarification, we can see a final and more debatable thread on solidarity, the need for a form of unity or fellowship. Whether solidarity requires an alignment, unity or fellowship is not evident. Also, it might be understood in two different forms. The distinction between relational and non-relational accounts of solidarity is particularly enlightening to approach this question.

In relational solidarity, there is a proximity or commonality that comes from two main factors. First, there is an existing relation not only of interdependence but even of certain shared conditions such as territory, culture, values, or institutions. Second, a mutual recognition of the other with whom a reciprocal solidarity is established. If we take both into account, we see the existence of such commonalities. Do these lead us to assure that a form of fellowship or unity is necessary to solidarity? Some accounts of solidarity, particularly communitarian ones, stress the importance of an existing unity, of existing interpersonal relations. This refers to a personal relationship solidarity centred on the mutual assistance between individuals at different levels of a community (Rippe, 1998). We will not yet expand on the possible sources of solidarity, so we will not yet explore the importance of these conditions for relations of solidarity. But we can determine how in relational accounts of solidarity, a certain sense of commonality appear to be determinant for solidarity.

Such commonality can be understood as a certain form of unity. Even before a sense of standing in for one another (Hoelzl, 2004), such unity refers to existing conditions for relations. This means that a comprehension of unity points towards a founding condition rather than a trait of existing solidarity. This relational account seems to be more effective in explaining the characteristics of already established relations rather than solidarity itself. We can agree that a certain form of unity, understood as what is present in existing relations, may exist and support solidarity.

Although we accept a certain importance of unity for a relational account of solidarity, it is not the case for a non-relational one. Following our review of the thread on action, solidarity does not seem to require a sense of unity or fellowship. The importance of underlying commonalities for solidarity is surpassed by a common goal or sense of justice. As we have seen, applying the own's sense of injustice on the situation of others external to the community and the possible establishment of common goals make it possible to think about solidarity in a non-relational manner. An engaged commitment towards the other agent or agents thanks to the previous threads already introduces a sense of solidarity. We might say that there is a certain notion of unity in

common human conditions or even shared goals, but it does not refer to an established unity or that solidarity requires a direct relation. Therefore, solidarity does not necessarily require a pre-existing unity. This does not mean that unity is completely undervalued, however. Unity as a pre-condition can still be effective in creating, maintaining and advancing relations of solidarity, but it is not a necessity. Non-relational forms of solidarity show that unity might come as a product, and not only as a condition for solidarity.

Our analysis of Harvey's threads on solidarity leaves us with a changed understanding of the concept. First of all, we can now more clearly distinguish between relational solidarity and non-relational solidarity. The first relates more closely to the existing relations in which free individuals engage with each other. They are highly influenced by interdependence and existing structural conditions. Meanwhile, non-relational solidarity can be understood as acknowledging the common human conditions of the other, with whom a sense of injustice can be triggered. It also allows for the identification with the enterprise of the other or the construction of a common goal. Non-relational solidarity also portrays a sense of commitment among agents to realize common goals without the need for mutual knowledge, nor pre-established relations.

We have very broadly categorized two forms of solidarity as relational and non-relational. This distinction is mainly based on the rupture of more traditional accounts and more novel accounts of solidarity. One of the most important elements in which they are distinguished, which only becomes apparent after our analysis of different threads of the core of solidarity, is the link with exclusion. The focus on pre-established relations strongly limit relational accounts to those members of an established community. This means that only those within interpersonal relations or members of an established community (more local or national) are able to engage in relations of solidarity. On the other hand, non-relational accounts broaden the horizons of solidarity because it attempts to explain bonds of solidarity that are not created within the same community.

The applicability of each of these two categories is still to be seen, but the differences among them reveal two distinct perceptions of solidarity, how it comes to be and its impact on real human relations. An important distinction that we have achieved, however, is the importance that pre-existing relations have on each of these conceptions of solidarity. The link to openness or inclusion, on the one hand, or to closedness or exclusion, on the other, is a finer distinction between these two

categories of solidarity that we have advanced. We can now better distinguish the emphasis that each category puts on either inclusion or exclusion, even though both are necessary to effectively understand actual relations of solidarity, whether they already exist or are new-forming ones.

Table 2. Relational solidarity and Non-relational solidarity

	Threads	Based on	Consequences
Relational solidarity	Existing relations, reciprocal; based on existent and shared normativity.	Established relations: family, community, nation; free association of individuals.	Commitment, possible action, cooperation – larger focus on exclusion of those not present in pre-established relations.
Non-relational solidarity	Not necessarily based on pre-existing relations; indirect relation to normativity but no necessary identification of values among agents.	Sense of injustice, even if external to the community; Common goals or values; free association of individuals.	Commitment, possible action, identification or creation of common ground – not focused on exclusion of those not present in pre-established relations.

If we attempt to construct a revised understanding of solidarity that comprises the non-relational accounts, we will have to take into account our previous analysis. Instead of focusing only on the relational form of solidarity, we need to extend the concept. In a more general sense, the core of solidarity lies in the attitude when an agent encounters injustice, even beyond his community, and the commitment towards the other with whom he might or might not initially share a relation, certain common goals or values.

The sense of injustice is supplemented by another key aspect in the actual establishment of solidarity, however. There seems to be a need to move beyond the realization that injustice is taking place, but it would also point towards an initial will to engage with the other who is suffering such injustice. This means that not any judgement of injustice external to the community would establish a relation of solidarity. Instead, the sense of injustice must be strong enough for an agent or group of agents to attempt establishing a relation of solidarity with the other. Solidarity, in this sense, would avoid being an abstract concept only dependent on a formal will. The opening of solidarity in non-relational accounts would still require the real process to engage with the other and at least spark a new relation of solidarity.

We have identified and analysed some of the main aspects of solidarity. Considering some ramifications of the concept, we now find a general sense of solidarity that englobes some of its varying characteristics. A more general characterisation of solidarity comprises both relational and non-relational accounts. We have reached a wider point which presents the possibility to understand solidarity in a broader sense. After this initial analysis of the concept of solidarity to find what actually lies at its core, we now need to explore the necessary conditions necessary for solidarity to arise.

3. Conditions of solidarity and the creation of moral obligations

Up until now, we have looked into solidarity from a more general perspective. Now, we will try to centre our analysis in understanding the conditions and the moral character of the identified core of solidarity. We will do so following our relational and non-relational distinction. First, we will explore the possible conditions of solidarity. Later, we will argue that these conditions open a moral character for solidarity in general, not being necessarily exclusive to its relational category.

The variability of solidarity is not only to be found in its historical review. Currently, the concept continues to be open to different interpretations and meanings. We have even seen evidence of this when we compared social democratic and Christian democratic solidarities. But the variations of solidarity go beyond these two political traditions. We will not deepen on such different applications but follow our account of the more general core of solidarity and explore its conditions.

Solidarity as an attitude and commitment towards the other has an important significance in modern states. Even though their description of solidarity differs from the one we have mentioned here, Banting and Kymlicka (2017) also focus on the

motivation aspect of solidarity, rather than the behavioural one. Besides this common focus, solidarity in modern and diverse contexts has particular characteristics and conditions.

Before introducing these conditions and their interconnection, we follow Banting and Kymlicka in insisting on the importance of solidarity for modern societies. They emphasise this in pointing out that the strains of commitment make self-interest insufficient or unreliable on its own to maintain a good society, especially in the context of growing diversity; and that citizens must also have, if not virtue or altruism, at least some degree of solidarity: they must at times be motivated by attitudes of mutual concern and mutual obligation towards their fellow co-citizens (2017, pp. 3-4).

We must note that even though mutual concern and obligation may be possible, as we have seen in the distinction between relational and non-relational solidarities, it is not a sufficient nor necessary condition for the rise of solidarity. Initial establishments of solidarity can dispense initial mutuality. The construction of solidarity, of new relations of solidarity, also call for our attention.

We can now distinguish between two different approaches to study solidarity. On the one hand, more related to relational accounts and in line with the considerations by Banting and Kymlicka, there is an approach that tries to find how existing bonds of solidarity come to be. These are also particularly concerned with solidarity at larger extensions, particularly at the level of the entire political community. This approach limits itself to be an examination of what makes actual (larger) relations of solidarity possible, even throughout contingent differences.

Conversely, non-relational accounts introduce another feature. These attempt to reveal the forms in which new solidarities can be established. It is here not limited to the political community, nor to pre-existing relations of solidarity. This second approach to study solidarity opens the study of solidarity to new and forming relations. As we will further explain in the second chapter, this second approach becomes particularly necessary since bonds of solidarity are not all limited to local expressions, not are all established among structured political communities.

With the distinction of relational and non-relational, we have been able to elucidate some the core of solidarity. Instead of highlighting the importance of reciprocity, we have found the more general significance of other features, namely, the attitudinal

disposition from recognizing injustice and commitment towards the other. These two are particularly valuable and remain at the core of solidarity.

A relational form of solidarity may be as valid as a non-relational one, but their study may vary, and their characteristics differ in various ways. But a central trait we must further analyse is reciprocity. Nevertheless, we will argue that reciprocity here is not a stand-alone feature, nor a previous requirement but it rather comes as a product of the conditions of solidarity.

Reciprocity in solidarity is linked to the standing in for the other, as the other. But this standing in is not an original motivation that creates solidarity. Instead, it is the expression that allows us to recognise solidarity. Reciprocity has two particular forms in which it can be expressed here. Reciprocity as action, or reciprocity as motivation or will. We will initially expand on the first.

Reciprocity as action is the actual development of actions of solidarity for the other. When need or injustice comes to be, an agent in solidarity will stand in for the other with concrete and determinate actions to support or end the unjust situation. However, as we have previously established, action is a possibility but not a necessity in relations of solidarity. Action might come to be and should be expected to be the case when injustice occurs, but bonds of solidarity are not limited to moments of action. The underlying relation that enables these actions are more important.

Therefore, reciprocity as motivation or will is precisely the foundational kind that is more relevant for solidarity. This form of reciprocity is not only found in relational and non-relational accounts, but it makes it possible for actions to take place when the case calls for it. The consideration of reciprocity and its main role here needs to be understood in this way, rather than the back and forth of single or multiple actions along a relation of solidarity.

After the previous precision, we will now look into the conditions that make solidarity possible. These are as well the conditions from which reciprocity in solidarity develops. By further exploring the conditions of solidarity, we will be able to have a clearer picture of the whole of solidarity, its conceptual bases and its development in actual real-world expressions.

A more detailed study of the conditions will also introduce how such motivational reciprocity in solidarity is not exclusive for co-citizens. Even though Banting and Kymlicka focus on this more limited form of solidarity, we will introduce how, it is possible that other forms of solidarities are created, even without group identification.

According to Ashley Taylor (2015), there are four conditions for solidarity that may relate differently to what we have named relational and non-relational solidarities⁷. We must take into account that these four conditions may be reciprocal, thus coherent with a relational solidarity. Yet, one of the conditions seems to be incompatible with non-relational forms of solidarity.

The first condition is a joint interest. A joint interest represents having a common goal towards which the group will work for. We can associate this with the shared goals or values aspect that we have already reviewed. In this case, for relational solidarity, there is “an executive interest that defines the group” (2015, p. 132). Taylor limits joint interests to larger groups, thought as well at the community level, but it is also coherent with non-relational solidarity.

It is possible that the agent identifies the goal of the other as its own or that it shares his interests from the beginning. Whichever the case, there is a joint interest that is not necessarily limited to a pre-established group. We can envisage, for example, joint interests on climate change throughout different nationalities and groups, which does not depend on being part of one or several of them. Whether for relational or non-relational joint interests, we see the expression of a certain commonality, linking two or more individuals.

The second condition is an identification with the group. Identification with the group comprehends also a reciprocal identification. Not only the individual identifies with the group, but the group identifies him in return. This condition also entails that the individual accepts as his own the interests of the group. In some instances, it may even require yielding individual interests for those of the group. Besides, this identification is not limited to one group, even allowing several identifications among conflicting groups (2015, p. 134).

Third, there is a disposition to empathy. Mainly, such disposition involves an attitude towards the other in which there is some degree of openness to different experiences and narratives. “A disposition toward empathy is met when one’s attitude makes

⁷ Taylor presents a different distinction between reciprocal and unidirectional solidarities as robust and expressional solidarities. The first relates more to the reciprocal aspect of what we characterized as relational solidarity. The latter is present in the cases of unidirectional expressions of the conditions of solidarity, where no mutuality is required, thus more easily related to non-relational solidarity.

empathy possible” (p. 135). This disposition to empathy is particularly compatible with our general account of solidarity. The readiness to engage in comprehending the other expands beyond pre-existing relations. It may also take part in different contexts, going beyond common values or goals. A disposition to empathy, then, seems to point towards widening the scope of those with whom one may enter into solidarity with. It is therefore coherent with both relational and non-relational solidarities.

Lastly, there is another condition that Taylor argues only applies to relational solidarities: mutual trust. In a broad sense, as Taylor recollects, we will accept the outline that trust involves vulnerability, an acceptance of the other’s good will, and an optimism of the other’s competence in whichever matter we decide to trust them (p. 136). Trust seems to be a particularly relational condition. To trust might be understood as directly engaging with the other in a mutual way. Trust and trusted may be bonded by a direct relation which requires the expression of the first entrusting something and the second accepting. But Taylor mentions that there might be other expressions of indirect trust. She sets the example of a workers’ party that decides to strike. Engaging in trust, workers go on strike, opening themselves to the vulnerability of others not taking their part, risking losing their jobs or receiving sanctions (p. 138). This possibly indirect character might open this condition to non-relational solidarity. The union example is valuable for showing how trust is a condition in group solidarity. This condition clearly enters into our category of relational solidarity, but it also has some characteristics that expand beyond it. Taylor’s example is limited to an existing union, but what about a different form of trust that is not limited to an already established group?

For instance, we can think about an indigenous community who is fighting to end downstream pollution reaching their territory. Struggling to obtain the attention of the national government, they promote their initiatives throughout social media and their message reaches Europe. Asking for support to reach their goals, they ask other people to amount pressure in their own governments so that the international community may influence their own national government. Luckily, a group in Europe heeds their call and decide to work on this issue, trying to advocate the cause to the European Union. By doing so, however, they are also accepting a form of vulnerability. Agreeing to take on this cause, they deviate time and resources that could help them directly, or even be destined towards biodiversity protection in their own homeland. Besides, they are also taking as their own a goal that could have ulterior motives that are not

compatible with their own values. Trusting the honesty and the good of this endeavour, the group in Europe opens itself to a bond of trust. The group considers the concerns of the indigenous community are valid and legitimate. On the other hand, the indigenous community entrusts their cause to others, even if it is initially motivated by necessity.

When compared with the example of the union, vulnerability is not as obvious, but it still exists. Furthermore, once the European group enters into this form of vulnerability, they will take the other's goals as their own and engage in working towards achieving them. These steps open a form of vulnerability in the side of the indigenous community. They are now counting on the European group to achieve what are now common goals. Hence, they end up entering into mutual trust. This expression of mutual trust might not be as direct as it could be engaged in a more direct or even contractual relation, but its final development shows that it is not only possible indirectly, but it is also not exclusive to established groups. Trust seems to be possible without direct interaction both in relational and non-relational ways.

