

The impact of Legislated Gender Quota Laws in gender political representation.

A comparative analysis of Bolivia and Chile, 1990-2017.

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Anna Beatryz Freire de Oliveira

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*“Eu vejo, e eu não estou só
Enxergo, contemplo
Almejo, e eu não estou só
Eu corro, e eu não estou só
Respiro, e eu não estou só
Eu canto e danço
A certeza que desata o nó
Sentindo que eu não estou só”
(Cigarras - Forfun)*

Abstract

This research aimed to analyse one institutional tool adopted to overcome the under- representation of women in politics, the Legislated Candidates Gender Quota Law. South America played a pioneer role, being the first continent where such measure was adopted, achieving the larger increase of the average women representation in national Parliaments ever-since. However, despite its very similar contexts, South American countries have displayed contrasted results. This research aimed to outline the factors that influence the adoption and enforcement of effective Gender Quota Laws, applying a comparative analysis method between two contrasted cases, Bolivia and Chile. Bolivia has adopted a law guarantying gender parity and gender alternation in all electoral lists for all national elections, leading to the first ever South American Lower House composed by more than a half of female members. Conversely, such law has been blocked until 2015 in Chile, where the proportion of seats held by women in the Lower House has never outpaced a fifth of the total number of seats.

Key words: Gender Quotas; Gender Equality ; South America ; Comparative studies ; Gender and Politics.

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Introduction

Gender equality and women empowerment is a major current challenge of our societies. Equality implies that human beings "enjoy the same rights, resources, opportunities and protections"¹. Still, "women and girls continue to suffer discrimination and violence in every part of the world"². Gender equality is a fundamental Human Right implied by the principles of the equality and non-discrimination, providing more peaceful, prosperous and sustainable societies³. As stated by Kofi Annan, "there is no tool for development more effective than the empowerment of women"⁴. Hence, gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls is among the seventeen United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals included in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development⁵, which aims to transform our society. Furthermore, local and international institutions have taken several actions to tackle the important challenge of gender equality worldwide.

Among all the distinct aspects that gender equality encompasses, the struggle for the reduction of the political under-representation of women is a recent matter, studied by various political scientists. There has always been a clear unbalance regarding gender representation in the political scene of all continents⁶. Nowadays, the average of National Parliaments seats held by women around the world is only 23%⁷, despite of all the efforts made to increase it. Gender-balanced political representation is expected to be beneficial to democracies, as it provides them better legitimacy⁸. Political institutions have thus introduced institutional responses to reduce this under-representation that has been shown to be slow without any measure taken⁹. One recent major achievement for women in politics is the Gender Quota Law, which has al-

¹UNICEF, *Promoting gender equality: an equity-focused approach to programing*.

²United Nations, *Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls..*

³*Id.*

⁴ANNAN, Kofi, Former Secretary General of the United Nations, speech for the Commission on the Status of Women in Beijing, 2005.

⁵United Nations, *The Sustainable Development Goals*.

⁶MURRAY, Rainbow. *Quotas for men: Reframing gender quotas as a means of improving representation for all.*, American political science review, 108(03), 520-532, 2014. pp. 520.

⁷Value for 2017, Inter-Parliamentary Union. *Women in National Parliaments*, <http://www.ipu.org>.

⁸HTUN, Mala N. *Women in political power in Latin America.*, Europe (OSCE countries), 16, 14-8, 2005. pp.1

⁹DAHLERUP, Drude *Increasing women's political representation: New trends in gender quotas.*, Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers, 141-153, 2005, pp.141

ready provided some noticeable results¹⁰. It has been implemented for the first time in the early 1990's, in Argentina and has been quickly spread worldwide. It is now a trendy institutional measure that has generated contrasted results in the different countries that have implemented it¹¹. Therefore, deepening the studies concerning Gender Quota Laws is relevant to analyse their effectiveness to later improve or propagate them.

The political science object of this *Master Thesis* will be focused on Gender and Politics, using a comparative method, in the continuity of a previous research started in 2016¹². Its main objective is to analyse the factors and actors that might influence the effectiveness of Legislated Gender Quota Laws. To do so, the geographical framework has been reduced to a paired comparison between two countries of South America, a pioneer continent concerning such law. Bolivia and Chile have been selected, as those countries share similar contexts but very different outcomes in terms of women political representation. The time framework will be the early 1990s, period of the apparition of the Gender Quota Law in South America, until 2017. The research question of the *Master Thesis* is the following: *Which factors favour or barrier the implementation of effective Legislated Gender Quota Laws and their relative success or relative failure in terms of the increase of the number of women Parliamentary Representation in Bolivia and Chile?*.

This research will be divided in four sections. The first one will provide a general framing concerning gender quotas based on the available literature, leading to the definition of the research question. The second section will present the theoretical framework, including the hypotheses raised as potential responses to the research question, along with the methodology and the theoretical concepts that will be used. The three selected hypotheses concern the influence of the previous women mobilization, the influence of the political elite and the influence of the public opinion on the outcomes of the Gender Quota law. The third section will discuss the spatio-temporal context of the research, providing a background concerning the studied countries that will be used as a basis for the last section, which will provide the empirical development that aims to corroborate or falsify the hypotheses raised.

¹⁰*Id.* 145.

¹¹*Id.* 146.

¹²FREIRE DE OLIVEIRA, Anna Beatryz, *Impact of Legislated Gender Quota Laws in gender political representation. A comparative analysis of Argentina and Brazil, 1991-2016.*, TFE 2015-2016.

1. General framing about Gender Quotas

This first section will present a general review of the available literature concerning gender quotas, including their history, the reasons behind their introduction, and the discussions about their legitimacy and their effectiveness. The studied case of South America will be developed, highlighting the contrast between the different countries' gender quotas and women political representation rates. This section will also present the observations and the reasoning that led to the final research question.

1.1 Gender Quotas

Equality is a central idea of modern democracies; It aims to guarantee the same rights for all citizens¹. Through history, societies have been divided in social, racial or gender groups, which political systems did not equally treat. In democracies, for instance, "women have been deliberately excluded from political power and participation"², as they did not have the right to vote or be candidates. Women and feminist groups struggled and fought for the women's suffrage and have continued to claim equal political rights. Still, it appears that equality in terms of rights may not be sufficient to overcome the historically inherited force of the dominating elite group³. In practice, the latter has systematically enjoyed a larger access to the decision-making process. Although all citizens vote, elections tend to result in a systematic elite's over-representation. For instance, most of worldwide Assemblies and Parliaments are composed of white upper-middle class men⁴. Hence, politics of redistribution have been introduced in order to decrease those inequalities, such as Legislated Gender Quota Laws, the ones studied by this research.

¹DIAZ, Mercedes Mateo. *Representing women?: female legislators in West European parliaments*. ECPR press, 2005, pp.1

²DESPOSATO, Scott, & NORRANDER, Barbara, *The gender gap in Latin America: Contextual and individual influences on gender and political participation*. British journal of political science, 39(1), 141-162, 2009, pp.141.

³Mercedes Mateo DIAZ (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.1

⁴*Id.* 14

1.1.1 Generalities concerning Gender Quotas

What does Legislated Gender Quota Laws stand for? First, they are **laws**, meaning that they are mandatory, and their non-respect may lead to sanctions. They emerge from national legislative bodies and are, thus, **legislated**. Besides, **Quotas** mandates the inclusion of a minimum and/or maximum threshold of a group of persons in a body (a party list or a Parliament, for instance). It is a term that raises debates and has generally a negative connotation⁵. The studied quota concerns **gender**, stipulating that neither gender should represent more, or less, than a given percentage of the members of the body members (for instance, more than 70% and less than 30%). Note that "gender is not a synonym for women"⁶. Although gender quotas introduction aimed to boost women political representation, the term "gender" in Gender Quota Laws transmits a crucial notion of equity to counter the beliefs that these are discriminatory policies against men⁷. Moreover, these laws are directed toward both genders, as it also aims to limit the over-representation of men⁸. This research will focus on the reduction of the under-representation of women and its benefits. Yet, researchers can also focus on the over-representation of men and its negative effects⁹.

Gender quotas introduction has aimed to counter an alarming observation of a considerable gender unbalance in the political sphere. Women compose more than half of the world population, yet, the average of National Parliaments seats occupied by them has never reached 25%, representing "a threat to democracy, political equality, and justice"¹⁰. Women's suffrage did not crumble all the barriers that women still must overcome in their political careers. The number of female politicians who have governed their country is much lower than the number of men who have occupied the same position. The first women to ever assume the role of President was Isabel Martínez de Perón, in Argentina (1974-1976)¹¹. However, she was not elected, she replaced her husband after his death¹². Nevertheless, in 2008, Rwanda became the first country

⁵KROOK, Mona Lena, *Electoral Gender Quotas A Conceptual Analysis.*, Comparative Political Studies, 47(9), 1268-1293, 2013, pp.1271

⁶CARVER, Terrell, *Gender Is Not a Synonym for Women.* Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996.

⁷Drude DAHLERUP (2005), *op.cit.* pp.142

⁸Rainbow MURRAY (2014), *op.cit.* pp.520

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰Mala N. HTUN (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.1

¹¹Encyclopædia Britannica, *Isabel Perón.*

¹²GRAY, Tricia, *Electoral gender quotas: lessons from Argentina and Chile.*, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 22(1), 52-78, 2003, pp.57.

to reach more than 50% of women in its Lower House¹³.

Gender quotas have appeared as instruments to facilitate the reduction of the women under-representation in politics, principally implemented at national levels, for Parliamentary elections. Originally, the idea appeared in Northern Europe in the 1970s¹⁴, where some parties have adopted voluntary gender quotas, under the pressure of feminist and women groups¹⁵. Before the 1990s, no Gender Quota Law mandating national political parties to include a minimal number of each gender to their lists existed. The first one appeared in 1991 in Argentina, with the *Ley de Cupos*¹⁶. Ever since, Legislated Gender Quota Laws have widespread around the globe, even in countries "where women historically have been almost totally excluded from politics", such as in the Middle East, for instance¹⁷. It has become a very popular and "common policy tool" to promote women in politics¹⁸. Various international organizations strongly recommend the introduction of Gender Quota Laws, including the United Nations¹⁹

Distinct types of Legislated Gender Quota Laws exist. The Legislated Candidate Quota Law is the most implemented one²⁰. It stipulates that a certain percentage/number of each party candidates registered for an election must be women. Its goal is to increase women's chances of election. It's inspiration comes from the previously cited parties' voluntary gender quotas. The second main type is the Reserved Seats Law. It stipulates that women must hold a minimum percentage or number of seats, reaching directly its goal: the growth of the number of women in Parliaments. Furthermore, some countries are forward-thinking, and have added their Gender Quota Law in their Constitution. Finally, gender quotas have been spread to other spheres than the political one²¹.

¹³Inter- Parliamentary Union, *Women in National Parliaments*, <http://www.ipu.org>.

¹⁴PANDE, Rohini & FORD, Deanna, *Gender Quotas and Female Leadership: A Review.*, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2011, pp.8

¹⁵HUGHES, Melanie M., KROOK, Mona Lena, & PAXTON, Pamela, *Transnational women's activism and the global diffusion of gender quotas.*, *International Studies Quarterly*, 59(2), 357-372, 2015, pp.359.

¹⁶JONES, Mark P., *Increasing women's representation via gender quotas: The Argentine Ley de Cupos.*, *Women & Politics*, 16(4), 75-98, 1996, pp.76, and Rohini PANDE & Deanna FORD (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.9

¹⁷Drude DAHLERUP (2005), *op.cit.* pp.143

¹⁸MEIER, Petra, & LOMBARDO, Emanuela, *Gender quotas, gender mainstreaming and gender relations in politics.* *Political Science*, 65(1), 46-62, 2013, pp.47.

¹⁹FRANCESCHET, Susan, KROOK, Mona Lena, & PISCOPO, Jenifer M., *The impact of gender quotas: A research agenda.*, Midwest Political Science Association National Conference paper, 2009, pp.7.

²⁰DAHLERUP, Drude, *Comparative studies of electoral gender quotas.*, Lima, Peru, 2003, pp.3

²¹ZILLMAN, Claire, *The EU Is Taking a Drastic Step to Put More Women on Corporate Boards*, *Fortune*, 2017

1.1.2 Legitimacy of Gender Quotas

There is an ongoing debate concerning Gender Quotas Laws. On one hand, opponents to gender quotas claim that it is an unfair and undemocratic measure. In their perspective, gender quotas are against the principle of equality, understood as "equal opportunity" or "competitive equality"²², in which all candidates are in competition and should start with equal chances. A candidates' program, ideas, implication and qualification should be the most prominent features noted by the voters, not its gender. Opponents also claim that there are "not enough women (...) qualified or willing to fill decision-making roles"²³. Consequently, it can generate tensions, competition and conflicts inside parties, as some men will have to give away their vacancies in order to introduce women into the party list. Gender quotas may also bring unintended impacts, as stigmatization, competition between women's candidates or division of women's groups²⁴.

On the other hand, supporters of gender quotas tend to defend another vision of the concept of equality. Supporters claim that this ideal "equal opportunity" does not exist, as some social groups have privileged access to information, support, training or resources. Instead, they defend the equality understood as "equality of results" and claim that gender quotas are rightful as there are "unequal opportunities" presented in our society²⁵. This idea is highlighted in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 23:

*Equality between men and women. Equality between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay. The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex.*²⁶

For supporters, "equality as a goal cannot be reached by formal equal treatment as a means"²⁷. Thus, Quotas are presented as tools to lower the difficulties that undergo women in politics. Women have been historically "downgraded and minimized in a male-dominated political sys-

²²DAHLEUP, Drude, & FREIDENVALL, Lenita, *Quotas as a Fast Track to Equal Political Representation for Women*. In IPSA World Congress in Durban, South Africa, June, 2003, pp.30.

²³Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.55

²⁴Drude DAHLEUP (2005), *op.cit.* pp.143

²⁵Drude DAHLEUP & Lenita FREIDENVALL, *op.cit.*, pp.30-31.

²⁶*Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union*, Official Journal of the European Communities, 2000, pp.13.

²⁷Drude DAHLEUP (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.145

tem" and still suffer from sexism or negative public opinion²⁸. It has been noted that women are willing to enter in politics and are as qualified as men are²⁹. However, the political world access is held by political parties that have long been a "male institution". Gender Quota Laws appeared to ease the women access to political parties. For instance, some very qualified women that once felt isolated and powerless have obtained higher influence due to the law and the increase of other women around them³⁰. Furthermore, women brought in politics by quotas may later influence other women willing to defend their ideas³¹. It has also been argued that the introduction of women in party lists do not decrease the voters' choice, as they can still vote for men.

Higher women political representation, which may be reached using gender quotas, and the evolution of the society are expected to lead to a general reduction of gender inequalities. With this long-term perspective, quotas may become unnecessary and vanish³². Quotas aim to be temporary implemented tools that accelerate the process of re-balancing the access to politics. Its plan is to reach equality understood as "equal opportunity", using temporary unequal treatment of the candidates³³.

Moreover, some supporters claim that the growth of the women representation is not only a question of fairness but is beneficial for democracies and our society, as "women's experiences are needed in political life"³⁴. The gender equality in political participation and representation increases the degree of political inclusiveness and pluralism of a democracy, providing more legitimacy³⁵. Likewise, it provides more opportunities for women to defend their interests or introduce new matters into political discussions³⁶, favouring the promotion of gender equality in the society³⁷. Furthermore, "women assuming more powerful decision-making roles can increase a country's human development as well as create a system better suited to further

²⁸*Id.* 144

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰*Id.* 149

³¹Drude DAHLERUP (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.7.

³²ALBERCA, Luján, & FERNANDO, José, *Princípio da igualdade e política de cotas na universidade.*, 2011, pp.17.

³³Mercedes Mateo DIAZ (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.19

³⁴The Quota Project, *Global database of quotas for women*, quotaproject.org.

³⁵Mercedes Mateo DIAZ (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.13

³⁶MANSBRIDGE, Jane, *Should blacks represent blacks and women represent women? A contingent "yes".*, *The Journal of politics*, 61(3), 628-657, 1999.

³⁷SCHWINDT-BAYER, Leslie, *Gender Quotas and Women's Political Participation in Latin America*. Americas Barometer, Small Grants and Data Award Recipients, 2011, pp.2.

empower women"³⁸. Note that the concept of "parity" has also been used to defend gender quotas³⁹. It asserts that the society is dual, made of men and women, both gender being required in all spheres of the society.

The gender quota debate is included in the general discussion concerning the importance of political representation in democracies. In the liberal democracy perspective, everyone can represent everyone⁴⁰. Citizens elect representative agents, independently of their belonging to any social group. Yet, can members of the elite fully stand for marginalized groups? Some authors have claimed that social groups have special needs and interests to defend, while representative agents share perspectives and interests with the groups they originated from⁴¹. In this perspective, political representation of social groups is required to promote their own interests and be fully understood. Distinct types of quotas exist in politics, such as geographical-based, linguistic or ethnic, and they are "usually not considered as controversial as gender quotas"⁴². However, if population commonly agrees with the importance of equal participation of women in politics (women's vote), many disagrees with the importance of their equal representation. In fact, women do not easily appear as a group, neither they easily stand up as a group, as claimed by DE BEAUVOIR:

*Women do not say 'We', except at some congress of feminists or similar formal demonstration; men say 'women', and women use the same word in referring to themselves. They do not authentically assume a subjective attitude.*⁴³

This research does not aim to argue in favour or against Gender Quota Law. The objective is to analyse their effectiveness as implemented laws to increase women representation in Parliaments around the world.

³⁸ANANTH, Ameya S., *Beyond the Ley de Cupos: The Variation in Gender Empowerment between Argentina and Chile*, 2009, pp.4.

³⁹Mercedes Mateo DIAZ (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.21

⁴⁰*Id.* 14

⁴¹*Ibid.*

⁴²Drude DAHLERUP (2003), *op.cit.* pp.3.

⁴³DE BEAUVOIR, Simone, *Le deuxième sexe.*, 2 vols. Paris. Gallimard, 1949.

1.1.3 Effectiveness of Gender Quotas

In some countries, Legislated Gender Quotas Laws have managed to remarkably improve the women political inclusion in the political decision-making process⁴⁴. Figure 1.1 illustrates this statement. It compares the evolution of the world's average percentage of seats held by women in national Parliaments (in blue) with the evolution of the number of countries that have implemented the two main types of Gender Quota Laws (in red). One can observe that the number of countries with those laws have constantly increased since the 1990s. Similarly, the world's average proportion of seats held by women in national Parliaments started to grow in the late 1990s, when Gender Quota Laws started to be applied. Thus, it may imply a potential relation between the two tendencies.




Figure 1.1 – Evolution of the world's average proportion of seats held by women in national Parliaments (in blue) compared with the evolution of the number of countries that have implemented a Gender Quota Law (in red). Data from The World Bank, *Proportion of seats held by women in National Parliaments (%)*, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS> and International IDEA, *Gedner Quotas Database* idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/quotas.