The four conditions for solidarity are interconnected and may influence each other. However, their importance varies, and some can even be absent. Nevertheless, there is another important aspect that we must review. Taylor mentions that moral obligations are only created for a kind of solidarity in which the four conditions are met with bilateral relations. This would translate into assuring that moral obligations are limited to relational solidarity. However, we will argue that they are also possible in non-relational solidarity, even if on occasion they are not directly created.

Taylor's main argument to limit moral obligations to relational solidarity is that they are only created by the four conditions of solidarity. According to her, it is only through fulfilling each and every of these conditions that moral obligations are created (p. 144). However, our account of solidarity points to a different direction.

A highly controversial issue in basing moral obligations for solidarity in all four conditions is the necessity of the "identification with a group" condition. After analysing each of the four conditions for solidarity, we have seen that only this last one remains limited to relational solidarity. We will not challenge how this condition is exclusive to relational solidarity, but we will argue that the other three conditions are sufficient to create moral obligations in non-relational solidarity.

The mutual trust condition reveals that moral obligations can be created. Trust is also possible where no previous relations are established, as portrayed by our indigenous

community - European group example. Initially, it might not be the case, but once accepted and taken the goal as their own, it creates an obligation to continue to form the actions the assisted have requested. Bonds of common goals and underlying values might lead to entering into a certain vulnerability. These bonds, in turn, will create certain moral obligations to do right and not violate the trust that has been given. Bonds might be severed, and trust broken, but it will come at the price of betraying the underlying values that enabled the first traces of trust.

The condition of trust and its openness to both relational and non-relational solidarities already reveal how moral obligations might rise. However, does the other two conditions of joint interest and disposition to empathy may also be a sufficient source of moral obligations for solidarity? We will first look into the latter.

A disposition to empathy, as we have described it, introduces an important element for solidarity, particularly relevant in an account focused on motivation and attitude. Nevertheless, it has as a consequence, at best, a very limited obligation. To have a disposition towards taking into account the other's perspective does not seem to entail a strong moral obligation beyond itself. The disposition might only lead towards a form of obligation in which being open to the other is created. But beyond listening and trying to comprehend the other, it does not bring about any further obligations, neither does it demand taking the other's concerns as one's own. Therefore, the reach of a disposition to empathy seems very limited. Contrary to mutual trust, it does not seem to create moral obligations.

On the other hand, joint interests present another perspective. Since they lead to collaboration in a form of a common executive interest, there is a certain engagement with one another. Those with joint interests may work either together or in parallel towards achieving common goal. Since our attention here is centred in non-relational solidarity, we will focus on parallel efforts. It is possible that no coordination nor communication among different actors will be effectuated but it is still possible that joint interests create moral obligations.

We can again take into account our example of joint interests on climate change throughout different nationalities or groups. Let's say group A in South Africa and group B in Chile both have this joint interest in working to tackle climate change. Even in parallel action, the actions of both groups, considering the global character of the problem will affect one another. Not only this, but each of the groups is conscious about this factor. Then, even if group A has the interest for itself, it ends up obliged to

recognise that all others will be affected by their actions or lack thereof. The same applies to group B. Both groups, without any coordination between them, nor conforming a new group, find themselves having an obligation towards the other. In this example of climate change, the obligation of A towards group B, and vice versa, is strengthened by the joint interest. Hence, joint interests, even in non-relational solidarity, can also create a moral obligation.

Since moral obligations are also possible in both relational and non-relational solidarity, none can be dismissed. The four conditions we reviewed portray a clearer picture of solidarity and lead us to accepting the moral character that it has in a more general sense. Most of all, we want to emphasise that non-relational solidarity, which does not depend on identification with a group, also has a moral character.

In this chapter, we have demonstrated how solidarity is a variable concept by introducing two different traditions, Catholic ethics and Classic Marxist theories. We have also showed the way in which different conceptions of solidarity at the political level affect differently the course of public action. The case of Christian democratic parties and social democratic parties has made such different influence clearer. After revealing how solidarity might be subject to different conceptions, we tried to explore what might be at the core of solidarity. By initially taking into account a definition that falls in line with the greatly influential Durkheimian understanding of solidarity, we analysed its different threads to find a more general conception of solidarity. We reached a more comprising core of solidarity that is coherent with both relational and non-relational accounts. At the same time, we categorized solidarity into two different major classes, relational and non-relational. Finally, once we made this distinction and had a clearer grasp of the core of solidarity, we studied the conditions of solidarity and applied them to both categories of relational and non-relational accounts. By doing so, we saw how some of them applied differently to each. Finally, we reached some key conclusions of this chapter: the coherence of both relational and non-relational forms of solidarity, as well as the existence of moral obligations in both forms, created from one or several of their conditions. In the next chapter, we will link our account of solidarity to transnationalism and some real-world expressions of non-relational solidarity.

Chapter II. Transnational Solidarity – Expanding solidarity beyond borders

In some of the most influential accounts of solidarity, as Durkheim's organic solidarity, it is often considered as limited to members of a community or a state. Either basing themselves on this account, or recalling this traditional sense, certain nationalist and communitarian authors have emphasised the limited aspect of solidarity. They insist that beyond the immediate bonds of care, of the community or under the umbrella of the welfare state, solidarity is either inexistent or ineffective. However, other analyses bring forward new expressions of solidarity that do not necessarily point towards such enclosed limits. In the previous chapter, we examined the concept of solidarity. As we have seen in the distinction between relational and non-relational conceptions of solidarity, it is possible to think of solidarity beyond pre-established relations. A conceptual framework for non-relational solidarity makes it possible to explore forms of solidarity that extend beyond the intimate, local and even national spheres. We will now further shape to such non-relational solidarity, pairing it with the concept of transnationalism.

We can first very broadly encompass transnational solidarity as a form of solidarity that is not limited by borders. Nevertheless, the theoretical foundation can take several shapes and focus on different specific notions, such as requirements, conditions or motivations. In this chapter, we will explore some of the particularities of transnational solidarity and integrate it into a coherent account with the conceptualization of solidarity from the previous chapter, then applying it to real expressions of transnational solidarity. As a result, we will show that solidarity beyond local and national spheres is not only possible, but that it is evidenced in the real world today.

A large part of our efforts here will be to look into providing an answer, a coherent account of solidarity that will be able to explain what is currently called as solidarity in migration. Considering the challenges that migration poses to the understanding of solidarity and the variant applicability of the concept, we will continue our analysis and extension of solidarity. At the end of this chapter, we will aim at having grounded account of solidarity at the transnational level that will help us understand real expressions of solidarity that take place in the world today.

In this chapter, we will focus on transnational solidarity and divide our argument in three main points. First, we will introduce transnational solidarity and provide its conceptual basis. We will explore certain variations among contemporary authors so that we can advance the most coherent strategy.

Second, we will focus on two main aspects that enable us to move from local to transnational and further define this form of solidarity. These are interconnectivity and vulnerability. We will show how, through globalisation, interconnectivity (both direct and indirect) brings the discussion surrounding solidarity to a new level. Stemming from this, we can see that links of vulnerability also enable a further transposition of solidarity to a transnational stage.

Lastly, we will first introduce how transnational “solidary” movements are in fact expressions of solidarity. By opening up solidarity to transnationalism, our objective is to establish the theoretical grounds necessary to understand solidarity movements whose concerns are not limited by borders. One of the main challenges is to distinguish solidarity from aid, even though they might overlap. Within this first point, we will then explore the different bases and motivations that are required for solidarity and how some of these movements meet them. By analysing several characteristics of transnational solidary movements, we will argue that they correspond to the bases and motivations necessary to be categorised within solidarity.

1. Transnational solidarity – universal and non-universal strategies

In the discussion of solidarity, other determinations that expand beyond the local have found significant challenges by the strong influence from relational accounts of solidarity. Expanding beyond pre-existing relations, and particularly those framed by national membership, continues to encounter significant theoretical shortcomings. Expanding solidarity beyond borders, towards a *transnational* account, requires accepting certain limitations, particularly in defining what transnational solidarity is. A reasonable concession is to avoid arguing in favour of transnational solidarity as a substitution of national or local solidarity. At the same time, there is a tendency to avoid attributing transnational solidarity a higher value, admitting that motivations for solidarity are not as strong at an international level. This, however, does not lead to a conceptual defeat where only local solidarity is compulsory or respected. It also does not limit the creation of new bonds of solidarity to the local.

Before expanding on the strategies for defining transnational solidarity, we must clarify what the modifier ‘transnational’ brings to solidarity. According to Steven Vertovec (2009), the term is usually not clearly defined and authors often find it interchangeable other terms such as ‘international’, ‘multinational’ or ‘global’ (p. 17). It not only is an evolving concept, but it is object of different approximations that might change depending on cultural values, context and even from existing or non-existing ties of transnationalism (1999). Such conceptual variation calls for further clarification from our side to appropriately define ‘transnational’.

In matters of development and cooperation, transnational more often refers to the “most flexible and least spatially fixed of (...) cooperation contexts” (Scott, 2017, p. 1). This first observation is relevant to understand what authors who are attempting to provide a more solid account for non-local solidarities mean by transnational. Both flexibility and lack of geographic determination are complemented by another key feature. In accounts of transnational solidarity, ‘transnational’ strongly focuses on interconnectivity and interdependence. Transnational, in this sense, refers to the various modes that link peoples across borders and beyond the scope of the nation-state.

Transnationalism is based on the emergence of transnational associations and social movements within the context of globalisation (Gould, 2009). It not only recognises the capacity, but the reality of people(s) across borders associating for purposes that are not limited to economic activity, as they may include cultural, political or religious purposes. These associations might be led by political representatives or by less powerful associations or individuals (Portes, 1999, p. 464). Besides, its objectives or scope of operation expand beyond national borders.

We will continue to understand transnationalism, then, as the interconnections across borders that lead individuals or communities to create associations of interdependence for a variety of purposes. With a clearer account on what we understand as ‘transnational’, we can move forward towards understanding transnational solidarity. Effectively understanding transnational solidarity would require having a sufficiently coherent account that is able to explain real interconnections that are shaped into expressions of solidarity across borders. Instead of reviewing or arguing for the normative value of transnational solidarity, we will first concentrate on providing a coherent description.

There are currently two differing sorts of attempts to conceptualise and defend transnational solidarity. These can be divided into two categories, universalist and non-universalist. Both entail different approaches, particularly in respect to the underlying motivations that might move people towards acting in solidarity beyond the local or national sphere. First, we will present the universalist definition, reviewing its limitations and the need to dismiss this approach. Second, we will review the non-universalist approach and see how it is more coherent with our account of solidarity, and with real expressions of transnationalism.

Universalist approaches limit themselves in their attempts to define transnational solidarity. Efforts in current academic discussion do not usually attempt to construct a universal solidarity. The analytical aspect of the discussion could be one of the main reasons not to do so. The limits and applicable scopes of solidarity, as seen with the four conditions of solidarity in the previous chapter (joint interest, identification, empathy, trust) (Taylor, 2015), would make it particularly difficult to expand solidarity, both conceptually and in application, to a universal level. Conditions and characteristics of solidarity point towards certain forms of connections in which people engage with each other and solidarity becomes possible.

Although we have established that solidarity does not necessarily depend on relational accounts, a certain connectivity remains key in understanding it. Even in non-relational accounts, bonds of solidarity are not abstract nor absolute towards all humanity. As we have seen in the previous chapter, even in its non-relational form, solidarity comprises a commitment, identification or even the creation of a common ground with specific individuals or groups. This means that solidarity is not universal in the sense that we engage in solidarity with every other human being.

We can already identify a main limitation of doing widening solidarity to an absolute universal. Solidarity with everyone, could also be understood as the dilution of solidarity. The bonds or relations that are the actual expressions of solidarity become void of sense if there is such universal expansion. Solidarity with and among all, in a more realistic sense would lead towards solidarity with and among no one. As we have established in the first chapter, solidarity can be related to the actual or new-forming relations that sustain it through by fulfilling its different conditions. As idealistic as it may be, completely universal solidarity lacks sense when introduced into our analysis of the concept and its application in the real world.

Even if we admit a universal moral disposition in a Kantian sense, accepting that principles of justice are sufficient to motivate duties towards others (Clark, 2003), these do not amount to actual expressions of solidarity. Universalist efforts to provide an account of transnational solidarity take this limitation into account, and rather focus on particular notions that might explain the motivation for solidarity beyond the local sphere. Transnational solidarity is then not universal in the sense of integrating all human beings into an equal frame, into a static relation of solidarity. The universalist argumentative strategy for transnational solidarity sets this more utopic notions aside. Transnational solidarity approached from a universalist strategy can roughly depend on a common humanity, which might then have several focus points such as dignity, suffering or humiliation. Such idea of sharing a common humanity is present in several accounts of solidarity. We have seen in our initial analysis of solidarity that these do have a certain relevance, particularly when we understand the form in which they trigger a sense of injustice and motivate the engagement towards the other.

The emphasis on humanity depends on the rational realization that every human being has an equal moral worth, which triggers a certain moral obligation towards each member of the human race. This rational approach based on Kantian ideas, presupposes that one acts morally towards other humans because of this rational conclusion, and the desire to comply with this realization. Not only is one a rational human that reaches this conclusion, but the fact that others are as well rational human agents means they are to be treated as ends in themselves (Bramer, 2010, p. 131). The focus here is the common humanity as rational agency.

However, the rationality argument for common humanity seems to fall short in explaining actual relations of solidarity among real individuals or groups, whether within or beyond borders. One of its main challenges is to provide an account for special obligations towards certain people, whether in the intimate or national spheres. In particular, it fails to describe the actual processes of motivation that lead people towards recognizing and fulfilling their duties towards others. In particular, it fails to explain the potential difference that local solidarities and international solidarities might have. We have already conceded that there might be differences among local and international solidarities, and this rational approach seems to be unable to explain such difference.

Furthermore, this rational sense of cosmopolitanism seems unable to motivate ethical action (Lenard, 2009, p. 101). It is quite evident that real individuals and groups do

not act in the same manner towards all of humanity. Whether from closer bonds or relations of solidarity, there is a different kind of behaviour with others. To establish an account of rational agency would ignore this very real and concrete fact of human life. What is needed, then, is a foundational approach that takes into account the distinctions that agents conduct and from which they may or may not include others into existing or new relations of solidarity.

There are other related attempts to explain and motivate duties of justice based on humanity. Besides the rational account, there are other attempts based on sentiment or emotion. These fundamentally rely on empathy. By highlighting the capacity for empathy, to recognize and value the suffering of others, these accounts provide a notion that extends beyond rational agency.

These accounts attempt to respond to claims that universal accounts are “cold and rational, and thereby unmotivating” (2009, p. 104). Although it is necessary to provide non-rational characteristics of social life, it is hard to determine the value they have for achieving universal justice. The relation between rational and sentimental or emotional attempts to conceptualize and provide motivations for solidarity remains, however, unclear. The empathic motivation for solidarity remains constrained to a local level, which more clearly explains solidarity in this context. Besides, its application to support the rational approach only opens up a new dimension, which does not necessarily respond to how the motivation for solidarity is possible in a universal sense for rational morality. From a perspective that tries to advance a universal answer to this question, sentiment or emotion do not seem to lead to the required universal response.