To discuss the effectiveness of the distinct types of implemented Gender Quota Laws that have been implemented, DIAZ separated them in four categories, taking into consideration their substantive and formal aspects⁴⁵. Concerning the substantive aspects, the quotas were separated into direct regulations on the Parliament seats and indirect regulations (through party list quotas). Concerning the formal aspects, they were separated into binding laws and unbinding recommendations or voluntary quotas. The results found for each category are gathered in

⁴⁴KROOK, Mona Lena, *Quotas for women in politics: Gender and candidate selection reform worldwide.*, Oxford University Press, USA, 2009.

⁴⁵Mercedes Mateo DIAZ (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.26

Table 1.1. In practice, it appears that voluntary candidates' quotas fail to increase the women political representation in national Parliaments. In fact, parties are free to place women at less winnable positions, and to respect or not their voluntary gender quotas. In contrast, Legislated Reserved Seats Laws lead to an immediate increase of women political participation, as the law secures a minimum percentage of the national Parliament seats reserved for them. Moreover, it favours their ascension in political parties that need to include women to fill the reserved seats. It appears to lead to a genuine change in attitudes about female leaders⁴⁶.

Table 1.1 – Effects of the substantive and formal aspects of the quota mechanisms on its success. Adapted from Mercedes Mateo DIAZ (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.26.

		Formal aspects	
		Voluntary or recommendation	Binding legislation
Substantive aspects	Party lists regulation	Failure in practice	Failure if no external pressures
	Parliament seats regulation	Failure if no external pressures	Successful outcomes

However, most of the countries that adopted a binding quota opted for a Legislated Candidate Quota Law⁴⁷, as it was illustrated in Figure 1.1. This type of quota is expected to fail without external pressure (see Table 1.1). It does not give guarantees of election to the women added in the party list. Therefore, it can be unsuccessful if voters are reluctant to vote for women or if the political elite try to bypass them, by adding women in parties' list whom have no real chance to be elected. Their effectiveness depends on the conjunction of the selected threshold of the quota, the enforcement mechanisms such as placement mandate⁴⁸, the presence of strong sanctions, along with the cultural, social, economic, political and electoral context of the country⁴⁹. Hence, international comparative studies are needed to highlight those factors impacting the effectiveness of Legislated Gender Candidate Quota Laws.

The analysis of the effectiveness of Gender Quota Laws may be quantitative, in terms of the growth of the women political representation, or qualitative, beyond the numbers. In this

⁴⁶Rohini PANDE & Deanna FORD (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.26

⁴⁷*Id.* 8

⁴⁸Drude DAHLERUP (2005), *op.cit.* pp.150.

⁴⁹Rohini PANDE & Deanna FORD (2011), *op.cit.*

research, their effectiveness will be analysed by considering net increase of women elected in national Parliaments, as it is the first objective of their introduction. However, one must keep in mind that "the consequences of quotas should also be studied in qualitative terms, looking into the intended and unintended ramifications"⁵⁰. Other studies have focused on their effectiveness understood as the increase of women's influence on the political decision-making process⁵¹. Quotas may help to include more women in politics, however, they do not include any regulation concerning their empowerment⁵² or their influence in Parliaments. Elected women can be isolated, bypassed by the majority of men⁵³, and may have only a symbolic presence. In fact, quotas cannot solve women empowerment deficiency alone, as they "do not remove all of the other barriers to full female citizenship"⁵⁴. They "must be complemented with necessary socio-economic changes in society at large" to improve women empowerment in a long-term scope⁵⁵.

1.2 Observations in South America

Due to the limit of time and resources available for this research, the geographical framework was shortened to South America, which is an interesting region to study Gender Quota Laws. This subsection will present the reasons why this continent is relevant for gender quota studies, along with the different quota laws implemented in South America and their results.

1.2.1 The selection of South America

The first reason to focus on South America is its pioneer role concerning Legislated Gender Quota Laws⁵⁶. As mentioned previously, in 1991, Argentina became the first country of the world to implement a Legislated Candidate Quota Law⁵⁷, and the first one to apply it to national elections in 1993⁵⁸. Then, the concept rapidly propagated in the continent during the late 1990s.

⁵⁰Drude DAHLERUP (2003), *op.cit.* pp.1

⁵¹CLAYTON, Amanda, *Women's political engagement under quota-mandated female representation: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment.*, Comparative Political Studies, 48(3), 333-369, 2015, and FRANCESCHET, KROOK & PISCOPO, *The impact of gender quotas.*, Oxford University Press, 2012.

⁵²The "ability to act and to prevent action" (Drude DAHLERUP (2003), *op.cit.* pp.2).

⁵³Drude DAHLERUP (2005), *op.cit.* pp.149

⁵⁴Drude DAHLERUP (2003), *op.cit.* pp.9

⁵⁵Drude DAHLERUP (2005), *op.cit.* pp.152

⁵⁶ZETTERBERG, Pär. *Do gender quotas foster women's political engagement? Lessons from Latin America.* Political Research Quarterly, 62(4), 715-730, 2009, pp.717.

⁵⁷Rohini PANDE & Deanna FORD (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.9, Leslie SCHWINDT-BAYER (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.2

⁵⁸Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.39.

As presented in Table 1.2, more than half of the South American countries have implemented their law before the end of 1997. Furthermore, until 1999, South America hosted more than half of the countries that have adopted a Legislated Candidate Quota Law⁵⁹. Recently, Uruguay and Colombia implemented Gender Quota Laws in 2008 and 2011 respectively, while in 2015, the Chilean Congress approved a Candidate Quota Law of 40%⁶⁰. Note that all countries have opted for a Legislated Candidate Quota Law.

Table 1.2 – Type, adoption year and results of Gender Quota Laws in South American countries. LCQ stands for Legislated Candidate Quota. Data from Quota Project, quotaproject.org, Inter Parliament Union, www.ipu.org/, Political Database of the Americas, <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/>, Leslie SCHWINDT-BAYER (2015), *op.cit.* and Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.36.

Countries	Type of gender quota law	Adoption years	Results before the laws (election year)	Results in January 2017
Bolivia	LCQ (50%)	1997	6.9% (1993)	53.1%
Ecuador	LCQ (50%)	1997	3.7% (1996)	41.6%
Argentina	LCQ (30%)	1991	5% (1991)	38.9%
Guyana	LCQ (33%)	2000	18.5% (1997)	31.9%
Peru	LCQ (30%)	1997	10.8% (1995)	27.7%
Suriname	-	-	-	25.5%
Venezuela	-	1997 (dropped in 2000)	-	22.2%
Uruguay	LCQ (33%)	2008	12.1% (2004)	20.2%
Colombia	LCQ (30%)	2011	12.7% (2010)	18.7%
Chile	LCQ (40%)	2015 (not applied yet)	-	15.8%
Paraguay	LCQ (20%)	1996	2.5% (1993)	13.8%
Brazil	LCQ (30%)	1997	6.6% (1994)	10.7%

Moreover, the implementation of Gender Quota Laws is an important regional phenomenon in South America⁶¹. This is illustrated in Figure 1.2, which depicts the geographical distribution of gender quotas in 2015. One can observe that South America is the continent where this mechanism is currently the most applied. With the recent addition of Chile (2015), all its countries but Venezuela and Suriname have a Gender Quota Law.

A second reason concerns the sexist and patriarchal culture of South America, inherited from the Catholicism brought by Spanish and Portuguese colons⁶². Women have been histor-

⁵⁹The Quota Project, *Global database of quotas for women*, quotaproject.org.

⁶⁰SCHWINDT-BAYER, Leslie, *Chile's Gender Quota: Will It Work?*, 2015, pp.3 and pp.6

⁶¹Leslie SCHWINDT-BAYER (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.1

⁶²JELIN, Elizabeth, *Women and Social Change in Latin America*, London: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1991, pp.4. and Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.19.




Figure 1.2 – Geographical distribution of gender quotas in 2015. Adapted from NORRIS, Pippa, & DAHLERUP, Drude, *On the Fast Track: The Spread of Gender Quota Policies for Elected Office.*, 2015, pp.27.

ically excluded from educational system, politics and labour forces⁶³. Women political representation before the introduction of a Gender Quota Law in each country was very low (below 20%), as it was shown in Table 1.2. However, the recent decades have been marked by "great progress towards equality with men, especially in schools, workplaces and politics"⁶⁴. A rapport published by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, presenting statistics concerning gender representation in world's Parliaments, highlighted the considerable boost of women opportunities and representation in Latin America⁶⁵. In addition, several women have been elected as President, such as Janet Jagan, (Guyana, 1997-1999), Michelle Bachelet (Chile, 2006-2010 and 2014-2017), Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (Argentina, 2007-2015) and Dilma Rousseff (Brazil, 2011-2016)⁶⁶.

A last reason to study this continent concerns the contrasted degree of success of the Gender Quota Laws implemented, as shown in Table 1.2. In 2017, the women representation in Lower Houses vary from 53.1% in Bolivia to 10.7% in Brazil. Moreover, Bolivia and Ecuador have implemented Legislated Candidate Quotas with a threshold of 50%, while Suriname and

⁶³CLARCK, Roger, RAMSBY, Thomas W. , & ADLER, Emily Stier, *Culture, gender, and labour force participation: A cross-national study.*, Gender and Society, 47-66, 1991, pp.52.

⁶⁴The economist, *Wonder women and macho men*, 2015.

⁶⁵Inter-Parliamentary Union, *Women in Parliament: 20 years in review.*, 2014, pp.4.

⁶⁶Some other women have also reached the head of their state but it was temporary and not based on elections.

Venezuela have no Gender Quota Law yet. This contrast of results can be used to perform comparative studies concerning the effectiveness of Gender Quota Laws.

1.2.2 The results of South American Gender Quota Laws

Based on the data presented in Table 1.2, Figure 1.3 was created to better illustrate the current results of South America. It depicts the women political representation in 2017 of each country reported with respect to the threshold of the Legislated Candidates Quota Law (Chile's quota has been put to zero as it has not been used during the considered temporal framework of this research). First, it illustrates the large contrast of the results and the quota thresholds. Second, one can observe that a high women political representation can be correlated to the strength of Gender Quota Laws. This is highlighted by the dashed line, showing the correlation between women representation in Lower Houses and the Gender Quota Law thresholds. In overall, the laws appear to be effective in this continent, as larger quota leads to higher women representation.




Figure 1.3 – Correlation between the threshold of the gender quota implemented and the women representation in South America. The dashed line represents the tendency line.

On the top-right of Figure 1.3, one can find Bolivia and Ecuador. These two countries have implemented Gender Quota Laws of 50%, yielding the highest women representation in Parliaments of South America. In particular, Bolivia has become the first South American country to have more than half of its Lower House members being women. A high women representation

is also found in Argentina, which was the first country to ever implement a Gender Quota Law. Conversely, on the bottom-left of the figure, one can find the countries that have currently no Gender Quota Law applied (Suriname, Venezuela and Chile). None of them exhibits a women representation higher than 30%. In addition, the countries that implemented a law not long ago (Colombia and Uruguay) and the countries with small quota threshold (Paraguay) exhibit low women political representation in their Parliaments.

The Brazilian case is particular, as discussed in the previous research⁶⁷. The country introduced a law with a threshold of 30% in 1997. Still, the women representation has continued to be very low, and presents currently the worst results of South American Parliaments. This case reveals the importance of strong sanctions and enforcement mechanisms to guarantee effective Gender Quota Laws. It has been argued that "whether a quota system meets its objective depends largely on the process and method of implementation and enforcement"⁶⁸. In particular, the addition of placement mandate, forcing political parties to insert women in sufficient high positions of their lists, has been found to be essential. Brazilian law does not include any placement mandate and it exhibits the weaker enforcement and sanction mechanism of South America⁶⁹. In contrast, Bolivia, Ecuador and Argentina all combine strong Gender Quota Law, placement mandate and strong enforcement mechanism, producing successful results.

Furthermore, the success of Gender Quota Laws is also influenced by the political and electoral system of the country⁷⁰ that determines how parties and voters can influence the elections. For instance, closed list proportional representation systems (Argentinian case) are known to be more effective than open list ones (Brazilian case), while combined with quota⁷¹.

⁶⁷ Anna Beatryz FREIRE DE OLIVEIRA (2016), *op.cit.*

⁶⁸ Drude DAHLERUP (2005), *op.cit.* pp.150

⁶⁹ Leslie SCHWINDT-BAYER (2015), *op.cit.*, pp.9.

⁷⁰ HTUN, Mala N., & JONES, Mark P., *Engendering the right to participate in decision-making: electoral quotas and women's leadership in Latin America.*, Gender and the politics of rights and democracy in Latin America. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 32-56, 2002, pp.36.

⁷¹ JONES, Mark P., *Gender quotas, electoral laws, and the election of women: Evidence from the Latin American vanguard.*, Comparative Political Studies, 42(1), 56-81, 2009, pp.56.

1.3 Research question

1.3.1 Most similar system design

In order to extract some factors that influence the effectiveness of Legislated Gender Quota Laws, this research will use a paired comparison method, which allows to deepen into the specificities of the selected cases⁷². Due to the cases reduction, their adequate selection will determine the future research findings. Thus, to control the cases selection, it has been chosen to use the Most Similar System Design (MSSD). This method consists in comparing two cases that share similar contexts but present different outcomes, focusing on a few key differences that may justify their contrasted outcomes⁷³.

On one hand, two countries that have similar political and electoral systems, along with comparable social, economical and cultural contexts, have to be selected. The reduction of the spatial framework to South America guarantees the similitude of cases contexts, as there are inherent similarities within a region⁷⁴. South American countries share a common history, languages, religion and culture. Moreover, they all share the same basis of the presidential political system⁷⁵. Their political and electoral systems are presented in Table 1.3. As discussed before, it has influences on the outcomes of the Gender Quota Laws. Therefore, two cases with similar political and electoral systems will be seek for this research.

On the other hand, the two cases must display extreme outcomes. As discussed previously, the continent exhibits contrasted results, and is thus suited for the MSSD method. The comparison will concern a country with a relatively strong quota that have shown relatively successful outcomes with another country having a relatively weak quota (or no Gender Quota Law) and with relatively poor women representation in its Lower House. The objective is to understand why some countries have implemented strong and successful quotas, well enforced, while others still do not have any Gender Quota Law or have weak and unsuccessful ones. Returning the attention to Figure 1.3, it finally corresponds to a country from the upper-right and one from the lower-left.

⁷²LANDMAN, Todd, *Issues and method in Comparative Politics. An introduction.*, third edition, 2008, pp.28.

⁷³TARROW, Sidney, *The strategy of paired comparison: toward a theory of practice.*, Comparative political studies, 43(2), 230-259, 2010, pp234.

⁷⁴Todd LANDMAN (2008), *op.cit.*, pp.71.

⁷⁵JONES, Mark P., *A Guide to the Electoral Systems of the Americas*. Electoral Studies, 14(1), 5-21, 1995.

Table 1.3 – Political and electoral systems of South American countries. Information from Leslie SCHWINDT-BAYER (2015), *op.cit.*, pp.9, and Political Database of the Americas, <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/>.

Countries	Political Systems			Electoral systems
Argentina	Federal	Presidential Constitutional Republic	Bicameral	Close list
Bolivia	Unitary	Presidential Constitutional Republic	Bicameral	Mixed
Brazil	Federal	Presidential Constitutional Republic	Bicameral	Open list
Chile	Unitary	Presidential Constitutional Republic	Bicameral	Open list
Colombia	Unitary	Presidential Constitutional Republic	Bicameral	Close list
Ecuador	Unitary	Presidential Constitutional Republic	Unicameral	Mixed
Guyana	Unitary	Presidential Constitutional Republic	Unicameral	Close list
Paraguay	Unitary	Presidential Constitutional Republic	Bicameral	Close list
Peru	Unitary	Presidential Constitutional Republic	Unicameral	Open list
Suriname	Unitary	Parliamentary Constitutional Republic	Unicameral	Open list
Uruguay	Unitary	Presidential Constitutional Republic	Bicameral	Close list
Venezuela	Federal	Presidential Constitutional Republic	Unicameral	Mixed

1.3.2 Definition of the research question

Based on those two selection criteria, the case of Bolivia and Chile have been chosen for this research. Bolivia first implemented a Legislated Gender Candidate Quota Law with a threshold of 33%, before increasing it to 50% with gender alternation in 2010⁷⁶. Moreover, the country presents strong enforcement and sanction mechanisms, along with the best Women Parliamentary representation of South America in 2017⁷⁷. In contrast, the Chilean women representation in its Lower House is relatively low and no Gender Quota Law existed before 2015. The law passed the Congress only in 2015, while a quota project was at stake since the 1990s⁷⁸. Therefore, this case allows the analysis of the factors and actors that have blocked the quota law until 2015. Furthermore, Bolivia and Chile are both Andean States and share a boundary, which favours contextual similarities due to space proximity⁷⁹. They also have similar political systems, as shown in Table 1.3, except on their Lower House electoral systems.

Finally, the research question is the following: *Which factors favour or barrier the implementation of effective Legislated Gender Quota Laws and their relative success or relative failure in terms of the increase of the number of women Parliamentary Representation in Bolivia and Chile?*

⁷⁶The Quota Project, *Global database of quotas for women*, quotaproject.org.

⁷⁷Leslie SCHWINDT-BAYER (2015), *op.cit.*, pp.9.

⁷⁸Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.68.

⁷⁹Todd LANDMAN (2008), *op.cit.*, pp.71.

2. Theoretical framework

This section will present the theoretical framework of the research. Three hypotheses have been selected as potential explanations of the research question previously raised. In a first subsection, their choice and their sequence will be justified. In a second subsection, the methodology of the analysis will be presented, discussing how the hypotheses will be later tested, and how the information and the data will be acquired.

2.1 Selected hypotheses

The number of hypotheses have been limited for the same reasons that justified the geographical framework reduction of the research. The use of the MSSD method, in which the chosen cases contexts are very similar, allows the focus on few key factors that may explain the contrasted outcomes. This research will centre the attention on the principal actors who may affect the process of Gender Quota Laws introduction, implementation, enforcement and support in Bolivia and Chile. As claimed by KROOK, it is relevant to analyse "the actors who support and oppose quotas and their respective roles with regard to quota implementation"¹.

The first selected actor is the women mobilization regarding women rights and gender quotas (H1). This mobilization is the spark, without which reformative measures such as gender quotas are unlikely to appear. The second selected actor is the elite that has a privileged access to the decision-making process (H2). Elite may oppose or support the quota introduction. They are the ones who select the candidates, and the ones who must respect the quotas. Finally, The last selected actor is the population that vote for candidates (H3). The voters are the ones who elect, or not, the women candidates. Other factors may explain the Bolivian and Chilean outcomes, however, they will not be considered in this research.

¹ Mona Lena KROOK (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.12.

2.1.1 Influence of the women and feminist mobilization (H1)

The first selected hypothesis concerns the influence of women and feminist mobilization on the implementation and enforcement of Legislated Gender Quota Laws. During the 20th Century, feminist movements have struggled, achieving important improvements concerning their rights and empowerment, such as the women's suffrage or the Gender Quota Law. mobilization usually results from contested cultural elements². For instance, feminist claims oppose to traditional expectations about the women behaviour within society. As women mobilization is behind all the improvements of the women status, it will be the first actor studied.

Women and feminist movements may have a considerable influence on the introduction and the successful implementation of Gender Quota Laws. It has been argued that the effectiveness of a quota strongly depends on its introduction process³. DAHLERUP noticed that "quotas that rest on a previous mobilization and integration of women into all parts of society have a better chance of success than those without this precondition"⁴. In particular, the role of women groups during important political moments, as the fight against Military Regimes or the democracy establishment, have influenced their political participation in the new system⁵. For instance, strong women activism during the transition to democracy in Argentina resulted in the creation of the first ever Legislated Gender Quota Law. Moreover, women mobilization engenders female political figures, inspiring models, and awareness concerning the importance of gender representation in politics.

Bolivian and/or Chilean Gender Quota Laws may have been introduced based on cross-country inspiration or international organization recommendations, instead of local women groups mobilization⁶. Indeed, during the second half of the 1990s, South American countries have been influenced by the Argentinian feminist militants⁷ and the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing, encouraging affirmative actions to ensure the women access to politics⁸. It resulted in a large spread of the concept of Gender Quota Law. However, Gender

²Mercedes Mateo DIAZ (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.20.

³Drude DAHLERUP (2005), *op.cit.* pp.150.

⁴Drude DAHLERUP (2003), *op.cit.* pp.9.

⁵Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*

⁶Drude DAHLERUP (2003), *op.cit.* pp.4.

⁷KROOK, Mona Lena, *Reforming representation: The diffusion of candidate gender quotas worldwide*. Politics & Gender, 2(03), 303-327, 2006, pp.316.

⁸Mala N. HTUN (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.8.

Quota Laws that do not rest on a national strong women mobilization are less likely to be well enforced and successful.

Finally, this first hypothesis assumes that *a large mobilization of feminist and women groups generate positive experiences for women to stand out politically, favouring the implementation of effective Gender Quota Laws. In contrast, its absence reduces the likeliness of the implementation of successful laws.* The mobilization of the feminist movements, the women emancipation and empowerment, the debates and the public information in the process of the quota introduction is expected to be more important in Bolivia than in Chile. It may explain the implementation and enforcement of the Gender Quota Law in Bolivia and its current women representation higher than 50%, while Chile's women mobilization was unable to achieve such success.

2.1.2 Elite support to quotas and reforms (H2)

The second selected hypothesis concerns the hypothetical influence of the elite's influence on Gender Quota Law implementation and effectiveness. The elite is defined as a governing minority that has a privileged access to the decision-making process. It gathers personalities, political party leaders, political and judicial figures, influential personalities, religious leaders, big company owners, among others. In South America, men have historically dominated the elite. It may support the implementation of effective Gender Quota Laws and the promotion of women in politics, or it can be more conservative and try barrier its implementation or bypass its effect. This may explain why the proposal of a quota law has been blocked in Chile until recently.

Notably, political parties and party leaders have a very important role⁹. They are the ones who propose and promote candidates for national elections, and the ones who must respect the Gender Quota Law. Women political representation cannot be reached without the presence of women placed in sufficient high positions inside their parties. However, political parties "have historically been highly gendered institutions that incorporated women on a different basis from men and in ways that impeded their access to leadership positions"¹⁰. Women active inside par-

⁹Drude DAHLERUP (2005), *op.cit.* pp.147.

¹⁰Mala N. HTUN (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.4

ties "rarely enjoy equal status with men"¹¹, and usually glean less visibility and resources than men during the campaigns. Gender Quota Laws aim to put the burden on political parties. Yet, they may try to bypass the rules or play with the potential lack of sanctions and weak applicability of the quotas to reduce their impact. The enforcement of the law is therefore essential to guarantee its success. As mentioned in Section 1.3, the Bolivian 1997 implemented law has been improved and adapted. Its threshold has been elevated and several enforcement mechanisms have been added, including a placement mandate.

Finally, the second hypothesis assumes that *the elite support to political reforms, gender quotas and women promotion in politics favours the implementation and enforcement of Gender Quota Laws. In contrast, a conservative elite may barrier their implementation or bypass their effect*. The Bolivian elite is expected to be more supportive to the promotion of women in politics than the Chilean one, which is expected to have more conservative and negative opinions towards Gender Quota Laws and women leadership.

2.1.3 Public opinion towards gender quotas and women leadership (H3)

The last selected hypothesis concerns the influence of the public opinion towards gender quotas and women leadership on the implementation of the law. Public opinion reflects the voters' perceptions and their vote tendencies. Voters are key actors, as they are the ones deciding who will represent them in the political arena¹². Sex-balanced party lists are insufficient to overcome the under-representation of women in Parliaments if voters tend to mostly elect male candidates. Their choice is influenced by their perception towards women role inside the society and their acceptance of women candidates. Mass public opinion depends on some absorbed cultural ideas and influences from the elite and medias.

It has been argued that the "adoption of quotas by countries is likely correlated with attitudes about women within a country"¹³. Hence, positive public opinion about quotas and women representation may increase the interest of politicians to implement effective Gender Quota Laws. In contrast, negative public opinion can hinder their introduction, as voters may back candidates opposed to it. Moreover, negative public opinion towards women role in politics limits

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²Mercedes Mateo DIAZ (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.28.

¹³Rohini PANDE & Deanna FORD (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.1.

the subjective competence of female politicians, which represents the degree of self-confidence to become actively involved in politics and satisfied with their political role¹⁴. If women have made great breakthroughs in the access to education and have gain in objective competences, their competence continues to be constantly questioned. Therefore, public opinion has an impact on the likeliness to have competent and willing women candidates.

Finally, the last hypothesis assumes that *favourable public opinion towards quota and women leadership have a positive influence on the implementation and the enforcement of Gender Quota Law. Conversely, negative public opinion tends to decrease the likeliness of finding effective Gender Quota Laws*. Bolivian public opinion is expected to be more positive, favouring the ascension of women to politics, while Chilean public opinion is expected to be more negative, explaining its lower women representation and its absence of a Gender Quota Law during an extended period.

2.1.4 Link between the hypotheses

The three hypotheses previously discussed concern the three key actors intervening in the Gender Quota Law implementation and application process. The logic of the sequence is inspired from the political recruitment process proposed by MATLAND¹⁵:

1. The women mobilization comes at first, as it the ground for women candidates aspiration, and has initially led to the creation of societal and electoral reforms such as Gender Quota Laws.
2. The influence of the political elite and political parties comes in second place, as they select the candidates. They are the ones that must approve the introduction of the quotas and later respect them.
3. Lastly, to obtain a successful Gender Quota Law, voters must elect the female candidates placed in the political parties.

¹⁴Mercedes Mateo DIAZ (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.29.

¹⁵MATLAND, Richard E., *Enhancing women's political participation: legislative recruitment and electoral systems.*, in *Women in parliament: Beyond numbers*, 2, 93-111, 2005, pp.94.

In order to perform the analysis, each hypothesis will be associated to an independent variable, noted H_1 , H_2 and H_3 . They represent the actors selected as potential explanations of the dependent variable variation. The latter is the variable investigated, noted Y . None of the independent variables have quantitative characteristics, contrasting with the dependent one. The hypothetical relationship between them is schematized in Figure 2.1. The empirical part provided in Section 4 will aim to corroborate or falsify the relationships between the independent variable H_1 , H_2 and H_3 , and the dependent variable Y , represented by the full blue lines.




Figure 2.1 – Schema of the hypothetical relations between the independent and dependent variables of the research. Inspired from Todd LANDMAN, *op.cit.*, pp.10.

In Section 4, each hypothesis will be analysed separately. However, one needs to take into consideration that the three studied actors have influences on each other. Those potential relations are represented by the dashed blue lines in Figure 2.1. For instance, strong women mobilization is expected to yield positive elite and public opinions towards women leadership, favouring awareness about the matter of women political representation. The elite influences electoral behaviours and the public opinion, as their ideology is transmitted to the voters¹⁶. Moreover, supportive elite towards women claims may contain strong feminist figures, providing legitimacy to the women mobilization. As a last example, positive public opinion towards women leadership may boost women claims and increases the elite interest to support gender quota.

¹⁶LICHBACK, Mark Irving, & ZUCKERMAN, Alan S., *Comparative politics: Rationality, culture, and structure*. Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.129.

2.2 Methodology

This subsection will discuss the methodology of the research, presenting how the knowledge will be acquired. First, some basic concepts of *few cases comparison* method will be reviewed. This analysis will adopt a cultural approach, focusing on how culture affects the behaviour of the involved actors. The justification and the particularities of this approach will be presented. Finally, this subsection will discuss how each hypothesis will be tested and how the data will be gathered, along with their limitations.

2.2.1 Few cases comparison

Comparing counter-factual situations is a powerful method to test hypothetical theories and eliminate rival explanations for an observed phenomenon¹⁷. The Bolivian and Chilean case studies will provide evidences that will be used to refute or corroborate the raised hypotheses. Comparative studies commonly assume that "the events and outcomes in each country are largely independent of events and outcomes in other countries"¹⁸. In this analysis, the number of cases has been reduced to two, which increases the feasibility of the research and allows to deepen into the specificities of each case.

Comparing a small number of cases raises two fundamental issues. First, the cases selection impacts the conclusions of the research and can lead to overestimation (or underestimation) of factors, or to incorrect conclusions¹⁹. As discussed in Section 1.3, the cases selection has been controlled applying the MSSD method. Second, the cases number reduction limits the variability and the number of observations concerning each selected hypothetical explanatory factor. If there are too many hypothetical factors, it may lead to an *indeterminate research design*²⁰. As discussed in Section 2.1, the MSSD design allows to reduce the number of hypothetical factors to key differences between the cases. Furthermore, temporal evolution and internal variation of these factors may also be used to increase the number of observations²¹.

¹⁷Todd LANDMAN, *op.cit.*, pp.4.

¹⁸*Id.*, 68.

¹⁹*Id.*, 28.

²⁰*Id.*, 30.

²¹*Id.*, 69.

2.2.2 Cultural approach

To study each selected actor, a cultural approach has been chosen. Culture has an indirect influence on political outcomes, influencing actor' behaviours²². It has been argued that it is relevant to focus on cultural elements to discuss gender political representation issues²³. Indeed, cultural beliefs and role models imposed to women are largely responsible for the historical under-representation of women in politics²⁴. Culture affects the national election either by a top-down mechanism (where elite selects the candidates), or by a bottom-up mechanism (where voters elect the candidates)²⁵. Moreover, this approach is well suited for small case comparison methods, as it requires relatively thick description of the cases context²⁶. The cases context will be developed in Section 3.

The application of a cultural approach can be tricky, as culture is a vague concept without a clear definition accepted by all. It often leads to vague methodology²⁷. This research will assume that culture encompasses the knowledge, the perspectives and the experiences of groups or individuals and influences their motives, behaviours, opinions and expectations²⁸. It builds individual and group identities and yields expectations about groups and individuals behaviours²⁹. This research will seek for key historical experiences concerning the women representation and gender quota matters of the studied actors.

The limit of a culture is blurred³⁰. It is unclear where a culture stops, and another begins. In this research, the cultural differences will be collected by country (Bolivia and Chile), as Legislated Gender Quota Laws are introduced at the national level. Countries present a unique set of historical background, political choices, path of development and often relatively homogeneous cultural and religion heritages. Therefore, this analysis will assume a certain homogeneity within countries, along with a certain heterogeneity between them. Nonetheless, countries contain different social groups with specific motives and behaviours, composed of individuals

²²Mark Irving LICHBACK & Alan S. ZUCKERMAN (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.11.

²³Leslie SCHWINDT-BAYER (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.4

²⁴Mercedes Mateo DIAZ (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.1.

²⁵*Id.*, pp.28.

²⁶Mark Irving LICHBACK & Alan S. ZUCKERMAN (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.6.

²⁷*Id.*, 61.

²⁸*Idem.*

²⁹*Id.*, 48.

³⁰*Id.*, 61.

with complex identities and multiple loyalties³¹. Hence, the collected data will encompass the heterogeneity that can be found inside each case.

2.2.3 Data and information

Data and information concerning each selected actor will be gathered by country. By focusing on their identity and experiences, the goal is more than just observe quantitative differences, but to understand why Bolivian and Chilean actors are likely to behave in different ways. Cultural elements are found in our daily lives, yielding a vast set of qualitative and quantitative data that can be used, such as discourses, surveys, pop culture, myth and rituals, daily life observation, justice cases, interviews or life stories. This large set of data and the heterogeneity that countries encompass may lead to complex studies and hypothetical explanations that are hard to refute³². As a consequence, cross validation mixing different set of data is essential to avoid hasty conclusions.

For each hypothesis, a set of relatively varied quantitative and qualitative data will be seek. It will encompass objective data, coming from official records and documents, such as historical facts, official elections results, data from official national websites and research centres, such as the Inter-Parliament Union or the Political Database of the Americas. Subjective data, such as interviews, surveys, researches, newspapers or websites from women activists, as the Quota Project one, will be also be seek. As subjective data is influenced by individual opinions, feelings or perceptions, it can be antagonist, yet, it allows to deepen into the cultural elements.

Several national and international institutions follow the women condition and their empowerment. Therefore, quantitative and qualitative data are available in surveys and reports. The research will aim to combine data from local institutions, such as parliamentary reports, and from international institutions, such as United Nations reports. Regional and national gender inequality have been quantified using several indicators. For instance, the Gender Development Index (GDI) from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)³³ compares the men and women Human Development Index (HDI) in each country³⁴. It highlights the persisting

³¹*Id.*, 62.

³²*Id.*, 72.

³³United Nations Development Programme, *Gender Development Index (GDI)*, 2016

³⁴The HDI encompasses the life expectancy, expected and the mean years of schooling and the gross national income (GNI).

gender disparity in health, education and share of incomes. The Gender Inequality Index (GII) from the UNDP is more complete. It adds the empowerment and economic status disparities³⁵, providing a larger view of the women situation in each country. Finally, recent elections results are provided in official websites, including statistical analyses of the percentage of seat held by women in national Parliaments³⁶.

Regarding the terminology, "gender" and "sex" have different meanings, even though they are often mingled³⁷. The term "gender" refers to social attitudes, while "sex" is related to the biological characteristic. Note that surveys and statistics usually use the variable "sex" to quantitatively discuss the composition of Assemblies or gender-based inequalities³⁸.

- **Data collection for H1**

To test the first hypothesis, a review of the feminist struggle history and their political mobilization in each country, notably during the transition to democracy, will be provided. The process that have led to the Gender Quota Law proposals and implementation will be discussed, focusing on the role played by women. Moreover, information concerning how women representation and gender quota have been debated in the society will be seek. To do so, information will be acquired from newspaper articles, official communications concerning the matter and literature reviews.

- **Data collection for H2**

To test the second hypothesis, data regarding the elite composition and its mobility, its degree of conservatism, along with its position concerning gender quotas will be seek. The degree of conservatism may be revealed by discourses and official communications, systematic blocking of women rights and reforming bills in the Parliament or the political strength of the conservative and religious wing. Likewise, the approval of "progressive" laws and constitutional reforms by the Parliament may reveal a more "reformist" elite. Moreover, the historical background of the elite group will be reviewed, as elite position is built on its experiences concerning women rights issues. Political turning points, such as the transition to democracy or

³⁵United Nations Development Programme, *Gender Inequality Index (GII)*, 2016

³⁶Inter Parliament Union www.ipu.org/

³⁷Mercedes Mateo DIAZ (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.8.

³⁸*Ibid.*

decisive electoral results may modify the elite position on the gender quotas matter.

As explained previously, political parties play a key role by selecting the candidates. They may try to bypass the Gender Quota Law by introducing female fake candidates in party lists. Fake candidate refers to candidates introduced only to reach the quota threshold. Likewise, other phenomena such as "proxy women" or "*mujeres de*" (women of") can be used to identify an opposing elite. "Proxy women" defines women placed in politics "as stand-ins for their husbands, who might even participate in the meetings in their place"³⁹. The "*mujeres de*" phenomenon describes the likelihood that prominent political women will be the wives or daughters of popular male politicians⁴⁰. In contrast, the presence of voluntary gender quotas implemented by political parties may reveal a relative parties support to the quota method⁴¹.

- **Data collection for H3**

The last hypothesis will require to outline the public opinions about women presence in politics, the necessity of women representation, the importance of legislation to favour women access to politics, the gender quotas and its impact on women access to politics in each country. To test this hypothesis, data from surveys and interviews will be used. Due to the heterogeneity of opinions within each country population, inconsistency may be expected. No survey will be made for this specific work, due to time and resources limitation. Instead, official and published surveys will be used. To provide a richer cultural patterns, the analysis will aim to confront the surveys and interviews with data from television programs, media coverage, magazine, publications, myths or rituals, popular culture or any other data that may reflect cultural trends and mass public opinions.

2.2.4 Limitations of the approach

Some limitations of this research can be pointed out. As discussed previously, this research has been made under time and resources constraint. Therefore, the number of cases and hypotheses has been reduced. As for the cases selection, the hypotheses selection and definitions will influence the future findings. For instance, it can lead to spuriousness if a key factor is not

³⁹Drude DAHLERUP (2005), *op.cit.* pp.149

⁴⁰Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.23.

⁴¹FRANCESCHET, Susan, & PISCOPO, Jenifer M., *Gender quotas and women's substantive representation: Lessons from Argentina.*, *Politics & Gender*, 4(03), 393-425, 2008, pp.404.

considered in the research⁴². Finally, the three raised hypotheses focus on groups of individuals, considering them as relatively homogeneous in each country. Nevertheless, women groups, elite and voters are made of individuals with complex identities. Therefore, their positions, perspectives and experiences can be contrasted within each country. As the cultural background of the cases have been selected to be very similar, more contrasted results may be found within the case than between them, leading to results sensitive to the data selection. Moreover, due to the reduction of the spatial framework to two South American countries, the findings of this analysis will be strongly bound to their contexts and may not yield other general explanations.

⁴²Todd LANDMAN, *op.cit.*, pp.40.

3. Spatio-temporal context

In order to later corroborate or falsify the selected hypothesis, this section will present a brief context of each country selected. The Bolivian and Chilean cultural and political contexts (focusing on gender relations) along with their women representation evolution will be reviewed. This section will highlight the comparability of the selected cases, which is a major assumption of this research, before discussing their specificities.

As previously discussed in Section 1.3, the South American continent presents inherent context similarities. It is composed of "Catholic Nations"¹ that share comparable colonial experiences, which led to patriarchal societies². Several tough Military Regimes have once ruled in the region. Since the 1980s, the continent has undergone a re-democratization process, although its democracies are known to be still relatively unsteady³. Nevertheless, South American women have achieved successful breakthroughs on their access to the political sphere, notably benefiting from the Gender Quota Laws widely implemented in the continent.