The limitations of universal accounts of solidarity are not only due to the vague relation between sentiment and rationality, they are also linked to main features or conditions of solidarity. Patti Tamara Lenard (2009) mentions that there are four conditions, of which we will select some and expand them in accordance to the conditions of solidarity as presented by Taylor (2015), that we analysed in the previous chapter. Lenard includes in her list shared goals or values, loyalty, empathy and trust. The only novelty in comparison to Taylor’s account here is the stress on loyalty, which we can compare with Taylor’s condition of identification with a group. Both are not to be equalised, but we can at least point that loyalty can be understood as a feature of group identification. The relevance of loyalty may vary depending on the context, but at least it is possible to point out that a minimal loyalty is expected. The development

and extent of loyalty is not further explained, which makes it particularly difficult to analyse. However, we will not focus on the development of loyalty but instead just take as granted that a certain (undefined) loyalty takes part in these accounts of transnational solidarity. In this differentiation, we can at least find a certain sense of thinking about loyalty as part of group identification.

According to Lenard, such accounts of solidarity dependent on loyalty (and therefore group identification in our account) fall short because they fail to be coherent with some of the conditions of solidarity. The main limitation of attempts to construct universal solidarity is that they require precision, so that the other agent, the objectives, values or sense of injustice in question are determined. This limitation is particularly true for the first two conditions of solidarity. Shared values and goals require referring to precise values and goals that motivate solidarity. Being part of a group also needs that the group is properly defined. Universal accounts of solidarity do not meet the requirement of precision for these two conditions.

The condition of empathy, however, is more coherent within universal accounts. Empathy, or the disposition to it, does not require a particularly determined object or relation, contrary to other conditions. As long as empathy is conceived as a potentiality that might be activated when meeting injustice against others, this is particularly coherent. Yet, it does not amount to a strong support for the claims of justice in a universal sense. The approach regarding the feature or condition of trust helps in such weakness. “The mechanism by which trust builds across boundaries is left unexplored” (2009, p. 108), so arguments for universal solidarity cannot support themselves in this feature.

Without an overall insufficient explanation for the conditions of solidarity, universal attempts to construct transnational solidarity remain abstract and unmotivating. Whether from the rational perspective or its supplemented general sentimental approach, universalist attempts do not seem to surmount the necessary challenges to provide an articulate explanation of transnational solidarity.

On the other hand, non-universal transnational solidarity, we will argue, presents the necessary tools to respond to the limitations we have just pointed out. We will now explore the non-universal approach, making some finer remarks on how it surmounts the challenges from the four conditions of solidarity. First, we will present how this non-universal account is constructed and why it differs from the sentimental approach in the universal strategy.

Our categorization of the non-universal strategy for transnational solidarity is largely based on the premise that actual bonds and networks that exist or that we develop are essential in the formation of solidarity. A prominent account is that of Carol Gould (2007). According to her, we can “put aside the idea that a norm of transnational solidarity would require that one feel and act supportively toward all individual human beings, or even toward all those who need help in fulfilling their human rights” (p. 155). This first disclaimer sets transnational solidarity in a different field, one that does not entail an abstract direction towards universality. Although this account does not negate universality, it does not require it or establishes it as a main objective. Instead, solidarity is conceived as held among determined individuals or groups. The most significant added value is the grounding to actual conditions and determinations on which bonds of solidarity actually develop.

Focusing on solidarity among determined individuals or groups introduces the first advantage to surpass the abstraction of universal accounts. It also has the advantage of providing an account that takes into account both individual and group actions, dispositions and motivations. Its most important feature is that, whether individuals or groups, are determined. Solidarity arises in determinate manners in such a way that they are not necessarily extended to a generalised humanity but towards some individual or group in particular.

A core aspect of this account of solidarity for a transnational application relies on affective ties of care or concern. These might rise whether through direct or indirect exposure to the unsatisfied needs or objectives of others (p. 157). Whether it develops from media coverage or more direct forms of communication, it is reasonable to envision that people with no previous relations may become empathic with the other.

The focus on affective ties is very close to the one on empathy in the universal approach. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference here. Concentrating on affective ties is only one aspect supported by other motivations, giving a more complete response to the insufficiencies regarding the four conditions for solidarity.

The introduction of affective ties in this sense does not equate all forms of these ties. It allows the differentiation (if not hierarchization) of different forms of ties. For instance, it marks the difference between familiar, communal, national and even other ties that go beyond borders. It does not put them all at the same level, but rather introduces the notion that a certain tie is either present or can be created, with varying strengths and obligations.

Besides affective ties, there are also common or cooperative projects in which solidarity occurs (p. 158). Linked with the condition of shared goals and values, this second aspect introduces that common transnational efforts are not only possible but a reality. These horizontal movements for shared causes are exemplified, for example, in labour movements around the world, in developmental efforts such as south-south cooperation, and even in diaspora coordination for political activity from abroad. Solidarity in this sense not only extends beyond the local, but it even goes past direct contact. For instance, “physical contact with international migrants may not be necessary for the emergence of solidarity” (Bauder & Juffs, 2019, p. 6). Common or cooperative projects are an embodiment of sharing goals or values. This observation is especially coherent considering that such expressions of solidarity are not a theoretic possibility but a reality.

Gould also mentions the possibility of solidarity emerging as purely discursive. She mentions the links between feminist movements from different locations, where certain relational forms are possible but not necessary and where “it can become more reciprocal to the degree that interlocutors are ready to learn from the others” (2007, p. 158). This is yet another response to the condition of shared goals or values.

This account of transnational solidarity considers both relational and non-relational senses, without undermining the value of the more local forms of solidarity. A novelty we identify already, and an important advantage when compared to the universal strategy, is that it provides a response to the condition of shared goals and values. Although it opens on affective ties and its necessary disposition for empathy, it provides a fuller account. Observing existing transnational movements, it is able to capture the fact that shared goals and values are manifested in transnational projects or cooperation.

Another advantage is its response to the identification of a group. Transnational labour or feminist movements around the globe are evidence of transnational solidarities that are based on group identification without recurring to a physical nor political community. What Gould calls *discursive* bases for solidarity, can lead to ways in which there is a certain identification with a group, and it may also entail a requirement of loyalty. Discursive manifestations of solidarity extend from common ground and common projects to an effective realization of a transnational community based on discourse.

Classic Marxist theory has best described and advanced normative arguments for this international community among the world's proletariat. Based on the quest for liberation from the economic oppression of the capitalist, this community is to join beyond borders and enter into reciprocal support for their common goal. They stand in for one another in their struggle of escaping oppression by seizing the means of production. It is, therefore, not a new idea to think of ways in which transnational communities might rise. Currently, labour movements and organizations are not limited to horizontal ones such as the International Labour Organization. Non-profits and unions are also noticeable examples, and some of them have increased their activities as they face current challenges of a globalised market and increased movement of workers (Peleg, 2011).

These communities are relevant to understand transnational solidarity and how the non-universalist strategy tackles the third condition. However, we must note that these do not trump local communities. Noting the existence of transnational communities is not an attempt to limit the importance of more local associations or bonds of solidarity. This is a central element of the account of transnational solidarity. It avoids a dichotomy between local and national. Instead, it remarks that there are expressions of "overlapping solidarities or of a new network of solidarity" (Gould, 2007, p. 158). These include both transnational individual relations such as intergroup relations. Local groups extending their scope and entering into solidarity relations, without undermining their own local intragroup and intergroup bonds, appears to be coherent. The response that Gould provides to the second condition, of identification with a group, avoids this challenge of local/transnational.

This non-universalist approach, nevertheless, seems to fall short in responding to the condition of mutual trust. The main challenge to establish trust is the lack of reciprocity among agents that have no direct connection in this transnational context. Could there be a certain reciprocity in this context to establish trust? Gould provides a possible argument. She states that contemporary forms of solidarity (transnational ones), may set the basis for the development of reciprocal practices and social trust (p. 159). But this argument is unconvincing. It does not provide a sufficient explanation on the relation between solidarity and reciprocity. In particular, it lacks one of the conclusions we have reached so far, that reciprocity is, in a certain sense, a mode of functioning which is necessary for maintaining or extending bonds of solidarity. Reciprocity is not a condition of solidarity, but it is neither a given product once such bond is established. We could say that there is an interaction between the conditions, existing solidarity,

and reciprocity, but it is problematic to reduce reciprocity to a given product of solidarity.

The way in which reciprocity is understood gains a major importance for the condition of mutual trust. Trust itself has as resource a certain form of reciprocity, of open vulnerability among trusting and trustee. Therefore, positioning reciprocity as a product, as a given in the already existent stages of solidarity, brings forward important challenges. We will have to expand on this challenge, trying to provide a satisfactory answer to it. At the same time, will be able to emphasise the adequate application of the other conditions which strengthen this non-universalist account of transnational solidarity.

Up until now, we have seen adequate responses to three of the four conditions of solidarity by this account. Empathy, condition from which this non-universalist account starts, is clearly addressed. It also provides a satisfactory answer to the condition of shared goals and values. Evidenced in already existing common projects or cooperation activities, it is clear that some agents are expressing their commitment towards shared goals at the transnational level. Linked to this last point, an emphasis on values or discourse provides an understanding of how identification with a group is possible in a transnational level. Feminist or labour organizations are relevant examples, the latter being particularly strong in classic Marxist theory, which has had a rich understanding of solidarity (Stjernø, 2005). Although successful in responding to these three conditions, this account falls short on responding to the mutual trust condition, for which an answer is due if we are to construct a coherent account of transnational solidarity.

The main issue from Gould's account is missing details on how transnational solidarity might have more than weak claims of reciprocity, with a "requirement of return in kind" that expands beyond the gratuitous gift. She rightly mentions that "solidarity relations to overcoming oppression makes them (*returns in kind*) more fully necessary" (2007, p. 159). It is necessary to provide further detail on how solidarity relations require such reciprocity. We will now once more apply our distinction between reciprocity as action (or in kind as Gould puts it), and reciprocity as underlying motivation.

We will try to strengthen this account by justifying that reciprocity, even though understood differently and less directly than that of local solidarity, is continuously present. To overcome this challenge, we will advance an argument we have used in

favour of non-relational solidarity in the first chapter, now applied to the transnational context.

If group A and group B engage in cross-borders solidarity, they both open up a certain vulnerability with one another. Vulnerability to others in this transnational sense is possible, particularly considering the extension of globalisation and the extension of markets and systems that have a worldwide ecological impact. Reciprocity in this sense might not be limited to a return in kind, that is to say, to give back to the other. We can think of reciprocity also as fulfilling the duty not to violate the vulnerability of the other with which a certain bond has been created for whatever purpose. A certain expression for this is having groups A and B working together or in parallel for common projects or values. For example, B accepting an open request by A, already links them in the sense that both of them are now vulnerable to each other. A will depend on B keeping its word, and B will not also be required to fulfil its new duty but will also depend on the adequate receiving response by A. Agents A and B are vulnerable to each other. Whether they are dealing in joint efforts or not, their common ground of shared objectives or value link them and widen the scope of their obligations to each other. This exemplifies how a relation of solidarity can be created in the transnational context. There is no dependence on gifts, but rather a stronger expectation of reciprocity. Engaging with each other and leaving themselves, their goals or values vulnerable create transnational bonds of mutual trust. These, just as their local counterpart, could be violated, but the necessary condition for their creation remain a constant. Mutual trust, then, is possible in the transnational context and it even seems to be necessarily present its expressions of solidarity. Reciprocity as motivation allows us to understand the intricate forms in which trust is formed and sustained. This condition of solidarity and the underlying reciprocity that develops along solidarity provides a supplement to Gould's account.

This non-universalist strategy to explain transnational solidarity, with a short revision, amounts to a more concrete and coherent account. It allows for a grounded theorisation that allows for distinction among different affective ties and relations of solidarity. At the same time, it responds conditions of solidarity.

This non-universal strategy for transnational justice provides a fuller account than the universal one. On the one hand, it has a notion that might aim but that does not necessarily require solidarity towards all fellow humans, centring on the particular or determinate sense in which relations of solidarity are formed. On the other hand, it

achieves in responding to the conditions of solidarity. Identifying and fulfilling conditions of solidarity has helped clarify the concept. At the same time, having an account that appropriately addresses them provides it with a stronger conceptual basis. We have identified the stronger strategy to advance our understanding of this form of solidarity. Now, we will further analyse two main concepts that allows us to expand solidarity from local to transnational.

2. Interconnectivity and Vulnerability – two pillars for transnational solidarity

Understanding solidarity beyond local contexts is necessary. Only through this, it is possible to provide a coherent account that considers actual solidary expressions that extend beyond organic intragroup solidarity. This becomes particularly relevant within the current context of globalisation and the new forms of interaction that it creates. In the account of transnational solidarity that we will further explore, there are two main concepts that explain how solidarity can be conceived in a transnational sense. These concepts are interconnectivity and vulnerability. We will analyse how the first provides a more descriptive account that explains how transnational relations of solidarity are formed. Then, we will explore the more normative dimension of vulnerability, that builds upon the capacity of interconnectivity.

Both interconnectivity and vulnerability could be understood as manifestations of globalisation. To limit our scope, we will establish what we understand here by globalisation. In short, globalisation is the phenomenon of intensified transnational interactions. These are observed in different domains and scopes of human life, including economic (transfer of goods), information, and the movement of people, in both tourism and migration. “The extraordinary range and depth of these transnational interactions have led social scientists and politicians to view them as a rupture with previous forms of cross-border interactions, a new phenomenon termed ‘globalisation’”⁸ (de Sousa Santos, 2006, p. 393). The main point that we bring to

⁸ The discussion about globalisation can also entail other descriptions that we must leave aside here. Globalisation as a hegemonizing force, an imposition that may lead to the ‘end of the south’ provides

attention here is the importance of cross-border interactions. These have not only increased but they have also intensified in their depth, at the same time strengthening bonds of interdependence.

In the context of increasing and deepening cross-border interactions, transnational interdependence becomes more important. Interdependence has two categories within the globalised context, an economic one and a social and cultural one. The first refers to all the components of economic activity across borders; the latter, to the “movement of ideas, information, images, and peoples behind it, such as the movement of religions or the diffusion of scientific knowledge” (Laouisset, 2011, p. 402). Both categories of interdependence are a reality of today’s relations. Networks of interdependence exist, and they can be exemplified in an economic sense, as occurred with the financial crisis of 2008 that began in the United States, which later had effects throughout the existing network (p. 402). On the other hand, we can consider the spread of manifestations and citizen movements against their government during the Arab spring. Beginning in Tunisia, the movement expanded creating an unexpected extension throughout the region. With an exchange of ideas and sentiments to fuel anti-government movements, the Arab spring is an example of social and cultural networks of interdependence.