3.1 Cultural context

Bolivia and Chile are both located within the Andean region of South America. Their culture is composed of elements inherited from the native indigenous population and from Spanish colons' Catholic culture. Colonial regimes have violently imposed their cultural norms to the indigenous population. The forced Catholic conversion of the local population and the slaves brought from Africa has been ever-since the "basic normative parameter" of their culture⁴. The colonization has affected the cultural construction of all social groups⁵. In particular, the traditional women's role in society received influences from the *Marianism* ideology, which represents an ideal of femininity, inspired by Mary, mother of Jesus⁶. This ideology led to the spread

¹Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.9.

²O'KELLY, Charlotte G., & CARNEY, Larry S., *Women and men in society*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1885.

³Mala N. HTUN (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.1.

⁴Elizabeth JELIN (1991), *op.cit.*, pp.40.

⁵Pew Research Center, *Religion in Latin America. Widespread Change in a Historically Catholic Region*, 2014 and Pew Research Center, *5 facts for Pope Francis' visit to South America*, 2015.

⁶STEVENS, Evelyn P. *Machismo and marianismo.*, 10(6), 57-63, 1973.

of gender stereotypes, considering women's mother duty as their primary role⁷, impeding them to work or participate to politics. Likewise, a patriarchal society was established. In the 19th Century, patriarchal civil codes were adopted in South America. The husband possessed legal control of their wives and daughters, resulting in females "deprived of full citizenship"⁸.

Since then, women have been excluded from the agricultural market, educational systems, labour forces⁹ and political spheres. Society did not encourage them to grow into a professional or political careers. However, the recent decades have been marked by "great progress towards equality with men, especially in schools, workplaces and politics" in the continent, although "social attitudes have changed more slowly"¹⁰. The Catholic religion influences have remained important in their societies, which tend to promote "conservative sex roles" and traditional family models¹¹. It continues to raise several barriers to women full citizenship, yielding large inequalities, such as lower incomes, unequal access to the formal work market and to the political arena¹². Large gender gaps are seen in almost all South American countries¹³. Moreover, the traditional family model is widely used as an argument against progressive policies, such as LGBT or contraceptive related ones.

Large rates of violence against women is found in the continent. South America is the third region with highest average of women violent death rates, after Central Africa and the Caribbean¹⁴. Bolivia, for instance, has experienced a constant increase of the registered femicides (crime motivated by the fact that the victim is a woman or a girl) between 2013 and 2017¹⁵. In response, 8 of the South American countries have introduced special laws concerning femicides and aggravated homicide for gender-related reasons, including Bolivia and Chile¹⁶.

South American women's rights advances are closely linked with democratic consolida-

⁷Charlotte G. O'KELLY & Larry S. CARNEY (1986), *op.cit.*, pp.253.

⁸Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.17.

⁹Roger CLARCK, Thomas W. RAMSBY & Emily S. ADLER (1991), *op.cit.*, pp.52.

¹⁰The economist, *Wonder women and macho men*, 2015.

¹¹Scott DESPOSATO & Barbara NORRANDER (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.150.

¹²BALESTERO, Gabriela Soares, *O papel feminino na política brasileira: breve debate sobre a quota partidária feminina*. Revista Espaço Acadêmico, 11(130), 01-08, 2011, pp.2.

¹³Scott DESPOSATO & Barbara NORRANDER (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.142.

¹⁴Small Arms Survey, *A Gendered Analysis of Violent Deaths.*, 2016.

¹⁵Coordinadora de la mujer, *Boletín informativo: 11 de octubre: situación de las mujeres en Bolivia 2017*, 2017

¹⁶United Nations, *Femicide or femicide as a specific type of crime in national legislations in Latin America: an on-going process*, 2015.

tion, sustainable development and equitable economic growth, which have been shown to be still volatile. Indeed, “many countries still suffer from alleged abuses of human rights by state agents, corruption, high crime rates, and an ineffective judicial system”¹⁷. Moreover, its economy is one of the most unequal in the world. Therefore, socio-economic changes are required to increase women’s rights in a long-term perspective.

3.1.1 Bolivia

Bolivia presents the largest South American indigenous population. The 2001 National Census of Housing and Population showed that 62% of the population self-identify as belonging to an indigenous group¹⁸. It results in a larger impact of the traditional indigenous on national culture and gender relations than in other countries of the region¹⁹. Indigenous culture assumes an ideology of complementary between men and women²⁰, in which both genders are expected to share the leadership. However, the colonialism and the capitalism development have marginalized the indigenous, leading to the transformation of their gender relations²¹. For instance, men traditionally own the lands and are the heads of the household²².

Bolivia shows an endemic poverty and large socio-economic inequalities²³. It is the poorest country of South America with about half of its population below the poverty line²⁴. Bolivia presented the lower Gross National Product *per capita* of South America²⁵, yet, Bolivian economy has exhibited the larger growth of the continent in the past decades²⁶. For informational purposes, the economic performances of South American countries are gathered in Appendix A.

Furthermore, large gender inequalities have remained in Bolivia. The Bolivian Gender Inequality Index (GII) is ranked at the 98th place, an alarming position. Moreover, it also presents

¹⁷Mala N. HTUN (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.1.

¹⁸LARSON, Brooke. *Democratic progress or peril? Indigenous and popular mobilization in Bolivia*. Democratic Deficits, 2007, pp. 189

¹⁹HTUN, Mala, & OSSA, Juan Pablo, *Political inclusion of marginalized groups: indigenous reservations and gender parity in Bolivia.*, Politics, Groups, and Identities, 1(1), 4-25, 2013, pp.9.

²⁰CORDOVA, Cecilia, *Gender and politics in Bolivia Violent repercussions of the political ‘empowerment’ of women*. Christian aid, 2017, pp.8.

²¹ROUSSEAU, Stéphanie, *Indigenous and feminist movements at the constituent assembly in Bolivia: locating the representation of indigenous women.*, Latin American Research Review, 46(2), 5-28, 2011, pp.17.

²²Habitat for Humanity, *Empowering women in Bolivia*.

²³Brooke LARSON (2007), *op.cit.*, pp. 183

²⁴Habitat for Humanity, *Women join voices for change in Bolivia*

²⁵Statistic Times, <http://statisticstimes.com/>

²⁶G1, *Como a Bolívia se tornou o país que mais cresce na América do Sul*, 2017.

the lower Gender Development Index (GDI) of the region. Bolivian women suffer from lower educational level, lower incomes and high maternal mortality rates²⁷. Less than half of Bolivian women have at least a secondary education. Moreover, they tend to have lower "access to informative meetings where men learn about legislation and state policies"²⁸. As cited previously, Bolivian females suffer from a rampant gender violence that is prevalent in its country. Its "traditional misogynist culture persists where women are assigned a subordinate, traditional and dependent role, mainly the roles of reproduction and care of the family"²⁹. Nevertheless, Bolivia presents one of the highest rates of women economical participation and labour force participation compared to the rest of the South American continents³⁰, even if it is characterized by vulnerable employment and a concentration in low-productivity sectors³¹. In 2013, 43% of Bolivian women worked in informal places³². For further information, the gender inequality performances, including GII, GDI, and gender disparities in education and labour force of South American countries are gathered in Appendix A.

3.1.2 Chile

Chilean culture is largely inherited from the Spanish colons' Catholic culture. The Catholic Church still strongly influences its society, leading to a very conservative and patriarchal country³³. Thus, it has presented some cultural obstacles to sensitive women issues advances, notably regarding reproductive rights. Chilean gender relations has always been characterized by a large male dominance, although its women political representation was once the largest of South American (before 1973)³⁴. Since its independence process and the definition of its national identity, the Chilean indigenous population has been relegated to subordinates³⁵. The Chilean state did not recognize their condition, culture, language, and history.

²⁷UNICEF, *The Situation of Women in Bolivia*.

²⁸Cecilia CORDOVA (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.9.

²⁹UNICEF, *The Situation of Women in Bolivia*.

³⁰TOBAR, Marcela Ríos, & VILLAR, Andrés, *Cuotas de género: democracia y representación*, FLACSO, 2005. pp.15.

³¹The World bank, *Bolivia: Challenges and Constraints to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment* 2015, pp.15.

³²*Id.* 17.

³³Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.35.

³⁴Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.63.

³⁵DE CEA, Maite, HEREDIA, Mariana, & VALDIVIESO, Diego, *The Chilean elite's point of view on indigenous peoples.*, Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 41(3), 328-347, 2016, pp.328.

Chile presents "the region's best-performing economy over the last two decades"³⁶. As shown in Table 4.2, its GNP and its economic development is much larger than the Bolivian ones. However, it has been shown that the economic development has no direct effect on gender participation rates in South America society³⁷. Indeed, the Chilean gender gap in the economic and political participation is much larger than the Bolivian ones. Chile has one of the poorest women participation rate in labour forces of South America and presents a large women unemployment, or employment in informal and/or precarious work places³⁸. Still, the country presents a global GII lower than the Bolivian one, being ranked at the second place of the South American region in 2015. Notably, this is due to its high education rates for both women and men, as shown in Table 4.3.

3.2 Political context

South American societies have been dominated by a small male elite, while the vast majority of the population, including women, was politically excluded and oppressed. Their political histories have raised "barriers to women's full equality of citizenship"³⁹. Women groups started to mobilize politically in the beginning of the 20th Century, obtaining the women's suffrage between 1929 (Ecuador) and 1961 (Paraguay). Chile and Bolivia implemented the universal suffrage in 1949 and 1952, respectively. However, despite this achievement, women representation remained very low in the continent, and women did not mobilize politically until the 1970s in the region.

The 20th Century was marked by a long period of domination of Military Regimes in South America, which have widely use terrorism and repression methods, including murders, lock-ups and disappearances of political dissenters and others human rights abuses that are still unknown. Those regimes did not favour women's rights and status improvements, resulting in a low women political representation rates⁴⁰. During this period, a large activism against human rights abuse was developed, being a intensified as a "gendered phenomenon"⁴¹. Women, moth-

³⁶ VALENZUELA, Sebastian, & CORREA, Teresa, *Press coverage and public opinion on women candidates: The case of Chile's Michelle Bachelet.*, International Communication Gazette, 71(3), 203-223, 2009, pp.204.

³⁷ Scott DESPOSATO & Barbara NORRANDER (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.142.

³⁸ Marcela Ríos TOBAR & Andrés VILLAR (2006), *op.cit.*, pp.15.

³⁹ Scott DESPOSATO & Barbara NORRANDER (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.142.

⁴⁰ Amey S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.12.

⁴¹ FRANCESCHET, Susan. *Women in politics in post-transitional democracies: The Chilean case.*, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 3(2), 207-236, 2001, pp.209.

ers and wives of human rights victims, have played key roles in movements against the Military Regimes and "were the first publicly to protest"⁴². The "militant mothers" formed a politically active "mobilized motherhood". As it captured the main traditional role of women, their role of "mother", they were perceived as a less political movement, receiving lower repression from the military⁴³. Moreover, the women mobilization included women from all the social classes, it had thus the mass power of the labour forces and the legitimacy of the upper classes⁴⁴. Note that during the repressions, women militants suffered from similar fates than men ones⁴⁵.

In the 1980s, South America experienced a wave of democratization. The democratic transition was a determinant period. It decided the new competitive electoral systems and the political inclusion of the different social groups of each country. The large scope of mass women movements previously discussed raised high hopes regarding a larger political inclusion of women. It actually occurred in some countries, such as in Argentina, which introduced a Gender Quota Law⁴⁶. Meanwhile, in other countries, due to cultural and institutional barriers, "women's organizations find the transition from activity in civil society to activity in political society problematic"⁴⁷. The return of democracy restored the male-dominated political parties as gatekeeper of the political arena, decreasing the influence of social movements in which women were largely active⁴⁸. Still, women groups have continued to struggle to improve the women status and defend women interests⁴⁹, resulting in a large improvement of women's rights, access to health, labour force and education⁵⁰.

The recent women political representation advances within the region has been spotlighted by an unprecedented wave of women elected as Presidents. Concerning the Parliamentary representation, it has exhibited a relatively large and quick growth, notably due to Gender Quota Laws. In Figure 3.1, one can even emphasize that the average percentage of seats held by women in national Parliaments in Latin America and the Caribbean (in blue) has now reached

⁴²*Ibid.*

⁴³Scott DESPOSATO & Barbara NORRANDER (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.151.

⁴⁴Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.20.

⁴⁵Susan FRANCESCHET (2001), *op.cit.*, pp.213.

⁴⁶Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.17.

⁴⁷WAYLEN, Georgina., *Gender and democratic politics: A comparative analysis of consolidation in Argentina and Chile*. Journal of Latin American Studies, 32(3), 765-793, 2000, pp.771.

⁴⁸Scott DESPOSATO & Barbara NORRANDER (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.151.

⁴⁹Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.52.

⁵⁰Mala N. HTUN (2005), *op.cit.*, pp.3.

the average values observed in the European Union (in red). Hence, the regional promotion of Gender Quota Laws can be explained by the willingness of democracy consolidation and modernity within the region⁵¹. Despite the advances, South American female politicians keep denouncing sexism and sexual harassments that impede them to reach the top of the political arenas in the region⁵².




Figure 3.1 – Evolution of percentage of seats held by women in national Parliaments in Latin America and the Caribbean (in blue) compared with the one of the European Union (in red). Data from the The World Bank, *Proportion of seats held by women in National Parliaments (%)*, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS>.

3.2.1 Bolivia

Since the Bolivian independence from Spain in 1825 until the the 1952 universal suffrage, "approximately 2% of the total population voted in elections"⁵³. The clear majority of Bolivians remained marginalized and excluded from politics, oppressed by a landowning *Criollo* elite. In the 1950s, internal war exploded between the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) and the government due to the tremendous inequalities. The victorious MNR took power. In 1952 they reformed Bolivian citizenship with the universal suffrage introduction⁵⁴. However, the MNR government actions divided the country and led to a 1964 military overthrow, which kept "radical social movements underground"⁵⁵.

⁵¹Drude DAHLERUP & Lenita FREIDENVALL, *op.cit.*, pp.32.

⁵²STAUFFER, Caroline, & TAJ, Mitra, *Chile election ends era of female presidents in Latin America.*, 2017.

⁵³MCKAY, Ben M., *The politics of convergence in Bolivia: social movements and the state.* Third World Quarterly, 1-23, 2017, pp.6.

⁵⁴Brooke LARSON (2007), *op.cit.*, pp. 184

⁵⁵Ben M. MCKAY (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.7.

Bolivia has a long history of instability and Military Regimes, including 193 attempts of overthrow since 1982 and the re-democratization process⁵⁶. In 1982, democracy was restored and multi-party elections were held in 1985. The new 1994 Bolivian Constitution incorporated several progressive reforms to improve the political participation of the marginalized groups, including a Gender Quota Law of 30% (1997) and the recognition of the indigenous population. As in other South American countries, Bolivian "women have played an integral role in the country's quest for democracy", yet, "they have not always enjoyed equal access to formal political spaces" in the latter⁵⁷. Instead, the transition installed a neo-liberal elite whose "savage capitalism" policies led to larger unemployment and incomes inequalities, marginalizing women and indigenous⁵⁸. The social degradation reached its peak in the early 2000s, when "social pressures and a series of political crises marked another period of turmoil". It led to the resignation of two successive Presidents⁵⁹, and mobilizations claiming for the redistribution of the political power⁶⁰.

In 2006, the election of the first self-proclaimed indigenous President Evo Morales, from the progressive left-wing *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS) party marked a political turnover in Bolivia. Its success came from the support of indigenous and grassroots movements hoping for redistribution, which "represents a fundamental turning point in the broadening of participatory democracy"⁶¹. In the same year, a Constituent Assembly was elected to design a new Constitution, approved in 2007. It included important reforms concerning the composition and elections of the Executive, Electoral and Judicial branches⁶². This Assembly was elected using candidate lists with gender parity and alternation, along with a proportional electoral system, resulting in 34% of women elected and an indigenous woman elected as President⁶³. This new Constitution guarantees the principle of gender parity and alternation in party lists in national elections, which was later formalized in a new electoral law. Furthermore, Evo Morales continues at the head of the Bolivian state and pretends to run for the 2019 elections. If elected, it will result in 19 years of presidency (2006-2009-2014). This situation is similarly to the one of his regional

⁵⁶Estadão, *Bolívia tem histórico de golpes e crises*, 2008

⁵⁷United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.1

⁵⁸Brooke LARSON (2007), *op.cit.*, pp.184.

⁵⁹United nations development Programme (2014) *op.cit.*, pp.2

⁶⁰Ben M. MCKAY (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.1.

⁶¹Brooke LARSON (2007), *op.cit.*, pp. 183

⁶²United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.2

⁶³*Id.*, pp.6

political allies, Hugo Chavez from Venezuela (1998-2000-20026-2012) and Rafael Correa from Ecuador (2007-2009-2013)⁶⁴.

3.2.2 Chile

Since the second half of the 20th Century, Chile has experienced radical changes, going from "having the most stable democratic tradition of Latin America, to a socialist experiment, a brutal military intervention, a harsh and enduring dictatorship, and a negotiated transition to democracy completed by a popularly elected government that embraced European social-democratic values"⁶⁵. Before the military overthrow of the General Pinochet in 1973, Chile was a stable constitutional democracy presenting "the largest numbers of women in its national legislature"⁶⁶. In contrast, Pinochet's dictatorship was extremely repressive, succeeding in "inhibiting any substantial opposition"⁶⁷, using violent and terrorism practices, until a crisis that raised violent popular protests in 1982. Chilean well-organized women and motherhood groups were the ones to first publicly mobilize, denouncing the human rights abuses and the crimes against their family⁶⁸.

After violent clashes between the government and the population, a more moderate strategy of negotiation with the Military Regime was adopted⁶⁹. Political parties re-emerged as main actors within the opposition, while the radical and violent ones were marginalized. Pinochet finally resigned in a 1988 plebiscite. In the same year, the Chilean Constitution was reformed and elections were held in 1989. As the transition has been negotiated with the Military Regime, the latter "was able to play a key role in constructing a new system which was designed to ensure that its vision of the world would be maintained"⁷⁰. They managed to moderate the country position on human rights and maintain its neo-liberal economic orientation⁷¹.

Moreover, the transition terms also established a political system with a strong President and

⁶⁴Folha de São Paulo, *Justiça da Bolívia libera Evo Morales para concorrer a quarto mandato*, 2017.

⁶⁵BUCCIFERRO, Claudia, *Michelle Bachelet, President of Chile: A Moving Portrait.*, Women in Politics and Media: Perspectives from Nations in Transition, 217-231, 2014, pp.217.

⁶⁶Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.63.

⁶⁷FRANCESCHET, Susan, & MACDONALD, Laura, *Hard times for citizenship: Women's movements in Chile and Mexico.*, Citizenship Studies, 8(1), 3-23, 2004, pp.10

⁶⁸Susan FRANCESCHET (2001), *op.cit.*, pp.209.

⁶⁹Susan FRANCESCHET & Laura MACDONALD (2004), *op.cit.*, pp.10

⁷⁰Georgina WAYLEN (2000), *op.cit.*, pp.772.

⁷¹Susan FRANCESCHET & Laura MACDONALD (2004), *op.cit.*, pp.10

Executive Government, able to control the Legislative branch, along with an electoral system, adopted to ensure an over-representation of the right and the total exclusion of small political parties. In addition, Pinochet gained an immunity and Senator-for-life position. The combination of these factors led to a Chile strong designed by the Military Regime, which has long impeded any modification of the terms of transition⁷². The country waited until 2005 for a legislative reform of the 1989 Constitution.

In 2006 Michelle Bachelet won her first presidential election. The first Chilean women President brought hope for many, "during her first four-year term, Ms. Bachelet steered legislative efforts to curb workplace discrimination, to protect victims of domestic violence and to expand health care for women, arguing that it was much more than a matter of fairness"⁷³. In 2013 she conquered her second presidential election, "during her second term, she created a ministry of women and gender equality, and passed an electoral change requiring that at least 40 percent of candidates for elected office be women"⁷⁴. Michelle Bachelet leaves office in 2018 and stated that "the hardest thing to change is the culture"⁷⁵. Sebastian Piñera (former president of Chile from 2010 to 2014), just won the 2017 presidential election and will be at the head of the state for one more time⁷⁶.

3.3 Women representation evolution

The Figure 3.2 illustrates the evolution of the proportion of seats held by women in the Bolivian and the Chilean Lower Houses, along with their introduction and improvement of Gender Quota Laws dates. In Bolivia, the women representation has increased by 42.3% between 1995 (before the quota adoption) and nowadays. One can see the large impact of the 2010 Bolivian reform on its Gender Quota Law, in which the concept of parity and gender alternation were added. In 2017, Bolivia presents the second larger women political representation of the world (behind Rwanda) and leads the South American region⁷⁷. In contrast, in Chile where no Gender Quota Law had been applied before 2016, women political representation has only slightly increased after the re-democratization process.

⁷²Georgina WAYLEN (2000), *op.cit.*, pp.782.

⁷³The New York Times, *President Bachelet of Chile Is the Last Woman Standing in the Americas*, 2017.

⁷⁴*Idem.*

⁷⁵*Idem.*

⁷⁶Time, *Chile Has Elected Former President Sebastian Pinera in a Return to the Right*, 2017.

⁷⁷Inter-Parliament Union, <http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>




Figure 3.2 – Comparison between evolution of the proportion of seats held by women in the Bolivian (in blue) and in the Chilean (in red) Lower Houses. Data from the The World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS>, Marcela Ríos TOBAR & Andrés VILLAR (2006), *op.cit.*, pp.12, and ARCHENTI, Nélide, & TULA, María Inés. *Cambios normativos y equidad de género. De las cuotas a la paridad en América Latina: los casos de Bolivia y Ecuador*. América Latina Hoy, 66 2014, pp.63

3.3.1 Bolivia

Bolivia is a Unitary Constitutional Republic with a Presidential system and a bicameral Congress. The country has a unique Parliamentary structure. It is composed of main members (or "incumbent") and alternates (or "substitutes"), all elected⁷⁸. The alternates take place in case of disabilities, resignation or death of the main members. In this analysis, the women representation will be counted considering the women proportion of main members, as it is commonly done in official records.

In the early 1990s, the women representation in the Lower House reached historic values of about 10%. With the introduction of the 1997 Gender Quota Law of 30% (*Ley de Partidos políticos*), a mixed electoral system substituted the closed list proportional representation. Yet, the quota did not include any placement mandate⁷⁹. This system reduced the impact of the law and ensured that women were mainly elected as alternates⁸⁰. Despite a progressive growth in women's political inclusion, the initial results of the quota were relatively low. The women representation rose to 11.5% in 1997 (main members), while 68% of the elected women were alternates⁸¹. During that period, women representation reached maximal values of 19.2%.

⁷⁸United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.5

⁷⁹Cecilia CORDOVA (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.12.

⁸⁰BENAVIDES, Jimena Costa, *Women's Political Participation in Bolivia: Progress and Obstacles*, 2003, pp.5.

⁸¹United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.5

With the new Bolivian Constitution and the introduction of the parity concept, the 2009 elections results made the women representation in Parliament achieve 22.3%. It was followed by a "remarkable jump in women's share of Bolivia's lower house, from 22.3% in 2009 to 53.1% in 2014 (+30.8%)", which "can be directly attributed to its revised quota law"⁸² (*Ley del Régimen Electoral*) in 2010 . It formalized the principles guaranteed by the Constitution. Bolivian party lists shall have 50% of each gender with alternation. Moreover, it stipulates that the main male candidates shall have female alternates, and vice-versa. It also mandates that "50% of the titular candidates in all the single member districts nominated by each party be women"⁸³. In addition, the law also include a Reserved Seat Quota for indigenous people (7 of the 130 deputy seats)⁸⁴.

3.3.2 Chile

Presenting the same political structure as Bolivia, Chile is a Unitary Constitutional republic with a Presidential system and a bicameral Congress. Before the military overthrow, the Chilean Congress was elected through a proportional representation system⁸⁵ that has once yield the higher women representation of South America. Subsequent to the Military Regime domination, the electoral system was reformed twice. As cited previously, the first reform took place during the transition to democracy under the influence of the Military Regime. A second reform was approved in 2015, including the introduction of a Gender Quota Law.

Before the 2015 electoral reform, the Chamber of Deputies was composed of 120 members elected for 4 years by district through a unique open list binomial electoral system. This system impeded small parties to accede to Parliament and led to the creation of large coalitions of parties in Chile. The Chilean binomial electoral system "severely limits women's opportunity to advance to elected positions of power". Moreover, it was an open-list system that "places women at a disadvantage compared to men for a number of reasons (financing, sexism, poor list position, etc.)" and no Gender Quota Law was applied⁸⁶. In the 1989 election, women represented 5.8% of the Lower House. Chile only achieved a women representation larger than

⁸²Inter-Parliamentary Union (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.5.

⁸³Mala HTUN, & Juan Pablo OSSA (2013), *op.cit.*, pp.7.

⁸⁴United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.3

⁸⁵Political Resources, *The chilean electoral system before 1973*.

⁸⁶Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.72.

the one prior to the military coup in 1997⁸⁷. The Chilean women representation in the Lower House poorly grew 10% between 1989 and 2015. Concerning the Senate, it was composed of 48 members, including 38 elected members for 8 years, 8 appointed senators and 2 senators for life⁸⁸ with the women representation remaining low. Note that a 2005 reform removed the appointed senators and senators for life.

The 2015 reforms replaced the binomial electoral system by proportional representation system using the D'Hondt rule along with the addition of a Chilean Gender Quota Law of 40%⁸⁹. The number of Deputies were increased to 155 and the number of senators to 50 (all elected)⁹⁰. This new legislation was applied for the first time on the general elections held in November 2017 for the 2018 Parliament (no official results were found during this research).

⁸⁷Georgina WAYLEN (2000), *op.cit.*, pp.782.

⁸⁸Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.64.

⁸⁹Centro Regional de Derechos Humanos y Justicia de Género, Corporación Humanas, *Opinión: La Resistencia de los partidos*

⁹⁰Election Resources on the Internet, *Presidential and Legislative Elections in Chile*

4. Empirical development

This last section will present the empirical development, which aims to corroborate or falsify the hypotheses using relevant information from the selected cases. The section will be divided in three parts corresponding to each hypothesis previously raised in Section 2.1.

4.1 Influence of the women and feminist mobilization (H1)

This subsection will discuss the influence of the women and feminist mobilization on the implementation of Gender Quota Law, assuming that *a large mobilization of women groups fighting for their political rights in a country increases the likeliness to have an effective Gender Quota Law implemented*. Women mobilization includes women from diverse social groups, which have distinct experiences and interests. It translates their collective actions concerning issues affecting all or the majority of women, and can only be politically effective if women are able to rally¹. The unity and coherence of women groups is required for major political achievements regarding women claims.

4.1.1 Women movements in Bolivia

Bolivian women have been very influential actors in the country political transformations, participating in the independence process and in the fight against several military dictatorships. Yet, "despite their presence in these emblematic moments, the number of women in positions of power in the State and in civil society has not reflected the important contributions women have made to Bolivia's history"². In the 20th Century, Bolivian women have mobilized to demand rights, including their political ones.

Figure 4.1 presents the time-line of their main electoral gains since the 1990s. The mobilization for electoral reforms started in 1996³, and led to the adoption of the 1997 Gender Quota Law for legislative elections. Two years later, a second electoral reform introduced a

¹Mala HTUN, & Juan Pablo OSSA (2013), *op.cit.*, pp.7.

²Cecilia CORDOVA (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.8.

³United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.1

similar Gender Quota Law of for political parties' structures and municipal elections, adding a placement mandate⁴. Between 2002 and 2004, indigenous groups pressured for constitutional reforms, resulting in The Law on Civic and Indigenous Peoples Groups that "established for the first time the principles of parity and alternation", applied in their candidate's lists. The election of the 2006 Constituent Assembly (based on parity and alternating principle) and the design of the 2009 new Constitution (that later transcribed those principles), constituted the second central period of Bolivian women mobilization concerning their political representation. Finally, the 2010 electoral law guaranteed these principles in all national, sub-national and judicial elections⁵.




Figure 4.1 – Time-line of the achieved Bolivian electoral reforms by women movements. Image from United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.4

To achieve gender parity and alternation, the Bolivian women movements manage to overcome its historic division⁶. Historically, the movement was divided in two: the feminist one, mainly composed of middle-class urban women, and indigenous women active within indigenous and popular movements.

- Bolivian feminist movement has promoted "women's human rights, gender-sensitive policy-making and the integration of women in politics and development"⁷. Since the 1980s, they politically participated through NGOs, political parties and collective organizations, with the support and funding of international organizations.

⁴Jimena Costa BENAVIDES (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.6.

⁵United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.1

⁶Mala HTUN & Juan Pablo OSSA (2013), *op.cit.*, pp.6.

⁷United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.8

- Indigenous women have started to organize against the Military Regime in the 1970s in small *clubes de madres* ("Mother club")⁸. After the democratization, they participated in labour force movements⁹ that rose in the 1990s and 2000s (See Section 3.2). Although women have constituted a majority of the indigenous movement, they have rarely enjoyed high decision power¹⁰. The only women-only indigenous organization is the "*Federacion Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas de Bolivia - Bartolina Sisa*", popularly named as "*Las Bartolinas*"¹¹. It has raised gender-specific demands, including women political inclusion improvements.

Unlike urban middle-class feminists, indigenous women have experienced "discrimination at the intersection of race, ethnicity, class and gender"¹². Their social and ethnic claims may thus prevail on gender-based ones. However, women indigenous activists "tend to relate the subordination of women to colonisation", perceiving women emancipation as a required part of the decolonisation process¹³. Indigenous culture does not oppose maternity and household work with active citizenship. Instead, as mentioned in Section 3.1, it encompasses a central principle of gender complementary in all spheres of the society. Men and women are not equal, they complement each other and may have distinct roles. This contrasts with feminists' conceptions of gender equality, whom have denounced the "traditional silenced women subordination in indigenous structures"¹⁴. Likewise, *Las Bartolinas* explicitly consider themselves "as not feminists, viewing feminism as a conflict against men"¹⁵. Furthermore, the two groups have divergent opinions concerning several women issues, such as abortion, for instance.

4.1.2 The introduction of the 1997 Bolivian Gender Quota Law

Under the influence of the 1995 Beijing Conference, feminist women from NGOs, different gender platforms, Congress or political parties gathered in a "*Foro Político Nacional de Mujeres*" ("Women's Political National Forum") to support the quota implementation strategy¹⁶. This forum promoted the political empowerment of female leaders and enjoyed a key role in

⁸Cecilia CORDOVA (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.10.

⁹United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.8

¹⁰Mala HTUN & Juan Pablo OSSA (2013), *op.cit.*, pp.9.

¹¹Stéphanie ROUSSEAU (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.18.

¹²BURMAN, Anders. *Chachawarmi: Silence and rival voices on decolonisation and gender politics in Andean Bolivia*. Journal of Latin American Studies, 43(1), 65-91, 2011, pp.90.

¹³*Id.*, pp.65.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵Stéphanie ROUSSEAU (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.18.

¹⁶Jimena Costa BENAVIDES (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.2.

the introduction of the law. Feminists "spent one year practically living in congress to lobby politicians", "held seminars and workshops around the country", "campaigned the press and other media" and "even distributed propaganda with popcorn at a soccer match"¹⁷. Furthermore, it had the support of "the government's pro-gender equity mechanism committed with the Beijing Plan of Action"¹⁸. It also received international assistance and funding from international women movements and organizations, such as International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)¹⁹. In 1997, they finally succeed in convincing the Congress and the traditional political elites, including the Bolivian then-President, to endorse a Legislated Candidate Quota Law of 30% in the proportional representation of the Congress mixed-electoral system.

Despite its strong organization, the pro-quota movements were composed principally of urban women that had little contact with popular and indigenous women. Therefore, the 1997 quota "was not a demand emerging from mass society"²⁰. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the feminists remained "largely unconnected to the social base", while "few indigenous women participated in their movement" or "advanced feminist claims"²¹. Instead, women indigenous mobilization focused on poverty and the protection of their culture. The 1997 Gender Quota Law resulted in a relative failure to increase women's political representation, which generated new demands of improvements from the feminist movement. Hence, they adopted the parity concept²². Meanwhile, the success of the 1999 quota for municipal election, overcoming its threshold, showed the need of placement mandate/alternation²³. Finally, the two women movements united around the quest for gender parity.

4.1.3 The mobilization for gender parity in Bolivia

In the early 2000s, social pressures rose in Bolivia and led to the election of Evo Morales. Its party (MAS) was attached to social movements and aimed to achieve a larger political inclusion of the Bolivian marginalized groups. The following discourse of the President Morales

¹⁷Mala HTUN & Juan Pablo OSSA (2013), *op.cit.*, pp.9.

¹⁸Jimena Costa BENAVIDES (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.2.

¹⁹United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.12

²⁰Mala HTUN & Juan Pablo OSSA (2013), *op.cit.*, pp.8.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.5

²³*Id.*, 7

illustrates this:

*The era of the empires, colonial hierarchies and financial oligarchies is coming to an end. Everywhere we look, we see the peoples around the world calling for their right to play their leading role in history. The 21st century must be one of the peoples, the workers, the farmers, the indigenous communities, the youth and the women. In other words, it must be the century of the oppressed. The realization of the peoples' leading role requires that democracy be renewed and strengthened. We must supplement the electoral democracy with participatory and community-based democracy.*²⁴

This speech reveals the willingness of a more equal share of the decision-making process to strengthen the democracy. Moreover, MAS quest of decolonisation was accompanied by women emancipation claims, as they perceived the patriarchal structure as a vestige of the colonial regime. Therefore, its electoral success favoured "greater connections between the urban feminist movement and women from indigenous and popular sectors"²⁵.

The formation of the Constituent Assembly offered a unique opportunity for women activists. Women lobbied in the Assembly negotiations "as a unitary voice" through formal and informal coalitions²⁶. The collaboration of the two women blocks allowed to include several women issues to the agenda of the 2009 Constitution, including their larger political inclusion. They organized a massive campaign called "*Mujeres Listas para las Listas*" ("Women Ready for the Lists") to enlarge citizens and political parties awareness²⁷. However, indigenous and feminist women have backed the parity measure for distinct reasons. Feminists supported the Western concept of equality, opposed to patriarchal traditions and gender discrimination. While indigenous movement based its claim in the principle of complementarity of gender in the society²⁸. Nevertheless, both blocks agreed on the importance of women political representation and recognized "their shared position of disadvantage"²⁹.

²⁴Speech by Evo Morales, President of Bolivia, *Towards a new world order for living well*, 2014, full speech available online at <http://www.worldfuturefund.org/Reports/G77/moralespeech.html>

²⁵Mala HTUN & Juan Pablo OSSA (2013), *op.cit.*, pp.8.

²⁶Stéphanie ROUSSEAU (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.12.

²⁷Mala HTUN & Juan Pablo OSSA (2013), *op.cit.*, pp.12.

²⁸Anders BURMAN (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.66-68.

²⁹Mala HTUN & Juan Pablo OSSA (2013), *op.cit.*, pp.8.

However, the collaboration of the two movements eroded after the new Constitution approval. With the strengthening of Evo Morales power, indigenous movements have increased their influence in Bolivian politics, affecting "the dynamics of the Bolivian women's movement"³⁰. Mistrust and mutual criticism have characterized the relation between the two women movements, while their different worldviews resurfaced. A Manager of the Juridical Office for the Defence of Women reported:

I think that women in general don't verbally express the term feminism, but their claims are feminist. They take action against violence, they claim their rights to decide how many children they want to have. They claim equal salary for equal jobs, they claim their right to be recognized in their home sphere, in their community, in the street and in their political participation. These are flags that have been raised for feminism for over 100 years. But clearly, since the feminism has been divided politically as a political discourse in the west, the discourse amongst indigenous has meant a denial of these values.³¹

This demonstrates that indigenous women groups militate for feminist claims but they tend to avoid the label "feminist". Meanwhile, the Bolivian feminist movements have seen the rise of indigenous movements as a threat to feminist proposals³².

Finally, Bolivian women has achieved major electoral gains since the 1990s³³. The larger progresses were achieved during the negotiation of the new Constitution between 2006 and 2009, which reflected the strength and the unity of women movements at that crucial moment³⁴. This statement from a female activist acknowledges that: "the main importance for the unity of the organization of women is to stay intact and not being divided (...). When we're together we can achieve our goals³⁵. Moreover, Bolivian movements have continued to struggle for gender equality, facing notably the rising issue of gender-based violence³⁶.

³⁰United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.8

³¹Interview of a Manager of the Juridical Office for the Defence of Women reported in LARSSON, Jenny. *Bolivian women in politics and organizational life, a minor field study.*, 2011, pp.39.

³²ROUSSEAU, Stéphanie. "Indigenous and feminist movements at the constituent assembly in Bolivia: locating the representation of indigenous women." *Latin American Research Review*, 46(2), 5-28, 2011, pp.21.

³³United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.8

³⁴Mala HTUN & Juan Pablo OSSA (2013), *op.cit.*, pp.12.

³⁵Interview of a Companion of the base organization in Lope Mendoza reported in Jenny LARSSON (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.30

³⁶TeleSur, *Bolivia Leads South America in Women's Political Inclusion*, 2016.

4.1.4 Women movements in Chile

Chile has an "extensive histories of robust women's movements"³⁷. In 1884, several women attempted to register to vote in a national election, arguing that no explicit impediment was stated in the Chilean Constitution. Their demand was refused, leading to a modification on the Constitution, denying their right to vote³⁸. It sparked the women mobilization for their political inclusion. Along the 20th Century, feminist mobilization has led to great improvements of women condition and achieved the largest women representation of South America in the period anterior to Pinochet's Military Regime. Their success landed in their ability to bind feminist ideas with traditional views, as family unit, for instance. Women have lobbied for their social, economical and political rights, "while holding on firmly to their duties as mothers"³⁹, which favoured the support from the conservative and the Catholic elite.