In this context of globalisation and granting the existence of interdependence in both economic and social and cultural manners, we can further explore the important role of interconnectivity in understanding transnational solidarity. Much as we have noted earlier, “globalisation is marked by the interconnection of people and their activities such that innumerable people are affected by decisions and actions at a distance” (Gould, 2009, p. 27). The capability to relate to one another through different ties and flows of economic or social goods enable people that initially did not share any commonalities to identify or establish them. Interconnectivity becomes the first foundation on which transnational solidarities can arise. The increase in cross-border

further insight to understand the interactions that globalisation refers to and how they actually impact today’s cross-border relations. Furthermore, another reading of globalisation also goes beyond the descriptive analysis of interactions, it also identifies it as an ideological and political move. Besides De Sousa Santos (2006) short and incisive account, see also other earlier works such as (Mazrui, 1998) for the question of hegemony from a different perspective.

interactions and the interdependence it creates amount to a stronger interconnectivity on which other non-local forms of solidarity depend.

As we have previously mentioned, the four conditions of solidarity require a determinate character, a particular understanding in which solidarity is created to a specific other or others. Interconnectivity makes such necessary particularism possible. It may involve direct interpersonal relations or organizational or institutional ones, but it does not depend on them. Indirect relations, whether mediated by traditional or new media outlets, for example, lets us conceive forms in which interconnectivity expands beyond the direct.

We can understand interconnectivity in this particular sense as the complex forms in which people can relate to the other throughout overlapping networks. Whether in more direct forms such as internet fora, or in more indirect ones as market relations with more complex networks (Laouisset, 2011), interconnectivity sets the structure for expanding transnational interactions. Interconnectivity is central in providing an account of transnational solidarities, since it sets the foundation for extending interactions, making solidarity in this possible. By doing so, it also creates the possibility to either know of or come into indirect contact with the particular other. The stranger is identified and provided with the determinate particular which the four conditions of solidarity require.

Interconnectivity, nevertheless, requires a certain expansion to provide a fuller account of transnational solidarity. As we have seen, interactions have actual effects on those found within the global network of interconnectivity. This brings us to the second pillar of transnational solidarity, vulnerability. Here, we complement Gould's perspective with the approach of Christine Straehle (2010) based on vulnerability. The author refers to vulnerability as "*specific conditions of constraint* on human life" (p. 116). From a liberal perspective, she mentions that vulnerability is particularly important to address because of its determination on the life of an individual, dependent on her relation to others. This occurs in two different levels. First, vulnerability is particularly related to exploitation by others. To be vulnerable is to lack a certain self-determination without which a person would not have the adequate options to avoid entering into a relation of exploitation with other(s). Second, "others may affect our vulnerability in good or bad ways (p. 117). These two build a relational perspective of solidarity that makes sense in the transnational context of interconnectivity. Vulnerability is then understood as in relation to others, but these

types of relations are not limited to local contexts, as cross-border interconnectivity makes clear.

This form of relational vulnerability is to be distinguished from our categorization of relational and non-relational solidarities. Relational vulnerability does not maintain that a determined direct relation among individuals is necessary. Neither does it portray a perspective limited to pre-established communities. Straehle's relational vulnerability relates instead to the larger extent on which relations of vulnerability might occur.

This relational vulnerability allows us to better understand the way in which cross-border interactions also give rise to moral claims. If self-determination is granted a significant value, then we must perceive vulnerability as something to avoid. Not only for oneself, but for others, vulnerability becomes something undesirable since it would create the conditions for an unjust situation of exploitation. Therefore, a claim of justice is not only created against those who exploit others, but also those who have a certain impact on vulnerability. Accepting that one's actions may affect other's vulnerability leads to granting an obligation to avoid or remedy one's negative effects on others.

The extent of this obligation towards other's vulnerabilities is not clear, and it may not even be respected in many occasions. Nevertheless, it provides a valuable normative conclusion to understand why expressions of transnational solidarity may take place. We can summarise the different layers of our argumentation until here. First, we established that cross-borders interconnectivity exists and that interactions have precise impacts on those among related networks. Second, we extended that interconnectivity also entail vulnerability, particularly understood in a relational sense. Finally, this gives rise to moral claims, from the actual interconnectivity in the globalised context and the vulnerabilities that may be influenced.

After reaching the previous conclusion, we can turn back into what transnational solidarity might require. As we have seen, a certain acceptance of the other's vulnerability in the globalised network of interconnectivity requires a certain action or inaction to avoid weakening the other's capacity to self-determination. This translates into the need to transcend cognitive understanding or empathy, but rather being ready to "take action in support of others" (Gould, 2007, p. 157). Transnational solidarity finds an *active* position. Much as with local solidarity, the disposition to act needs to be present for solidarity to arise. In fact, expressions of solidarity are more easily

identifiable not through empathic notions, but through real actions. This remains true in the transnational context.

Gould adds another requirement for transnational solidarity, *deference*. It entails not imposing the forms of support to the other, but allowing them to determine the forms which are most beneficial for them (p. 157). This leads to a particular account on the way that actions for solidarity are to be applied. This particular notion is also considered by other authors that are not basing themselves on necessarily exclusionary forms of solidarity. For example, similarly to Gould, Kolers understands deference as “action on others’ terms”, thus “acting on their behalf in the sense of acting as if I were they” (Kolers, 2016, p. 52). Therefore, acting in solidarity requires a lack of imposition and effectively taking into account the desire of the other, in our account, to avoid vulnerability.

The inclusion of deference is actually the precise recognition of those engaged as agents. In the first chapter, we have already emphasised that solidarity, contrary to aid, portrays parties as agents. This is not only a theoretical distinction, but it also expands on the effects and the form that transnational solidarity takes. Acting in the other’s terms is the effective consideration of mutual agency, with a new perspective of reciprocity (either as action or motivation). It will entail that at the foundation and the functioning form of solidarity, all involved recognise their own’s and the other’s agency.

Deference, however, will have different forms in which it is effectively applied. We can envisage two different forms in which deference can be applied, considering the forms in which different parties recognise the other’s agency. It seems to be that the most effectively application of this requirement of deference, a certain channel of communication must exist so that those who are provided support decide the best way in which their interests will be protected. In this sense, a certain relation must be present, whether it is newly created, or it was already present. On the one hand, they must at least be able to express their preference. On the other, those who will provide support must be able to listen and they must have the disposition to respect the preferences of the supported. Considering interconnectivity, these are at least in the most basic sense possible, but its exact functioning would require to be analysed in particular cases of transnational solidarity.

A different and more complicated form to accomplish deference in this case is the through a mere unilateral disposition from one agent to try and identify the other’s

preferences for action. This would be a form of standing in for the other in the sense of trying to put themselves in the other's shoes. For instance, the disposition to empathy and its active realisation would allow such form of deference. It might be a possibility, particularly in the cases where no direct link has been established. However, it seems evident that it does not achieve the same efficacy as the first, more direct form.

Transnational solidarity is further established thanks to the pillars of interconnectivity and vulnerability. Not only they provide the necessary theoretical background to understand how the current globalised context influences possible relations of solidarity, but they also identify a possible motive to actually establish them. Besides, our account so far even introduces a moral dimension that arises from both interconnectivity and vulnerability. Finally, we have seen a particular mode of action which that comes from the deference requirement. It introduces two distinct forms in which it is applied, with one more effective than the other to actually recognise the other as agent. Transnational solidarity entails that there is an interconnectivity that enable further interactions than those presupposed in local solidarity. It also identifies that this interconnectivity brings forward cross-border relations of vulnerability that advance a moral obligation. Such moral obligation, however, needs to be fulfilled applying the deference principle, standing on behalf of the other, in the other's terms.

3. Making sense of real-world expressions of transnational solidarity – two examples

At the beginning of this chapter, we established the goal to achieve an account of transnational solidarity that is coherent with actual manifestations in the real world. Building up from solidarity and then widening the conceptual framework to transnational solidarity, we have reached the final step in extracting a coherent account. We will now test our findings of transnational solidarity on two categories. First, transnational solidarity in movements based in identification to a group. This type of solidarity relates more closely to feminist and ethnic solidarity, but we will only explore the first. Later, we will see that transnational solidarity does not necessarily depend on gender (or race) to transcend borders. To better exemplify this, we will move into transnational solidarity in cases of migration. Although this includes migrant-homeland solidarity (more often named diaspora solidarities) or solidarity with migrants, we will only use the latter to test our account.

There are two objectives to this subsection. Initially, to test our account of transnational solidarity and prove its coherence with real-world situations. However, expanding our discussion on the final example of solidarity towards migrants, we will more clearly mark that transnational solidarity does not necessarily depend on group identification understood as sharing more determinate characteristics such as race, gender or nationality.

Before testing our account of transnational solidarity on examples of the first category, we must further expand on why we bind both categories of gender and race. It is because transnational solidarity among women and ethnic communities share a very basic commonality. Both have a strong emphasis on the identification to a group (condition for solidarity), that we identified in the first chapter. Identifying common characteristics and extrapolating them to the creation of a group is a fundamental aspect for this first category. But this foundation is made stronger by aspects such as the commonalities that the shared characteristic brings about in the life of each individual or group.

Although the shared trait might be gender or race, conditions surging or correlating to such traits are particularly relevant. It means that experiences related to this first trait might have a significant impact on the self-identification of identity (Modood, Beishon, & Virdee, 1994). We will presuppose this extends to a transnational level. Therefore, rather than focusing on the importance of ethnic or gender differences, we will centre on the experiences (positive or negative) that shape them and that more strongly lead them into group identification. Considering the reason why such identification is important, we will move towards the first case for which we will apply our transnational account, feminist solidarity.

Feminism and its impacts are widely analysed by both feminist and non-feminist authors. The feminist movement, however, is not a monolith. It has various ramifications among the academic discussion, but also among different feminist movements worldwide. An important challenge that divides the discussion is the tension between feminist ideology and cultural identity. There are numerous attempts to purge feminism from this reading of cultural imposition from developed countries to developing countries. However, the discussion remains latent.

Within the recent discussion, authors like Emejulu (2018) point towards an important concern among the feminist movement stating that “from the earliest days of women’s suffrage in the nineteenth century, to the Women’s March in the twenty-first century

– a ‘call to sisterhood’ is usual made by and for white, middle-class women” (p. 270). Not only the imperialist character of feminism is set as a main challenge, but it also adds that there has been a somewhat limited application of feminism. Since the ‘call to sisterhood’ has erroneously remained strongly limited to a fragment of the concerned population, this brings particular challenges to our account of solidarity.

Considering the scope of solidarity in feminist movements limited to a very reduced scope could be partially challenging to our opening account of solidarity in transnationalism. However, Emejulu introduces an interesting response that takes into account the reality of current feminism and actual challenges that women experience. Both construct a normative account of feminism which several organisations seem to be following. The author claims that “a global call for sisterhood is not enough – it assumes a unity and a shared purpose amongst women that does not exist – it must be fought for and made real through individual and collective action” (p. 272). Her claims for feminist movements are particularly enlightening for the current status not only of today’s feminism but the process in which solidarity is established among movements, groups and individuals.

On the one hand, there is no such thing as a common identity that relies solely on womanhood. If it were, it would very closely relate to universalist accounts based on a common humanity. We have already argued the weakness that this type of arguments has in moving people towards solidarity. Here, the argument is further weakened. Emejulu recognises the lack of universal commonality amongst women. This serves as an extension of our initial observation that gender (and race) are not the main drives for commonalities, but rather the conditions that extend from them. Sharing womanhood, therefore, seems to be overshadowed by further conditions in which being a woman is experienced. Therefore, it makes sense to dismiss a universal a common identity for women.

On the other hand, there is no shared purpose, not only because of the lack of common identity, but also because of the contextual experiences and aspirations that lie at the base of women’s lives. As Amartya Sen famously identified, context and availability of opportunities shape aspirations. These conclusions later had a strong impact on the further development of feminism and are still considered in more recent discussions (Nussbaum, 2001). In the practical case of feminist movements, this means that goals might differ substantially between organisations in different contexts.

Priorities for one organisation in Belgium may be radically different from those in Cambodia. We can even continue this contextualization and extend it to the intranational level, focusing on the more local efforts. In both national and transnational stages, Emejulu among other authors detect the lack of pre-existing shared purpose. There might be, however, common values that could allow for the construction of common objectives. Core values in this context might mean basic notions of feminism such as the liberation of woman and the quest for gender equality. Values might also vary in the influence of context, but considering the existing presence of feminist movements, at least a certain discursive commonality could be envisaged. We will later see that this translates to actual points in the agenda of feminist movements.

The lack of common identity and shared purpose could lead us to conclude that solidarity is at risk because two of its four conditions are not met. However, it is not the case. The challenges that Emejulu points out are part of what we have named non-relational accounts of solidarity. This means that there are no pre-existing forms of relation supported by a common identity or group belonging, nor shared goals. The call for global sisterhood is therefore weak and unconvincing. But, opening up to further possibilities and taking into account the constructing aspect of solidarity, as we have identified in non-relational solidarities, provides a further explanation of the possibility of solidarity among women from different contexts.

Fighting for and mobilising individual and collective efforts in feminist movements are particular expressions of non-relational solidarity. The developing of bonds of solidarity and their expansion throughout the networks of feminist movements is not a given. Calls for support, responses to these calls, future collaboration and opening up to the other in a direct or indirect manner, are precisely expressions of non-relational solidarity.

The normative conclusion of having to fight for feminist solidarity is more strongly supported by understanding the forms in which solidarity is constructed. Particularly, it depends on not limiting solidarity to pre-existing relations, thus opening the construction of new solidarities as a possibility for the future.

Solidarity among feminist movements may not have existed centuries ago, and even in the last few decades, it has developed with both expansions and contractions of solidarities. For instance, certain key points have gained more of a global status and are establishing stronger networks around the globe, such as women's rights, abortion,

female worker's migrations, violence against women, sexual harassment, sexual equality, women's work, care-work and globalisation (Caouette, Masson, & Dufour, 2010, p. 11). The strengthening of networks for these key issues has been a result of constant will and action. They are not a condition for initial actions, but actually a result from them. Solidarity across these subjects is therefore made possible and actively reinforced by engagements from feminist individuals and groups.

In our analysis, had we not constructed the path to a non-relational solidarity, the call for fighting towards feminist solidarity would seem void of sense. We have identified solidarity as having a sort of double identity. On the one hand, it is the expression of already existing relations that amount to solidarity. Nevertheless, it is not limited to such forms of existing solidarities. This means that, just as new relations can be formed, new solidarities can arise as well. The mechanism by which this occurs is explained by our account of non-relational solidarity, which later expands into transnational solidarity.

Although feminist movements are significantly challenged by the question of multiculturalism, they are not limited to local scopes. In fact, there is an intricate network that has been created and that continues evolving towards internationalization, whether this is the objective or just a consequence to advance local interests. The daily work of activists that reach out beyond their local contexts and the interaction that takes place in congresses, meetings, manifestations, and in the cyberspace are all constructions of this process. "It is in the reciprocal dynamics between the local and the global political processes in which women's movements are involved that one can understand the contribution of women's transnational organizing" (2010, p. 12). Through specific actions, women's organisations are both creating links among themselves and with international horizontal organisations. This leads towards the possible establishment of solidarity relations, whether in the short or the long term.