During the Military Regime, Chilean women formed unified and visible movements⁴⁰. They were the first to face the repressive regime, playing a significant role on its defeat by forming an active motherhood⁴¹. The Chilean women movement was characterized by large cross-class linkages, which reflected on their demands for socio-economic improvements and their larger inclusion in the political, economic and social spheres⁴². The transition to democracy represented a unique opportunity for their larger inclusion in the new regime, as its negotiation generated space to raise gender issues and to argue against traditional political practices⁴³.

However, the transition negotiation did not resulted in the women's political empowerment that could have been expected. In the 1990s, women activists attempted to introduce a national Gender Quota Law, which was never approved, while the voluntary quota adopted by some Chilean parties under women's groups pressures led to "minimalist achievements"⁴⁴. As presented in Section 3.3, their large influence as opposition movement against the military regime was not translated into a political one. The women political representation remained low, despite a small and continuous growth with few women reaching formal leadership positions⁴⁵.

³⁷Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.11.

³⁸*Id.*, pp.15.

³⁹*Id.*, pp.13.

⁴⁰Susan FRANCESCHET & Laura MACDONALD (2004), *op.cit.*, pp.20.

⁴¹Susan FRANCESCHET (2001), *op.cit.*, pp.209-210.

⁴²Susan FRANCESCHET & Laura MACDONALD (2004), *op.cit.*, pp.9

⁴³*Id.* 11

⁴⁴Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.67.

⁴⁵Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.35.

4.1.5 The failure to secure women political inclusion in Chile

The failure of the Chilean women movement to secure the introduction of a Gender Quota Law can be explained by its inability to "act decisively when the moment was most auspicious"⁴⁶. The democratization process fragmented the robust and united women movement that lacked of a common strategy and concrete demands for larger women political inclusion⁴⁷. While several women supported the defense of the traditional family unit and the motherhood identity of the movement, others claimed for progressive demands and higher political leadership. Women who mobilized for the introduction of the Gender Quota Law were thus isolated, unable to overcome the opposition of the male-dominated and conservative Congress.

Instead of claiming for gender equality, several women groups adopted a new strategy based on the "women difference"⁴⁸. This strategy was attributed to the overall nature of the Chilean women's movement. It was centralized on the mother identity, therefore, they did not pursue the quota strategy, impeding them to directly pursue political power. Instead of demanding direct power, women groups lobbied for the commitment of the main parties to adopt gender-specific policies. Meanwhile, many women who were active in women movements during the Military Regimes, continued their activities in non-political, social or community organizations⁴⁹, or demobilized and return to their household⁵⁰.

During the new Chilean Constitution negotiation, women movements focused their efforts on the creation of the "*Servicio Nacional de la Mujer*" (National Women's Service - SERNAM). A national institution with ministerial powers, created to defend women interests⁵¹ and seen as the main women achievement of the transition process⁵². It managed to promote some women issues and recognized the need of women political inclusion⁵³. Yet, SERNAM had some drawbacks. The institution became the main interlocutor concerning women issues, weakening the influence of women movements, yet, its role was limited by men coalitions. It was able to secure important social and economic reforms for women, and bills concerning gender-based

⁴⁶Susan FRANCESCHET (2001), *op.cit.*, pp.228.

⁴⁷Susan FRANCESCHET & Laura MACDONALD (2004), *op.cit.*, pp.6

⁴⁸Susan FRANCESCHET (2001), *op.cit.*, pp.208.

⁴⁹*Id.*, 209.

⁵⁰Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.27.

⁵¹Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.65.

⁵²Georgina WAYLEN (2000), *op.cit.*, pp.788.

⁵³Susan FRANCESCHET & Laura MACDONALD (2004), *op.cit.*, pp.12

violence. However, it faced large resistance concerning central gender relation issues, its equal political opportunity plan or sensitive matters, such as divorce or reproductive rights⁵⁴.

As parties were re-emerging during the transition to democracy, the "narrow windows of opportunity for women to challenge fundamentally gender relations in the formal political sphere" closed⁵⁵. "Women were pushed aside"⁵⁶, and few of them were selected as candidates for the forthcoming elections. In the 1990s, female activists aimed to penetrate the party platforms, as parties had restored their domination of politics⁵⁷. Several feminists attempted strategies to increase women influence in parties, creating women sections or pushing for voluntary gender quota adoption, for instance⁵⁸. However, those methods remained unsuccessful, while women interests fragmented into distinct political parties, decreasing the coordination of their actions⁵⁹. Chilean parties adopted "relatively open attitude towards the incorporation of some gender demands", still, they excluded women from the decision-making positions⁶⁰.

In the second half of the 1990s, women Deputies from the Concertación, the left-wing coalition, attempted to introduce a Gender Quota Law. However, they faced strong opposition in the Parliament, including from women from right-wing and conservative parties⁶¹. Notably, in 1997, female Deputies, such as Fanny Pollarolo and Mariana Aylwin (daughter of Patricio Aylwin, former President of Chile 1990-1994), introduced a bill proposal "to promote the right of women to participate in national public life" to the Congress, which consisted in a Gender Candidate Quota Law of 40% for all national elections⁶². Most of the male leaders argued against it, and the bill was not approved⁶³. Finally, women movements were unable to achieve electoral, civil divorce or reproductive rights reforms during the 1990s. They have only managed to form cross-party coalitions in Congress concerning family related issues and gender-based violence⁶⁴.

⁵⁴Georgina WAYLEN (2000), *op.cit.*, pp.786-787.

⁵⁵Susan FRANCESCHET (2001), *op.cit.*, pp.210.

⁵⁶*Id.* 211.

⁵⁷Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.66.

⁵⁸Georgina WAYLEN (2000), *op.cit.*, pp.784.

⁵⁹Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.65.

⁶⁰VALENZUELA, Maria Elena. *Gender issues in Chilean politics.*, Peace Review 2(4), 24-27, 1990, pp.27.

⁶¹Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.69.

⁶²Georgina WAYLEN (2000), *op.cit.*, pp.785.

⁶³Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.70.

⁶⁴Georgina WAYLEN (2000), *op.cit.*, pp.784.

4.1.6 Chilean women movements advances in recent years

Since the transition, women have continued to mobilized through active networks to promote their interests, although the women movement is definitely "no longer characterized by the same degree of cross-class solidarity as it was in the era of the dictatorship"⁶⁵. Some independent feminist movements have militated for electoral reforms and the introduction of a national Gender Quota Law, based on the positive experience of neighbour countries⁶⁶. Recently, several advances have been observable in Chile. For instance, all parties of the Concertación have implemented a voluntary quota⁶⁷, and and there has been improvements on the women access to education and working sphere.

A notable advance was the election of Michelle Bachelet in 2006 as President, which was a "political breakthrough"⁶⁸, as she is a divorced mother who has grown within the Socialist party without carrying the role of "women of". She was also active against the Military Regime until her exile. During her Presidential campaign, she had some contact with feminist activists and she added some of them in her Cabinet⁶⁹. The President having a very powerful position in the Chilean democracy, she managed to push several women bills, including domestic violence, the reduction of gender inequalities, contraception issues and extended child care for poor mothers. However, despite Bachelet election, women remained politically marginalized.

It is finally in 2015, during her second mandate, that Chile adopted a Gender Quota Law, which may leads to a future improvement of women political inclusion. It was aimed to be applied for the 2017 elections and to expire in 2029⁷⁰. The gender Quota Law was already present in the 2005 Michele Bachelet's Program:

*En lo político, conformaremos un gabinete paritario entre hombres y mujeres en los cargos de designación presidencial. Impulsaremos una Ley de Cuotas para corregir el déficit de representación política femenina.*⁷¹

⁶⁵Susan FRANCESCHET & Laura MACDONALD (2004), *op.cit.*, pp.21

⁶⁶Georgina WAYLEN (2000), *op.cit.*, pp.788.

⁶⁷Susan FRANCESCHET (2001), *op.cit.*, pp.228.

⁶⁸Sebastian VALENZUELA & Teresa CORREA (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.204.

⁶⁹The Washington Post, *Chile's president is a woman — and she just scored a major policy victory for women. Here's why that matters.*, 2014

⁷⁰Americas Society - Council of the Americas, *Electoral Reform: Chile to Implement Gender Quotas*, 2015

⁷¹Michelle Bachelet's 2005 Program reported in RAMIL (2008), *op.cit.*, pp.222.

This statement announced that Bachelet aimed to create a Cabinet including both genders, and to promote the adoption of a Gender Quota Law to correct the women representation deficit. In 2015, she also introduced progressive bills such as the legalization of abortion under certain circumstances⁷², which was previously banned in all instances, or the same-sex marriage⁷³.

4.2 Elite support to quotas and reforms (H2)

This subsection will discuss the influence of the elite support to quotas and reforms on the implementation of Gender Quota Law, assuming that *a positive and progressive attitude of the elite towards quotas increase the likeliness to have an effective Gender Quota Law implemented*. There are worldwide evidences that the major drawbacks for women political representation are unfavourable electoral systems and the male domination of political parties⁷⁴. Legislative seats are seen as the ultimate political prize, hence, their access "is usually carefully guarded"⁷⁵ by elites, which often leads to their resistance regarding marginalized groups claims.

4.2.1 Position of the traditional Bolivian elite regarding gender quotas

Historically, Bolivian society has been dominated by a landowner *Criollo* elite, while most of its population has lacked political power. In Bolivian democratic system, political parties have "a monopoly on representation, and citizens can only exercise the right to hold public office and run for election through them"⁷⁶. They are characterized by weak institutionalization, lack of ideological factors, internal divisions and centralization around party leaders. Moreover, the fast democratization process led to the persistence of traditional and authoritarian practices, corruption, along with lack of transparency⁷⁷. The political parties's structures tend to encompass traditional hierarchic relationship between members. The Bolivian transition to democracy process has failed to transform the political culture, decreasing the legitimacy of the Bolivian democratic system.

⁷²The Guardian, *A triumph of reason': Chile approves landmark bill to ease abortion ban*, 2017.

⁷³The Guardian, *'Essential rights': Chile's President Bachelet introduces gay marriage bill*, 2017

⁷⁴Marcela Ríos TOBAR & Andrés VILLAR (2006), *op.cit.*, pp.10

⁷⁵LOVENDUSKI, Joni, *The dynamics of gender and party*. in *Women, Gender, and Politics: A reader*, 2010, pp.84.

⁷⁶Jimena Costa BENAVIDES (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.7.

⁷⁷*Id.*, 8.

Bolivian parties have not been supportive of the 1997 Gender Quota Law, assimilating it "out of obligation, not out of democratic conviction"⁷⁸. The male elite tended to consider that the women inclusion "implies a loss of their privileges"⁷⁹. Therefore, they have used several strategies to mitigate the effect of the implemented gender quota. The 1997 law had no placement mandate. Thus, parties tended to place women in alternate positions, the smoothest way to obey the law, without affecting the male leaders' interests⁸⁰. Table 4.1 presents the electoral results of the Lower House separated by main and alternates (substitutes) members between 1982 and 2009. It reflects that the law introduction mainly led to an increase of female alternates in 1997 and 2005. A similar feature was observed in the Senate⁸¹. Moreover, several irregularities occurred, such as men registering in candidates list using women names⁸². Parties also tended to turn to sisters, wives or family-related women of influential male party members or to any women who is expected to not interfere in the decisions of her male counterparts, independently of their competence, preparation or willingness⁸³.

Table 4.1 – Total number of female main and substitute members of the Chamber of Deputies in Bolivia between 1982 and 2009. The total number of main and substitute members is 130. Table from United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.5

Before quotas were introduced					Quotas and mixed electoral system			Parity & alternation
	1982	1985	1989	1993	1997	2002	2005	2009
Main	1	4	11	11	13	24	19	33
Substitute	3	7	13	19	28	28	37	97

Furthermore, the Bolivian political elite established a mixed electoral system in 1997, as a mean to reduce the effects of the Gender Quota Law⁸⁴. The law only mandated practical dispositions for the 62 Lower House seats (over 130) allocated by the proportional representation method. Thus, although women gained 18%, 26% and 47% of those 62 seats in 1997, 2002 and 2009 respectively, they only achieved 11.5%, 18.5% and 22.3% of the total Lower House seats for those elections⁸⁵, illustrating the negative effect of this mixed system. The elite managed to mitigate the impact of the law, which globally showed disappointing outcomes. Moreover,

⁷⁸*Id.*, 9.

⁷⁹Cecilia CORDOVA (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.13.

⁸⁰Jimena Costa BENAVIDES (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.2.

⁸¹United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.5

⁸²Cecilia CORDOVA (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.12.

⁸³MONASTERIOS, Karin & MEALLA, Luis Tapia, *Partidos y Participacion Politica de las Mujeres en El Alto*, 2001, pp. 84.

⁸⁴United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.5

⁸⁵Mala HTUN & Juan Pablo OSSA (2013), *op.cit.*, pp.12.

elected women representatives have "suffered from discriminatory sexist attitudes that led to psychological abuse, as well as overt physical violence when performing their roles"⁸⁶.

4.2.2 The rise of the *Movimiento al Socialismo* in Bolivia

The election of the President Evo Morales and the rise of the the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS) marked a turning point in Bolivian political history. Since 2006, the MAS became the main political force of Bolivia. Morales administration has shown impressive electoral success with its 2009 Constitution, reaching 61% of approval in a national referendum⁸⁷. As discussed in Section 4.1, it is a pro-reform government, which promotes greater inclusion of the marginalized citizens in the decision-making process⁸⁸. Morales introduced a reserved seat quota for indigenous, conjointly, he also favoured great advances concerning gender claims. The MAS won the election of the Constituent Assembly, with 46.72% of its elected candidates being women⁸⁹. The 2009 Bolivian Constitution is considered progressive; it includes important women interests, along with economic, social and electoral reforms⁹⁰ (Appendix B provides some main articles, for informative purpose). During this period, the remarkable Gender Parity and Alternation Law was democratically adopted, "without roadblocks, strikes, or intimidation"⁹¹.

As a consequence, women have been included in various leadership positions, rising in number in the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate or the Government (this is illustrated in the Figure 4.7, in Appendix C). In 2010, under the pressure of *Las Bartolinas*, the first ever Bolivian Cabinet to comprise 50% of women was appointed⁹². In this government, women obtained "influential ministries such as the Ministry of Planning and Defence"⁹³. However, this number decreased back to 20% in 2017. Women leadership role have also grown inside their political parties, in the Court of Justice or in the national electoral management⁹⁴. For instance, the 2011 election of the Supreme Court led to 33% of women titular judges⁹⁵.

⁸⁶Cecilia CORDOVA (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.6.

⁸⁷United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.4

⁸⁸Ben M. MCKAY (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.3.

⁸⁹Stéphanie ROUSSEAU (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.12.

⁹⁰United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.4

⁹¹Mala HTUN & Juan Pablo OSSA (2013), *op.cit.*, pp.5.

⁹²*Id.*, pp.12.

⁹³United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.7

⁹⁴*Ibid.*

⁹⁵The World bank (2015), *op.cit.*, pp. 24.

However, the reform capacity of the MAS government was limited by some conservative elite, contesting the social and economic changes⁹⁶. In the Constituent Assembly, the MAS did not obtain an absolute majority, which led to "tough negotiations and confrontations in Congress" with the traditional elite⁹⁷. The parity and alternation principles were even temporarily removed by legislators. Notwithstanding, women unity managed to secure them, as discussed in Section 4.1, despite of sexist remarks, hostility from male legislators and harassment of elected female officials⁹⁸.

Likewise, parties complied with those principles "in a minimalist manner, conforming to a common tendency in Latin American elections"⁹⁹. Indeed, only 36.23% of the women were placed as titular candidates and women represented only 23.52% of the first positions of parties in 2009¹⁰⁰, justifying the results previously displayed in Table 4.1. In particular, the MAS has aimed to appear as a "women-friendly" party, however, gender issues are not its main concerns; it is more conceived as a piece of the decolonisation of the state¹⁰¹. In fact, "much of the MAS's male leadership – especially the president – displayed little awareness of gender discrimination" and the "President Morales is notorious for making insensitive and even sexist comments in public"¹⁰².

In 2010, the parity law, formalizing the parity and alternation principles, managed to overcome the political party barrier, leading to impressive results in 2014, as discussed in Section 3.3. Nevertheless, new challenges have emerged. Several negative actions of male politicians towards female representatives have been reported in Bolivia, including: manipulation, pressures to guarantee the vote alignment and to limit gender issues proposals¹⁰³, harassment, threats, public humiliation, physical aggression, kidnapping or even feminicide¹⁰⁴. Notably, female titulars have been constantly threatened to resign their offices in favour of male alternates¹⁰⁵.

⁹⁶Ben M. MCKAY (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.3.

⁹⁷Stéphanie ROUSSEAU (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.5.

⁹⁸Mala HTUN & Juan Pablo OSSA (2013), *op.cit.*, pp.11.

⁹⁹*Id.*, pp.12.

¹⁰⁰ALBAINE, Laura, *Paridad de género y ciudadanía política de las mujeres. El caso de Bolivia y Ecuador* (2009). Argumentos. Revista de crítica social, 12, 2010, pp. 129.

¹⁰¹Mala HTUN & Juan Pablo OSSA (2013), *op.cit.*, pp.10.

¹⁰²*Id.*, pp.10.

¹⁰³The World bank (2015), *op.cit.*, pp. 25.

¹⁰⁴Cecilia CORDOVA (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.13.

¹⁰⁵Mala HTUN & Juan Pablo OSSA (2013), *op.cit.*, pp.11.

Between 2000 and 2011, 572 episodes have been registered¹⁰⁶, mainly at the municipal level, and the "Bolivian police received more than 4,000 complaints of harassment from women participating in politics"¹⁰⁷. In response, the government recently passed a special law Against Political Harassment and Political Violence¹⁰⁸.

4.2.3 The traditional conservative Chilean elite

Chile is a very conservative country, notably concerning gender relations¹⁰⁹. Its elite has shown little mobility during the past decades¹¹⁰. The Catholic Church influences "is undeniably the primary source of the conservatism within Chile"¹¹¹, hindering women political inclusion, as it tends to promote traditional gender relation and encourages "women to embrace their primary role as mothers"¹¹². The Church secured its legitimacy and authority after the transition to democracy, due to their opposition to the dictatorial regime and its human rights violation¹¹³. As discussed in Section 3.2, the latter managed to negotiate the terms of the transition to democracy and they used several strategies to maintain the power in the hand of the conservative political elite. The General Pinochet obtained immunity and a Senator-for-life position, maintaining a certain political power in Chilean politics.

Therefore, reforms concerning social or women issues have faced tough opposition. It has also long prevented the introduction of any social or electoral reforms. FRANCESCHET has describe the country position on women issue as the following:

*Women's issues are dealt with in an extremely conservative manner and any perceived challenge to traditional family values is met with strong resistance not only from the Church, but also from the political Right and even conservative elements of the Christian Democratic Party.*¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷Cecilia CORDOVA (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.12.

¹⁰⁸United nations development Programme (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.21.