Relations that are being created among feminist organisations are coherent with our account of transnational solidarity. We have already expanded on two particularly troubling conditions of solidarity, group identification and common identity. But what about some of the most important traits of transnational solidarity, interconnectivity and vulnerability? The expansion of feminist movements to the transnational stage are already evidencing the strong interconnectivity that lies among them. For instance, abortion legislation, even though variant throughout different states, concerns a similar discussion. The struggles regarding abortion find important tendencies that extend

beyond the national borders. For example, regions like Latin America and Africa have extensively seen a rise in partial legalisation of abortion, whether to save the woman's life or to preserve health ("The World's Abortion Laws Worldwide," 2019). Legalisation of abortion on one country, along with the international debate, may stimulate the debate along the region, thus revealing at least a certain interconnectivity. There are certain connections that extend beyond borders. This not only affects abortion legislation but also the work of activists that undertake projects on the subject. Furthermore, feminist organisations are more and more linked among themselves throughout the construction of different settings for discussion and collaboration. Within the generalised movement, they are already forming significant bonds that leave them vulnerable to each other in two ways. First, vulnerable as they have the risk of losing self-determination and being absorbed by another side of the movement or being minimised by the narratives from developed countries. Second, they become externally vulnerable if, for example, a certain collaboration has already been established and they depend on the continuous efforts to reach their objectives. This is particularly troubling considering that most feminist movements have essential goals to surpass challenges of domination by institutional and cultural gender-biased norms. Hence, vulnerability seems to be present in the cases of expanding cross-borders interactions among feminist movements.

The case of feminism is an example of how our account of solidarity adequately describes existing manifestations of transnational solidarity. This example has been taken into account due to its strong presence and various instances, but it is not the only one. After applying our account here, we can expand into a less evident example, finally entering the context which troubles us, and which has inspired our present endeavour: solidarity in migration.

To better assess the example of migration, it is necessary to see two main classifications of solidarity in migration, the first less challenging to understand than the other. The first is solidarity from migrants or diaspora towards those who are joining their newfound homes or those who remain in a territory. In this case, migrants might have two different forms of creating and exercising solidarity. Migrants who have already left their origin countries and established elsewhere might create solidarity bonds with their co-nationals back home. This solidarity is evidenced, for example, by involvement with political actions from abroad which may require organisational or financial support. Organisations with political purposes abroad are a

clear evidence of this, and their character may vary from victims' associations, human rights activists, and even nationalist organisations that are created abroad. The second subcategory is solidarity with those newcomers to the new country. A sense of new migrant community is created, and a relation of solidarity is established. Senses of community and commitments of solidarity might rise among different contexts and through differing processes.

The previous forms of migrant solidarity are categorised as migrant-migrant solidarity. Such type of solidarity can be more directly understood under relational solidarity. A common identity and group identification, from a common origin is quite clear. For a solidarity that guides actions back home, there is also a clear mark of shared goals or values. Conversely, in the case of solidarity (from migrants) towards other incoming migrants, the shared goals are not as clear. It might be creating a new sense of community or it might be more strongly mobilised by an empathic disposition reinforced by a common identity. Although such form of solidarity is not necessarily achieved, its realization seems to avoid significant challenges for conceptualisation from more classic relational understandings of solidarity.

On the contrary, another type of solidarity in migration introduces certain characteristics on which relational and local solidarity is unsuccessful to explain. This is solidarity from locals, traditionally established nationals, towards incoming migrants with whom no previous bonds are shared. How to explain that these expressions of solidarity are, in fact, solidarity? Relational solidarity focuses on the four conditions for solidarity in a pre-established condition. But, transnational non-relational solidarity, as we have constructed so far, provides an account which allows to explain newly forming solidarities, as some of the conditions also begin to form.

The only condition which we will take as a pre-established requirement is the disposition to empathy. The other conditions, namely shared goals and values, common identification, and mutual trust, become not only conditions but the intricate brocade that solidarity forms and on which they actual relations of solidarity are toughened.

Usually, local-migrant solidarity initially lacks three of the four conditions for solidarity. In the cases where locals and migrants have not had any previous contact, it is hard to imagine, first, that they share a common identity or that they both identify to a same group. This condition can certainly be left aside.

On the other hand, they might unknowingly have shared goals or values, but without any specific interaction between the two, this remains unnoticed. Finally, mutual trust is also particularly challenging, even though one might be vulnerable to the actions of the other, the lack of direct plea and agreement makes it difficult to understand how a relation of trust is formed between the local and the migrant to whom he or she shows signs of solidarity. This short analysis, nevertheless, largely comes from the relational account of solidarity. Transnational non-relational solidarity is able to provide a more complete narrative.

Here, we will take into account a specific example of local-migrant solidarity and we will apply our account of solidarity. We will review, first, the conditions for solidarity; then, we will apply the concepts of interconnectivity and vulnerability to this case. The result will be a fuller understanding of the motivations and nature of this instance of solidarity in migration.

The last few years, the discussion of migration in Europe has taken a larger place in the public debate. Governments and European institutions have changed discourses and strategies to deal with constant migration. In 2017, 2,4 million non-EU national immigrants arrived in the European Union ("Migration and migrant population statistics," 2019). And, in 2019, there have been 120,243 arrivals from across the Mediterranean, of which 97,906 have arrived by sea. Estimate deaths from this migration flow is 1,277 ("Operational Portal Refugee Situations - Mediterranean situation," 2019). With this current situation and even coming from previous times, even before the so-called European refugee crisis in 2015, certain local movements from Mediterranean countries like Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain have come up in what they call solidarity towards incoming migrants. Efforts go beyond search and rescue that can be more easily identified as humanitarian actions. Instead, there are even more binding actions within and outside refugee camps. A particular trait of these efforts is the recognition of the other and the building sense of cooperation, rather than a focus on aid.

Solidarity of locals towards migrants is in some cases particularly strong. It even reaches the extents of defying new rulings and persecution by law enforcement. Currently, there are harsher conditions to develop solidarity with migrants in these arrival contexts. It has reached a point on which several activists are calling such persecution as the "criminalisation of solidarity", which they unsurprisingly conceive as particularly unjust and a constraint to their moral actions.

Since authorities are unable or unwilling to provide the appropriate conditions for incoming migrants, locals have acted and created steadily created bonds of solidarity with newcomers, “communalising resources and building up those autonomous structures where we can run our own things”, in cooperation with migrants themselves (Fekete, 2018, p. 79). But even with poorer conditions and at the risk of being prosecuted themselves, many continue their work and continue advancing and strengthening relations of solidarity in this context.

A particular trait of solidarity in our account that enables us to understand this continuing strive for solidarity has been summarised in a compatible characterisation of solidarity by Schwertl (2017). “In activities grounded in solidarity, the other is not considered to be needy, but independent and responsible. They do not aim at dissolving differences – instead solidarity means ‘connectivity despite difference’” (p. 73). In the case of local-migrant solidarity in the Mediterranean, this marks a significant difference to distinguish humanitarian actions and the deeper form of solidarity that they build through common actions.

The arrival of migrants is not an abstract fact and it directly impacts life on the territory on which they arrive. Before, or even because, a political process does not mediate all relations that occur in this context, it is possible to identify a building relation between locals and migrant arrivals. This direct contact that takes place in “arrival” camps, and in the larger towns and cities that become hubs in the Mediterranean, already makes it possible for locals and migrants to have a direct contact.

Real interactions enable a more direct form in which locals and immigrants establish shared goals and values. The initial motivation for locals to reach out and step in where governments ‘fail’ might come from moral conviction based on common humanity, on more established beliefs as the protection of human rights or even from pure emotional empathy. Although it is hard to pinpoint the specific origin of an initial approach, another observation is more important for our understanding of solidarity. There is in fact a direct contact that effectively takes place and that requires the participation of both sides. Not only are locals reaching out to immigrants, but immigrants are engaging with them. This brings about a bidirectional relation in which both parties open up to each other.

Opening up to one another occurs through direct day-to-day actions and the establishment or dissolution of commitments. Instead of thinking about this relation as an abstract possibility, or as a necessarily existing one as focused on relational

solidarity, we insist on this character of developing and advancing new bonds of solidarity.

For instance, a local NGO, formed by locals, present their aid to immigrants, which in turn, are agents themselves. This establishes a dialogical process in which humanitarian actions enter a spectrum of dialogue, of cooperation between the two parties. Interactions in real conditions and the discussion that stems from it begin to extend the relation from humanitarian aid to a relation of solidarity.

Developing shared goals and values becomes particularly possible in this process of direct interaction and dialogue. Even though initially established as aid, as the unidirectional support of one agent to a needful immigrant, the relation begins to shift as interactions amount. In their discussion, both agents begin to construct a bond and start to shape common goals. A common goal, however, might initially be tilted towards the benefit of immigrants. For instance, improving conditions in migrant camps is a specific example. Nevertheless, it still becomes a shared goal between the two. Both local activists and immigrants may direct their efforts and resources to improved conditions, thus entering into a constructing sphere of shared goals.

Furthermore, a common identification to a group, even if not previously existing, might also arise in this constant interaction. Although this is possible, this does not seem to be as enlightening from our account. The creation of a common identity or to identify oneself with the other as belonging to the same group can be a longer process. It might be possible to envisage a certain identification to a group for both locals and migrants. For example, a group identification based on the migration hub on context, both agents recognising the shared circumstances and challenges that arise in such a common setting. Nevertheless, as we have previously argued, group identification is not a necessary pre-condition for solidarity. In our account, group identification is possible, and it might actually bolster relations of solidarity, but it is not necessary for solidarity to surface.

However, even without a common identity, constant interactions and the creation of shared values achieve an important condition for solidarity. As both locals and immigrants entrust their goals to each other, they establish as well a relationship of mutual trust. The amounting joint effort and the progressive character of its development create conditions for one to put what was once a single goal into the hands of the other. In this process, locals and immigrants leave accomplishing their objectives at least partially vulnerable to the follow-up of the other. Therefore, each

become vulnerable to the actions or inactions of the other, thus opening up the possibility of developing mutual trust.

Solidarity in this case is coherent with our account. We presuppose a certain disposition to empathy, but beyond this, we provide a fuller narrative on the actual processes that take place in the creation of relations of solidarity in cases found in the European Mediterranean. The conditions of shared goals and mutual trust, considering the bidirectional relation between locals and migrants, provide a better understanding on how and why the actions by several local groups determine their own actions as expressions of solidarity (Fekete, 2018). The focus we have given so far is to consider solidarity not as a product of pre-established conditions, but rather as a symmetric phenomenon that grows in accordance to them.

There is a final point in this case for which transnational solidarity is particularly enlightening. It is one thing to take into account the case of locals who are progressively engaging with immigrants, but solidarity from non-locals requires a different explanation. In other words, how can we explain solidarity from non-local agents? Let's take for example citizen-led organisations from non-Mediterranean countries, who do not share this particular context with incoming migrants. What is to motivate citizens from Sweden or Belgium, for example, to reach and create a relation of solidarity with immigrants with whom most likely they will have no shared conditions? For the sake of the argument, we can leave aside the expanding consequences of migration throughout the European Union. Supposing that those immigrants who remain will still have no direct contact nor relation to the Belgian or Swedish state, we can ask about the motivation for solidarity with someone with whom there will be no expected future relation. The answer lies in the concepts of interconnectivity and vulnerability that we have advanced for the construction of transnational solidarity.

Interconnectivity allows us to understand the non-direct relations that might exist or that could be established even across borders. Current communication tools and mediatisation already provide a possible reach from one group to the other. Although not facing one another in a direct manner, they are still capable of having a first contact and even creating more meaningful long-distance engagements dynamized through, for instance, internet fora. Besides our point on information and communication, there is a more relevant characteristic of possible or existing cross-border relations.

As we have established, interconnectivity must also be supplemented by the idea of vulnerability to better understand transnational solidarity. Belgian and Swedish citizens are, in this instance, affecting immigrants through the policies that their representatives create. Both from international negotiations and throughout regional negotiations in European institutions, their representatives are presenting, in the name of their citizens, arguments that directly impact the treatment of migrants, particularly in these main hubs. In this case, what has been called as the “criminalisation of solidarity” is a direct effect of such policies. Hence, not only is the policy shaping institutional action towards immigrants, but it also trumps efforts from the civil society that are attempting to step in (2018). Belgian and Swedish citizens are interconnected with immigrants and their situation of vulnerability. Instead of only inferring a normative premise from this, we remark the existing cross-border connectivity in place, which citizens are able to recognise and provide further motivation towards further engagement and the construction of a relation of solidarity.

In this chapter we have continued our exploration of the concept of solidarity. We have also solidified the main bases of the concept and provided a new dimension of transnationalism to our account. We have explored different strategies to do so and have followed the one we have argued to be the strongest family of argumentations from the current academic discussion, a non-universal one. We have also expanded on this strategy, emphasising and supplementing it with the concepts of interconnectivity and vulnerability (both closely related here), to better understand what transnationalism actually means and how it is related to solidarity. Finally, we have put our account to the test in two cases. First, feminist movements in the transnational setting. Second, solidarity in migration, particularly the case of solidarity from non-migrants to migrants, both from locals and non-locals. This latter case has taken into account the different dynamics in which solidarity with migrants take place in the European Mediterranean, revealing the strengths of our account to understand why efforts to help immigrants can still be properly understood as solidarity.

Chapter III. The Freedom to Include and Transnational Solidarity – Individual moral agency in migration

In the previous chapters, we have more closely analysed the concept of solidarity and have expanded its comprehension to transnationalism and certain manifestations of migration. After drawing up a core account of solidarity, we have seen that it can be coherently expanded to transnationalism and even provide a better understanding of manifestations of solidarity towards non-members of a community. The theoretical construction of solidarity and, ultimately, transnational solidarity, brings us to a final point of discussion. Besides the conceptual structure and its application to better understand phenomena of relations between locals and immigrants, we will advance a normative argumentation. Given the conditions for transnational solidarity, and its foundation on interconnectivity and vulnerability, we assume that there is a real-world effect of this conceptualisation, as evidenced in manifestations of transnational solidarity.

We will now pair the conceptual work with a novel normative argumentation that we will divide in two fronts. First, we will argue in favour of a moral value for the relations of transnational solidarity. For this, we will focus on the individual and his moral agency, closely linked to freedom of association. We will argue that if a moral agency is assumed and valued, then his decisions of association need to be seriously considered. Then, we will apply our initial conclusions to the discussion on the ethics of migration. We will provide an insight into the current state of the debate and its focus on the opposition between exclusion and the claims of migrants. We will then propose a shift of focus on the weighing of interests, including those who desire to establish inclusive relations of solidarity with migrants who do not belong to the political community.

1. Moral agency and freedom of association

We will now argue that a minimal protection of transnational solidarity is relevant to satisfy certain conditions for justice, at least in the liberal egalitarian framework of John Rawls. For this, we will build up fundamental principles of justice and move up to more complex aspects that will link transnational solidarity to the ethical discussion on migration. We will introduce individual moral agency, linking it to freedom, then

analysing its effects on freedom of association. Then, we will associate transnational solidarity to such freedom of association and, by extension, to the fundamental principles of individual freedom and moral agency.

Liberal theory provides an interesting notion for transnational solidarity due to its large expansion in the debate as well as its influence on public institutions. Liberalism “entails focusing on what reasonable people can still share, despite their differences about the good life” (Larmore, 1999, p. 602). Nevertheless, it is not the nature of liberal theory that calls for our attention here. Instead, we focus on one of its key principles, freedom. Although we will not try to provide a strong definition for the concept of freedom, nor review its historical development throughout liberalism or other families of theories, we can remark two important features of what freedom entails.