¹⁰⁹ARAUJO, Clara, and DINIZ ALVES, José Eustáquio, *Impactos de indicadores sociais e do sistema eleitoral sobre as chances das mulheres nas eleições e suas interações com as cotas.*, Dados-Revista de Ciências Sociais, 50(3), 2007, pp.536.

¹¹⁰María de los Ángeles Fernández RAMIL (2008), *op.cit.*, pp.226.

¹¹¹Ameyá S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.35.

¹¹²*Id.*, pp.0.

¹¹³*Id.*, pp.36.

¹¹⁴Susan FRANCESCHET (2001), *op.cit.*, pp.229.

Women movements have faced strong opposition concerning women issues that challenged the conservative definition of gender relation. For instance, it was only in 2004 that Chile legalized civil divorce, despite a strong opposition from the Church¹¹⁵. Moreover, until 2015, Chile was the only South American country to proscribe abortion in all instances (the 2014 South American policies concerning abortion are provided in Table 4.4, in the Appendix C). Chilean women even risk a 5-year imprisonment for having illegal abortion. In 2015, Michelle Bachelet finally legalized it in case of life danger and rape¹¹⁶. Until recently, the conservative elite have blocked all proposals of national Gender Quota Law from the public policies agenda. The Chilean elite has been found to be the main opponent to gender quotas¹¹⁷. In the 1990s, for instance, the male leaders of the Concertation opposed to the proposal of women deputies from their own parties, as discussed in Section 4.1. Moreover, conservative Chilean elite has also shown reticence concerning the recognition of other marginalized groups, such as the indigenous, which remained largely excluded until the present days¹¹⁸.

4.2.4 The influence of the binomial electoral system in Chile

Another proposed explanation for the insufficient inclusion of women in politics is the unique Chilean binomial system negotiated by the Military Regime, which raised "barriers to popular participation and obstacles to institutional reforms, especially constitutional amendments"¹¹⁹. It was particularly disadvantageous for minorities and small political parties¹²⁰, and it favoured an over-representation of the right-conservative coalition that managed to block any political and electoral reforms¹²¹. Moreover, this yielded an over-representation of upper class female candidates from right and conservative parties that were less likely to support feminist policies¹²². This system remained in place for 25 years, until the recent electoral reform of Bachelet's government, replacing it by a open-list PR system.

The large power granted to the Executive and its lack of women empowerment made it difficult for women deputies to pass gender issues¹²³. Indeed, the Chilean Government has been

¹¹⁵Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.17.

¹¹⁶The Guardian, *Can Chile's abortion rights reforms overcome staunch religious opposition?*, 2015.

¹¹⁷Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.71.

¹¹⁸Maite DE CEA, Mariana HEREDIA & Diego VALDIVIESO, *op.cit.*, pp.333.

¹¹⁹Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.63.

¹²⁰*Id.*, 65.

¹²¹*Id.*, pp.64.

¹²²*Id.*, pp.67.

¹²³Georgina WAYLEN (2000), *op.cit.*, pp.785.

largely dominated by men. For instance, the first appointed Government subsequent to the transition to democracy did not include any women¹²⁴. Meanwhile, the SERNAM, implemented with the objective to be the main institution promoting gender issues (See Section 4.1), had seen its budget and functions scaled down by the conservative right-wing elite¹²⁵.

If Chilean democracy is a multi-party system, the binomial system favoured an electoral organization centered on two major coalitions (the center-left and the right-conservative) that aimed to maximize their share of the votes. It provided them a monopoly of the access to the political world. Women have tended to be "invisible" to the male party elite, unwilling to grant them higher positions. FRANCESCHET reported that her interviews with female politicians have revealed how political parties have remained the principal barrier to women access to politics in Chile. Between 1989 and 2005, 90.3% of the overall candidates introduced by political parties in election list were men¹²⁶. The women sections formed in various parties have gained only small visibility, remaining "excluded from central decision-making bodies"¹²⁷. Moreover, male politicians tend to perpetuate cultural political practices unfavourable for women inclusion, such as late discussions that prevent women to spend the night with their family. This is particularly important due to the widespread traditional women role as mothers¹²⁸.

Before the implementation of the quota law, women movements have lobbied for the introduction of voluntary Gender Quota. Three main Chilean parties adopted it: Partido por la Democracia (PPD - 40%), Partido Socialista (PS - 30%) and Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC - 20%)¹²⁹. However, none of those implemented quotas has achieved its full capacity. In the 1993 election, the candidates provided by the PS and the PPD to the Concertación coalition included only 9.2% of women. In 1997, only 18.3% of the candidates for Lower House elections were women, with the PS and PPD list including 19% and 17% of women respectively, far from their voluntary quota¹³⁰. They have tended to place women in lower positions or in competition against each others, and to rely on "fake candidates" and "women of" mechanism¹³¹.

¹²⁴Maria Elena VALENZUELA (1990), *op.cit.*, pp.24.

¹²⁵Georgina WAYLEN (2000), *op.cit.*, pp.786.

¹²⁶Marcela Ríos TOBAR & Andrés VILLAR (2006), *op.cit.*, pp.29

¹²⁷*Id.*, 65.

¹²⁸Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.35.

¹²⁹*Id.*, pp.66.

¹³⁰Georgina WAYLEN (2000), *op.cit.*, pp.783.

¹³¹Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.67.

Moreover, political parties have also demonstrated little support to the introduction of a national Gender Quota¹³². In 1996, the male political leaders opposed the proposal arguing that there were not enough women available, although women composed about half of the parties members¹³³. In 2006, when Bachelet was elected with a program including a proposal of Gender Quota Law, 50.8% of the deputies interviewed were against it¹³⁴. Once again, the main arguments used was the insufficiency of willing and competent women, and the concept of merit¹³⁵. Still, the Gender Quota Law was adopted in 2015, as discussed in Section 4.1.

4.3 Public opinion towards gender quotas and women leadership (H3)

This subsection will discuss the influence of the public opinion concerning gender quota and women leadership on the implementation of Gender Quota Law, assuming that *a positive public opinion increases the likeliness to have an effective Gender Quota Law implemented*. The political leadership has been traditionally portrayed by masculine models. Women have to overcome this culturally constructed masculinity representation of the political leader and the cultural mother/housekeeper role model that have been imposed to them¹³⁶.

4.3.1 Bolivian opinion on women leadership

In Bolivia, both the indigenous and the Catholic cultures have built a masculine definition of leadership¹³⁷, which have influenced voters' opinions. All the leadership positions of the society have traditionally been occupied by men. For instance, most of the historic political leaders and the Catholic priests are male, while the highest authority position in indigenous tradition is denied to women, youths, single persons, and those who do not own land¹³⁸. Moreover, the cultural construction of the Bolivian family "is built upon that the man is the domestic provider

¹³²Tricia GRAY (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.66.

¹³³*Id.*, pp.70.

¹³⁴María de los Ángeles Fernández RAMIL (2008), *op.cit.*, pp.225.

¹³⁵*Id.*, pp.226.

¹³⁶ROBERTS, Stephanie, & KULKARNI, Kishore G., *Measuring Development through Women's Empowerment: A Case of Comparison, Brazil & Bolivia*. Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, 3(1), 10, 2011, pp.145.

¹³⁷Jimena Costa BENAVIDES (2003), *op.cit.*, pp.9.

¹³⁸*Ibid.*

whilst the woman is the housekeeper"¹³⁹. Women also tend to enjoy less visibility in Bolivian society. Despite the high women participation to the social, economic and political sphere, it has been found that women receive a mere 26% of the informative coverage¹⁴⁰.

The relative failure of the 1997 Gender Quota Law can be explained by its inability to overcome "the traditional gender roles in Bolivian society" that barrier women political participation in Bolivia¹⁴¹. It has been largely reported by Bolivian women and observers that widespread gender prejudices have filled Bolivian society. Men have been commonly assumed as better prepared for the political world¹⁴², justifying that women are rarely placed in main ministries such as defense or external affairs¹⁴³. Women have also been perceived as weaker than men and unable to make the required sacrifices to dedicate themselves to a political career¹⁴⁴, although the current large participation of women shows the shortcut of this statement. Moreover, the traditional Bolivian society encompasses negative perceptions toward women politicians, seen as "neglecting what she should prioritize", which is her tasks as a mother and a wife¹⁴⁵, as illustrated by the following statement of a women activist:

*When I went to the first meeting of the central Pocona, the men didn't let me speak, and they asked me (...) why I wasn't cooking for my children, not even a word they allowed me to speak.*¹⁴⁶

Moreover, a 2014 public opinion survey from the World Bank has revealed this "persistence of gender stereotypes that depict the man as the principal breadwinner"¹⁴⁷. This survey found for instance that more than 60% of the Bolivian women interviewed agreed that "men should provide for the family", compared to only 30% of them agreeing that "women should provide for the family". This survey also found that 65% of those women agreed that politically active women neglect their duties as wives and mothers, showing slightly higher agreement from

¹³⁹LARSSON, Jenny. *Bolivian women in politics and organizational life, a minor field study.*, 2011, pp.26

¹⁴⁰Coordinadora de la mujer (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.11.

¹⁴¹Cecilia CORDOVA (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.11.

¹⁴²Jenny LARSSON (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.27

¹⁴³*Id.*, pp.35

¹⁴⁴Cecilia CORDOVA (2017), *op.cit.*, pp.9.

¹⁴⁵Jenny LARSSON (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.27

¹⁴⁶Interview of a Companion from the base organization in Lope Mendoza, Pocona reported in Jenny LARSSON (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.26.

¹⁴⁷The World bank (2015), *op.cit.*, pp. 17

indigenous women compared to non-indigenous¹⁴⁸. Other local surveys have revealed similar pattern¹⁴⁹.

However, despite the persistence of those prejudices, Bolivian voters have been found likely to disagree that "men as better leaders than women". Figure 4.2 presents the percentage of disagreement and strong disagreement with this statement in Latin America obtained by a 2009 survey from the Latino Barómetro¹⁵⁰.




Figure 4.2 – Attitudes toward Male and Female Leaders in Latin America. Figure from HTUN, Mala, & PISCOPO Jennifer, *Women in politics and policy in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum Working Papers on Women in Politics, 2, 2014, pp.17.

One can observe that almost 80% of the Bolivian women and 70% of the Bolivian men either disagreed or strongly disagreed that "men make better political leaders than women" in 2009, which correspond to the year of the new Bolivian Constitution adoption. Bolivia actually showed one of the highest scores for both genders (higher than Chile for instance). Similar

¹⁴⁸The World bank (2015), *op.cit.*, pp. 25

¹⁴⁹Coordinadora de la mujer, *A situación de las mujeres en Bolivia. Encuesta nacional de discriminación y exclusión social*, 2014. pp.152.

¹⁵⁰Latino Barómetro, <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>

results were reported in 2014 by the *Coordinadora de la Mujer*, with 77.5% of the Bolivian women interviewed disagreeing that "men are better leader than women"¹⁵¹. This trend may justify the success of the parity law. Moreover, recent women's testimonies have revealed that their access to public spheres "has become less problematic"¹⁵², mainly because of the huge increase of the number of women already present.

Nonetheless, as the inclusion of women in economical and political spheres has been relatively fast, it has led to some hostile reactions of their male counterparts. For instance, an increase of the domestic violence and several complications of the family relation have been reported, revealing the resistance of the traditional gender relation ideas. Female politicians have faced resistance from their family¹⁵³, in particular from their husbands, reproaching their negligence of their home duties or because of "jealousy and fear that they would meet other men"¹⁵⁴. Moreover, women have suffered from gender-political assaults from some male politicians opposed to their political inclusion, as discussed in Section 4.2, creating a rampant fear within the women group¹⁵⁵.

4.3.2 Bolivian opinion on women representation and gender quota

Despite the persistence of negative prejudices towards women inclusion in politics, women have managed to achieve impressive representation in Bolivia. It can be bond to a robust construction of their feminine identity, inherited from the discrimination felt by a most of them¹⁵⁶. This is illustrated by the results of a 2014 survey¹⁵⁷, depicted in Figure 4.3. The survey found that 82.2% of the indigenous women interviewed and 81.3% of the non-indigenous ones agreed that "female politicians represent better female constituents than their male counterparts", which "suggests that there is a clear demand and approval for female leadership in politics despite the many remaining barriers that female politicians face"¹⁵⁸. This is in agreement with reported testimonies and interviews of Bolivian women¹⁵⁹. It is interesting to notice that the perceived principal reason of the current high women representation in Bolivian is the higher recognition

¹⁵¹Coordinadora de la mujer (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.152.

¹⁵²Jenny LARSSON (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.30

¹⁵³The guardian, *Bolivian women are breaking down barriers to seek political power*, 2012.

¹⁵⁴Jenny LARSSON (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.26-27

¹⁵⁵*Id.*, 27

¹⁵⁶*Id.*, 29

¹⁵⁷The World bank (2015), *op.cit.*, pp. 25

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹Jenny LARSSON (2011), *op.cit.*

of their rights by the Bolivian women, which comes in front of the 2010 parity quota, as revealed by a 2014 survey¹⁶⁰. It outlines the importance of the women identity.




Figure 4.3 – Percentage of agreements of Bolivian indigenous and non-indigenous women with "Female politicians represent better female constituents than their male counterparts. Data from Coordinadora (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.152.

An interesting feature is the slightly higher score provided by indigenous women. It has been discussed in Section 4.1 that, in the 1990s, indigenous women showed little interest in gender-balance political representation, and the 1997 law was mainly supported by urban feminists. This growth of indigenous women awareness concerning the need of their political representation can be bonded to the rise of the MAS in the 2000s. The Bolivian traditional patriarchal structure of the society has been challenged by the decolonisation process promoted by the MAS. It has brought a public recognition of the necessity of the simultaneous "de-patriarchalisation" of the society in the transformation process¹⁶¹. The indigenous principles of gender complementary have been absorbed by the indigenous movement and the MAS government, leading to the advances previously discussed in Section 4.1. The awareness concerning Bolivian patriarchal society among women is illustrated by the following statement from a women activist:

*I think that the problem is something more profound. We have a colonial mentality, I know that this is an obstacle for advancing. We have a patriarchal mentality, it is embodied in all public spheres, even in the 'Bartolinas' and with the women in the city*¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰Coordinadora de la mujer (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.149.

¹⁶¹Jenny LARSSON (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.45

¹⁶²Interviewed of a Manager of the bicentennial program of Cochabamba reported in Jenny LARSSON (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.38.

It denounces the remaining obstacle of the deep-rooted patriarchal traditions. Surveys have indeed showed that Bolivian women tend to acknowledge the remaining obstacles faced by female politicians. In 2014, despite the parity law, only 4.2% of Bolivian women believed that they were no remaining obstacles to their full political participation¹⁶³. The lack of time due to their family duties or the fear of rejection were found to be the main perceived barriers.

Nevertheless, Bolivian women are aware of the great achievements made concerning their access to politics. The recent large introduction of women in politics has helped to tumble several cultural barriers to women political inclusion. Indeed, a 2014 survey revealed that 70% of the interviewed women believed that equality has been achieved in Bolivian politics, while 72% of them believed that female politicians are as powerful as male politicians¹⁶⁴. Moreover, this survey revealed that 46% of them believed they are guaranteed the freedom of political participation, which is a slightly lower score than the men's one (50%). Meanwhile, another 2014 survey revealed that only 11% of the interviewed women felt discriminated in social organization and political parties¹⁶⁵. Finally, surveys have revealed that more than half of the Bolivian population believed that gender equality is guaranteed or strongly guaranteed in Bolivia, over the period from 2007 to 2015¹⁶⁶. This trend has been found to be relatively stable (Figures 4.8 and 4.8 in Appendix C illustrates this statement).

4.3.3 Chilean opinion towards women leadership

As previously discussed, Chile is one of the most patriarchal and conservative countries of South America¹⁶⁷. The Catholic Church still enjoys an influential position and its norms prevail, in some cases, on the country's laws¹⁶⁸. Due to the open-list characteristic of the Chilean electoral system, voters' attitudes concerning women candidates are a determinant factors influencing women political representation.

¹⁶³The World bank (2015), *op.cit.*, pp. 25

¹⁶⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵Coordinadora de la mujer (2014), *op.cit.*, pp.161.

¹⁶⁶Latino Barómetro, <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>

¹⁶⁷ROEMHILDT, Lisa, *Understanding Women's Representation in Chile*, UW-L Journal of Undergraduate Research, 2016, pp.1

¹⁶⁸Ameya S. ANANTH (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.17 and pp.35.

It has been shown that most of the Chilean voters collect information concerning candidates through public medias¹⁶⁹. In Chile, public medias have tended to spread traditional values and gender prejudices with respect to gender roles¹⁷⁰, influencing voters' perceptions. For instance, some have accused Chilean medias of an "*asesinato de imagen*" ("image murder") of the President Bachelet.¹⁷¹ It has been found that their attitudes have also hindered advances concerning gender equality¹⁷². The comparison of the public media portray of male and female candidates has revealed a gendered pattern¹⁷³. Men are commonly assumed to be "efficient, competent and rational" leaders¹⁷⁴, and medias tend to provide information concerning their occupations, experiences or accomplishments. Meanwhile, women are confronted to a traditional masculine definition of leadership and gender prejudices, such as their generic "incapacity" to rule a country¹⁷⁵. They tend to disseminate personal information of female candidates, "highlighting the stereotypes of care, compassion and motherliness" they traditionally represents¹⁷⁶.

Nevertheless, surveys have tended to reveal positive public attitudes towards female politicians, especially among women¹⁷⁷. For instance, a 2016 public opinion survey found that Chileans are not likely to preferentially vote for male candidates (66% indicated no candidate's gender preference, while 16% and 15% indicated a preference for male and female candidates, respectively)¹⁷⁸. Therefore, the inclusion of women in high positions of parties' lists may lead to a consequent increase of women representation. In fact, by comparing the electoral performance of female and male candidates in 2001 and 2005, researchers have found that women from both main Chilean coalitions displayed better performances than their male counterparts¹⁷⁹. Moreover, in 2006, the country has elected a women at the highest political position, which illustrates the relative low rate of negative opinions on women politicians among voters.

¹⁶⁹A 2009 survey found that 64% of the interviewed population were informed about candidates' campaign through television, with only 1.9% through parties' programs, FUENTES SAAVEDRA, Claudio, *Chile 2009: percepciones y actitudes sociales*, 2010, pp.9.

¹⁷⁰Susan FRANCESCHET (2001), *op.cit.*, pp.225.

¹⁷¹María de los Ángeles Fernández RAMIL (2008), *op.cit.*, pp.227.

¹⁷²FORT, Lucía, INDU, John-Abraham, ORLANDO, Maria Beatriz, & PIRAS, Claudia, *Chile - Reconciling the Gender Paradox.*, 2007, pp.2.

¹⁷³THOMAS, Gwynn, *Michelle Bachelet's Liderazgo Femenino (Feminine Leadership). Redefining political leadership in Chile's 2005 presidential campaign*. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13(1), 63-82, 2011 , pp.77.

¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵María de los Ángeles Fernández RAMIL (2008), *op.cit.*, pp.227.