First, an absence of domination, so that the individual is only subdued to the rule of law, thus free from the unwilling subjugation to the other. In liberal thought, it is usually accepted that individuals are to only be bound by principles of conduct that they would give themselves, particularly under ideal and appropriate conditions (Larmore, 1999, p. 614). Principles that lie underneath are, however, varied and they reach different conclusions. We can remark certain indications such as non-domination and non-interference, but it can also comprise other efforts that expand beyond negative obligations, also including the positive ability for individual self-realization. Even though we will not expand on the different notions of freedom, we maintain a wider consideration of both negative and positive aspects, so that we can better understand its link to transnational solidarity. Besides, we will take for granted that in today’s liberal societies, individual freedom is a strong value that guides and limits the moral scope of individuals and collectives.

To insist on the weight that freedom carries in these societies, we can recall John Rawls’ considerations on the needs for a just society. A preeminent figure in contemporary political philosophy, and a champion of liberalism, his understanding of freedom and justice have had undeniable effects on political philosophy, both within and beyond academia. Given the analysis on which we are focused here, we will have to leave aside a complete reconstruction of the arguments advanced by Rawls. Instead, we will borrow a few components in his liberal account to construct our perspective of the relation of transnational solidarity and freedom. Mainly, we will base our argument in his understanding of moral agency and its role in the development of a just society.

Rawls' influential account on the primary goods can help us better understand the importance of freedom. He points out that ensuring such primary goods is necessary for a just society. In *Political Liberalism*, Rawls (2005) presents primary goods with a central notion of basic rights and liberties, which allow for "the adequate development and full exercise of the two moral powers" (p. 45). Such moral powers of individuals are reasonableness and rationality. In summary, the first is the ability to "exercise an effective sense of justice, that is, a capacity to recognize and act from justice's demands" (Hoffmann, 2017, p. 1603). The latter is the capacity "to possess and pursue a conception of the good, that is, to adapt some more or less complete set of valued ends and take up effective means to those ends" (p. 1603).

Following Rawls, there are two moral powers that individuals should be able to exercise. Nevertheless, these powers demand a certain set of basic rights and liberties that we will now link with freedom of association. We will presuppose the validity of these claims in order to advance our following argumentation and will shed a new light to them.

Exercising moral powers may lead to different real-world actions. Nevertheless, this is not the point with which we should be concerned with if we take the argumentation of Rawls (1999) into account. To better understand this point, we can very briefly recount the two principles of justice that come from his argument of the original position and the veil of ignorance. We will now just recall the conclusions of this argumentation.

According to Rawls, we imagine each of us as free and equal individuals in an original position where a veil of ignorance is established, and we are unaware of any possible personal, social or other contextual characteristics. To answer the question on what the most desirable conception of justice would be, considering such ignorance, individuals are to find an agreement on which is the conception of justice that will allow best for them to advance their interests. As a consequence of this position, individuals will find as the most rational conclusion two principles of justice. We must keep in mind here, that these principles of justice will then rule our conception of what will be understood as required for a just society. The two most reasonable principles of justice that come from the original position, as initially introduced by Rawls, are:

First, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others; and second, inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable

to expect that they will work out for everyone's advantage, and provided (Rawls, 1958, p. 165).

Rawls, however, points out that these are not to be understood as *the* principles of justice (p. 165), but that they rather come from the conditions portrayed in the original position. Even if they are not considered as a universal truth, they still reveal a valuable lesson for our argumentation. Rational individuals in the original position find it to be that the most reasonable conception of justice, even though motivated by self-interest, leads to the two principles of justice.

The first principle is particularly intriguing in our analysis. "Equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others" entails a strong commitment. We now see an initial dimension of this issue. Ensuring equal liberties among all is the initial agreement to achieve justice. It would seem quite contradictory to state that a just society can be achieved without respecting the first principle on which rational individuals have agreed upon behind the veil of ignorance. This is just an initial and quite evident conclusion. We have only reviewed this argumentation by Rawls to contextualize the relevance of the moral agent to achieve a just society.

Liberty now claims an important role in achieving justice, and we can find a strong link with the importance of moral powers. The infringement of basic rights and liberties amount first and foremost to an injustice towards the individual, particularly those that trump the free exercise of the moral powers. We can identify two main reasons why this is particularly troubling. First, it impedes the free realization of the individual's moral capacities. The individual is therefore stripped from the possibility to not only act according to what he finds reasonable, but it can even lead towards a certain form of imposition of a conception of the good life (for which neutrality is particularly important in liberal societies). The individual, originally valued as a rational moral agent, finds a significant obstacle to act on his moral conclusions. If we extend this to the initial original position, we can see that the second moral power of rationality is in fact necessary to even determine what the conception of justice should be. Assuming that agreeing on a conception of justice is fundamental to later pursue such later defined justice, rationality becomes paramount in the process of achieving a just society. Liberty and the moral powers are related in this sense, that the latter requires the first to even aspire towards justice. In this account, justice can only be possible with a certain degree of rationality, given in the second moral power. Hence,


moral powers and the effective capacity for their exercise are essential to establish a just society.

If the individual is unable to exercise his moral powers, not only is the conception of justice jeopardized, but also the individual's self-realization. It would seem hard to question the premise that if a moral agent reaches reasonable moral conclusions he should be allowed to express or act on them. The main issue here is not the nature of such conclusions, but rather on the liberty that is owed to the individual so that he is able to assert his own moral conduct. Both the rational process and the application of moral powers are essential in the development of the individual, who builds himself within a context through rational processes, decisions and actions. Therefore, an unsurmountable obstacle for the exercise of moral powers leads to a disruption of individual freedom and the capacity for self-realization.

However, in our concern for questions of transnational solidarity in migration, we can identify and focus on selecting and effectively associating with others. Also considered among the basic liberties individuals should enjoy in liberal societies, freedom of association is an essential component of the discussion on the ethics of migration. Freedom of association usually entails a positive and a negative notion. It involves including those with whom the individual is looking to associate regardless of the motives so long as they are reasonable (leaving aside for example groups based on hate speech or unreasonable discrimination). At the same time, it involves excluding those who will not form part of such association.

Both inclusion and exclusion may be part of the exercise of moral powers, thus being directly related to freedom and the development of the moral agent. Balancing the weight of collective action against individual action, freedom of association seems to be particularly relevant to exercising reasonableness and rationality. Effectively creating or countering change beyond the individual and private sphere more often require collective action. Therefore, we can envisage that at a certain level, the possibility to actively engage in association with others is part of the individual's enactment of his moral conclusions. Hence, freedom of association is significantly important for the moral agent's self-realization.

Figure 1. Relation between moral agency, moral powers, freedom of association and justice.



We have covered the need of ensuring liberties for the individual, but how does it relate to other liberties with similar or equal worth? Considering the first principle of justice, on which liberties are to be compatible with the liberties of others, freedom of association fits into a weighing relation among individuals. Ensuring the liberty of freedom of association on an individual would require to be limited by a weighing with the same freedom of another individual where both would conflict. In other words, the liberty to exclude of a first individual would need to be weighed with the liberty to include of a second individual. As we will see, this will have significant consequences in determined cases, particularly in that of migration.

The actual weighing between the two liberties becomes a matter of a case by case analysis. Instead of concluding on the primacy of one liberty over the other, a moral judgement on real conditions would then be necessary. We do not extract a principle of justice or a general conclusion here, but rather the more moderate indication of the weight the interest to include also has.

The liberty to include becomes even more significant when we consider the significance that transnational solidarity has, particularly with the opening towards inclusion as we have argued in chapters 1 and 2. Since solidarity refers to actual relations that relate to actual interconnectivity and vulnerability, its inclusionary perspective is relevant for moral considerations. Besides, the moral obligations from some of the conditions of solidarity make it clear that there is a certain weight to existing or developing relations of solidarity. For instance, the condition of mutual trust introduces the way in which both agents make themselves vulnerable to the other. Even in a transnational sense, solidarity is grounded and presents a form in which more concrete moral obligations take place.

Transnational solidarity not only gives way to understanding actual expressions of solidarity in different manners. Since it is bounded on real conditions and ways in which relations are created, it allows to further explore the liberty to include on which it depends.

Insisting on the argumentation by Rawls has provided a clearer perspective, on which we have advanced an argumentation in favour of further considering the weight that transnational solidarity has on the normative discussion. Recognising the weight and relevance of solidarity is supplemented by the toughened notion of inclusion. In the end, we find that freedom of association is coupled with the underlying bases of transnational solidarity. The transnational account strengthens its relation to morality, and a review of Rawlsian arguments points towards the normative importance of solidarity.

There is an important relevance of freedom of association in the liberal conception of justice. Both inclusion and exclusion are components of the necessary liberties that the moral powers require for the development of moral agency. By extending on justice, as understood by Rawls, we have seen the significant relation and dependence that moral agency and its moral powers have on freedom of association. Simply said, freedom of association is not only relevant but necessary for the development of a conception of justice, but also to attempt to achieve justice.

2. Exclusion, but also inclusion in migration

Freedom of association has also received considerable attention in the debate on migration. It is often found within the argument of self-determination for states permissibly being able to limit and select incoming immigrants. In this instance, we

are moving from the individual perspective of the moral agent, onto the collective and state-centred perspective.

We will take into account several aspects of the current debate in the ethics of migration, but we will have to leave aside a full account of the state of the discussion. We can only introduce this by pointing out the strength that the liberal - communitarian debate has gained in the matter. Authors defending more communitarian perspectives focus on the normative value that the structure of the community has (Hardin, 2005). It is commonly agreed that the communities have norms of exclusions at different levels. But, ultimately, the importance and extent of such exclusion continues to power a large portion of the debate.

The community as a whole has a certain set of rights and interests that it should be able to defend. Particularly considering that immigrants or newcomers might cause a detriment to the community, exclusion would seem at least partially permissible. This is a cornerstone of the debate, with different kinds of arguments in favour or against that might come from rights-based approaches, nationalism, dignity, empirical data or several others.

Instead of situating our argumentation within the extent of permissibility of exclusion as is more commonly found within the debate on migration, we will rather introduce a new focus on inclusion. In coherence with the importance of moral agency, inclusion in migration will point towards a more recondite side of the discussion. However, before that, we will continue to explore some of the features of exclusion in the debate of migration. By clarifying the importance that exclusion has on the discussion, we will open the path to our argumentation to also take inclusion into account.

An important aspect of exclusion in migration is its relation to self-determination, meaning of the capacity of the community to determine who are its members. Determining who are insiders or outsiders is then a fundamental aspect of community-building.

Self-determination is usually understood to include the right to control membership of the body that decides, subject to the usual human rights provisos (...) part of its value is that it gives us, as citizens, some degree of control over what happens to our political community in the future (Miller, 2016, p. 63).

An essential part of self-determination (Wellman, 2008), freedom of association brings us to a crucial component for the control of the political community embodied by the state. Controlling the distribution of membership, which comes with full economic and

political rights within the community, is currently an essential part of the discussion on migration. In the discussion for open or closed borders (or the extent of the porosity of borders), self-determination is reviewed through the scopes of risks, advantages and the costs of accepting or rejecting newcomers. However, we will not take into account such costs, but rather focus on the aspect of the freedom of association and the way it is more commonly approached in the discussion.

Freedom of association within self-determination is more often brought to the table in its exclusionary capacity. For example, focusing on the permissibility of the entirety of the political community to exclude, David Miller (2016) mentions that there is a weighing process between the interests of nationals and those of immigrants, in which “a compatriot partiality is permissible” (p. 71). As a result, incoming immigrants are selected, and the shape of political community is maintained or reshaped by the acts of exclusion or inclusion.

At the level of the political community, the discussion on the permissibility or impermissibility to exclude seems to lead to a partial acceptance. Even for certain authors constructing a case for open borders, the question does not lead to a notion of banning any form of border control. For instance, Joseph Carens (2008) concedes as a basis for improving the recognition of rights of immigrants (particularly irregular immigrants), “the right (of the state) to enforce immigration laws” (p. 182). However, he and other authors such as Miller, share a certain general conclusion on the treatment of immigrants. Although the state has a certain permissibility to exclude, the claims of immigrants need to be seriously addressed.

The current debate continues to deal with exclusion, freedom of association and self-determination. Here, we will disrupt these often-found considerations on two fronts: focusing on the individual instead of the political community and centring our argument on the positive inclusive side of freedom of association rather than exclusion. Freedom of association might lead to a different analysis depending on the level in which it is applied. It is clear that it is permissible for the political community to exercise a certain form of exclusion. In fact, inclusion is necessarily related to exclusion. However, we can categorize different levels in which association occurs, where moral agency is developed. For our analysis, we can differentiate between three different levels in which freedom of association might take place: individual, public and political. We will review the differences among them, maintaining that the

individual level also requires particular attention, which is often overlooked in the moral discussion on immigration.

We can start with the widest level: political. We have already introduced some notions of what the political level is, particularly understood as the totality of the political community. People are represented through the centralisation of power on the state, leading us to the established institutions for decision-making and a general moral ethos embodied in law and policymaking. A main aspect of the political level for which people's political and economic rights and duties are assured is membership. Full membership to the political community involves citizenship, granting total access to political freedom. In a democratic political system, these include voting rights, freedom of expression and, of course, freedom of association.

In some cases, the political level finds more than one sort of membership. For instance, citizens of a Member State of the European Union, enjoy two overlapping memberships. They are both citizens of their home state, but they are also European citizens, with the institutional power and democratic process to support it, providing members with an active civic identity (Benhabib, 1999). This evident observation simply allows us to point to the possibility of overlapping memberships at the political level.

Membership to a political community, however, is becoming increasingly complex in the current context of transnational interconnectivity. "Through the unprecedented movement of peoples and goods, capital and information, microbes and communication across borders, individuals no longer enter societies at birth and exit them at death" (1999, p. 719). This makes us conceive a somewhat changing political community that explains the acceptance of new members, as well as the departure of existing ones. The complexity of membership brings about the examples of those with overlapping citizenships, not only between a European state and the European Union, but also with a different political community (whether European or not).

However, a main aspect of membership, particularly in examples such as in Member States of the European Union, is the access to core political rights. In particular, citizens and residents are differentiated by their extent of their political rights. A complete access to the democratic process in all elections (local, national, European) is the most evident difference, but it also extends to freedom of association. Establishing political associations is part of the core political rights which only citizens can enjoy (1999). It is now important not only to emphasise the restriction of such

associative freedoms for non-citizens, but rather on the complete right of the citizen to form such associations. This, however, will need to be analysed through the scope of other levels in which freedom of association takes place.

We have conceived the political level as the totality of the political community. Nevertheless, it is not only at such level that certain public associations are formed. Associations with particular objectives that might not involve institutionalised political action are also possible. We can categorise these into the public level in which freedom of association is developed. These may include associations that do not extend to political parties, but that may link to rights that are not restricted to citizens. There is a wide range of forms in which people may experience solidarity and develop their associative capacity at the public level. Leaving aside political parties, which is reserved for the political level, they include associations such as “neighbourhoods, churches, unions, professional groups, societies for mutual aid” (Walzer, 1998, p. 51), but we can also perceive other forms of association such as those for and with non-members.

Expressions of transnational solidarity, as seen in the previous chapters, open up the public level of association to those with whom are not full members, lacking political associational rights. Associations that go beyond borders exist and have an active role in the development of local affairs. While not being political parties or movements, they still have an impact on public life and the general public debate. International unions or feminist movements are two major examples that we have already seen more closely in the first and second chapters. Even if focused on economic or social disadvantages (not dealing with political rights), they still bring an important influence on the development of public life (Stjernø, 2005). Besides, it would be hard to deny the impact that this kind of associations have had in political change.

Freedom of association in the public level shapes a large extent of the actual life of individuals, whether they are citizens or not. These associations not only effect changes in the political community and at non-political levels. They also play an essential role in the day-to-day living of different forming groups. Whether in the form of churches, unions or solidarity movements, these associations become a structural component of common life.

Freedom of association in the public level introduces a key element in the development of common life. We take for granted that regardless of the objectives, the bonds that are created become an essential part of creating, developing and changing the identity

of a group. Whether such development occurs overtly and in a structured discourse, or in more tacit and organic ways does not change their importance. Associating drives public life and groups to evolve, intertwine and develop. Considering that they are not limited to co-nationals, we can extend their importance beyond the conscripts of a single state. We also see the importance of freedom of association on this level, and its expansion beyond members and borders.

Although it has been necessary to outline the political and public levels for the application of freedom of association, our argumentation does not depend on them. Both provide an insight into the importance that associations have for the development of the individual in the different spheres in which it moves, but they are not at the core of our argument. We find our final category as the most relevant for our argumentation for the importance of the inclusive side of freedom of association.

At the individual level, we can finally centre our argument to consider transnational solidarity as a matter of justice, even though we have found some hints in the public and political levels. We will initially outline what freedom of association at the individual level entails, particularly in the case of migration. Then, we will link it to transnational solidarity by emphasising the core notions of moral agency and individual freedom.

The individual level of application of freedom of association is the basic capacity of the individual to make associative decisions for himself. These include selecting those other individuals or groups with whom the individual is willing to associate with. It also includes the capacity to exit certain groups if one wishes to do so. Exiting might be simpler or harder depending on the case, but the capacity depends on his will.

In this capacity to exit, however, we find a challenge in the context of migration and non-members. As a manifestation of freedom of association, we find the right to exit. This is a one-way freedom of movement right established in both national and international stages. However, as Benhabib (1999) rightly points out, there is an asymmetrical relation between the right to exit and the right to entry. The individual's freedom of association allows him to leave his original political community, thus exiting the state's territorial jurisdiction. But no other state is obligated to admit his entry. This situation causes a troubling asymmetry. Since there is nowhere to go in today's world without ending up on someone else's territory, "we are all potentially strangers in another land" (pp. 731-732). We will not expand on this issue, which is a more common item in the ethical discussion of migration. However, we can identify

an essential component that remains applicable in our argumentation. Freedom of association is considered in two parallel, pondered ways. The individual who has the capacity to exit and the state that controls its own borders and enforces its self-determination by selecting immigrants.

We will now bring the focus of the discussion into a different relation of asymmetry, between both the individual that exits, and the other individual from a different political community who enjoys his own freedom of association. We have introduced the emphasis on the freedom of association of the exiting individual, turned migrant, that often captures large part of the attention on the ongoing debate on migration. However, we will now expand on the freedom of association of the individual at the receiving state.

We have actually already outlined some of the aspects of the individual level of application of freedom of association, which we will briefly summarise for the case of the individual who might be willingly including another individual that is not also a member of his own political community.

Given the primacy of the individual's freedom of association, the individual's right to include seems to be as important as the right to exclude. An essential component for the development of his moral agency, associative practices of inclusion need to be further analysed. Given the current context of interconnectivity and the weight that actual relations of solidarity have, freedom of association at the individual level also expands beyond the local political community.

A particularly illustrative example of such forms of inclusion in the context of migration are the expressions of solidarity that have been surging in Mediterranean Europe by individuals actively engaging in associating with migrants to establish relations of solidarity, further providing support networks and even stronger forms of cultural exchange. As we argued in the previous chapter, these cases can effectively attempt at becoming strong relations of solidarity, thus forming a tougher bond among agents who exercise their own freedom of association. The individual is not only providing support, but he is selecting and including another incoming individual in his capacity of moral agent. It is therefore relevant for his own self-realization and the active development of his moral agency on which a just society depends.

Our argument here is based on two important realizations. First, moral agency that involves freedom of association is valued not only for self-realization but also as a foundation for the reasonableness and rationality on which a just society depend.

Second, in the context of migration, the individual at the receiving state needs to also be taken into account. His moral agency and its implications such as freedom of association are also relevant. Within such freedom of association, we have shifted the focus from exclusion to inclusion. This means that an individual's inclusion of others needs to be introduced into the discussion and it should be further considered.

We must also emphasise an important conclusion of the previous chapters. Solidarity and its transnational form have a particularly important weight for individuals that engage in it. As we have seen through the analysis of its conditions, relations of solidarity become particularly significant in the deployment of empathy but also to the construction of commonalities such as shared goals or values. Engaging in solidarity is not only a superfluous action, but a special form of relation is created with it. Even though it is not equal to the relation within the political community, relations of solidarity have a particular claim given the seriousness that they involve. Interconnectivity and vulnerability in transnationalism help us understand the weight that these relations reach, even beyond pre-existing local solidarities.

As we have argued, transnational solidarity is not only coherent with a more general understanding of solidarity, but it has a particular importance that reveals us the weight of its relations. The robust basis of solidarity shows us that claims based on these relations have a significant weight, at least sufficient for them to be introduced in the discussion of migration.

Relations of solidarity become particularly relevant here because they reveal a specific way in which a moral agent exercises his freedom of inclusion. Given the conditions of solidarity and the reciprocal engagement which it entails, solidarity becomes a particular form of inclusion. This transforms a more general form of inclusion that we have not specified until now (besides the case of membership) into a specific relation of solidarity. The extent of such relation could vary and, as seen previously, might not even require for agents to belong to the same political community. However, the strength of relations of solidarity that we have argued and the moral obligations among the parties that come from it, allows us to point towards a stronger claim that these relations might have in the weighing of freedom of inclusion.

Coming back to moral agency, we must still question if the individual's moral agency (considering the weight that transnational solidarity has as an expression of inclusion) is so important that there should be an unwavering right to include? Not exactly. This would be unrealistic in the current political system both domestically and

internationally. Even within our argumentation, it would still be troubling because no moral agency, neither guiding towards exclusion nor inclusion has more weight than another in a just society. Each individual's freedom of association leads to having equal worth for decisions of inclusion or exclusion. Within a political community, this means that an individual who takes the moral stance to include a newcomer does not automatically introduces him to the community, specially not granting him membership. The opposing decision of other individuals to exclude, maintain their equal worth.

The important insight that we can introduce here is the need for further attention on the interests of such individuals to include, as the exercise of their freedom of association and their self-realization as moral agents. Particularly considering expressions of inclusion, with the weight that relations of solidarity carry, this interest of inclusion should be more closely considered.

We have seen that moral agency is valued in the liberal account for the conception of justice, and freedom is necessary for moral agency to develop because it allows to exercise the moral powers on which it depends. Freedom of association, as a component of basic freedoms, is then necessary and it is a real application of the moral powers. Applying this to the context of migration and considering the weight of solidarity, we have found that there has been a focus on the permissibility of political communities to exclude. We now focus our attention to the claims for inclusion at the individual level.

3. Moral agency and expressions of transnational solidarity

There are certain possible normative conclusions of shifting the discussion to the welcoming and inclusive individual. The first one that we can point out is the increase of weight in the claims of those who are advocating for inclusion. To understand the reach of their claims, we must note that in some cases there is more than the individual moral conclusion to include. In some cases, freedom of association with non-members becomes effective and reinforced by the development of a bond of solidarity.

Transnational solidarity helps us to better understand the limits freedom of association may lead to among members and non-members. With a new-forming bond of solidarity, the claim for self-realization of the moral agent becomes even more graspable. The moral agent decides to include the non-member to a certain relation in which solidarity can develop (which is not necessarily an inclusion to the political

community), but it also takes a step further. These relations can actually form and strengthen without the mediation of the state. To some extent, they become an integral part of the self-realization of the individual moral agent. Therefore, if we value his or her moral agency, impeding or restricting such transnational bonds should require a strong justification, equally weighed with those who see their interests at risk by such inclusion.

Since transnational expressions of solidarity and the relations that are developed through them show the capacity and existence of associations beyond borders. It is then not only a matter of the political community excluding or not, but also about individuals establishing new forms of associations with strong enough links for bonds of solidarity to be created. This new factor needs to be introduced into the weighing of the interests of compatriots (now comprising their interest to include) and the interests of immigrants.


The case of criminalisation of nationals for the harbouring, rescue or support of irregular immigrants in Europe is particularly enlightening for our argument. Both individuals and non-governmental organisations that have been conducting operations in the benefit of irregular immigrants have seen an increase in the obstruction and criminalisation of their activities. The reach and intensity of obstructions have actually seen important increases. Some testimonies in the field even describe it as an evolution from a “smear campaign from the far-right movements to become a the main official position of the EU (*and national institutions*)” (Fekete, 2018, p. 76). The increase in prosecution of organisations and individuals engaging in solidary relations and providing support to irregular immigrants allows us to apply the distinction between the interests for exclusion and inclusion.

We must leave aside here the discussion on the legality of the expressions of solidarity and of the institutional acts for their criminalisation and prosecution. Instead, we will centre on the normative discussion that we have been cementing. We propose that a fuller understanding of the shaping of transnational solidarity and the moral weight of freedom of association will provide a fuller picture to the discussion of solidarity in migration.

Analysing the situation of criminalising solidarity to irregular migrants in Europe, we find that there are three set of interests in place. First, the interest of immigrants to enter and to have their human rights respected. Second, the interest of European states and the EU to protect their borders and select their immigrants as self-determination

and collective right to exclude. As previously stated, such selection and exclusion does not overshadow the obligation to respect a basic set of human rights of immigrants. Finally, we find the interests of those who are acting in solidarity with migrants. In this case, the latter seem to be left aside, without an actual consideration.

Figure 2. Conflicting interests at different levels in migration



We must stress a key element. Associating with immigrants might also mean associating through expressions of solidarity. This form of association is however not a necessary introduction of a foreign agent to the political community. We propose that acts of solidarity are to be understood as interests to include by determined individuals within the political community. However, such inclusion leads to specific forms of transnational association rather than the grant of membership. We can certainly envisage the creation of solidarity bonds with non-members without the need nor the will to become compatriots.

In other words, there is an interest to establish or maintain relations of solidarity that should be more carefully considered. The interest for those moral agents that are deciding to establish these relations bring an important consideration. We can now

analyse the extent of obligations of such consideration. We can divide them in two different sets of obligations: positive and negative. Positive obligations in this case would lead towards facilitating, promoting or even supporting the creation and development of relations of transnational solidarity. However, the unbalance and the permissible partiality for the interests of nationals make it difficult to reach such conclusion. If applied, this would lead towards a situation in which the state would actively engage with immigrants to establish relations of solidarity (by itself and through non-government action of its members). However, the existing conflict of interests and the capacity for self-determination and freedom of association is a challenge that is yet to be resolved.

Negative obligations, on the other hand, extend to the obligations to non-interference, limiting the actions that the state or other individuals or groups can exert. Considering the importance of individual freedom and freedom of association, we can see a stronger point here. Limiting relations of transnational solidarity of an individual that is part of the political community requires a strong justification. In the European Mediterranean case, those who are extending and expanding their relations of solidarity continue to defend their bonds and their consequent actions. Their interests, nevertheless, are thought to be in conflict with the right of the state to control its borders and, we would insist, with other's individual interest for exclusion, also as development of their moral agency.

This particular example can help us to better understand the ongoing conflict of interests. Shedding some more light into it, we are able to see that a large portion of the conflict is not factual, certain empirical facts indicate the presence of misinformation or blatant manipulation. Here we can highlight arguments of correlations between migration and crime, crisis in housing, employment or social security, or even fears of losing social cohesion. The most important false argument is however that which states that supporting immigrants will motivate and exacerbate future migration. Such arguments, however, are often proven wrong. Therefore, the justification for breaching the negative obligation of non-interference falls short.

Before looking more closely to empirical facts, we can sum up the underlying conflict of interests, which would serve the state to legitimise obstructing relations of transnational solidarity. We can focus on the conflicting interests of individuals within the political community, generalising two groups for such a conflict:

- A) those who wish to include immigrants into their own association, being a relation of solidarity that does not necessarily extend to become an invitation to the political community.
- B) Those who wish to exclude immigrants from any kind of associations. These include possible or existing relations of solidarity and to the political community.

Initially, the extent of inclusion of group A does not have the extent to reach granting full membership, but it also does not entail an invitation to enjoy other non-political rights. Economic and social rights are initially not brought to the table by this group. Although the claim of irregular immigrants to access these rights might become stronger as time passes by (Carens, 2008), this is initially not a component of group A's interests.

Considering the value of freedom of association, should the interests of exclusion of group B overcome those of inclusion of group A? The short answer seems to be no. If we consider the weight of both interests, group A's seems not as an infringement or an imposition of group B. Since no membership nor any other rights of citizens or regular migrants are being offered, A's interests carry the same weight.

In this case, the development of moral agency by A withstands the argument for an equal worth as the interests of B. A's decision to include immigrants into their relation of solidarity is to a certain extent protected thanks to freedom of association. Now, since we conceive this relation as overlapping but not necessarily connected to other associations such as citizenship or economic activity, the interests of A require further consideration.

We even find supplementing empirical arguments that reveal the independence of the relations of solidarity that A establishes with immigrants. A particular example is rescue missions at sea for incoming immigrants. Usually, the argument is simple. The state must protect the interest of its members, thus it should be able to avoid the imposition of inclusion of A, where B takes a stance of exclusion. Nevertheless, this argument has two significant flaws. First, as we have just argued, B's interests to exclude do not automatically trump A's interest to include. Besides, we can take a closer look to the falsehood of the argument that A would only motivate a larger flow of immigration.

The situation at the Mediterranean, as recorded by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("Operational Portal Refugee Situations - Mediterranean

situation," 2019) reveals even more challenging notions that deny the weakening of A's interests. After the so-called refugee crisis in 2015, in which registered immigrants to Europe through the Mediterranean reached a record number of 1,032,408, arrivals have dramatically decreased. The reasons for the constant decline are varied and we will not explore them. However, we can see that in 2019, there were a total of 125,472. Some advance as an argument that the decrease is due to the criminalisation of solidarity towards incoming immigrants, considering that "several leading politicians, even senior EU leaders, have claimed that the presence of rescue boats to the Libyan coast serves as 'magnet' or 'even a bridge to Europe'" (Steinhilper & Gruijters, 2018, p. 524). Nevertheless, it has already been disproved that there is a correlation between the arrival and even the attempt to reach European territory by sea and the criminalisation of agents of solidarity in Europe.