¹⁷⁶Sebastian VALENZUELA & Teresa CORREA (2009), *op.cit.*, pp.205.

¹⁷⁷María de los Ángeles Fernández RAMIL (2008), *op.cit.*, pp.225.

¹⁷⁸Auditoría a la democracia, *IV encuesta nacional*, 2016.

¹⁷⁹Marcela Ríos TOBAR & Andrés VILLAR (2006), *op.cit.*, pp.29

Figure 4.4 presents the percentages of agreement with the statement "men are better leader than women" within the Chilean population in 2009 (consistent with Figure 4.2) and in 2016, reported in a 2016 survey¹⁸⁰. It shows that most of the interviewees disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement, both in 2009 and 2016. However, an interesting pattern is the large decrease of the proportion of agreements, coupled with an increase of the proportion of strong disagreements, which may reveal a trend of more favourable public opinion towards women leadership in Chile.




Figure 4.4 – Percentage of agreement with the statement men are better leader than women among Chilean women, comparison between 2009 and 2016. Data from Auditoría a la democracia (2016), *op.cit.*.

Furthermore, the election of Michelle Bachelet in 2006 has challenged the traditional masculine definition of leadership. During her campaign, she was abundantly attacked on her pre-supposed lack leadership ability. For instance, her main opponent called her a "valiant women" but claimed that she lacked of "tenacity and leadership" to be a good ruler¹⁸¹. However, she successfully confronted those attacks affirming her "feminine leadership"¹⁸², as illustrated by this following speech:

There are distinct types of leadership: there are types of leadership that are more traditional, the father that decides and directs, and there are styles of leadership, that are, in general, more feminine, that are more about articu-

¹⁸⁰Auditoría a la democracia (2016), *op.cit.*.

¹⁸¹The guardian, *Victim of Pinochet era asks Chilean voters to make history*, 2006.

¹⁸²Gwynn THOMAS (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.78.

*lating and calling people to join together to pursue noble work.*¹⁸³

Her high approval rating during her first mandate¹⁸⁴ may be seen as a informal agreement of the Chilean population with her leadership capacity.

4.3.4 Chilean opinion on women representation and gender quota

Although, public opinion appears to be positive concerning women leadership, it is not reflected on the women political representation that has remained low in Chile. It has been revealed that the population is aware of the unequal access to political power. In fact, the overall Chilean society is qualified by a most of its citizens as "unfair"¹⁸⁵, which reveals a public awareness of the rampant pattern of inequalities that composes the country. This awareness is an essential factor for positive public attitudes towards redistribute methods. Public opinion data on the extent of the gender equality guarantees in Chile showed a global growth of negative answers from 2007 to 2015¹⁸⁶ (as illustrated by Figures 4.10 and 4.11 in the Appendix C). This trend outlined the increasing awareness concerning the matter. Moreover, women tend to have more pessimist opinions than men, due to their constant experience of the gender-based discrimination¹⁸⁷. A 2017 survey also revealed that 88% of the Chilean women considered Chile as a sexist country, with its workplaces and politics being the worst spaces for them¹⁸⁸.

It has been found that the perceived inequalities are the principal reasons of citizens' mistrust toward the Chilean Democracy¹⁸⁹. Hence, redistributive policies and the inclusion of the marginalized social groups, notably women, is expected to inflate Chilean democracy legitimacy. A 2006 survey collected opinions from Chilean women on the matter of the women inclusion in political and public positions. It noticed that 87% of the interviewees hoped for a more balanced gender political representation, while 80% of them requested a gender balanced representation in all public positions¹⁹⁰. The results outline the positive women opinion

¹⁸³Michelle Bachelet debate with Sebastián Piñera reported in of a Companion from the base organization in Lope Mendoza, Pocona reported in Gwynn THOMAS (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.64.

¹⁸⁴Gwynn THOMAS (2011), *op.cit.*, pp.78.

¹⁸⁵Claudio FUENTES SAAVEDRA (2010), *op.cit.*, pp.9.

¹⁸⁶Latino Barómetro, <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>

¹⁸⁷Maite DE CEA, Mariana HEREDIA & Diego VALDIVIESO, *op.cit.*, 2016, pp.336.

¹⁸⁸Centro Regional de Derechos Humanos y Justicia de Género, Corporación Humanas *Percepciones de las Mujeres sobre su situación y condiciones de vida en Chile 2017, Duodécima Encuesta Nacion*, 2017.

¹⁸⁹Auditoría a la democracia (2016), *op.cit.*.

¹⁹⁰Centro Regional de Derechos Humanos y Justicia de Género, Corporación Humanas (2017), *op.cit.*.

concerning the importance of their political representation. This large support to a women representation claim was found the year of Bachelet election. Finally, the same survey found that 81% of women feels discriminated in the political sphere.

The 2015 Chilean Gender Quota Law may provide an effective response to the women requests of better gender-balanced political representation. Figure 4.5 presents the main results of a 2017 survey on women opinion concerning their access to politics and the gender quota mechanism¹⁹¹. This survey was made just before the quota the law application (October 2017). One can notice that a mere 6% of them believed that politics should be only accessible to men. The old men-only political world ideology seems to have vanished in Chile. Moreover, 74.4% of them believed that the political world remains discriminating towards women. The interviewed women tended to put the burden on the political parties, pointing out them as the main obstacle to women political access. Indeed, 64% of them believed that parties provide few opportunities to them. An interesting feature is that 78% of them argued in favour of the Gender Quota Law mechanism, showing the positive women opinion concerning the method. The optimism towards this method may be revealed by a last result expressing that 72,5% of the interviewed women believed that women have achieved major breakthroughs concerning their access to Congress and decision-making positions¹⁹². It reveals that Chilean women are upset with inequalities and willing for a better political representation.




Figure 4.5 – Perceptions of Chilean women concerning their access to politics in 2017. Data from Centro Regional de Derechos Humanos y Justicia de Género, Corporación Humanas(2017), *op.cit.*.

¹⁹¹ *Idem.*

¹⁹² *Idem..*

Conclusion

South America has achieved the higher improvement of the women political representation since the 1990s. This is notably due to Gender Quota Laws application, appearing as attractive tools to quickly improve the women political representation. This research has provided a comparative analysis of Bolivia and Chile, two countries with similar contexts but very different outcomes in terms of women Parliamentary inclusion growth. Bolivia has introduced a Legislated Candidate Quota Law, later enforced and improved through several electoral reforms. It has led to the first ever South American Lower House composed by more than a half of female members. Meanwhile, Chile has not adopted any national gender quota until 2015, which led to a women representation that has never exceed a fifth of its Lower House. In this research, the negative or positive influence of three selected actors, the women mobilization, the elite and the voters, has been analysed as hypothetical explanation for this contrast. The comparison of the Bolivian and Chilean case studies has provided evidences to corroborate or falsify each of the three raised hypotheses.

It has been found that Bolivian women have mobilized since the 1990s, achieving several electoral reforms. The well organized feminist movement secured a Gender Quota Law in 1997. Yet, it showed relatively unsuccessful results, which can be explained by the lack of support from the elite that managed to relatively bypass its impact along with the traditional perception of women's role in society that has long limited its effectiveness. Meanwhile, in Chile, the strong and united women mobilization formed during the Military Regime did not manage to benefit from the unique opportunity provided by the transition to democracy to guarantee their political participation. Instead of demanding a Gender Quota Law, they adopted a "women difference" strategy, inherent to the motherhood identity of the movement. The movement fragmented and women politically active felt too isolated to secure the Gender Quota Law proposal. Meanwhile, the democratisation of the country restored the male-dominated traditional political organizations, and installed an electoral system that maintain the conservative elite in power. Moreover, conservative gender role beliefs were widespread among voters, notably due to the large influence of the Catholic Church.

The year of 2006 has been found to be a central electoral turnaround for both countries. In Bolivia, large progresses were achieved during the negotiation of the new Constitution, outlining the close link between the women movements success and its ability to overcome historical divisions to establish a common political strategy. The election of Evo Morales from the MAS party, has strongly modified the Bolivian political arena, favouring the adoption of "women-friendly" reforms, as the MAS decolonisation process included actions for the removal of the patriarchal structure of the society, inherited from its colonial regime. The 2010 Gender Parity Law has left little space for party bypass, which may explain its great results. The larger inclusion of women in politics has eased their access to politics and softened negative prejudices. Yet, despite the achievements, women are conscious that they are still much work to do to reach gender equality in Bolivia, notably concerning gender-based violence.

In Chile, the 2006 Presidential election resulted in Michelle Bachelet's victory, supported by some feminist movements, which changed the *status quo*. With the high power granted to the President in the Chilean democracy, she managed to introduce several women bills. Yet, she faced strong opposition from the conservative elite, which has been found to be the main barrier to women political access in Chile. Conversely, no pattern of negative voters' attitude was found. In fact, most of Chilean women were demanding a quota strategy. Finally, it is only in 2015 that Bachelet managed to reform the damaging electoral system inherited from the transition, including a Gender Quota Law.

If gender quotas may lead to impressive results, they are not sufficient to guarantee gender political equality in the long run. Education, information and constant mobilizations are longer-term solutions, while quotas provide only a boost to increase the women political representation, often seen as temporary measures. For instance, Chilean Gender Quota Law is set to expire in 2029. In South America, global improvements of the women condition is perceptive. Women have closed the gender gap of primary and secondary school enrollment¹⁹³ and improved their economic participation, despite rampant inequalities and "archaic" discrimination¹⁹⁴.

¹⁹³ROBERTS, Stephanie, & KULKARNI, Kishore G., *Measuring Development through Women's Empowerment: A Case of Comparison, Brazil & Bolivia*. Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, 3(1), 10, 2011, pp.146

¹⁹⁴*Id.*, pp.149

This research presented several limitations. First, due to time and resource constraints, the geographical framework has been reduced to two South American countries. Therefore, the conclusions made reflect the selection of those two cases. It induces no general findings, as the results are bound to the cases contexts and may not be applied to other region of the world, for instance. Similarly, the number of hypotheses have been reduced to the hypothetical influence of three key actors. However, other explanatory factors may have been omitted. For instance, this research has not taken into account the influence of international actors such as international institutions and NGOs, which may have militated in favour of a national gender mechanism. Finally, the validity and the reliability of the used data impact the research findings. As Spanish is not the author's mother language and the research was done from outside South America, it reduced the access to relevant information. Therefore, it would be interesting to confront the results found in this research to opinions and perceptions of local or international experts on the matter, which would strongly enrich the present analysis.

In terms of perspectives, it would be interesting to extend the study to other South American countries. For instance, Ecuador (parity quota and high women representation), Paraguay (small threshold and low women representation) and Venezuela (Quota dropped in 2000 and low women representation) present intriguing features. South American features could also be confronted to other continents' ones to provide a more general understanding of the factors that affect the adoption and enforcement of effective Gender Quota Laws. Furthermore, this thesis focused on the impact of gender quota in terms of the quantitative increase of the women political representation. It would be interesting to go beyond the numbers, and analyse the real influence that women have achieved in national Parliaments.

Finally, the results of the recent election in Chile may provide interesting features to confirm or falsify the findings of this research. Yet, the current electoral features of South America may mitigate those results. After a wave of left-wing parties domination and female Presidents, it is now experiencing a rise of the conservative wing. Indeed, Mauricio Macri has replaced Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner in Argentina in 2015, Dilma Rousseff faced an impeachment and was replaced by Michel Temer in 2016 in Brazil, while Sebastián Piñera was recently elected in Chile for 2018 to replace Bachelet, leaving the continent without any female President¹⁹⁵.

¹⁹⁵G1, *Com a saída de Michelle Bachelet no Chile, América Latina fica sem nenhuma presidente mulher*, 2017.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Economic and gender equality performance of South American Countries

Table 4.2 – Nominal Gross National Product (GNP), GNP *per capita*, the GNP growth and the world ranking of the South American countries in 2014. Data from Statistic Times, <http://statisticstimes.com/>

Countries	Nominal GNP in millions \$ [World ranking]	GNP <i>per capita</i> in \$ [World ranking]	GNP Growth [World ranking]
Brazil	2 346 118 [7]	11 604.5 [61]	0.103 [169]
Argentina	540 197 [24]	12 873.2 [59]	0.454 [165]
Venezuela	509 964 [26]	6 756.6 [84]	-3.894 [188]
Colombia	377 740 [31]	8 075.6 [75]	4.386 [61]
Chile	258 062 [42]	14 477.1 [52]	1.832 [140]
Peru	202 903 [52]	6 458.3 [88]	2.385 [120]
Ecuador	100 543 [63]	6 286.4 [89]	3.675 [80]
Uruguay	57 471 [77]	16 198.5 [47]	3.498 [88]
Bolivia	34 176 [96]	3 061 [127]	5.461 [40]
Paraguay	30 985 [101]	4 304.6 [108]	4.722 [52]
Suriname	5 299 [152]	9 583.5 [71]	1.838 [139]
Guyana	3 228 [163]	3 747.9 [112]	3.841 [78]

Table 4.3 – Gender Inequality Index (GII) and world ranking, Gender Development Index (GDI), and gender disparities in Parliament, secondary education and labour force of South American countries in 2015. Data from United Development Programme, <http://hdr.undp.org/>

Countries	GII	World ranking	GDI	Women in Parliaments	Secondary education		labour force	
					Women	Men	Women	Men
Uruguay	0.284	55	1.017	19.2%	55.0%	51.6%	55.4%	76.3 %
Chile	0.322	65	0.966	15.8%	76.1%	76.9%	50.7%	74.6%
Argentina	0.362	77	0.982	37.1%	63.5%	61.4%	48.4%	74.5%
Peru	0.385	86	0.959	22.3%	56.2%	67.0%	65.7%	82.6%
Ecuador	0.391	88	0.976	41.6%	48.2%	49.4%	49.0%	78.5%
Colombia	0.393	89	1.004	20.9%	50.3%	59.6%	57.9%	79.7 %
Brazil	0.414	92	1.005	10.8%	59.1%	55.2%	56.3%	79.8%
Bolivia	0.446	98	0.934	51.8%	49.6%	58.7%	63.9%	82.5%
Suriname	0.448	99	0.972	25.5%	57.7%	56.8%	40.5%	68.6%
Venezuela	0.461	101	1.028	17.0%	72.6%	65.0%	51.4%	78.4%
Paraguay	0.464	104	0.966	16.8%	46.2%	47.0%	58.1%	84.6%
Guyana	0.508	117	0.943	30.4%	68.1%	53.2%	41.8%	77.2%

Appendix B: Bolivian new Constitution

Several articles of the Bolivian Constitution of the State - 2009¹⁹⁶:

Article 1:

Bolivia is constituted as a Unitary Social State of Pluri-National Communitarian Law that is free, independent, sovereign, democratic, inter-cultural, decentralized and with autonomies. Bolivia is founded on plurality and on political, economic, juridical, cultural and linguistic pluralism in the integration process of the country.

Article 8:

II. The State is based on the values of unity, equality, inclusion, dignity, liberty, solidarity, reciprocity, respect, interdependence, harmony, transparency, equilibrium, equality of opportunity, social and gender equality in participation, common welfare, responsibility, social justice, distribution and redistribution of the social wealth and assets for well being.

Article 15:

Everyone, in particular women, have the right not to suffer physical, sexual or psychological violence, in the family as well as in the society.

¹⁹⁶https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf

Article 11:

The Republic of Bolivia adopts a participatory democratic, representative and communal form of government, with equal conditions for men and women.

Article 26:

All citizens have the right to participate freely in the formation, exercise and control of political power, directly or through their representatives, individually or collectively. Participation shall be equitable and under equal conditions for men and women.

Article 48:

The State shall promote the incorporation of women into the workforce and shall guarantee them the same remuneration as men for work of equal value, both in the public and private arena.

Article 278:

I. The Departmental Assembly shall be composed of members elected by universal, direct, free, secret and obligatory vote; and by members elected by the nations and rural native indigenous peoples, in accordance with their own norms and procedures.

II. The law shall determine the general criteria for the election of members of the departmental assemblies, taking into account population, territorial, cultural identity and linguistic representation when there are rural native indigenous minorities, and parity and alternation of gender. The Statutes of Autonomy shall define its application in accordance with the specific reality and conditions of its jurisdiction.

Appendix C: Supplementary figures to illustrate the research




Figure 4.6 – Female Presidents of Latin America until 2017. Figure from G1, *Com a saída de Michelle Bachelet no Chile, América Latina fica sem nenhuma presidente mulher*, <https://g1.globo.com/>




Figure 4.7 – Evolution of the women representation in Lower House (in blue), Upper House (in red) and in the Cabinet (in green) in Bolivia. Data from the The World Bank, *Proportion of seats held by women in National Parliaments (%)* <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS>, and Coordinadora de la mujer, *Boletín informativo: 11 de octubre: situación de las mujeres en Bolivia 2017*, 2017

Table 4.4 – Abortion laws in South America in 2013. Inspired from The Guardian, *Abortion rights around the world – interactive*, 2014.

Reasons	Save life	Physical health	Mental health	Rape or incest	Foetal impairment	Economical or social reasons	Request
Argentina							
Bolivia							
Brazil							
Chile							
Colombia							
Ecuador							
Guyana							
Paraguay							
Peru							
Suriname							
Uruguay							
Venezuela							

Appendix D: Comparison of the perceived extent of gender equality in Bolivia and Chile




Figure 4.8 – Temporal evolution of the public opinion concerning the extent of gender equality in Bolivia. Data from Latino Barómetro, <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>




Figure 4.9 – Female and male opinion concerning the extent of gender equality in Bolivia in 2015. Data from Latino Barómetro, <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>




Figure 4.10 – Temporal evolution of the public opinion concerning the extent of gender equality in Chile. Data from Latino Barómetro, <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>




Figure 4.11 – Female and male opinion concerning the extent of gender equality in Chile in 2015. Data from Latino Barómetro, <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>

Cette recherche a pour objectif d'analyser une réponse institutionnelle adoptée pour faire face à la sous-représentation des femmes en politique, la loi de quota de genre sur les listes de candidats. L'Amérique du Sud a joué un rôle pionnier, étant le premier continent où une telle mesure a été adoptée, et présente depuis la plus grande augmentation de la représentation féminine moyenne dans ses Parlements nationaux. Cependant, malgré des contextes très similaires, les pays d'Amérique du Sud exhibent des résultats contrastés. Ce travail a pour objectif de décrire les facteurs qui influent sur l'adoption et l'application de lois de quota de genre, en appliquant une méthode d'analyse comparative entre deux cas contrastés, la Bolivie et le Chili. La Bolivie a adopté une loi garantissant la parité et l'alternance de genre dans toutes les listes électorales pour toutes les élections nationales, menant à la première Chambre basse sud-américaine dont plus de la moitié de ses membres sont des femmes. À l'inverse, une telle loi a été bloquée jusqu'en 2015 au Chili, où la proportion de sièges de la Chambre basse occupés par des femmes n'a jamais dépassé le cinquième du nombre total.

Mots-clés: Quotas de genre; Egalité de genre; Amérique du Sud ; Etudes comparatives; Genre et politique.