Search and rescue operations are active components of the bonds of solidarity that we have identified between A and migrants. Political leaders have increased their efforts to limit this type of activity hoping that it would reduce the number of attempts to enter European territory, and also reducing the mortalities at sea. However, contrasting periods of low or high activity of search and rescue operations with the influx of migrants reveals that there is no correlation (2018). Therefore, actions of solidarity by A do not even reach a potential infringement of B's interests of exclusion. In the end, their efforts are beneficial for immigrants who are entitled to basic human rights (regardless of their location or situation), but not detrimental to the receiving political community. In fact,

Search and rescue operations can substantially reduce relative and absolute mortality, while the absence of SAR does not discourage crossings. In this light, the political backlash against humanitarian rescue operations that emerged in the spring of 2017 appears completely misguided (p. 529).

In this case of transnational solidarity in the Mediterranean, we see that the interest of A turns out to not only be strong in terms of freedom of association, but it also responds to some of the most basic of claims by immigrants. Considering the little effect that they have on the freedom to exclude by B, interests of A are solidified and should be more seriously considered.

The Mediterranean example has helped us view our argumentation in a clearer manner. However, our aim here is not to restrict our scope to this case. Instead, the important conclusion that we are aiming at is the shift of attention towards the including

individual. This could be applied in different contexts, helping to balance out the interests of those who are engaging in relations of transnational solidarity. Since individuals in liberal societies enjoy such basic freedom of association, this would be particularly revealing to achieve more just policies. Particularly, it would bring forward into the discussion the freedom to include.

The debate is currently focused on the exclusionary freedom and on the claims of migrants. Nevertheless, it could be largely beneficial for the discussion to incorporate and seriously consider the interests of those within the community who reach their own moral conclusion to include. Realizing this could help to at least partially reshape the discussion. It could be a possibility to extend from the constant justification of exclusion into reviewing the claims for inclusion within the same receiving community. Cases such as the criminalisation of solidarity are a lively example of the need to better consider the interests of those who decide to include newcomers.

We have built an argumentation that is based on the importance of the individual's moral agency. We have established that developing one's moral agency is necessary for self-realization, also requiring certain liberties. Since certain basic rights and liberties are necessary for moral agency to develop, freedom of association becomes essential. Such freedom enables the individual to exercise the moral powers on which moral agency depends. Within the liberties that the person requires, we identify freedom of association as a key component for the real application of moral powers. It involves both the decisions and actions of inclusion and exclusion. The latter is particularly valued and treated in the discussion of migration. There is a constant focus on the permissibility of exclusion of political communities. With certain limitations, particularly within the respect of basic human rights, exclusion of immigrants is generally understood as a permissible action by states. However, inclusion also plays an important role in the real conditions for migration.

What we have proposed here, through the scope of transnational solidarity and the conclusions that we have reached in the previous chapters, is a shift in the discussion towards the value of moral agency of the individual. Transnational expressions of solidarity exist and the relations that are developed through them reveal the capacity and potential of associations beyond borders. Some individuals establish new forms of associations with strong enough links for bonds of solidarity to be created. This new factor needs to be introduced into the weighing of the interests of compatriots

(emphasising on their interest of enjoying their freedom of association) and the interests of immigrants.

Conclusion

The concept of solidarity is particularly troubling for political philosophy and other fields that find it either directly or indirectly relevant. The lack of consensus of its meaning, modes of functioning and its limits is particularly challenging. Attempts to elucidate the meaning of solidarity are increasing in the contemporary literature, but this does not point towards a unified comprehension. The concept of solidarity comes along its fine distinctions and different approaches that expand or limit its application. More historical reviews of solidarity reveal the constant variation of the concept. Not only the study and meanings of solidarity have been variant, but its effects on the real life of individuals both within and beyond borders has also changed. The way solidarity is understood not only helps explain already existing expressions of solidarity, it also helps guiding towards new relations and the transformation of existing ones. The relevance of the concept relates with real conditions of social interactions and the structures individuals or groups create to sustain and advance solidarity among them.

We have introduced the reader to the complexities of the concept of solidarity and categorised different accounts. The main reason for such analytical work has been to understand the theoretical ramifications of the concept and its applicability to specific conditions of migration. Solidarity in migration is a concept often applied but that carries more than one meaning. We have dealt with the issue of applying the concept of solidarity, not among states (or member states in the case of the European Union), but directly in relation to immigrants. The point of departure for this work has been the coherence or incoherence of discussing solidarity between locals and immigrants. The variability of solidarity and a large distinction between relational and non-relational solidarities has early in this work opened the possibility to understand solidarity in migration (as previously clarified).

The constant evolution of the concept, given by differing interpretations by philosophical, religious or political traditions, provides a wide range of sources to understand and rework solidarity. It is in such variety that we have identified two major theoretical categories of solidarity, we have named these as relational and non-relational accounts. The distinction among them is, above all, associated with the level of dependence on pre-existing relations to help explain solidarity.

Relational accounts of solidarity are those closer to Durkheim's prominent conception. Focusing on the explanation of solidarity within already established groups or societies, these accounts are also often characterised by more exclusionary notions. These refer to pre-established communities and relations of solidarity that do not take into account the income of potential new members. Relational accounts are particularly valuable in the sense that they provide a significant explanation to pre-existing relations within established political communities. However, they present certain insufficiencies to explain the way in which other forms of solidarity are created, whether they occur in relation towards immigrants or at a transnational level, for instance.

Non-relational accounts, on the other hand, are more related to newer attempts to conceptualise solidarity. These are particularly sensitive to the closed character of relational accounts and portray the focus of exclusion as a challenge to surmount. Some basic notions differ in these accounts to extend the understanding of solidarity towards other manifestations than those among closed societies. A basic notion on which these accounts stand is the recognition and triggering that injustice has for some agents. Without necessarily sharing same values nor belonging to the same community, some agents are capable of recognizing the injustice suffered by the other and, in some cases, triggering them towards attempting to establish a relation of solidarity with the other. A significant difference here is not the sense of injustice per se nor the capacity to recognize it and be motivated by it. The role of injustices in this sense is present in both relational and non-relational accounts. What is present here is a finer distinction of the emphasis between the two. Non-relational accounts have a stronger focus on the capacity that injustice has to motivate towards sustaining or establishing relations of solidarity. Perhaps an even more important difference is that injustice as motivation for solidarity is not limited to pre-established relations nor constrained within determined communities.

The distinction between relational and non-relational helps us understand key differences that restrict or open solidarity. Whereas relational accounts are more strongly related the necessary exclusion that solidarity entails, non-relational point towards the possibilities to include. Even though inclusion and exclusion are both varying components of solidarity, emphasising on one or another provide different implications, both at analytical and normative levels.

By analysing the conditions of solidarity and how non-relational accounts try to provide an answer to them, we have also argued that other accounts that distance themselves from Durkheim's influential conception seem plausible. Non-relational accounts become, then, not only an observation of theoretical attempts to reconstruct solidarity. Instead, they become coherent conceptualisations. Non-relational accounts provide two major advantages which we point must be further valued to understand contemporary complexities among relations of solidarity. First, they expand the scope of solidarity beyond the closed community by centring on inclusion, but not doing away with exclusion. Also, they allow us to think about the forms in which new solidarities are possible. The conceptualisation of solidarity is then widened not only to capture existing expressions, but also to explain the potential for further development and evolution of solidarity in evolving contexts.

Valuing the strengths of non-relational accounts is an essential component of this work's argumentation. However, the pretension has not been to dismiss entirely other relational accounts. The consideration here is that the relational and non-relational accounts provide subtly different conceptual tools. Each corresponds better to diverse challenges. Notably, non-relational accounts open up the discussion of solidarity to a transnational level.

After analysing the concept of solidarity and concluding on the coherence of non-relational accounts, we have extended solidarity from an initial closed notion towards a transnational one. We have introduced an important modifier that extends solidarity as applicable in migration, transnational. The introduction of solidarity to transnationalism, has nevertheless required more conceptual precisions. Considering the particular risk of becoming particularly abstract and non-motivating, we have reviewed two forms of argumentation for transnational solidarity. We have reviewed universal and non-universal attempts to later focus on the most fecund approach to further understand solidarity in migration.

We have found that the non-universal approach is the most convenient one, not only because of its internal coherence, but because it is better tailored to help us understand actual manifestations of solidarity in real conditions. The non-universal approach considers actual relations as well as grounded expressions of solidarity that may occur in the real world. Universal strategies depend on either one or two universal motivations which are insufficient to explain actual solidarities at the transnational level. The first is the recognition of common universal rationality, one that is supposed

to motivate towards moral judgements and the attempt to establish bonds of solidarity. This is a rational foundation. The other is a generalised disposition to empathy that, on its own, remains too wide and does not explain how or why action might be triggered in certain cases but not on others. Whether based on one or both of the previous foundations, universal strategies fall short by providing an abstract understanding of solidarity that are unlikely to motivate to actual action in real-world conditions.

Another test we have devised to inquire on the adequacy of either strategies has been their response to conditions of solidarity. We have contrasted and merged the four conditions of solidarity by two different authors, Taylor's and Lenard's. The latter allows for a direct connection of the conditions of solidarity to a transnational setting. With some further specifications, we defined the four conditions of solidarity as shared values or goals, identification with a group, disposition to empathy and mutual trust. The non-universal account, in its response to conditions of solidarity, achieves a stronger conceptualisation. In particular, it introduces how group identification is possible beyond borders. It introduces a similar conclusion for sharing goals and values even without direct or pre-established relations. Empathy is more easily responded, considering that the disposition to empathy is a present but not sufficient condition. Finally, as we analysed, it presents the form in which mutual trust, strongly linked to vulnerability, is possible at a transnational level. The non-universal account, then, enables us to conceive solidarity as the possible establishment of solidary relations. It considers actual real conditions and the possibility to do so, without requiring nor providing a normative value that requires such establishment. In a descriptive sense, the non-universal strategy such as that developed by Carol Gould allows us to understand actual expressions of transnational solidarity. With some precisions and nuances, we conclude that non-universal strategies are more apt to understand solidarity in migration.

Transnational solidarity also presents two main concepts on which it is based: interconnectivity and vulnerability. Addressing the conditions of globalisation, interconnectivity explains new and intricate ways in which relations of solidarity become possible. Cross-borders interconnectivity is a real fact of today's world. New forms of direct and indirect interactions have precise impacts on those among networks of individuals or groups. Interconnectivity helps us realize the basic fact that these extended networks exist, thus influencing the possibilities for new relations of solidarity.

In parallel, given the cross-border interconnectivity, there are also extensive forms of vulnerability at play. Linked to exploitation and the capacity for self-determination of the individual, we have argued how vulnerability comes with interconnectivity. An interconnected world, in which actual new relations with others beyond borders are possible or existent, will also have a cross-border vulnerability that opens significant moral questions.

The deconstruction and reconstruction of the concept of solidarity has led to a particular understanding that is applicable to the discussion of international migration. At the end of this initial analytical segment that included the first chapter and a large portion of the second chapter, we achieved an open conceptualisation of solidarity. The leap from relational (more closed) solidarity to transnational solidarity is the result of exploring the core of solidarity and applying it to current challenges posed by migration. Both interconnectivity and its entailing cross-border vulnerability lead towards a stronger foundation and coherence of a non-universal transnational account of solidarity.

We have then put the conceptualisation of transnational solidarity to the test. First, transnational solidarity proved to be coherent to explain the case of solidarity across feminist movements across borders. Secondly, it provided a coherent account to the more intricate relations of solidarity that are being created in the European Mediterranean. We have performed an analysis of transnational solidarity and its conditions within this particular case. The result is the confirmation of a conceptualisation of solidarity that is at the same time grounded but open enough to expand to the complex interconnectivity of international migration.

The main conclusion from the second chapter is that it is coherent to apply the concept of solidarity to the discussion of migration. Particularly understood between as solidary relations between local agents and incoming immigrants (also respected as agents), transnational solidarity explains the coherence of applying solidarity in migration. Not only does it make sense to introduce solidarity in this new sense into the discussion of migration, it provides stronger conceptual tools than more limited accounts of solidarity. We have then responded to the first main question for this thesis.

The applicability and coherence addressed; we have moved into a normative argumentation which points towards further consideration of the now coherent transnational solidarity. In the third and final chapter, we argue for the importance that

such relations of solidarity have in liberal societies. Solidarity carries an important moral relevance. We had already described some features of morality while analysing its conditions on non-relational and transnational accounts and in transnational solidarity. Based on mutual trust and vulnerability, we have already argued for a certain morality of solidarity, even in non-relational accounts. It seems that solidarity not only contains a descriptive value, on which we focused the work on chapters 1 and 2. We also argue in favour of seriously taking into account such transnational forms of solidarity.

We made the case for the moral weight of transnational solidarity by introducing to some basic notions in John Rawls liberal egalitarianism. The relevance of moral agency for the foundation of justice in the original position became our point of departure. The moral agent is then at the basis of the organisation of a just society and the possibility for his further development is essential. Among basic rights and liberties that the moral agent has, we have found the freedom of association. Such freedom, certainly, includes both freedoms to exclude and to include. We have emphasised the notion of inclusion, even if in new and complex forms such as those better explained by transnational solidarity. The moral agent will then require a capacity to establish meaningful relations of solidarity, even with those external to the political community, for the full development of his moral agency. We found that freedom to include or exclude, to which solidarity is closely related, is not only relevant but an essential component to take into account.

We then introduced this initial argumentation into the debate of migration ethics. Considering the state of the discussion, we have pointed towards a renewed valuing of inclusion. Transnational solidarity reveals the importance that inclusion has for the development of moral agents in liberal societies. While the debate is often focused on the limits of exclusion and the rights of immigrants, we highlight a different perspective. The interest to include by those who attempt to establish relations of solidarity need further consideration. The weight that solidarity has for moral agency and its direct link to morality with others opens shows the relevance of a new perspective. The interests to include require then a more serious consideration in the debate.

We have highlighted a particular set of interests that needs to be further discussed. But, the interest to include is not all-powerful. Our argumentation simply indicates the importance of this set of interests, found and elevated in transnational solidarity. The

interest to include must still be weighed with other interests. In more specific cases of migration, conflicting interests arise. Among locals, both interests to include and to exclude require consideration. We have tried to provide the interest to include with a strengthened argumentation for it to be further considered in the debate of migration. The main objective has not been to prove that transnational solidarity and the interest to include that comes from it must reign. It must be more closely contrasted in the weighing of interests with the interest to exclude of states or fellow locals.

The discovery and re-discovery of solidarity amounts to new possibilities in the debate of migration. In the end, solidarity in migration provides a novel understanding of cross-border relations and new normative argumentations they make possible. At the same time, it allows for a redirection of the ethical discussion that not only opposes the rights to exclude and rights of immigrants. A new dimension of the debate might be possible and its further consequences and deriving arguments must be examined. Further arguments in favour or against inclusion must still be explored. Both academic and political debates will still need to further develop such arguments. In the meantime, we can at least envisage new forms in which the debate of migration integrates the significance of solidarity and its inclusionary features. Cases such as that of the criminalisation of solidarity expose the need to include other dimensions of the debate, taking into account the complex forms in which individuals and groups relate to each other and establish new forms of solidarity.

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